What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

[Juvenal]

You are aware of course that Spain was also massing at the border with France?

That was the reason for Suchet, argueably Napoleon's best general at that point, being left to defend the border.

Just in passing, no one has yet mentioned the phenomenal Marshal Brune who held off the Austrian Army from Italy with a tiny force (the Allies were so embarrassed that they murdered him when he finally surrendered).

As for Napoleon's choice of senior generals for the Waterloo Campaign, well that was to some extent forced upon him. Berthier was dead (probably assassinated by being thrown out of his own window), so Napoleon needed a good Chief-of-Staff. He chose Soult because he didn't trust Louis's ex-Minister for War enough to leave him in Paris (remember what had happened there in 1814).

Davout was left at Paris because he was the most capable and trustworthy. Marmont, MacDonald and Mortier were not available. Despite criticisms, Grouchy was a good commander, as he demonstrated after Waterloo, winning at Wavre and bringing his Wing back to France intact by a circuitous route. Ney was also good, but not as effective as he had been, especially without Jomini to advise him. But at least he was loyal (remarks about a certain "iron cage" notwithstanding).

The failure of the Waterloo Campaign is down the Napoleon in my opinion, not his subordinates. Ney was not properly briefed, joining his new command on the march north. Ney's orders were to capture Quatre Bra and push north, he needed d'Erlon for this since Wellington actually outnumbered him on the day. Napoleon failed to inform Ney that blocking the road at Quatre Bras was sufficient, and he also failed to tell Ney he was detaching d'Erlon. At Waterloo, Napoleon detached Ney's horse artillery before the famous cavalry charges, and when asked for infantry reinforcements, actually gave Ney more cavalry instead.

Grouchy was fooled by the desertion of the Saxons who looked remarkably like the whole Prussian army retreating on Namur and Liege.

If Napoleon's plan at Ligny had succeeded, then Wellington would not have stood at Waterloo, but would have instead retreated on Antwerp. Napoleon did not have time to pursue Wellington because he needed to get back to face the Austrians and Russians.

As mentioned in an earlier post, a decisive French victory at Waterloo was very unlikely due to Wellington's caution and ability to retreat, and the Prussian's resiliance which allowed them to continue fighting after heavy defeats. The best outcome for Napoleon would have been a decisive Ligny (with d'Erlon delivering the killing blow) followed by a rapid march south to pick up Davout's 125,000 being trained around Paris.

The outcome of the war would then hinge on Napoleon's ability to quickly defeat the Austrians and German Allies before the Russians arrived from the German interior. A decisive Austrian defeat was the only prospect for breaking the Allied Coalition, but Napoleon really needed another Ulm to achieve this, so I think my money would have been on the Allies.

[Invictus XII]

You are aware of course that Spain was also massing at the border with France?

Ahh yes Spain, but i highly doubt that Spains military capabliity was at the standards of Russia and Austria, well not at least without the British beside them as the did in the Peninsula War. Spain was a great force, but didn't have the disipline or training that other nation did, but thats another topic.

[Invictus XII]

Anyway, remember this thread is also about Waterloo's place in NTW as a end of campaign feature, if you would please elaborate on that fellow members.

[Ebusitanus]

Ahh yes Spain, but i highly doubt that Spains military capabliity was at the standards of Russia and Austria, well not at least without the British beside them as the did in the Peninsula War. Spain was a great force, but didn't have the disipline or training that other nation did, but thats another topic.

What do you base this on? 1815 Is not 1808 anymore for either Austria or Spain.

[bluenose-09]

here is a good website about British battles and Waterloo:

http://www.britishbattles.com/waterl...-june-1815.htm

[HMS Empire Broadsword]

i think Napoleon could have pulled through in one piece if he had won Waterloo. He would have defeated the two best allied armies, the British one and the Prussian one, and the defeat of Wellington and Blucher would have terrified the Austrians and Russians. The British were the only nation that had regularyly beat France, if they were defeated, then the remaining allies would have had a severe blow to morale.

Also rerember that the French still had hundreds of thousands of troops guarding the borders, so even if Napoleon had lost lots of men, he still had plenty of others.

