Discussion and Debate Community Thread

[mishkin]

you keep exaggerating based on a perfectly normal comment

I had the idea south korea was a quite advanced society, really don't know why. but hey, the more you know, the more you want to retire to live on a desert island.

[Aexodus]

Is South Korea a primitive society? Considering a desert island is apparently, preferable.

[sumskilz]

you keep exaggerating based on a perfectly normal comment

Perhaps a rather normal comment for you, but I was alluding to more of a pattern than a single comment. The following being your recent comments referring to South Koreans:

I had the idea south korea was a quite advanced society, really don't know why.

Yes, such a foul misogyny is not typical of advanced societies

they mistreat and despise women

I do not know what the abuse or contempt of women can be based on if it is not for the education / culture in which you were born.

As per my last post, none of these refer to government polices, but rather to the people, culture, and society. It was observable in the thread in almost real time how quickly you went from knowing next to nothing about the issue to doubling then tripling down on unsupported hostile assertions.

[mishkin]

Is South Korea a primitive society? Considering a desert island is apparently, preferable.

What?

[Aexodus]

Are they not an advanced society?

[mishkin]

Are they not an advanced society?

Not as advanced as I thought, I say that exactly in the post you quoted. Who spoke here of "primitive societies"?

[Condottiere 40K]

Unless you mean conservative; I think it's an evolving society, partially due to ironically it's development of it's own take on pop culture, which will change expectations.

[Aexodus]

POTF round 41 is up for voting! Up this round are Dick Cheney., CommodusV, pacifism, sumskilz, Ludicus, and antaeus.

[mishkin]

POTF round 41 is up for voting! Up this round are Dick Cheney., CommodusV, pacifism, sumskilz, Ludicus, and antaeus.

That cool, but could you answer me?

Not as advanced as I thought, I say that exactly in the post you quoted. Who spoke here of "primitive societies"?

[Lord Thesaurian]

Although every new administration seeks to distinguish itself from its predecessor—and this incoming administration all the more so—President Joe Biden should not squander the leverage he has inherited. The reimposition and intensification of American sanctions has placed enormous pressure on the Iranian regime. After waiting out the old administration in the hope that 2021 would bring a new one, the regime is now trying to intimidate Biden into renewing the JCPOA. It is hardly coincidence that the regime waited two years before approaching 20 percent enrichment—which it could have done at any time—but is doing so only now, with the onset of the new administration. The regime responds to pressure and acts defiantly when it senses hesitation. Biden must not give in to this nuclear blackmail.

The JCPOA allowed Iran to both maintain its nuclear program and revitalize its economy. Biden must make clear to Tehran that it can have one or the other, but not both. Tragically, spokespeople for the new administration are proposing to return to the JCPOA and lift sanctions, and only afterward negotiate a longer, stronger deal. Such a course has no chance of success. Even a partial lifting of sanctions would forfeit any leverage that could compel the regime to negotiate a deal that genuinely removes the danger of a nuclear Iran. At best, the regime will agree to cosmetic changes—for example, extending the sunset clauses—but not to dismantling its nuclear infrastructure. A fatally flawed deal would remain essentially intact.

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/ar...n-deal/617755/

Agreed. Biden has previously said he will rejoin the deal if Iran honors its commitments, and Iran has responded “no you.” We’ll see who blinks first. Maybe the Ayatollah will finally die in the meantime and shift the calculus a bit. It will be a high profile example of many tests the Biden will face as US adversaries seek to bully the new administration for concessions against the backdrop of Biden’s pitch to end Trump’s one man show.

[pacifism]

If you lay aside any jingoist inclinations for a moment, you might consider how embarrassing it must be that the God-blessed American government dishonored it diplomatic commitments before the Ayatollah of all people did. Iran responding "no, you" isn't hot air, it's literally the reality of the situation of that deal, especially when the U.S.' withdrawal seriously hampered the efforts of the Iranian party that believed the U.S. could be negotiated with. That's just self-evidently bad optics on the U.S.' part.

