Whoever is responsible for starting this war, it is becoming horrifically clear that everyone would benefit from ending it.
That a diplomatic agreement is possible is testified to by the fact that Russia and Ukraine seemed close to a deal at least three times. First in Belarus, then in talks mediated by then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennet, and, most promisingly, in Istanbul, where they actually initialed a tentative agreement. We, therefore, know that but for the opposition of the United States and key allies, the war could have ended on terms that would have preserved Ukrainian statehood and its current government and even allowed it to join the EU with Russia’s blessing, provided only that it gave up NATO membership. We can also confidently say that, despite all that has occurred since, Russia would be willing to return to the Istanbul agreements if Ukraine agreed to negotiate.
So, what is preventing a ceasefire? The two most obvious sticking points are Zelensky’s presidential decree of October 4, 2022, prohibiting any negotiations with Russian president Vladimir Putin, and the adamant opposition of the United States to any ceasefire “right now.”
Yet, the mere fact that a framework for an agreement has been reached before suggests that the most debilitating assumption about this war—that the parties’ differences are irreconcilable—is not true. In fact, it is the willingness to negotiate, not the terms of the agreement, that now stands in the way of peace.