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The cavalry battle
The clash of steel
The chopping down of the infantry was a bloody kind of work which usually came, if it
arrived at all, towards the end of an action. Cavalrymen were trained and equipped in the
first place to do battle with their fellows.
The basic unit of cavalry combat was relatively small, namely the squadron of
between 130 and 160 officers and men (see p. 121). The combat formation was in two or
three ranks. The Austrian regulations stipulated that
was of much greater relative importance than the first rank in the infantry. The rearward
ranks acted as a reserve—supporting the first rank as necessary, or veering out on the
flanks. They also compelled the first rank to keep straight on for the sake of physical
survival, for if any horse checked the animal and its rider would be trampled under the
hooves of the horses coming up behind. The files rode as close together as was possible,
and in the Prussian service even the intervals between the squadrons were omitted, which
produced walls of cavalry several hundred paces long.
By the middle of the eighteenth century a consensus was being reached on one of the
most enduring debates about cavalry action, namely whether cold steel should be
preferred to the use of firearms. The majority now favoured an unchecked charge of
cavalry relying on shock and the sword. A force of cavalry which halted to fire with its
pistols or carbines would be blinded by smoke and deafened by its own discharges, and it
forfeited all the advantages of getting in its blow first:
was when the men were doing dismounted service as sentries or foragers. Carbines and
pistols proved to be useful or even essential against the wilder types of light cavalry,
which would have evaded an organised charge but were easily deterred by fire
(Cogniazzo, 1779, 78). Frederick was amused to see how a Prussian musician saved his
own life simply by pointing his woodwind at a Cossack who was bent on his destruction.
Firearms were also admitted to be of service in the pursuit, when the quarry could not
be reached with the sword. During the battle of Zorndorf (1758) an impudent Cossack
emerged from a wood and skewered a Prussian Garde du Corps from behind with his
lance.
fully extended and the weapon tilted over to the right, so that the priming charge covered
the touch hole.
This kind of work was a diversion from the real business of cavalry, which was
delivering shocks in the open field. We must once again address ourselves to the problem
of reconciling the image of combat in which everything appears orderly, clean and
decisive, with what happened in reality, which is much more difficult to establish.
One of the accepted wisdoms about cavalry attacks was stated by Turpin de Crissé:
‘We may suppose, indeed it has been demonstrated, that in a contest between two equal
forces, the one which strikes first must drive the other back’ (1754, I, 188). In the course
of the century there was a movement of opinion in favour of beginning the advance at a
considerable distance from the enemy, and building up by successive increases in speed
to an all-out gallop. The cavalry started at a purposeful walk. The break into the trot
accelerated the laden cavalry horse to very approximately 10 miles per hour and the
gallop to about 25. The gallop was supposed to be kept up for about 180 paces, after
which the horses were given their heads for the last few strides before the line crashed
into the enemy.
Possibly only the Prussian cavalry at its best was capable of attcking in good order at
anything like the prescribed velocity. Minden (1759) Lord George Sackville led his
cavalry onto the field at a slow trot, halting every now and then to adjust the dressing of
his eighteen squadrons on their frontage of 1,950 paces. He explained that he had
fourrageurs (glorified by the Marquis d’Argenson, Richelieu, 1918, 103; castigated by
Guibert [1772], 1804, I, 158).
What happened next is generally described as ‘shock’. Horses were heavy and
relatively fast-moving objects, and something loosely approximating to shock accounts
for episodes like the over-throw of the Saxon cavalry at Hohenfriedeberg (1745), and of
the Austrian cavalry at Soor (1745) and Prague (1757). However it was noticed that the
horses did not actually collide chest-to-chest like inanimate masses which were thrown
together. Usually the rival squadrons clashed only briefly, or failed to engage at all, for
one or the other force would sink into confusion and turn tail:
World Wars, for the orientation of individuals was rapidly lost, friend and foe appeared
and disappeared in an entirely arbitrary fashion, and the cavalrymen were in perpetual
danger of being assailed from behind (Lojewsky, 1843, I, 181).