[Lord Thesaurian]

If you lay aside any jingoist inclinations for a moment, you might consider how embarrassing it must be that the God-blessed American government dishonored it diplomatic commitments before the Ayatollah of all people did. Iran responding "no, you" isn't hot air, it's literally the reality of the situation of that deal, especially when the U.S.' withdrawal seriously hampered the efforts of the Iranian party that believed the U.S. could be negotiated with. That's just self-evidently bad optics on the U.S.' part.

There’s nothing jingoistic about acknowledging reality. Iran has had a nuclear program since the days of the Shah, and the fatal flaw of the JCPOA was revealed as soon as the US backed out. Complaining about optics implies there would be any different consequences if the roles were reversed and Iran had officially backed out first. As we’ve seen, Iran is perfectly capable of violating the terms of the agreement with relative impunity, even while still theoretically bound to it. What little teeth the JCPOA ever had against the ability of the regime to move closer to developing nukes - and that’s only considering before the sunset clauses expire - is almost an afterthought against the backdrop of Tehran’s support for terrorism and her regional ambitions, which are, if anything, strengthened by the deal’s oil sanctions relief, access to SWIFT, and elimination of bans on conventional arms sales to Iran.

Optics is all the deal accomplished, and those optics were a gift to the regime, regardless of whatever the US did or will do subsequently. It merely gave the regime what they’d been using the threat of nuclear development to extort from the international community in the first place: Integration into the global economy, diplomatic legitimacy, and protection from attempts to use sanctions to curtail the regime’s malign activities in the region - all this, again, for a promise that the regime won’t do what they were threatening to do to accomplish those things anyway. Whatever praise the agreement deserves for delaying Iranian nuclear development is peanuts compared to what Tehran got in exchange. The article highlights this fact:

Iran needs to acquire three components in order to become a military nuclear power: highly enriched uranium, a functional warhead, and a missile capable of delivering it. The JCPOA addresses only the first of these efforts in any detail, and even then, offers merely partial and temporary solutions. The deal largely ignores the second effort, and actually advances the third.

JCPOA allowed Iran to retain its massive nuclear infrastructure, unnecessary for a civilian energy program but essential for a military nuclear program. The agreement did not shut down a single nuclear facility or destroy a single centrifuge. The ease and speed with which Iran has resumed producing large amounts of more highly enriched uranium—doing so at a time of its own choosing—illustrates the danger of leaving the regime with these capabilities. In fact, the JCPOA blocks nothing.

The JCPOA, then, has not substantially blocked any of Iran’s efforts. The violations that Iran has committed since America’s withdrawal from the deal, and more intensively in recent months, will pale compared with the industrial-scale enrichment program the JCPOA ultimately permits. Combined with its weaponization-related work and its missile development, this will position Iran to become a global nuclear power.

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/ar...n-deal/617755/

[Love Mountain]

There’s nothing jingoistic about acknowledging reality. Iran has had a nuclear program since the days of the Shah, and the fatal flaw of the JCPOA was revealed as soon as the US backed out.

It appears that the fatal flaw in the JCPOA was not including punitive measures in the event United States backs out of the deal, which is exactly what happened.

Complaining about optics implies there would be any different consequences if the roles were reversed and Iran had officially backed out first. As we’ve seen, Iran is perfectly capable of violating the terms of the agreement with relative impunity, even while still theoretically bound to it. What little teeth the JCPOA ever had against the ability of the regime to move closer to developing nukes - and that’s only considering before the sunset clauses expire - is almost an afterthought against the backdrop of Tehran’s support for terrorism and her regional ambitions, which are, if anything, strengthened by the deal’s oil sanctions relief, access to SWIFT, and elimination of bans on conventional arms sales to Iran.

Speaking of reality, did Iran violate any terms of the agreement before United States decided to back out?