[Abdul'Allah]

I don't really think these kinds of "what if" questions matter. What if Hitler won in Stalingrad? What if the Persians won at Thermopylae? What if Custer won at Little Big Horn?

While it may be interesting to think about the opposite outcomes, it doesn't really matter all too much to make assumptions on what might have happened. Instead we should focus on the implications of what actually did happen.

[Jihada]

Some strange opinions on here.The Persians did win at Thermopylae ! (Hollywood and history lol http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/300_(film)) and someone further back even claims Leipzig was a draw,even though the French retreated and after Leipzig began the retreat back to France.The allies had a large advantage in numbers but the French had a decent central position and although they defended well ,the battle was a definite defeat.This is almost like claiming Dunkirk 1940 as a draw or even victory for Britain because of a partially successful retreat.
The British historian George Trevelyan wrote an essay before WW1 on 'If Napoleon had won the Battle of Waterloo'.His opinion was that an exhausted France would have offered peace to Britain.This would lead to Russia out of Europe, France dominant and no prospect of German unification during the 19th century and Britain isolated.
I find his conclusions rather naive as I doubt the Allies would allow Napoleon to remain in power even after a possible defeat at Waterloo.

This topic has been discussed many times even on the internet, for instance
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forum....php?p=1388713

[Kolyan]

i think Napoleon could have pulled through in one piece if he had won Waterloo. He would have defeated the two best allied armies, the British one and the Prussian one, and the defeat of Wellington and Blucher would have terrified the Austrians and Russians. The British were the only nation that had regularyly beat France, if they were defeated, then the remaining allies would have had a severe blow to morale.

Also rerember that the French still had hundreds of thousands of troops guarding the borders, so even if Napoleon had lost lots of men, he still had plenty of others.

In 1815 Prussian “excellent” army they started a military reform which was in progress and had a significant negative impact on the Prussian army facing Napoleon in 1815. Arguably it was in a worst shape since 1807.

Prussian line,
“Only part of the Prussian army in 1815 consisted of “old Prussians”. Rhinelanders and to an extent Westphalians which were incorporated into the army were of the questionable quality. Secondly, a number of foreign- non Prussian formations were amalgamated into the line and were considered line only on paper”. (Waterloo myths, 1990.)

Prussain Jagers:

“Undoubtedly many volunteers had a high morale but there were men who volunteered (especially in 1815) to avoid being drafted anyway and who just wanted to take part in privileges given to Jager detachment or avoid being together with ordinary men whom some of them considered riff-raff... Discipline was not as strict as in line and training was not very thorough, so I wouldn’t rank them higher than average. Many of them came from town and had never fired a shot before they bought their rifle and they were not as fit and healthy as the men from the countryside who filled the ranks of the line. (Waterloo myths, 1990.)”

In addition Prussian army included some Saxons whose morale was the lowest and who deserted whenever they had a chance. I think it is also mentioned on this forum here that a whole formation made of Saxons deserted and started to retreat making Grouchy to beleive that the whole Prussian army is leaving.

As for the quality of the “excellent” British army considering that about 70% of that were not British hence I cant even call it “British” so I refer to it as Wellington’s army.

By 1815 significant number of the Peninsular war veterans went to America and Wellington’s army had a lot of recruits.

“British troops in Holland received "scathing criticism from foreign military observers and Allied commanders. There were damning comments on the appalling behaviour of officers, their lack of care for their men and their generally drunken demeanour. The Army as a whole showed up badly in the field. The drill manuals were out of date, the battalions were of poor quality ..." (Haythornthwaite - "Wellington's Infantry (1)" p 6)”

“Nederland’s army was very young and consisted mostly of recruits… The militia was formed partly of volunteers and partly of conscripts…The Belgian components of the army, whose reliability was expected by many to be as doubtful as their loyalty to their new Dutch masters, made up only three cavalry regiments and six of the 38 infantry battalions of the Netherlands army; and in the event not one Belgian soldier deserted to the enemy.” (PTW Notes)

Amongst another weaknesses of the Wellington’s army I can mention arrogant officers corps with majority have their commission bought, rigid cavalry organisation, low artillery to troops ratio, inability to concentrate strategically (In the beginning of the 1815-Campaign the Prussians got 3/4 of their men to the right place at the right time, Wellington only miserable 1/3 of his total forces), slow manoeuvring and excessive dependency on supplies.

