Why the Roman Republic won - manpower or mobilization?

[Alwyn]

Bret Devereaux wrote recently that, in the third and second centuries BC, the Roman Republic completed its conquest of peninsular Italy and then defeated its major rivals in the Mediterranean - Carthage, Macedon and the Seleucids, while winning smaller conflicts in Spain, the Balkans, Cisalpine Gaul and Transalpine Gaul - and that, that traditionally, this success was explained by Rome's large supply of manpower.

Naturally the question of how Rome was able to effectively run the table, overturning the entire Mediterranean state system in just a century and a half or so, is an important one. Traditionally, scholars have pointed to some of the tremendous and outsized Roman mobilizations (especially in 216-214) and thus argued that ‘manpower’ was the Roman secret: Rome had, in the words of Nicholas Sekunda, “horde after uncomplaining horde of Italian peasant manpower” to throw at its enemies. Fireside Friday, October 28, 2022

However, there are problems with the theory that Rome won because of an "uncomplaining horde" of manpower:

It isn’t that the Romans just had more surplus manpower because [...] the nature of ancient agriculture meant that everyone had lots of surplus manpower, with small farms generating little surplus because they supported families that, as units of labor, were much too large for their tiny farms.[...] The question was never finding a lot of farmers with not a lot to do (they were the one thing you had a lot of), the question was turning those farmers into soldiers, which was in turn about prying resources, not people out of the countryside. Fireside Friday, October 28, 2022

He suggests that Rome's advantage was not only in its reserves of manpower, but in the quality of the equipment worn or wielded by its soldiers:

... the Romans were anything but expendable: they were the most expensive kitted fellows out there. The main quantitative comparative element ended up being worked metal (iron and bronze) because worked metal was so expensive compared to other materials,[...] the Romans wore a lot of it, 25% more than their nearest competitors, in fact. Indeed just about everyone else’s kit seemed to look for any opportunity to substitute metal equipment for something else (like textile for armor, as in the linothorax). Meanwhile the Romans went gangbusters with mail armor, a new defensive technology whose main drawback was that it was very expensive, being both made of lots of expensive iron but also demanding a very labor-intensive manufacturing process. Initially worn by wealthy Romans, by the end of the period this became the standard armor of the legions, which is just wild. Fireside Friday, October 28, 2022

Is Devereux right about the secrets of Rome's success?

(I started a parallel thread in Rome II General Discussion for people who'd like to discuss the implications of his argument for players and modders - this thread is for the historical debate.)

[Abdülmecid I]

I think he's called Devereaux. In regards to his thesis, he may delve more deeply into it in his published articles, but it appears unconvincing to me. The Roman armies are relatively well-documented, but, for Rome's adversaries, not much evidence is available, besides Polybius' remarks and some sporadic archaeological findings (pieces of equipment, as well as a few Greek inscriptions mainly found in Anatolia). The exception is Ptolemaic Egypt, thanks to the massive papyrus archives discovered in the Fayoum Oasis and elsewhere, but the Ptolemies are hardly representative of Rome's enemies. The argument also fails to take into account the fact that a large portion of the armies the Romans deployed was composed of auxiliaries, whose equipment was very diverse. Moreover, even if it's true, it poses an additional question: How and why were the Romans capable of producing on a massive scale weapons and equipment of such high quality?

That being said, the demographic hypothesis also poses some obstacles. Roman expansion coincides with a rapid increase in population growth, but the causality relationship is not clear (chicken or the egg dilemma?). The union of Italy, the relative stabilisation of the political situation, the accumulation of loot and the development of the commercial network led to greater agricultural productivity, urbanisation and immigration, which themselves facilitated subsequent attempts of expansion. In any case, although Rome had a larger reserve in manpower than the tribal confederations in Gaul and Iberia or the relatively small kingdoms and confederacies in Macedonia and Greece, the densely populated, irrigated and urbanised valleys of Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia, under the control of the Seleucids and the Lagids, were still more populous.

