Following its gruesome terrorist attack in Israel, Hamas has frequently been compared, or even equated to the Islamic State. Although it may be politically tempting to equate Hamas, IS, al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups, it is not conducive to a nuanced understanding of how these groups actually operate.
First... idea of a caliphate governed by Sharia-based law and uniting the world’s Muslims under a single leader, thereby breaking existing nation-state borders, has historically been central to both al-Qaeda and IS, although the two organizations have differed in their views regarding the envisioned timing of declaring such a caliphate. Whereas for al-Qaeda and IS the aspired liberation of Palestine and the fight against Israel represent first and foremost a strategic opportunity to unite the world’s Muslims in a global struggle,
for Hamas, the Palestinian struggle constitutes the sole, primary focus.
Second, Hamas’ cooperation with Iran and a variety of Iran-sponsored Shi’ite Islamist actors, including the Lebanese Hezbollah, is particularly problematic for al-Qaeda and IS as Sunni Muslim, Salafi-jihadi actors, not least because both al-Qaeda and IS have clashed directly and indirectly with several of these Shi’ite actors in the Syrian Civil War.
Third, a major concern for al-Qaeda and IS, which condemn democracy as a Western and un-Islamic concept, has been Hamas’ participation in the 2006 legislative elections in the Palestinian territories and its subsequent power-sharing agreement with its secular rival Fatah. These decisions were already at the time sharply opposed by al-Qaeda,
which viewed it as a step of Hamas towards accepting the existing nation-state order and, thereby, indirectly accepting, and legitimizing Israel’s existence.
Fourth, both al-Qaeda and IS have previously criticized Hamas for what they view as its failure to implement appropriate Sharia-based legislation in Gaza.
Last, Hamas’ earlier repression of Salafi-jihadi factions in Gaza, some of them known for their supportive stance towards al-Qaeda or IS, has equally raised objections. Examples include the al-Qaeda-leaning Jaysh al-Ummah and the pro-IS Jama’at Ansar al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi Bayt al-Maqdis.
These various divides can thus explain why Hamas has long perceived both al-Qaeda and IS primarily as threats, rather than as potential allies.
Lastly, although al-Qaeda and IS have long wished to gain an operational foothold in the Palestinian arena, it remains unclear to what extent they will be able to do so within the near future. Not only is Hamas opposed to both organizations, but an additional, major challenge is that all states that directly border Israel and the Palestinian territories – Egypt, Lebanon (including the Hezbollah as the dominant actor in the South), Jordan and Syria – are hostile towards them