The Prussian army under Blucher after defeat at Ligny was a mere 60,000 – 70,000.. British army at Waterloo is around 70,000. These armies cannot even be compared to the size of the Russian and Austrian armies of about 350,000 heading towards Napoleon.

Also British army and in particular senior officer corps did not have that vast experience Russians and Austrians accumulated fighting Napoleon for 16 plus years. Brits were skirmishing French in Spain in favourable conditions on a less than a secondary importance Napoleonic wars theatre and never faced Napoleon himself.

Their war experience especially at operation level cannot be even compared to vast and brutal campaigns raged in Italy, Central in Eastern Europe. British soldiers, well supplied, welcomed by locals, stationed in warm country endured nothing similar to horrors of 1807 Winter campaign in Poland or 1812 war in Russia. Same as British senior staff never experienced a war against Napoleon himself and he was a hard man to play against.

Finally in 1815 at Waterloo arrogant “scum of all earth” (British soldiers as per Wellington himself) faced French army with Napoleon himself the battle was going to turn in to a near run thing if Prussians would not be on time to save Wellington). AND mind you this is all :

• Outnumbering Napoleon 70,000 Brits to 55,000 – 58,000 French (about 12,000-15,000 had to be send against approaching Prussians). Imagine this badly needed infantry dispatched to fight Prussians would support Ney in his massive cavalry attack on Wellington Centre! I bet the battle would end right there. However there was not infantry to support Ney. And the credit goes to Blucher and Prussians definitely not Wellington and his army.
• Having a very strong defensive position (the ridge)
• Facing 1815 mediocre quality French troops.
• At 11-30 am Wellington knew that Blucher is on the way and will arrive soon. All they need to do is to hold for 5 hours.

And ignoring Prussians the result is: “near a run thing” after 5 hours.


Compare this to Situation of the Russian army in 1812 on the Borodino field.

• Outnumbered 10 to 12.
• Facing Grand army with its best Marshals and veteran soldiers at the peak of its might.
• Knowing that no one is going to come and help them after 5 hours , nor after 10 and 20 and 200.

Result is they managed to hold for 14 hours retreating mere 1-2 km maintaining order, discipline and cohesion while slaughtering the third of the Napoleonic army and 47 of his generals, having its own casualty ratio unprecedented in Napoleonic wars and not having nothing near to Wellington’s “near run thing” (there is a written Kutuzov’s order to prepare to continue the battle on the next day).

If one is really interested in the topic of what if scenario i suggest investing some time in reading about the Political situation in 1815 and in particular the role Russian emperor Alexander I played. After reading on this subject I strongly believe that no matter what - Alexander was going to press forward to remove Napoleon from the throne. Strategically destruction of Wellington’s - in coalition terms – minor army would be just a minor set back for Alexander I and defiantly would not stop 350,000 + Russian and Austrians veterans with experienced generals who already tested the victory against napoleon in 1813 and 1814.

[Geronimo2006]

i think Napoleon could have pulled through in one piece if he had won Waterloo. He would have defeated the two best allied armies, the British one and the Prussian one, and the defeat of Wellington and Blucher would have terrified the Austrians and Russians. The British were the only nation that had regularyly beat France, if they were defeated, then the remaining allies would have had a severe blow to morale.

Also rerember that the French still had hundreds of thousands of troops guarding the borders, so even if Napoleon had lost lots of men, he still had plenty of others.

Less than 200,000 actually.

[Ebusitanus]

Also British army and in particular senior officer corps did not have that vast experience Russians and Austrians accumulated fighting Napoleon for 16 plus years. Brits were skirmishing French in Spain in favourable conditions on a less than a secondary importance Napoleonic wars theatre and never faced Napoleon himself.