What perhaps made the difference was Roman success in incorporating the elites of the annexed regions. It was a slow, gradual and not always peaceful procedure, as the Social War demonstrates, but the Roman Republic proved more adept than Athens or Sparta, for example, where political power was monopolised by Athenians and Spartans respectively, while naturalisations were extremely rare. As a result, Roman defeats were not followed by an outbreak of secessionist movements, like in the case of the Seleucid Empire, in the aftermath of the Laodicean War and Magnesia. In fact, around the Aegean, where social tensions seem to have been especially pronounced in the 2nd century BC, there are several cases of oligarchs cooperating with the Romans against either their neighbors or "independence" movements, scolded by Polybius as "populist" and bloodthirsty. The most typical examples coming to mind are the collapse of the Achaean League and the Attalid kingdom, where the Roman annexation was abetted by internal collaboration. These divisions also led to some interesting developments in 19th and 20th century historiography, where those hostile to the Romans were praised as freedom fighters by nationalists and defenders of the proletariat by Marxists (like Critolaus of Corinth and Aristonicus/Eumenes III), while the others were lambasted as traitors. Ironically, it's a complete reversal of the image Polybius (himself pretty cozy with the Roman authorities) paints.

[Alwyn]

Thanks, I've corrected the spelling and I'm reading your response with interest. You make good points about why Romans were capable of producing high-quality weapons and equipment on such a scale and about the Roman ability to incorporate elites of annexes regions, as well as the reliance on auxilaries.

Maybe your point about the Roman incoporation of elites is somewhat similar to Devereaux's contrast between the 'engines of force' used by Rome's rivals ("taxes were used to raise force and then that force was used to raise taxes and around and around the wheel spins. But that system imposes a lot of administrative overhead and also demands that a lot of the troops it creates be held back to keep the engine running."), and Rome's 'willing compliance' system? He's talking here about how Rome managed to incorporate the socii - maybe the experience of incorporating the socii showed Rome's leaders how to incorporate the elite of other nations?

When he says that the Roman Republic's armies were "mobilized through a freeholding farmer class willing to dig deep into their pockets to field the heaviest equipment in defense of communities (both Rome and the allies) they saw as their own", it sounds like Rome was unusually successful at engaging the support of wealthy people to fund their wars.

[alhoon]

I didn't know there was a question whether the very good equipment and discipline of the huge and well trained Roman Armies was the key behind those successes...

[Gyrosmeister]

The Greeks ed up their entire manpower in the Diadochoi Conflicts, so they were already on the back foot when the fights with Rome began. Pyrrhos had an impressive k/d, but he could never win a war of attrition.

[Roma_Victrix]

If these are the most salient points brought up by Devereaux (2022), then he doesn't seem to have agreed with or even read critical works on the subject such as Klaus Bringmann's History of the Roman Republic (2002; translated into English in 2007 by W. J. Smyth).

For instance, Bringmann makes it pretty clear that long before the Marian reforms — which brought the lower class plebs into the fold as a major backbone of the late Republican Roman military — the wealthy patrician and equites class Roman citizen soldiers who could largely afford their own equipment were supported by an endless flood of allied auxiliaries. The latter came from the enormous patchwork of city-states of Italy (and beyond) who were allied to Rome, each with their own unique official treaty of alliance with the Roman Republic. These were generally not Latin colonies filled with Roman citizens, but rather included various Italic ethnic groups like the Umbrians and Samnites, as well as Greeks and Etruscans, and even the Celts, Veneti and Ligurians up north in Transalpine Gaul. The Romans had a huge amount of citizen soldiers, but they had an even larger amount of allied troops who could be easily mustered.

Also, there was a reason why these Roman allies and their auxiliary soldiers had few complaints when it came to aiding Rome. Firstly, unlike Hellenistic powers that taxed the hell out of their provinces and relied largely on a core of professional highly paid mercenaries, the Romans had few if any taxes levied on their allies and left them alone as tiny autonomous powers with their own microstate republics and local constitutions (or in the case of an ally like Syracuse, on occasion it was an allied monarchy). They simply levied troops from these underling petty powers when needed. This was rather ingenious considering how the absence of a heavy-handed economic burden allowed each allied city-state and region to prosper and grow, and every once in a while the Romans simply required the adult sons of their households to join them in war.