During all of this the cavalrymen had to contend with their own horses. These were
irrational creatures which might take fright at a scrap of paper floating in the air, while
ignoring a block or marble falling on their heads, ‘from which we may guess how
terrified they must be by the polished and shining metal of the weapons, the different
kinds of explosions, the fire and smoke, the warlike yells, and the smells given out by
wounds, spilled blood and corpses’ (Mottin de la Balme, 1776, 104–5). In combat the
rider could spare only one hand to manage his mount, and even this measure of control
was lost when the reins were cut, as very frequently happened (see p. 119). Many a hero
was borne away from the combat willy nilly, and it was all too easy for somebody who
was less than a hero to absent himself from the scene as well:
swordmanship the prominence it was going to acquire in the nineteenth century. Most
authorities were content to recommend that the sword should be held with the blade
forming a straight line with the arm, the hilt covering one’s face, and the point projecting
straight ahead. This posture was the one best suited for delivering a blow with the point
of the sword, which was universally admitted to be the most lethal stroke of all: ‘a single
thrust into the body with the point will kill a man, which frequently cannot be achieved
with twenty cuts with the edge’ (Grandmaison, 1756, 21).
The Hungarian hussar captain Jeney was virtually alone in advancing the virtues of the
cutting edge over the point, and he maintained that dragoons should abandon their
straight swords in favour of curved sabres like those of the hussars:
Grandmaison was forced to concede (Grandmaison, 1756, 21).
The most detailed accounts of eighteenth-century mounted action come from the
Prussian hussar Lojewsky, whose bloodthirsty memoirs are full of stories of mighty
blows delivered with the edge of the sabre. At Grottkau in 1741
work. The Prince of Sachsen-Hildburghausen was surrounded by enemy troopers at
Rossbach (1757), but he was merely belaboured with the flat of the swords and he was
able to make good his escape. On the night after the battle an apothecary found that his
back required only to be bathed with distilled water (Kalkreuth, 1840, III, 202).
It is significant that the great majority of wounds sustained in cavalry combat were
painful but not particularly dangerous cuts to the sword arm. ‘Prague was one battle
where a genuine cavalry shock took place. Afterwards I showed my officers 150 Prussian
and Austrian cavalrymen who were lodged in a barn; nearly all of them had been
wounded in the right arm between the hand and elbow’ (Warnery, 1785–91, IV, 83. See
also Corvisier, 1964, 681).
The collapse of one side or other during the combat appears to have proceeded less
from the losses sustained than from an infectious panic, and it was noted that the second
rank was much more likely to give way than the first, which was fully engaged in
swapping blows with the enemy (Puységur, 1749, I, 246; Turpin de Crissé, 1754, I, 179;
Saint-Germain, 1779, 205). The defeated cavalrymen now drew on the remaining
strength of their horses in order to make good their escape, which they usually
accomplished without difficulty, since their victors were by now in disorder and (unless
they were Prussians) they were seldom in condition to mount an immediate pursuit. An
artilleryman commented bitterly:
Special forms of cavalry action
The heavy cavalry had to keep a watchful eye on the movements of the enemy hussars
and the other kinds of light horse. Turpin de Crissé, Grandmaison and Warnery all
emphasised how dangerous those folk could be, for they were quick to exploit any sign of
disorder in a running fight.
Another special action was against infantry fire. The
details are illustrated by the experience of the French Gendarmerie and Carabiniers at
Minden in 1759.
further ordeal: ‘It is no way to inspire courage among your cavalrymen to force them to
stand cold-bloodedly under prolonged cannonades, and see their relations, comrades and
friends carried away by the shot’ (Santa Cruz, 1735–40, VI, 35). Howitzer fire was
particularly dreaded, for the shells searched out the cavalry in dead ground, and when
they exploded in a tightly-packed regiment they were capable of killing eight or ten
horses at a time and of terrifying many more. Few things in the annals of eighteenthcentury
combat are more impressive than the ability of disciplined cavalry to stand or
manoeuvre under such an ordeal. The performance of the English Horse Guards at
Dettingen (1743) was as striking in its way as that of the Prussian cavalry at Soor (1745)
or of the Austrians at Lobositz (1756).
caught up in the general onrush of the attack, and be unable to exercise any control. The
usual position of most of the officers was in the first rank, or just in front of it, where they
merely served to get in the way of the troopers in the mêlée. The Austrian field service
regulations of 1749 laid down a much better scheme, whereby the senior captain (as
squadron commander) nosed a little in front of the first rank, but a lieutenant was
stationed in front of the squadron, and the rest of the officers were arranged across the
rear.