Optics is all the deal accomplished, and those optics were a gift to the regime, regardless of whatever the US did or will do subsequently. It merely gave the regime what they’d been using the threat of nuclear development to extort from the international community in the first place: Integration into the global economy, diplomatic legitimacy, and protection from attempts to use sanctions to curtail the regime’s malign activities in the region - all this, again, for a promise that the regime won’t do what they were threatening to do to accomplish those things anyway. Whatever praise the agreement deserves for delaying Iranian nuclear development is peanuts compared to what Tehran got in exchange. The article highlights this fact:

The JCPOA halted Iran's progress towards a nuclear weapon without exacerbating a direct military confrontation. By unilaterally imposing costs on Iran we only further incentivized their acquisition of a nuclear weapons and brought the region closer to war. In short, the only thing Trump's administration has done is the exact opposite of what it claims it wants to do.

[Lord Thesaurian]

It appears that the fatal flaw in the JCPOA was not including punitive measures in the event United States backs out of the deal, which is exactly what happened.

The point of the agreement was to delay Iran’s nuclear development, not punish the parties trying to effect that delay. The fatal flaw of the JCPOA was that it undermined US efforts to deter Tehran’s malign activities in the region and failed to prevent the regime from using the threat of nuclear development as a way to coerce concessions from the international community, deal or no deal, which is exactly what has happened.

Speaking of reality, did Iran violate any terms of the agreement before United States decided to back out?

Iran can and has since violated the agreement with relative impunity thus far, even while still a party to it. The regime’s actions illustrate how the deal fails to prevent the nuclear extortion it is designed to disincentivize, regardless of anything the US does or doesn’t do.

The JCPOA halted Iran's progress towards a nuclear weapon without exacerbating a direct military confrontation. By unilaterally imposing costs on Iran we only further incentivized their acquisition of a nuclear weapons and brought the region closer to war. In short, the only thing Trump's administration has done is the exact opposite of what it claims it wants to do.

Tehran’s incentive to acquire a nuclear weapon is to extort concessions from the international community which the regime could not otherwise accomplish without curtailing the sorts of malign activities that got it sanctioned in the first place. The JCPOA slowed Iran's progress towards a nuclear weapon by granting it the kinds of concessions the regime had used the nuclear threat to coerce from the beginning.

[Love Mountain]

The point of the agreement was to delay Iran’s nuclear development, not punish the parties trying to effect that delay. The fatal flaw of the JCPOA was that it undermined US efforts to deter Tehran’s malign activities in the region and failed to prevent the regime from using the threat of nuclear development as a way to coerce concessions from the international community, deal or no deal, which is exactly what has happened.

A. This doesn't say anything about Teharn's "malign activities" in the region outside of its nuclear programs. The JCPOA was restricted to the nuclear domain speicifically and for a reason.
B. As is succinctly explained,

The senior Obama administration official acknowledged that the twin sets of negotiations influenced the overall U.S. counterproliferation effort against Iran, especially the timing of individual investigations, prosecutions and international efforts to bring suspects to justice.

Such competing equities are unavoidable when high-level matters of diplomacy and geopolitics are under consideration, the official said. At those times, the White House must be guided by broader policy objectives, in this case de-escalating conflict with Iran, curbing its nuclear weapons program and freeing at least four American prisoners.

“The White House wouldn’t be getting involved in saying yea or nay to particular arrests or cases or the like” that are the purview of the Justice Department, the administration official said. “It was not uncommon, though, that before we were going to undertake a law enforcement action that we thought would have foreign policy implications, we would alert folks at the White House so that there could be appropriate notice given to a foreign government. That happens.”

This isn't a surprise. This is what high-level dealmaking is about. And if anybody should be upset about anything, is how much effort was pissed away by the subsequent administration who squandered any progress made regarding dialogue between Tehran and Washington. Of course any real cynic can clearly see that deterrence wasn't any specific or concerted effort on Trump's part.

Iran can and has since violated the agreement with relative impunity thus far, even while still a party to it. The regime’s actions illustrate how the deal fails to prevent the nuclear extortion it is designed to disincentivize, regardless of anything the US does or doesn’t do.