For that matter Hannibal's strategy in Italy relied on cleaving these city-state allies away from Rome and over to the side of Carthage, with Capua and Taranto (Taras) as some the biggest prizes to be nabbed. Hannibal's army suffered from a lack of serious logistical help from the Carthaginian Senate and each battle meant his army that crossed the Rhone and then the Alps into Italy became smaller. He needed to gain allies and new recruits from the existing population groups in Italy, and found some very enthusiastic support from the Celts who had recently been conquered by Rome in northern Italy.

It also goes without saying that Roman auxiliary soldiers could be rewarded with Roman citizenship upon completion of military service, another incentive that became more appealing by the mid-Republic when Rome became a juggernaut projecting power across the entire Mediterranean. The Social War of the early 1st century BC was fought largely because Roman allies wanted Roman citizenship.

[Cyclops]

...
It also goes without saying that Roman auxiliary soldiers could be rewarded with Roman citizenship upon completion of military service, another incentive that became more appealing by the mid-Republic when Rome became a juggernaut projecting power across the entire Mediterranean. The Social War of the early 1st century BC was fought largely because Roman allies wanted Roman citizenship.

Yes good point. Rome gave rewards up and down and across the scale of its society, from patrician to amicus to citizen to alae.

I think the Roman state became a conquest engine where many elements of the society were mobilized toward more or less the same end: a cycle of warfare and acquisition, where the spoils were shared.

In a typical Macedonian dominated Hellenistic state the elements of society were usually segregated by class (traditional Makedonian nobility, and the multiethnic imperial administrative elite, Hellenic city state citizens, Macedonian peasantry, other city elites, middle classes and rural poor, as well as temple hierarchies which could be substantial in Mesopotamia and above all Egypt) and ethnicity 9with Macedonians/Hellenes at the top of the tree, Persians lower in some places and the rest very lowly, hardly conducive to military stamina or loyalty). These elements benefited from war to different degrees so warmaking require a lot of cat herding: fostering a competent officer class up to the general level would be fraught as a successful general might displace an existing king.

Even a fairly homogenous state like Carthage was more a loose confederation with a small leadership based in a single city. The strong economic base meant a mercenary army was a viable option but their motivation was purely financial. The best Carthaginian army was Hannibal's with a mix of mercenaries and personal allies which is unsustainable because if Hannibal dies the army doesn't automatically transfer its allegiance to the next Carthaginian in line.

Rome borged conquered states into mini Romes that spewed out new roman forces. They liked the rewards and were given a reasonably standard Roman state form, integrating them in a way the unimaginative (aside from Phillip and Alexander) Macedonians never managed to (admittedly the Romans were working with a lot of similar Hellenic Poleis in Italy so it went smoothly at first) and the Carthaginians didn't even bother with.

Roman division of spoils was informal but rooted in the patron-client system at the heart of Roman society, which was also supported by a "semi-democratic" political system with power sharing and turn taking built in. For a good century 260-160 BCE the cake was shared more or less fairly, powerful families took their turns and stepped aside: the talented Scipios did not form a tyranny, they stepped down when the time came and others had a shot.

The Cursus Honorum gave talented men from establish but also new families a route to serve the state with sensible experience gained along the way all the way to the senate, so Rome rarely had to rely on that one guy to win, they usually had a roster. If a Varro threw away an army there were fresh recruits, NCOs officers and generals on the bench (eg Fabius Cunctator) and the rules could be bent (sending out a too-young Scipio to take over his uncle's forces in Spain as likely they included Scipio clients without fear he'd form a new kingdom instead of serving he senate) without too much stress. When Phillip put a lot of trust in a general (Parmenion or Antipater) they became a dynastic problem.

An Hellenic monarch who went to war was watching his heir, his generals, his mix of forces and his chequerboard state structure as much as his enemy. War might be necessary but the only real winner would be the King, and the rewards for others were the crumbs he let fall. The motivation profile was a funnel shape, very narrow at the bottom.