The general of horse inevitably put his own life at risk when he led a wing of cavalry
into battle (see p. 238), but he was not expected to take a personal part in the fighting.
The Prussian general Zieten wore the ordinary sabre of the hussars, but he drew it only
once in the course of the Seven Years War, and that was during a reconnaisance on 2
November 1760, the day before the battle of Torgau, when he was surrounded by the
Austrians: ‘He cut his way out in regulation style, and calmly replaced the bloody blade
in its sheath. He never spoke of this affair, but even now you can clearly distinguish the
bloodstain as a reddish-brown rust on the blade’ (Fontane, 1906–7, I, 8).
click to enlage
The cavalry battle
The clash of steel
The chopping down of the infantry was a bloody kind of work which usually came, if it
arrived at all, towards the end of an action. Cavalrymen were trained and equipped in the
first place to do battle with their fellows.
The basic unit of cavalry combat was relatively small, namely the squadron of
between 130 and 160 officers and men (see p. 121). The combat formation was in two or
three ranks. The Austrian regulations stipulated that
when it is drawn up in line of battle, every squadron must have a first rank
of thoroughly good and reliable men who are mounted on sound horses.
The less good men and the recruits go to the second rank. The third rank,
however, must have the most senior and steady men of all. (Feld-Dienst
Regulament. Vienna, 1749, unpaginated)
All the authorities agreed that the first rank of horse bore the brunt of combat, and that itof thoroughly good and reliable men who are mounted on sound horses.
The less good men and the recruits go to the second rank. The third rank,
however, must have the most senior and steady men of all. (Feld-Dienst
Regulament. Vienna, 1749, unpaginated)
was of much greater relative importance than the first rank in the infantry. The rearward
ranks acted as a reserve—supporting the first rank as necessary, or veering out on the
flanks. They also compelled the first rank to keep straight on for the sake of physical
survival, for if any horse checked the animal and its rider would be trampled under the
hooves of the horses coming up behind. The files rode as close together as was possible,
and in the Prussian service even the intervals between the squadrons were omitted, which
produced walls of cavalry several hundred paces long.
By the middle of the eighteenth century a consensus was being reached on one of the
most enduring debates about cavalry action, namely whether cold steel should be
preferred to the use of firearms. The majority now favoured an unchecked charge of
cavalry relying on shock and the sword. A force of cavalry which halted to fire with its
pistols or carbines would be blinded by smoke and deafened by its own discharges, and it
forfeited all the advantages of getting in its blow first:
At a range of more than fifty paces a pistol shot and a well-thrown stone
have just about the same effect. In a mêlée a discharged pistol is useless
for parrying, and the only thing you can do is cast it away, for if you
replace it in its holster and draw your sword you will receive a cut over
your ear for your pains…. When a first rank opens fire with its forty
carbines, there is frequently not a single hit. Can we be surprised? Not
only is a carbine too heavy to be fired single-handed, but the troopers
usually fire at long range when the horses are galloping and the men are
shaken about, and the target itself is moving so fast that it is quite
impossible to take proper aim. (Berenhorst, 1798–9, II, 434–5;
d’Authville, 1756, 309)
The use of firearms by cavalry was normally relegated to specific situations. One of thesehave just about the same effect. In a mêlée a discharged pistol is useless
for parrying, and the only thing you can do is cast it away, for if you
replace it in its holster and draw your sword you will receive a cut over
your ear for your pains…. When a first rank opens fire with its forty
carbines, there is frequently not a single hit. Can we be surprised? Not
only is a carbine too heavy to be fired single-handed, but the troopers
usually fire at long range when the horses are galloping and the men are
shaken about, and the target itself is moving so fast that it is quite
impossible to take proper aim. (Berenhorst, 1798–9, II, 434–5;
d’Authville, 1756, 309)
was when the men were doing dismounted service as sentries or foragers. Carbines and
pistols proved to be useful or even essential against the wilder types of light cavalry,
which would have evaded an organised charge but were easily deterred by fire
(Cogniazzo, 1779, 78). Frederick was amused to see how a Prussian musician saved his
own life simply by pointing his woodwind at a Cossack who was bent on his destruction.