Before or after they announced they will start doing so? As far as I understand it (and the large international community), Iran has been transparent with their actions and follow the Iran nuclear deal until it was clear United States would not budget. There is nothing duplicitous or surprising about that. If you don't like it, the fault lies with United States for refusing to engage in any good-faith negotiations.

Tehran’s incentive to acquire a nuclear weapon is to extort concessions from the international community which the regime could not otherwise accomplish without curtailing the sorts of malign activities that got it sanctioned in the first place. The JCPOA slowed Iran's progress towards a nuclear weapon by granting it the kinds of concessions the regime had used the nuclear threat to coerce from the beginning.

Wrong, the intent on acquiring a nuclear weapon is to guarantee a method of retaliation should the United States or Israel attempt to end the current regime in Iran. The current campaign of "maximum pressure", far from deterring such efforts, is actively incentivizing it. The JCPOA was the first viable alternative away from that outcome. Under the JCPOA, Iran had strong incentives to avoid pursuing nuclear weapons and to engage in further dialogue with United States and our allies. The proof is in the pudding. Iran has neither scaled back their proxy activities, nor backed down to U.S. demands. Quite the contrary, tensions are higher, the proxy wars ongoing, and Iran is continuing to seize tankers to demonstrate the damage it can cause to global maritime trade.

[Love Mountain]

you keep exaggerating based on a perfectly normal comment

Perhaps a rather normal comment for you, but I was alluding to more of a pattern than a single comment. The following being your recent comments referring to South Koreans:







As per my last post, none of these refer to government polices, but rather to the people, culture, and society. It was observable in the thread in almost real time how quickly you went from knowing next to nothing about the issue to doubling then tripling down on unsupported hostile assertions.

Thought I don't necessarily disagree with Mishkin's comments directly, it is a rather Eurocentric view. Even in Eastern Europe, there is more misogyny than in Western Europe and United States. And in Asian countries? Oh my. One of the world's largest economies, Japan, has cultural norms that many progressives in United States would find absolutely horrifying. The same is of course true of South Korea.

[sumskilz]

Tehran’s incentive to acquire a nuclear weapon is to extort concessions from the international community which the regime could not otherwise accomplish without curtailing the sorts of malign activities that got it sanctioned in the first place. The JCPOA slowed Iran's progress towards a nuclear weapon by granting it the kinds of concessions the regime had used the nuclear threat to coerce from the beginning.

Wrong, the intent on acquiring a nuclear weapon is to guarantee a method of retaliation should the United States or Israel attempt to end the current regime in Iran.

I actually think it's both. The former (Legio_Italica's point) is a short term flexible strategy, but long term they hope to achieve the latter (Love Mountain's point). They might even hope to use the former while simultaneously achieving the latter behind the scenes. That was basically North Korea's strategy.

Although about Israel's strategy, I doubt they would ever try to engineer regime change in Iran like the US would. Israel tends to be less ambitious in their goals. They're primarily concerned with degrading any of Iran's military capabilities that could be used against them. I expect that it's highly likely that they would attack Iran's nuclear facilities if they believed Iran was close to producing a weapon. I also interpret the fact that they've been recently talking about doing so as evidence that they're unlikely to do so in the near future.

[Lord Thesaurian]

A. This doesn't say anything about Teharn's "malign activities" in the region outside of its nuclear programs. The JCPOA was restricted to the nuclear domain speicifically and for a reason.
B. As is succinctly explained,

A. False, and the JCPOA was restricted to the nuclear domain because the Obama Admin couldn’t get European partners on board with including conventional arms proliferation and/or ballistic missiles in the deal.

Most nonproliferation experts would say Iran certainly defied the spirit of the U.N. resolution, but technically didn't violate it — because it contains no prohibition against such testing, as one of its predecessors, passed in 2010, specifically did.

In fact, the Obama administration had argued for keeping in place the stronger prohibitory language of Resolution 1929, but it lost that argument when its negotiating partners wouldn't back the Americans up.