A roman proConsul at war had to worry his subordinate might nip back to Rome to pinch his commission (this happened a few times after about 110 BCE) but by and large his force was interested in victory as he was. At home the families would be supported by the client patron system, on the battlefield the soldier looked forward to a share of loot, and all of them preferred the system they had a share in to some foreign monarch or tribal leader who promised a regular plundering if they were good.

The park plug of the system was the rewards of military victory the magisterial class could enjoy. With a power sharing pollical system little things like crowns and triumphs became prized, so a series of even low-level conquests generated personal as well as state victory points.

This is way over simplified but Rome was a conquest engine where most levels of society benefited from cooperation and from war, whereas in other states the benefits were less fairly distributed, and many levels of society had little or no benefit from war, or stood to lose to the King's benefit.

The Roman system of adding people to its military class, from elites to citizens and even lower classes (ultimately Marius made the army a citizen-manufacturing engine) should not be under-rated. The TW games give a bland manpower value to cities but frankly I believe Rome got more manpower out of its conquests, at the elite and citizen level, than any other system. They sure as hell weren't better soldiers in the Republican period when they conquered the Med, typically they opened a campaign by getting their arses kicked and taking it from there.

[Laser101]

If these are the most salient points brought up by Devereaux (2022), then he doesn't seem to have agreed with or even read critical works on the subject such as Klaus Bringmann's History of the Roman Republic (2002; translated into English in 2007 by W. J. Smyth).

For instance, Bringmann makes it pretty clear that long before the Marian reforms — which brought the lower class plebs into the fold as a major backbone of the late Republican Roman military — the wealthy patrician and equites class Roman citizen soldiers who could largely afford their own equipment were supported by an endless flood of allied auxiliaries. The latter came from the enormous patchwork of city-states of Italy (and beyond) who were allied to Rome, each with their own unique official treaty of alliance with the Roman Republic. These were generally not Latin colonies filled with Roman citizens, but rather included various Italic ethnic groups like the Umbrians and Samnites, as well as Greeks and Etruscans, and even the Celts, Veneti and Ligurians up north in Transalpine Gaul. The Romans had a huge amount of citizen soldiers, but they had an even larger amount of allied troops who could be easily mustered.

Also, there was a reason why these Roman allies and their auxiliary soldiers had few complaints when it came to aiding Rome. Firstly, unlike Hellenistic powers that taxed the hell out of their provinces and relied largely on a core of professional highly paid mercenaries, the Romans had few if any taxes levied on their allies and left them alone as tiny autonomous powers with their own microstate republics and local constitutions (or in the case of an ally like Syracuse, on occasion it was an allied monarchy). They simply levied troops from these underling petty powers when needed. This was rather ingenious considering how the absence of a heavy-handed economic burden allowed each allied city-state and region to prosper and grow, and every once in a while the Romans simply required the adult sons of their households to join them in war.

For that matter Hannibal's strategy in Italy relied on cleaving these city-state allies away from Rome and over to the side of Carthage, with Capua and Taranto (Taras) as some the biggest prizes to be nabbed. Hannibal's army suffered from a lack of serious logistical help from the Carthaginian Senate and each battle meant his army that crossed the Rhone and then the Alps into Italy became smaller. He needed to gain allies and new recruits from the existing population groups in Italy, and found some very enthusiastic support from the Celts who had recently been conquered by Rome in northern Italy.

It also goes without saying that Roman auxiliary soldiers could be rewarded with Roman citizenship upon completion of military service, another incentive that became more appealing by the mid-Republic when Rome became a juggernaut projecting power across the entire Mediterranean. The Social War of the early 1st century BC was fought largely because Roman allies wanted Roman citizenship.

He does reach a similar conclusion near the end of the post though, comparing the socii to the already-existing systems of patronage in Roman society.

