I think a few of things in this thread need to be cleared up, so i'll answer a few of the points made.
In my opinion based on my limited knowledge of WW2, I would say that Stalingrad was the turning point of the war, but the German Army could still have turned things around. But after Kursk, they lost all chance at turning back the Soviet Steamroller and were doomed.
The question here is how? It's easy to make an assumption that they could turn things around, but even at the apex of their military might the Germans couldn't defeat the Soviet Union? What makes you think after the failure to meet their goals in 1941 and then the destruction of an entire army from a war effort already desperately short of manpower that they could have turned things around post-Stalingrad? Personally I feel the end of a chance of German victory occurred following their inability to destroy the RAF (thus unable to invade Britain thus unable to cause them to submit which leaves one of their main enemies unconquerable), but i'm just questioning what made you state that Kursk was the final turning point.
Kursk didn't break the back of the German Army. It recovered it's strength quickly (lots of mythical perceptions about their entire armoured forces getting annhilated, etc). I'd almost argue that neither Stalingrad nor Kursk were the reasons the Germans lost. therussian is probaby closest with his post - Moscow. Personally, I think the campaign was lost earlier than that - maybe in August of '41 - everything after that was just another nail in the coffin.
Precisely. If you check
here it states the following for German tank strength:
06/1941 - 5,639
03/1942 - 5,087
05/1942 - 5,847
11/1942 - 7,798
03/1943 - 5,625
08/1943 - 7,703 (post-Kursk, I don't see the German tank strength having been particularly diminished from March 1943's sum)
06/1944 - 9,148
09/1944 - 10,563
10/1944 - 11,005
11/1944 - 12,236
12/1944 - 13,175
01/1945 - 13,362
(figures exclude APCs and armoured cars)
Bearing in mind it took a few years for the Germans to gear in to their war-time economy (during the early years they were still producing domestic goods to give an aura of normality to the populace!), it's unsurprising their figures went up later on. The only credibility the "Kursk destroying the German armour" theory has is that Zitadelle would have resulted in the loss of a lot of seasoned troops, the tank crews being hit badly too; in the final stages of the war the Germans (having resorted to cheaper materials, alternative materials and speedier construction methods) definitely had more tanks than they could even provide fuel or crews for - the same applied for aircraft with many ME-262s being grounded due to a lack of fuel.
The day the operation started - it was waay delayed, and the original plan was that Moscow, Leningrad and Ukraine would be done for by winter, thus pretty much breaking the soviets.
2 months earlier and the war would either end much more quickly, or drag on for several more years.
The Germans needed the
rasputiza to clear up first. It's a definite fact that the roads in Eastern Europe at the time were near-impossible for German tanks to traverse while it was wet and muddy. By October when it began the German advance had slowed to a crawl, and if the same occurred for the launching of Barbarossa (by not waiting for the weather to clear) the Soviets wouldn't have been as heavily mauled as they were since they would have had more time to prepare against a slow German advance. It's an interesting point to note that none of the main German eastern offensives took place before June. Barbarossa occurred on June 22, Operation Blue on June 28, and Operation Citadel on July 5 (originally planned for the second week of June however).
Kursk WAS NOT UNWINNABLE. The germans were already more than half-way through by the time they received the order to halt and withdraw.
Not really. Fourth Panzer Army had reached Oboyan (half way to Kursk) though Ninth Army had been bogged down quite quickly. The whole point of the operation was for the two pincers to link up and they weren't even close.
522 men;
3-6 tanks destroyed;
41 - 89 tanks damaged.
The Germans lost 6 tanks in the greatest tank battle in history? Riiiiiiiiight.
Soviet:
~5500 men;
207 - 334 tanks destroyed;
420 tanks damaged.
So you're saying the Soviets lost the strength of perhaps half a rifle division when they had perhaps
ten armies in the Kursk salient. Hmmm.
Do you really think Kursk was unwinnable?
Yes, it was. Now if you actually knew what on earth you were talking about the hostile attitude would be more understandable, but when you have to be mauled in debates repeatedly (which I have done to you in the past too) you have no reason to be aggressive to anyone when you're constantly proved wrong.
What stopped them was that they didn't disable the russians quick enough, so they could prepare. End of discussion.
Woah, okay Mr. armchair mastermind.
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While Stalingrad and Kursk did cripple German morale and manpower, they didn't cripple the number of German tanks available as their production figures simply went up to make up for these losses. The problem was lack of personnel to operate these vehicles and the reduced quality of their construction following the Allied blockade which resulted in the Germans having to use alternatives which for the mechanically unreliable German tanks meant they would be even more prone to breakdown. Personally i'm of the thought that the impossibility of defeating Britain and the United States made the war unwinnable (especially the US, I have no idea how they're meant to win World War 2 without being able to defeat the US) rather than specific battles but that's just me.