"When Mr. Obama sought to include a prohibition on ballistic missiles in the Iran deal, or at least extend a previous Security Council resolution banning them, not just Russia and China but even our European allies in the nuclear negotiations refused," former Obama White House official Philip Gordon explained this week in the New York Times. "They argued that the ballistic missile ban was put in place in 2010 only to pressure Iran to reach a nuclear deal, and they refused to extend it once that deal had been concluded."

https://www.npr.org/sections/paralle...u-n-resolution

This isn't a surprise. This is what high-level dealmaking is about. And if anybody should be upset about anything, is how much effort was pissed away by the subsequent administration who squandered any progress made regarding dialogue between Tehran and Washington. Of course any real cynic can clearly see that deterrence wasn't any specific or concerted effort on Trump's part.

B. A deliberately misleading characterization of an infamous expose on what the article cites as “a real scandal.” As is succinctly explained,

By dropping charges against major arms targets, the administration infuriated Justice Department officials — and undermined its own counterproliferation task forces.

In his Sunday morning address to the American people, Obama portrayed the seven men he freed as “civilians.” The senior official described them as businessmen convicted of or awaiting trial for mere “sanctions-related offenses, violations of the trade embargo.”
In reality, some of them were accused by Obama’s own Justice Department of posing threats to national security. Three allegedly were part of an illegal procurement network supplying Iran with U.S.-made microelectronics with applications in surface-to-air and cruise missiles like the kind Tehran test-fired recently, prompting a still-escalating exchange of threats with the Trump administration. Another was serving an eight-year sentence for conspiring to supply Iran with satellite technology and hardware. As part of the deal, U.S. officials even dropped their demand for $10 million that a jury said the aerospace engineer illegally received from Tehran.

The biggest fish, though, was Seyed Abolfazl Shahab Jamili, who had been charged with being part of a conspiracy that from 2005 to 2012 procured thousands of parts with nuclear applications for Iran via China. That included hundreds of U.S.-made sensors for the uranium enrichment centrifuges in Iran whose progress had prompted the nuclear deal talks in the first place.

When federal prosecutors and agents learned the true extent of the releases, many were shocked and angry. Some had spent years, if not decades, working to penetrate the global proliferation networks that allowed Iranian arms traders both to obtain crucial materials for Tehran’s illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programs and, in some cases, to provide dangerous materials to other countries.

“They didn’t just dismiss a bunch of innocent business guys,” said one former federal law enforcement supervisor centrally involved in the hunt for Iranian arms traffickers and nuclear smugglers. “And then they didn’t give a full story of it.”

Lincy, who closely tracks the U.S. counterproliferation effort against Iran, said that by letting so many men off the hook, and for such a wide range of offenses, Washington has effectively given its blessing to Iran’s continuing defiance of international laws.

Former Obama administration officials deny that, saying the men could still be prosecuted if they continue their illegal activity. But with their cases dropped, international arrest warrants dismissed and investigative assets redirected, the men — especially the 14 fugitives — can now continue activities the U.S. considers to be serious threats to its national security, Lincy said.

“This is a scandal,” she said. “The cases bear all the hallmarks of exactly the kinds of national security threats we’re still going after. It’s stunning and hard to understand why we would do this.”

Even some initial supporters of negotiating with Iran said the disclosures are troubling.

“There was always a broader conceptual problem with the administration not wanting to upset the balance of the deal or the perceived rapprochement with the Iranian regime,” said former Bush administration deputy national security adviser Juan Zarate, who later turned against the accord. “The deal was sacrosanct, and the Iranians knew it from the start and took full advantage when we had — and continue to maintain — enormous leverage.”

Most, if not all, of the Justice Department lawyers and prosecutors involved in the Counterproliferation Initiative were kept in the dark about how their cases were being used as bargaining chips, according to interviews with more than a dozen current and former officials.

So were the federal agents from the FBI and departments of Homeland Security and Commerce who for years had been operating internationally, often undercover, on the front lines of the hunt for Iranian arms and weapons smugglers.