Firearms were also admitted to be of service in the pursuit, when the quarry could not
be reached with the sword. During the battle of Zorndorf (1758) an impudent Cossack
emerged from a wood and skewered a Prussian Garde du Corps from behind with his
lance.
‘Your Majesty’, said an officer from the suite of General Seydlitz, who
was standing right next to the king, ‘with your permission I shall catch the
Cossack.’
‘Go ahead, then.’
The officer darted away and succeeded in taking the Cossack
unawares. The man saw no alternative but to seek safety in flight, and he
came closer and closer to the king. The officer took aim with his pistol
and shot him between the shoulder blades, and he fell instantly from his
horse. (Anon., 1787–9, XI, 50–1)
We must imagine the officer holding his pistol in the conventional style, with his armwas standing right next to the king, ‘with your permission I shall catch the
Cossack.’
‘Go ahead, then.’
The officer darted away and succeeded in taking the Cossack
unawares. The man saw no alternative but to seek safety in flight, and he
came closer and closer to the king. The officer took aim with his pistol
and shot him between the shoulder blades, and he fell instantly from his
horse. (Anon., 1787–9, XI, 50–1)
fully extended and the weapon tilted over to the right, so that the priming charge covered
the touch hole.
This kind of work was a diversion from the real business of cavalry, which was
delivering shocks in the open field. We must once again address ourselves to the problem
of reconciling the image of combat in which everything appears orderly, clean and
decisive, with what happened in reality, which is much more difficult to establish.
One of the accepted wisdoms about cavalry attacks was stated by Turpin de Crissé:
‘We may suppose, indeed it has been demonstrated, that in a contest between two equal
forces, the one which strikes first must drive the other back’ (1754, I, 188). In the course
of the century there was a movement of opinion in favour of beginning the advance at a
considerable distance from the enemy, and building up by successive increases in speed
to an all-out gallop. The cavalry started at a purposeful walk. The break into the trot
accelerated the laden cavalry horse to very approximately 10 miles per hour and the
gallop to about 25. The gallop was supposed to be kept up for about 180 paces, after
which the horses were given their heads for the last few strides before the line crashed
into the enemy.
Possibly only the Prussian cavalry at its best was capable of attcking in good order at
anything like the prescribed velocity. Minden (1759) Lord George Sackville led his
cavalry onto the field at a slow trot, halting every now and then to adjust the dressing of
his eighteen squadrons on their frontage of 1,950 paces. He explained that he had
ever found the greatest difficulty in preserving intervals, or even the
appearance of a line, without a considerable attention to their motions, and
stopping the first appearance of irregularity. To attack with vigour and
velocity, you must advance without hurry or confusion. (Mackesy, 1979,
198)
An attack at speed was only too liable to collapse into what the French called a charge enappearance of a line, without a considerable attention to their motions, and
stopping the first appearance of irregularity. To attack with vigour and
velocity, you must advance without hurry or confusion. (Mackesy, 1979,
198)
fourrageurs (glorified by the Marquis d’Argenson, Richelieu, 1918, 103; castigated by
Guibert [1772], 1804, I, 158).