Although the other major point is that Rome simply lacked the manpower issues of its Mediterranean peers. The Seleucids and Ptolemies both had even bigger populations than Italy, but the problem was that they were dominated by a small Greek elite which didn't trust the native population. Additionally, for the Ptolemies at least AFAIK native Egyptian society was not very 'militarized' (unlike the Greeks and Romans) and the social institutions for 'mass mobilization' didn't exist (even native Pharaohs of the late period relied heavily on foreign mercenaries). Macedon suffered from the fact that there was a large amount of emigration to the eastern successors- effectively, the Ptolemies, Seleucids and Antigonids were all tapping the same manpower pool. Furthermore, Macedon wasn't able to tap the manpower of the southern Greek cities like Rome with the Italian socii (it was the reverse; they needed to install garrisons to keep the Greek cities under control).

With Carthage, they didn't have a strong tradition of citizen-soldiers (in the army anyway) like the Greeks and Romans did, instead relying on mercenaries and levies from peoples under their control. Again, they didn't really have a system like the socii.

Fundamentally, Rome's largest advantage relative to its competitors was resilience; the Romans still managed to win the Second Punic War even after the utter disaster of Cannae (a massacre which would have crippled any of Rome's contemporaries- or really almost any other pre-modern state).

[conon394]

Fundamentally, Rome's largest advantage relative to its competitors was resilience; the Romans still managed to win the Second Punic War even after the utter disaster of Cannae (a massacre which would have crippled any of Rome's contemporaries- or really almost any other pre-modern state).

Set against Roman manpower at the time its not that crippling. I would say the Plague at Athens was worse in a comparative scale (and worse again in demographic one since it cut across all the population) and the near period military losses. - and neither military operation nor state functions ceased.

Still a profound loss and it is a testament to the cohesion of the Roman Republic at the time that its resulted in Rome (and the majority of it allies) simply doubling down. It also fair to say when considering other polities Large wealthy ones like Persia or Carthage could sustain similar losses as long as they were at the periphery of their interests and largely involved paid for allies and mercenaries or non key subjects.

[Roma_Victrix]

Yes good point. Rome gave rewards up and down and across the scale of its society, from patrician to amicus to citizen to alae.

Thanks for sharing! You make some fantastic points about Republican Roman society versus those under Hellenistic monarchies. It's a situation that could be applied to other states across time as well. For instance, the effectiveness of armed forces under constitutional liberal democracies versus totalitarian dictatorships, police states or theocracies.

He does reach a similar conclusion near the end of the post though, comparing the socii to the already-existing systems of patronage in Roman society.

Thanks for the clarification! That is indeed a similar conclusion, especially with the comparison to contemporary Hellenistic powers and Carthage.

[Cyclops]

Set against Roman manpower at the time its not that crippling. I would say the Plague at Athens was worse in a comparative scale (and worse again in demographic one since it cut across all the population) and the near period military losses. - and neither military operation nor state functions ceased.

Yes the Democracy was a radical mobilising tool as the Demos saw directly the benefits of their decision making as the ships sailed back loaded with treasure, or their scapegoat exiled.

The plague as you say was a demographic disaster, were there 20-40,000 citizens and a similar number of metics at the time? Thats a very small population base and while the Athenians deepened it in Attica, they did not broaden it to other poleis (once they had unfied Attica into a single poleis). In fact they typically made (or at least allowed) colleague states into tributaries as often as possible.

[Alwyn]

For instance, Bringmann makes it pretty clear that long before the Marian reforms - which brought the lower class plebs into the fold as a major backbone of the late Republican Roman military - the wealthy patrician and equites class Roman citizen soldiers who could largely afford their own equipment were supported by an endless flood of allied auxiliaries. The latter came from the enormous patchwork of city-states of Italy (and beyond) who were allied to Rome, each with their own unique official treaty of alliance with the Roman Republic. These were generally not Latin colonies filled with Roman citizens, but rather included various Italic ethnic groups like the Umbrians and Samnites, as well as Greeks and Etruscans, and even the Celts, Veneti and Ligurians up north in Transalpine Gaul. The Romans had a huge amount of citizen soldiers, but they had an even larger amount of allied troops who could be easily mustered.