It wasn’t just that prosecutors and agents with years of detailed knowledge about the cases were left out of the consultations about the significance of the 21 men let go in the swap. The lack of input also meant that negotiators were making decisions without fully understanding how the releases would impact the broader and interconnected matrix of U.S. investigations.

“Part of the frustration is that there is strong evidence Iran is still conducting illegal procurement operations and the FBI can’t really go forward with these cases,” said Arnold, who has been closely following the Jamili-Cheng case as part of a Harvard research project into nuclear proliferation networks.

https://www.politico.com/story/2017/...release-236966

Before or after they announced they will start doing so? As far as I understand it (and the large international community), Iran has been transparent with their actions and follow the Iran nuclear deal until it was clear United States would not budget. There is nothing duplicitous or surprising about that. If you don't like it, the fault lies with United States for refusing to engage in any good-faith negotiations.

Iran has demonstrated a clear ability to break its obligations with relative impunity whether it is formally bound by the JCPOA or not, and regardless of anything the US does or doesn’t do. If you don’t like it, the fault lies with the US for ever assuming Tehran has any interest in good-faith negotiations.

President Obama on Friday criticized Iranian leaders for undermining the "spirit" of last year's historic nuclear agreement, even as they stick to the "letter" of the pact.

In comments following the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, Obama denied speculation that the United States would ease rules preventing dollars from being used in financial transactions with Iran, in order to boost the country's engagement with the rest of the world.

Instead, Obama claimed, that Iran's troubles even after the lifting of sanctions under the nuclear deal were due to its continued support of Hezbollah, ballistic missile tests and other aggressive behavior.

"Iran so far has followed the letter of the agreement, but the spirit of the agreement involves Iran also sending signals to the world community and businesses that it is not going to be engaging in a range of provocative actions that are going to scare businesses off," Obama said at a press conference.

"When they launch ballistic missiles with slogans calling for the destruction of Israel, that makes businesses nervous."

"Iran has to understand what every country in the world understands, which is businesses want to go where they feel safe, where they don't see massive controversy, where they can be confident that transactions are going to operate normally," he added. "And that's an adjustment that Iran's going to have to make as well."

https://thehill.com/policy/national-...t-of-nuke-deal

Wrong, the intent on acquiring a nuclear weapon is to guarantee a method of retaliation should the United States or Israel attempt to end the current regime in Iran. The current campaign of "maximum pressure", far from deterring such efforts, is actively incentivizing it. The JCPOA was the first viable alternative away from that outcome. Under the JCPOA, Iran had strong incentives to avoid pursuing nuclear weapons and to engage in further dialogue with United States and our allies. The proof is in the pudding. Iran has neither scaled back their proxy activities, nor backed down to U.S. demands. Quite the contrary, tensions are higher, the proxy wars ongoing, and Iran is continuing to seize tankers to demonstrate the damage it can cause to global maritime trade.

Wrong. Regime change by military force has always been considered too costly with a disparate risk of failure to boot, which is why the regime has been around for decades projecting power and influence beyond its borders despite strict sanctions and other strategies short of all out war, with no nukes in the equation. The US and the Gulf states if not the whole world have a self evident interest in containing and if ever possible, eliminating Tehran’s deliberately destabilizing influence, aggression and malign activities in the region. The regime’s intent on acquiring a nuclear weapon is to guarantee a method of negating US and allied efforts to do so in any actual or potential scenario short of nuclear war.

I actually think it's both. The former (Legio_Italica's point) is a short term flexible strategy, but long term they hope to achieve the latter (Love Mountain's point). They might even hope to use the former while simultaneously achieving the latter behind the scenes. That was basically North Korea's strategy.

Of course, but the point is Tehran has proven perfectly capable of maintaining its existence without nukes for the last forty years and the foreseeable future, so the idea it needs the latter to guarantee its continued existence is misleading without proper context. North Korea does have a similar strategy but it’s a bit of a different case since the latter’s nukes are arguably a de facto deterrent against China, NK’s “ally,” as well as against the US. If self-preservation were the only (defensive) goal, giving the US and allies infinite reasons to combat the regime’s malign activities runs directly counter to that goal. The reality is Tehran wants to have cake and eat it too; doing terrorism and proxy wars while still having access to world markets. As the JCPOA legitimized, nuclear extortion is one very effective way to do that.