While I started reading with agreement Kolyan´s input, soon enough it seems we have hit with the same partisabn arguments many time seen before. This above is an example where you can detect where his bias is.
Never been a great fan of all things Wellington and his drive for selfpromotion but this here is simply wrong.

[Kolyan]

While I started reading with agreement Kolyan´s input, soon enough it seems we have hit with the same partisabn arguments many time seen before. This above is an example where you can detect where his bias is.
Never been a great fan of all things Wellington and his drive for selfpromotion but this here is simply wrong.

The campaign in Spain "was to the Napoleonic wars what North Africa was to the WW2, an arena of British failure, redeemed by victory only when the enemy broke one of the great laws of war: NEVER INVADE RUSSIA."
- 'The Economist' Oct 3rd 2002, London

PS I didnt mean Brits were partisans, byt comparing to main theatres it was a skrimishing (in my biased opinion).

[Ebusitanus]

I´m not really sure what you mean by that. Most of the greatest French Marshalls fought (and lost) In Spain. 350.000 French troops were tied down for years in this land. Battles fought and won in Spain prompted again and again the renewal of the Coalition (Bailen 1808 or Vitoria 1813). Napoleon himself had to come to Spain to set things right but they never were. The Spanish conflict never stopped (1808-14) and it sapped French forces continuosly while she had made peace with either prussia, austria or russia. The costly defeats in Spain were certainly not the main reason for Napoleon´s demise but to brush it aside as some skirmishing invalidates the rest of your well exposed argument.

The fantastic idea that the fighting taken place in the Peninsula somehow made worse commaders of those who partook in it is astonishing.

[Kolyan]

Most of the greatest French Marshalls fought (and lost) In Spain. 350.000 French troops were tied down for years in this land. Battles fought and won in Spain prompted again and again the renewal of the Coalition (Bailen 1808 or Vitoria 1813). Napoleon himself had to come to Spain to set things right but they never were. The Spanish conflict never stopped (1808-14) and it sapped French forces continuosly while she had made peace with either prussia, austria or russia. The costly defeats in Spain were certainly not the main reason for Napoleon´s demise but to brush it aside as some skirmishing invalidates the rest of your well exposed argument.

Agree. I hope you don’t mean that British corps held "350,000 French for years".
As per the Economist quote above the only reason British were not completely expelled from Spain is that Napoleon was too busy fighting Austrians and Russians. However whenever he had a chance to intervene in 1809 it resulted in a humiliating evacuation ala Dunkirk 1940 style.

“The retreat was more properly a flight.”
- C. Robinson
"...we have suffered a shameful disaster."
- The Times, London


Could the Spaniards win the war without British money and Wellington's British-Portuguese army ? Probably. One has only to look at the example of Soviet Invasion of Afganistan (ext.link) to realize that armies - with facilities and innovations beyond anything that Napoleon could ever have dreamt of - were strained by the type of warfare that he encountered in the Peninsula. (http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/cruel_war_in_Spain.html)
Hence was the presence of the British Corps crucial to Napoleonic defeat overall? to me the answer is no.

Could the Spaniards win the war without British money and Wellington's British-Portuguese army ?
Probably. One has only to look at the example of Soviet Invasion of Afganistan (ext.link) to realize that armies - with facilities and innovations beyond anything that Napoleon could ever have dreamt of - were strained by the type of warfare that he encountered in the Peninsula. (http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/cr..._in_Spain.html)
Hence was the presence of the British Corps crucial to Napoleonic defeat overall? to me the answer is no.

[Ebusitanus]

Neither the British, nor the Portuguese nor the Spaniards could have won the Peninsular Campaign on their own.

[Juvenal]

In 1815 Prussian “excellent” army they started a military reform which was in progress and had a significant negative impact on the Prussian army facing Napoleon in 1815. Arguably it was in a worst shape since 1807.

Despite the "dilution" of the Prussian line, it actually performed remarkably well. Ziethen's and Pirch II's Corps being able to fight at Waterloo just two days after the heavy defeat at Ligny. The desertion of the Saxons was a special case, caused by the recent annexation of Saxony by Prussia, and allowing them to be brigaded together.