When you talk about an "endless flood" of auxiliaries, a "huge amount" of soldiers and an "even larger amount" of allies, it sounds like you're arguing that Devereaux is wrong because Rome did have a lot of manpower. As I see it, Devreaux's point wasn't that Rome lacked manpower - and he was arguing that every major power had plenty of manpower - so manpower alone can't explain why Rome beat the Carthaginians, Macedon and the Seleucids:

It isn't that the Romans just had more surplus manpower because, as we've noted here, the nature of ancient agriculture meant that everyone had lots of surplus manpower, with small farms generating little surplus because they supported families that, as units of labor, were much too large for their tiny farms. I work this out in the project with some modeling of typical smallholders, but the upshot is that the countryside was pretty much always going to be long on labor but short on agricultural (or other economic) surplus. But you need that surplus to support a population of non-farmers, to provide their wages, equipment and so on. The question was never finding a lot of farmers with not a lot to do (they were the one thing you had a lot of), the question was turning those farmers into soldiers, which was in turn about prying resources, not people out of the countryside. - Fireside Friday, October 28, 2022

As you, Cyclops, conon394 and Laser101 pointed out, this raises the question of why Rome won, if it wasn't a bigger supply of men. I agree, Cyclops made an a good point about how Rome managed to get its people invested in the success of its armies, compared to Hellenic states where the ruler would be the only real winner. Laser's contrast between Hellenic states where a small elite didn't trust the native population, combined with Rome's relience, makes sense too.

You mentioned that auxiliary soldiers were motivated by the opportunity to earn citizenship. Abdulmecid mentioned Rome's success in incorporating the elites of conquered regions - was this done by giving them Roman citizenship, as well as the comfortable lifestyle that Roman elites enjoyed? I'm wondering if citizenship runs like a thread through this, showing how Rome motivated conquered elites and auxiliaries - contrasted with the domination by a small elite in Hellenic states and the lack of a citizen-soldiers tradition in Carthage's army (as Laser mentioned).

Anthony Goldsworthy seems to agree that Rome's citizenship was a crucial factor in its resilience - but not the only factor.

The Romans were unique among ancient states in maintaining the principle of a citizen militia, but turning it into a force capable of standing up to a modern, professional army. Roman citizens accepted the burden of a harsh military discipline, in many cases for the duration of a war, during which time they were trained to a high level of efficiency. Polybius claimed that the total number of Roman citizens and allies liable to military service at the start of the Second Punic War was more than 700,000. Even if this claimed total is too large, the real figure was certainly considerable and allowed Rome to endure the appalling casualties inflicted on her by Hannibal and still raise more legions, as she had been able to do to cope with the equally terrible losses suffered at sea during the First Punic War. No other contemporary state could have weathered such disasters and still gone in to win the conflict - Anthony Goldsworthy, Roman Warfare p. 54 to 55

He goes on to explain that normally, when nations went to war in the 3rd century BC, a war would be won by gaining enough of an advantage that the enemy would negotiate a deal - but Rome's resilience meant that it kept on fighting until it won, after other nations would have conceded defeat.

I wonder if this debate is becoming not so much about 'manpower or mobilization', as about 'physical or psychological' reasons for Rome's victory. Devereaux seemed to be talking about physical factors ("Rome’s way of warfare seemed to be incredibly materiel intense; the Roman soldier was, man for man, the most expensive fellow on the battlefield"), while an alternative view is that psychological factors - the lure of citizenship, harsh military discipline and Rome's incredible resilience - mattered more.

[Roma_Victrix]

When you talk about an "endless flood" of auxiliaries, a "huge amount" of soldiers and an "even larger amount" of allies, it sounds like you're arguing that Devereaux is wrong because Rome did have a lot of manpower. As I see it, Devreaux's point wasn't that Rome lacked manpower - and he was arguing that every major power had plenty of manpower - so manpower alone can't explain why Rome beat the Carthaginians, Macedon and the Seleucids:



As you, Cyclops, conon394 and Laser101 pointed out, this raises the question of why Rome won, if it wasn't a bigger supply of men. I agree, Cyclops made an a good point about how Rome managed to get its people invested in the success of its armies, compared to Hellenic states where the ruler would be the only real winner. Laser's contrast between Hellenic states where a small elite didn't trust the native population, combined with Rome's relience, makes sense too.