[Love Mountain]

A. False, and the JCPOA was restricted to the nuclear domain because the Obama Admin couldn’t get European partners on board with including conventional arms proliferation and/or ballistic missiles in the deal.

This isn't a refutation of my statement. I didn't say why the JCPOA was restricted to nuclear activities, merely that it was structured so.

B. A deliberately misleading characterization of an infamous expose on what the article cites as “a real scandal.” As is succinctly explained,

"Scandal".

Iran has demonstrated a clear ability to break its obligations with relative impunity whether it is formally bound by the JCPOA or not, and regardless of anything the US does or doesn’t do. If you don’t like it, the fault lies with the US for ever assuming Tehran has any interest in good-faith negotiations.

So they did or they didn't break the terms of JCPOA while they were still bound by it?

Wrong. Regime change by military force has always been considered too costly with a disparate risk of failure to boot, which is why the regime has been around for decades projecting power and influence beyond its borders despite strict sanctions and other strategies short of all out war, with no nukes in the equation. The US and the Gulf states if not the whole world have a self evident interest in containing and if ever possible, eliminating Tehran’s deliberately destabilizing influence, aggression and malign activities in the region. The regime’s intent on acquiring a nuclear weapon is to guarantee a method of negating US and allied efforts to do so in any actual or potential scenario short of nuclear war.

Clearly too costly. Just as Iraq, Libya, and Syria have repeatedly proven and repeatedly failed to deter United States from attempting a regime change when it is attractive to do so.

Of course, but the point is Tehran has proven perfectly capable of maintaining its existence without nukes for the last forty years and the foreseeable future, so the idea it needs the latter to guarantee its continued existence is misleading without proper context. North Korea does have a similar strategy but it’s a bit of a different case since the latter’s nukes are arguably a de facto deterrent against China, NK’s “ally,” as well as against the US. If self-preservation were the only (defensive) goal, giving the US and allies infinite reasons to combat the regime’s malign activities runs directly counter to that goal. The reality is Tehran wants to have cake and eat it too; doing terrorism and proxy wars while still having access to world markets. As the JCPOA legitimized, nuclear extortion is one very effective way to do that.

Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons for the same reason the USSR pursued nuclear weapons, which is the same reason China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea pursued nuclear weapons. It is the ultimate deterrent. That's the "reality", and it is quite literally the reality that any Realist IR expert will tell you.

[pacifism]

There’s nothing jingoistic about acknowledging reality. Iran has had a nuclear program since the days of the Shah, and the fatal flaw of the JCPOA was revealed as soon as the US backed out. Complaining about optics implies there would be any different consequences if the roles were reversed and Iran had officially backed out first. As we’ve seen, Iran is perfectly capable of violating the terms of the agreement with relative impunity, even while still theoretically bound to it. What little teeth the JCPOA ever had against the ability of the regime to move closer to developing nukes - and that’s only considering before the sunset clauses expire - is almost an afterthought against the backdrop of Tehran’s support for terrorism and her regional ambitions, which are, if anything, strengthened by the deal’s oil sanctions relief, access to SWIFT, and elimination of bans on conventional arms sales to Iran.

Optics is all the deal accomplished, and those optics were a gift to the regime, regardless of whatever the US did or will do subsequently.

I'm not arguing about how good the deal was. I'm saying that the U.S. made a mistake when they broke it because it causes the international community to lose trust that the American government will keep its word. Of course the optics side was a gift to Iran: they were handed a PR victory when their dictatorial government still honored an agreement better than the U.S. did. That's not to mention what it did to the clout of the faction that wanted to negotiate with America.

Tough talk is fun and all, but it's probably not a great way to avoid conflict.