As for the quality of the “excellent” British army considering that about 70% of that were not British hence I cant even call it “British” so I refer to it as Wellington’s army.

Indeed, Wellington's Army was an unknown quantity and Wellington himself did not trust it. In the event it too fought well, witness the Netherlanders holding out alone at Quatre Bras and the bravery of Bijlandt's brigade against d'Erlon's attack at Waterloo.

Amongst another weaknesses of the Wellington’s army I can mention arrogant officers corps with majority have their commission bought, rigid cavalry organisation, low artillery to troops ratio, inability to concentrate strategically (In the beginning of the 1815-Campaign the Prussians got 3/4 of their men to the right place at the right time, Wellington only miserable 1/3 of his total forces), slow manoeuvring and excessive dependency on supplies.

Purchasing of commissions appears ludicrous to modern eyes, but the system did work. It ensured that the British class system was replicated in the Army, the officer class already being accustomed to command in civilian life. Don't forget also that the British retained a small professional army with no conscription, so the weakness of little promotion "from the ranks" was not overwhelming.

The "vast experience" of the Austrian's and Russians did not prevent them being beaten as late as 1814.

Napoleon's 1815 Army was not of mediocre quality. It had an unprecedented proportion of veterans thanks to the release of French POWs. The actual problem was loyalty. It was riven with fears of betrayal by Royalist sympathisers. Indeed, one of Gerard's division commanders defected to the Allies on the eve of Ligny with his whole staff!

The campaign in Spain "was to the Napoleonic wars what North Africa was to the WW2, an arena of British failure, redeemed by victory only when the enemy broke one of the great laws of war: NEVER INVADE RUSSIA."
- 'The Economist' Oct 3rd 2002, London

PS I didnt mean Brits were partisans, byt comparing to main theatres it was a skrimishing (in my biased opinion).

That is a silly quote. Wellington was extremely successful given the small size of his force and the distrust of the Spanish. Also there were many substantial battles. Most of the Peninsula campaign happened outside the time of the invasion of Russia anyway.

Neither the British, nor the Portuguese nor the Spaniards could have won the Peninsular Campaign on their own.

Spot on!

[Didz]

Despite the "dilution" of the Prussian line, it actually performed remarkably well. Ziethen's and Pirch II's Corps being able to fight at Waterloo just two days after the heavy defeat at Ligny. The desertion of the Saxons was a special case, caused by the recent annexation of Saxony by Prussia, and allowing them to be brigaded together.

To get a better impression of what the Prussian army achieved in the 1815 campaign, one needs to study Hofschroer's two books on the 'The Waterloo Campaign'.

Ignoring, the controvertial aspects of Hofschroers account I came away with a new level of respect for the quality of the Prussian staff work and the resilience of the Prussian soldier during this campaign. Together they managed to pull off some amazing feats of maneouvre and competely negate the benefits Napoleon should have gained from his stratetgy of the central position, which by rights should have given him victory.

Most other armies of the period would have literally fallen apart under the pressure. The British for example spent most of the first day just trying to find Quatre Bras, nevermind actually fighting there, whereas the Prussian's managed to achieve a forward concentration by marching the entire of Zieten's Corps directly across the face of the French advance fighting two battles at enroute before they even reached Ligny, and then after their defeat at that battle repeated the maneouvre in reverse through the worst terrain and weather to arrive at Waterloo.

Brilliant.

[emperorpenguin]

Also British army and in particular senior officer corps did not have that vast experience Russians and Austrians accumulated fighting Napoleon for 16 plus years. Brits were skirmishing French in Spain in favourable conditions on a less than a secondary importance Napoleonic wars theatre and never faced Napoleon himself.

Outnumbering Napoleon 70,000 Brits to 55,000 – 58,000 French (about 12,000-15,000 had to be send against approaching Prussians). Imagine this badly needed infantry dispatched to fight Prussians would support Ney in his massive cavalry attack on Wellington Centre! I bet the battle would end right there. However there was not infantry to support Ney. .