What happened next is generally described as ‘shock’. Horses were heavy and
relatively fast-moving objects, and something loosely approximating to shock accounts
for episodes like the over-throw of the Saxon cavalry at Hohenfriedeberg (1745), and of
the Austrian cavalry at Soor (1745) and Prague (1757). However it was noticed that the
horses did not actually collide chest-to-chest like inanimate masses which were thrown
together. Usually the rival squadrons clashed only briefly, or failed to engage at all, for
one or the other force would sink into confusion and turn tail:
When, however, the two squadrons are made up of men and mounts
which are equally experienced in war and equally well trained, the charge
proceeds as follows—the ranks run at each other, the horses seek the
intervals of their own accord, the riders engage in hand-to-hand combat,
and the forces are so completely intermingled that the two squadrons cross
and emerge in the other’s rear. In this mêlée the issue is decided by the
most agile of the horses and the most skilful of the troopers. (Guibert
[1772], 1804, I, 164. See also Tempelhoff, 1783–1801, I, 68; Mirabeau
and Mauvillon, 1788, 104; Ligne, 1795–1811, I, 23–5; Vorontsov (1802),
1876, X, 481)
The experience of the mêlée had much in common with that of aerial combat in the twowhich are equally experienced in war and equally well trained, the charge
proceeds as follows—the ranks run at each other, the horses seek the
intervals of their own accord, the riders engage in hand-to-hand combat,
and the forces are so completely intermingled that the two squadrons cross
and emerge in the other’s rear. In this mêlée the issue is decided by the
most agile of the horses and the most skilful of the troopers. (Guibert
[1772], 1804, I, 164. See also Tempelhoff, 1783–1801, I, 68; Mirabeau
and Mauvillon, 1788, 104; Ligne, 1795–1811, I, 23–5; Vorontsov (1802),
1876, X, 481)
World Wars, for the orientation of individuals was rapidly lost, friend and foe appeared
and disappeared in an entirely arbitrary fashion, and the cavalrymen were in perpetual
danger of being assailed from behind (Lojewsky, 1843, I, 181).
During all of this the cavalrymen had to contend with their own horses. These were
irrational creatures which might take fright at a scrap of paper floating in the air, while
ignoring a block or marble falling on their heads, ‘from which we may guess how
terrified they must be by the polished and shining metal of the weapons, the different
kinds of explosions, the fire and smoke, the warlike yells, and the smells given out by
wounds, spilled blood and corpses’ (Mottin de la Balme, 1776, 104–5). In combat the
rider could spare only one hand to manage his mount, and even this measure of control
was lost when the reins were cut, as very frequently happened (see p. 119). Many a hero
was borne away from the combat willy nilly, and it was all too easy for somebody who
was less than a hero to absent himself from the scene as well:
Cavalry are everywhere treated better than the infantry, and rightly so, for
the trooper of necessity follows different principles of conduct from those
of the foot soldier. The performance of the cavalryman in combat depends
almost entirely on his good will, for it is difficult to compel him to do his
duty. When he does not wish to do that duty, his horse will offer him
endless excuses to avoid it. The officer cannot keep him constantly in his
view, and moreover the officer himself sometimes has his hands full with
individual combat. (Warnery, 1785–91, II, 90–1)
Seydlitz was one of the very few cavalry leaders in the Age of Reason who gavethe trooper of necessity follows different principles of conduct from those
of the foot soldier. The performance of the cavalryman in combat depends
almost entirely on his good will, for it is difficult to compel him to do his
duty. When he does not wish to do that duty, his horse will offer him
endless excuses to avoid it. The officer cannot keep him constantly in his
view, and moreover the officer himself sometimes has his hands full with
individual combat. (Warnery, 1785–91, II, 90–1)
swordmanship the prominence it was going to acquire in the nineteenth century. Most
authorities were content to recommend that the sword should be held with the blade
forming a straight line with the arm, the hilt covering one’s face, and the point projecting
straight ahead. This posture was the one best suited for delivering a blow with the point
of the sword, which was universally admitted to be the most lethal stroke of all: ‘a single
thrust into the body with the point will kill a man, which frequently cannot be achieved
with twenty cuts with the edge’ (Grandmaison, 1756, 21).
The Hungarian hussar captain Jeney was virtually alone in advancing the virtues of the
cutting edge over the point, and he maintained that dragoons should abandon their
straight swords in favour of curved sabres like those of the hussars:
I know that straight swords deal a more deadly blow, but they are not
nearly as effective in combat. If you need convincing, I will explain the
mechanism of the two kinds of weapon. When he is at a full gallop and a
cavalryman attacks his enemy with the point, he will inevitably pierce
him. But then he must stop his horse and break off his part in the action,
so as to pull the sword out. During an equivalent amount of time a
dragoon with a curved sabre will have wounded three or four enemy,
without having to stop his horse or stop fighting. The enemy will not be
mortally wounded, but at least they will be disabled, which is what we
ought to look for in battle. (Jeney, 1759, 17)
The use of the edge also accorded with the instinctive reactions of the horseman, asnearly as effective in combat. If you need convincing, I will explain the
mechanism of the two kinds of weapon. When he is at a full gallop and a
cavalryman attacks his enemy with the point, he will inevitably pierce
him. But then he must stop his horse and break off his part in the action,
so as to pull the sword out. During an equivalent amount of time a
dragoon with a curved sabre will have wounded three or four enemy,
without having to stop his horse or stop fighting. The enemy will not be
mortally wounded, but at least they will be disabled, which is what we
ought to look for in battle. (Jeney, 1759, 17)
Grandmaison was forced to concede (Grandmaison, 1756, 21).