You mentioned that auxiliary soldiers were motivated by the opportunity to earn citizenship. Abdulmecid mentioned Rome's success in incorporating the elites of conquered regions - was this done by giving them Roman citizenship, as well as the comfortable lifestyle that Roman elites enjoyed? I'm wondering if citizenship runs like a thread through this, showing how Rome motivated conquered elites and auxiliaries - contrasted with the domination by a small elite in Hellenic states and the lack of a citizen-soldiers tradition in Carthage's army (as Laser mentioned).

Anthony Goldsworthy seems to agree that Rome's citizenship was a crucial factor in its resilience - but not the only factor.



He goes on to explain that normally, when nations went to war in the 3rd century BC, a war would be won by gaining enough of an advantage that the enemy would negotiate a deal - but Rome's resilience meant that it kept on fighting until it won, after other nations would have conceded defeat.

I guess you could say not all but most native folk living under Hellenistic states didn't have much of a stake in things, and only occasionally intermarried with the Greek elite or were accepted as legal citizens of a local polis city-state within a larger kingdom under a basileus. Ptolemaic Alexandria comes to mind, where incredibly wealth native Egyptians were able to become "legally" Greek (Burstein, Reign of Cleopatra, 2004), but only after jumping through bureaucratic hoops, renouncing their original Egyptian culture, embracing the Greek pantheon, etc. The Ptolemies recruited native Egyptians only out of necessity, but for nearly a century after Ptolemy I Soter ignored them as a pool of recruits in favor of Greeks, Jews, and Galatian Celts as kleruchoi landholder soldiers. Native Egyptians to the south also rebelled in Upper Egypt for several decades during Ptolemaic rule with their own rival pharaohs. Most native Egyptians were simply farming peasants along the Nile, while the wealthy Egyptian priesthood remained loyal to the Ptolemies due to royal patronage.

The Seleucids in West Asia were perhaps far better at incorporating native Persian subjects and the monarchy itself was one of mixed Greek and Persian ancestry. However, their form of governance in Hellenistic kingship suffered from all the limitations that the Antigonids experienced in Macedon and that Cyclops outlined above. Pre-Marian and for that matter post-Marian Romans simply did not have these disadvantages. Rome had a highly motivated core of upper and middle class citizen soldiery whose entire lives were invested in keeping the Republic alive as a way to advance their own careers and families. Meanwhile, their allied auxiliaries were ruled with a relatively light hand with economic incentives to retain their military alliance and civic relationship with Rome.

I wonder if this debate is becoming not so much about 'manpower or mobilization', as about 'physical or psychological' reasons for Rome's victory. Devereaux seemed to be talking about physical factors ("Rome’s way of warfare seemed to be incredibly materiel intense; the Roman soldier was, man for man, the most expensive fellow on the battlefield"), while an alternative view is that psychological factors - the lure of citizenship, harsh military discipline and Rome's incredible resilience - mattered more.

That's a really fascinating subject to explore!

Aside from the personal, familial, career, and financial reasons for regular Roman citizens or allied auxiliaries to support the Republican Roman state, there were surely psychological factors as well. I'm suddenly reminded of Octavian's propaganda aimed at Mark Antony and his wife Cleopatra VII of Egypt, depicting Antony as being a brainwashed sycophantic tool of a dangerous sorceress and mysterious easterner whose revolting animal-headed gods were poised to destroy the good honest deities worshiped by the Romans. This sort of xenophobic stuff was preserved in Augustan era literature, despite the same Cleopatra being generally adored by the Roman public as "Venus Genetrix" when she was attached to Julius Caesar as his mistress (well, aside from figures like Cicero, who always hated her and was insulted that she failed to let him borrow books from the Library of Alexandria).