Biased a bit are we?

First of all the British army did a lot more than skirmish in the Iberian peninsula, secondly they did, under Moore, face Napoleon and performed well at Corunna.

Next point is your figures for Waterloo are very wrong.

Wellington had 53580 infantry, 13350 cavalry and 157 guns for a force of 73200.
Napoleon had 53400 infantry, 15600 cavalry and 246 guns for a force of 77500.
Grouchy was detached with 24000 infantry, 3500 cavalry and 96 guns, for 30000 men.

So Napoleon did (barely) outnumber Wellington. Oh and Ney DID commit infantry to support the cavalry attack, just he ordered them in too late. Bachelu's division and Tissot's brigade numbering 6500 men were sent in.

All figures are from Mark Adkin's Waterloo Companion.

[Redalvilgeshki]

Juvenal,

Grouchy was a good commander

,

I concur, he preformed very well in 1814 but during the Waterloo campaign his actions were not that of a good commander.
Thought blame cant be fully his as Soult's order was a maze of words.

Ney was also good, but not as effective as he had been, especially without Jomini to advise him. But at least he was loyal (remarks about a certain "iron cage" notwithstanding).

I agree, Ney is my favorite Marshal.

The failure of the Waterloo Campaign is down the Napoleon in my opinion, not his subordinates. Ney was not properly briefed, joining his new command on the march north. Ney's orders were to capture Quatre Bra and push north, he needed d'Erlon for this since Wellington actually outnumbered him on the day

This is completely false, Ney even without d'Erlorns force outnumbered by a huge margin the tiny Dutch Force at the crossroads.
Wellington did NOT deploy his force there untill very late in the day and Ney botched that operation with delay in attack.

At Waterloo, Napoleon detached Ney's horse artillery before the famous cavalry charges, and when asked for infantry reinforcements, actually gave Ney more cavalry instead.

Napoleon did this to add potency to Ney's attack I thought? And Napoleon did eventually reinforce Ney with infantry as they captured La Haye Saint.

Grouchy was fooled by the desertion of the Saxons who looked remarkably like the whole Prussian army retreating on Namur and Liege.

Another of his errors, which is why Waterloo could be blamed solidly on Ney and Grouchy.

If Napoleon's plan at Ligny had succeeded, then Wellington would not have stood at Waterloo, but would have instead retreated on Antwerp. Napoleon did not have time to pursue Wellington because he needed to get back to face the Austrians and Russians.

That begs the qustion, if Blucher had been eliminated by Napoleon completely and Wellington did fall back, who's to say the British and Austrians would not lose heart?

They were in the game for balence of power in Europe? If Napoleon kept 1792 borders (which he clearly stated in early 1815) why would they press on

As mentioned in an earlier post, a decisive French victory at Waterloo was very unlikely due to Wellington's caution and ability to retreat, and the Prussian's resiliance which allowed them to continue fighting after heavy defeats. The best outcome for Napoleon would have been a decisive Ligny (with d'Erlon delivering the killing blow) followed by a rapid march south to pick up Davout's 125,000 being trained around Paris.

Thats exactly what I was saying, Grouchy comeing to Waterloo would not result in a defeat sufficient enough to end the entire war.

The outcome of the war would then hinge on Napoleon's ability to quickly defeat the Austrians and German Allies before the Russians arrived from the German interior. A decisive Austrian defeat was the only prospect for breaking the Allied Coalition, but Napoleon really needed another Ulm to achieve this, so I think my money would have been on the Allies

The Austrians would need less I think, Maybe a decisive Lingy and Brunes stoping actions in Italy would be enough.

Russia was starting to become the problem, Czar Alexander even threatend the British and Austrian Governments at the C.o.V. and forced borders to be drawn more on their terms and even offered them to kick the Russians out, or at least try to.

[Redalvilgeshki]

Emp.P.;

First of all the British army did a lot more than skirmish in the Iberian peninsula, secondly they did, under Moore, face Napoleon and performed well at Corunna.

Do you mean the RETREAT at Corunna? Where Moore and his men fled to their ships and left thousands of dead behind?