The most detailed accounts of eighteenth-century mounted action come from the
Prussian hussar Lojewsky, whose bloodthirsty memoirs are full of stories of mighty
blows delivered with the edge of the sabre. At Grottkau in 1741
my first blow hit the enemy officer and severed his arm. The hand and
sword landed almost beside me, and the crippled man fell from his
horse…. I made another powerful cut at the next enemy to present
himself, and he fell with his skull split open. I shouted a warning to
Captain Kladowsky. I dealt a third full-blooded blow, but I struck the
carbine of an enemy hussar and the blade shattered. At that very instant an
enemy split Kladowsky’s face, and he sank from the saddle to the ground.
(Lojewsky, 1843, I, 67)
The straight swords of the Prussian heavy cavalrymen were less suited for this kind ofsword landed almost beside me, and the crippled man fell from his
horse…. I made another powerful cut at the next enemy to present
himself, and he fell with his skull split open. I shouted a warning to
Captain Kladowsky. I dealt a third full-blooded blow, but I struck the
carbine of an enemy hussar and the blade shattered. At that very instant an
enemy split Kladowsky’s face, and he sank from the saddle to the ground.
(Lojewsky, 1843, I, 67)
work. The Prince of Sachsen-Hildburghausen was surrounded by enemy troopers at
Rossbach (1757), but he was merely belaboured with the flat of the swords and he was
able to make good his escape. On the night after the battle an apothecary found that his
back required only to be bathed with distilled water (Kalkreuth, 1840, III, 202).
It is significant that the great majority of wounds sustained in cavalry combat were
painful but not particularly dangerous cuts to the sword arm. ‘Prague was one battle
where a genuine cavalry shock took place. Afterwards I showed my officers 150 Prussian
and Austrian cavalrymen who were lodged in a barn; nearly all of them had been
wounded in the right arm between the hand and elbow’ (Warnery, 1785–91, IV, 83. See
also Corvisier, 1964, 681).
The collapse of one side or other during the combat appears to have proceeded less
from the losses sustained than from an infectious panic, and it was noted that the second
rank was much more likely to give way than the first, which was fully engaged in
swapping blows with the enemy (Puységur, 1749, I, 246; Turpin de Crissé, 1754, I, 179;
Saint-Germain, 1779, 205). The defeated cavalrymen now drew on the remaining
strength of their horses in order to make good their escape, which they usually
accomplished without difficulty, since their victors were by now in disorder and (unless
they were Prussians) they were seldom in condition to mount an immediate pursuit. An
artilleryman commented bitterly:
You must pardon me if I venture the opinion that the shock of cavalry is
not as decisive as it seems to be. In the campaign of 1762 I witnessed a
shock [at Reichenbach] which was delivered by the greater part of the
Prussian cavalry against a still larger force of Austrian cavalry. It resulted
in a few hundred wounded and prisoners on the two sides. Not a single
dead man lay on the field of battle (Tempelhoff, 1783–1801, I, 63).
not as decisive as it seems to be. In the campaign of 1762 I witnessed a
shock [at Reichenbach] which was delivered by the greater part of the
Prussian cavalry against a still larger force of Austrian cavalry. It resulted
in a few hundred wounded and prisoners on the two sides. Not a single
dead man lay on the field of battle (Tempelhoff, 1783–1801, I, 63).
Special forms of cavalry action
The heavy cavalry had to keep a watchful eye on the movements of the enemy hussars
and the other kinds of light horse. Turpin de Crissé, Grandmaison and Warnery all
emphasised how dangerous those folk could be, for they were quick to exploit any sign of
disorder in a running fight.
Another special action was against infantry fire. The
details are illustrated by the experience of the French Gendarmerie and Carabiniers at
Minden in 1759.
They set off at a considerable distance at the gallop, and in a continuous
line. To begin with the advance had the effect of squeezing the centre, and
then the wings felt the pressure, especially on the right. The fire of the
enemy infantry opened in the centre of their formation, and progressively
extended towards their wings, and when we were only about fifteen paces
away our horses tried to escape by throwing themselves to left and right.
The force exerted by this phenomenal pressure became enormous. The
men were no longer able to control their horses and the mass piled up so
deeply that only eight or ten men at the most remained in the saddle in
each squadron. These in turn were borne instantly away, and although
some of them passed through the enemy ranks they were too few to cause
any disorder. Only a few men were killed by the enemy fire, but many
suffered contusions or broken or dislocated limbs, and a number were
suffocated or trampled under the horses’ hooves after falling from the
saddle. (Mottin de la Balme, 1776, 105)
Old warriors like Santa Cruz and Frederick were much concerned to spare their cavalry aline. To begin with the advance had the effect of squeezing the centre, and
then the wings felt the pressure, especially on the right. The fire of the
enemy infantry opened in the centre of their formation, and progressively
extended towards their wings, and when we were only about fifteen paces
away our horses tried to escape by throwing themselves to left and right.
The force exerted by this phenomenal pressure became enormous. The
men were no longer able to control their horses and the mass piled up so
deeply that only eight or ten men at the most remained in the saddle in
each squadron. These in turn were borne instantly away, and although
some of them passed through the enemy ranks they were too few to cause
any disorder. Only a few men were killed by the enemy fire, but many
suffered contusions or broken or dislocated limbs, and a number were
suffocated or trampled under the horses’ hooves after falling from the
saddle. (Mottin de la Balme, 1776, 105)
further ordeal: ‘It is no way to inspire courage among your cavalrymen to force them to
stand cold-bloodedly under prolonged cannonades, and see their relations, comrades and
friends carried away by the shot’ (Santa Cruz, 1735–40, VI, 35). Howitzer fire was
particularly dreaded, for the shells searched out the cavalry in dead ground, and when
they exploded in a tightly-packed regiment they were capable of killing eight or ten
horses at a time and of terrifying many more. Few things in the annals of eighteenthcentury
combat are more impressive than the ability of disciplined cavalry to stand or
manoeuvre under such an ordeal. The performance of the English Horse Guards at
Dettingen (1743) was as striking in its way as that of the Prussian cavalry at Soor (1745)
or of the Austrians at Lobositz (1756).
The cavalry officer
The officer of horse was under a constant pressure to exercise his own discretion:I allow that the strength of an army consists chiefly in its infantry, but
cavalry service requires more judgement and presence of mind on the part
of the officer, and more speed, bearing and skill in manoeuvre and tactics
than in the work of the infantry, which fights in a slower and more
mechanical way, and whose success depends merely on its endurance and
cohesion. (Warnery, 1785–91, III, 119–20)
Unfortunately the nature of cavalry combat was such that the officer might find himselfcavalry service requires more judgement and presence of mind on the part
of the officer, and more speed, bearing and skill in manoeuvre and tactics
than in the work of the infantry, which fights in a slower and more
mechanical way, and whose success depends merely on its endurance and
cohesion. (Warnery, 1785–91, III, 119–20)
caught up in the general onrush of the attack, and be unable to exercise any control. The
usual position of most of the officers was in the first rank, or just in front of it, where they
merely served to get in the way of the troopers in the mêlée. The Austrian field service
regulations of 1749 laid down a much better scheme, whereby the senior captain (as
squadron commander) nosed a little in front of the first rank, but a lieutenant was
stationed in front of the squadron, and the rest of the officers were arranged across the
rear.
The general of horse inevitably put his own life at risk when he led a wing of cavalry
into battle (see p. 238), but he was not expected to take a personal part in the fighting.
The Prussian general Zieten wore the ordinary sabre of the hussars, but he drew it only
once in the course of the Seven Years War, and that was during a reconnaisance on 2
November 1760, the day before the battle of Torgau, when he was surrounded by the
Austrians: ‘He cut his way out in regulation style, and calmly replaced the bloody blade
in its sheath. He never spoke of this affair, but even now you can clearly distinguish the
bloodstain as a reddish-brown rust on the blade’ (Fontane, 1906–7, I, 8).