With that in mind, we shouldn't forget that the Romans were a religiously devout people. Some of their most impressive edifices were temples dedicated to the gods and goddesses. The state was responsible for their maintenance and care. For that matter, religion was woven into the state itself with institutions like the Vestal Virgins and College of Pontiffs led by the Pontifex Maximus. Considering how the latter was an elected position that eventually became open to plebeians, not just patrician families, this was yet another incentive for regular Romans to support the state, since the state itself upheld their polytheistic religion.

Also yes, the Roman military was incredibly harsh and disciplined, something that seemed to awe the historian Polybius a bit when he explained how Rome came to dominate affairs in the Mediterranean during the mid-2nd century BC. However, most Roman citizen soldiers didn't seem to buck at the thought of harsh discipline and were motivated by more than just shared spoils. As for the psychological factors in accepting this harsh military discipline, you could argue that for some Romans it was because they had an eye for politics and becoming a praetor or even a consul one day. In most states at the time moving up the social ladder was extremely difficult or even impossible, but in Rome a plebeian could serve out a military career, get elected to a series of offices, and have his family become prestigious after becoming a senator. People descended from consuls were the nobiles of the Republic, and this was generally open to everyone who had citizenship, was ambitious enough to climb the career ladder, and fortunate enough to win elections (also wealthy enough to win over voting blocks).

There were few states like this or even remotely comparable to this in antiquity. Regular citizens of Democratic Athens saw the fortunes of their household rise and fall, and they did have a stake in upholding their democratic state. However, Democratic Athens never constructed an allied support system like the socii Italici mentioned above, only the Delian League, in which members had to pay exorbitant fees that maintained the Athenian navy and enriched state coffers in Athens (the Romans did the opposite by not levying such taxes). While Athens did colonize and establish new poleis as a mother polis (for instance, Amphipolis along the Strymon River in Macedonia), this was hardly comparable to the widespread Latin Roman colonization of Italy coupled with Latin Roman colonization of distant regions like Iberia (Spain) as far back as the 2nd century BC.

[conon394]

Regular citizens of Democratic Athens saw the fortunes of their household rise and fall, and they did have a stake in upholding their democratic state. However, Democratic Athens never constructed an allied support system like the socii Italici mentioned above, only the Delian League, in which members had to pay exorbitant fees that maintained the Athenian navy and enriched state coffers in Athens (the Romans did the opposite by not levying such taxes). While Athens did colonize and establish new poleis as a mother polis (for instance, Amphipolis along the Strymon River in Macedonia), this was hardly comparable to the widespread Latin Roman colonization of Italy coupled with Latin Roman colonization of distant regions like Iberia (Spain) as far back as the 2nd century BC.

" in which members had to pay exorbitant fees that maintained the Athenian navy"

Err the Tribute was actually really quite low. And of course thus in general the members largely made choice for tribute over naval service themselves.

"and enriched state coffers in Athens"

Not really in the way you mean it

"(the Romans did the opposite by not levying such taxes)"

So the Ager Publicus and or the space for those colonies just expanded magically in the territory of the allies on land they were not using?


Aetyra in Aeolis was assessed 500 drachma a year. Had it provided military service instead it would have had to prove a Trireme. That was by consensus of historians working a couple different ways cost about 2 Talent to build and if you were fortunate it would last about 20 years. But by the end of that it be a slow 3rd rate ship so might pushing your luck that it would pass muster in any case (~600dr per year over the 20 years). One month of operations cost another Talent (for the crew). Add on The cost to the Trierarch of say and average 50 mina for a year... But lets assume Aetyra in Aeolis in the 5th century can pay less than the prices at Athens. So only 3000dr for the crew for a month and the Trierarch comes away at 30 mina (3000dr). All total 6600dr a year - assuming no early loss or significant damage. I can't see 500dr as 'exorbitant' (math works the same even for Aigina where you would think the Athenian would have been harsh)(*) ... Even if you work the numbers and assume say Athens brigaded all its one or two ship providers in some larger squadrons so that in any particular year there might not be call up you still can't walk the cost back to tribute not being a bargain.

Athens reversed the Roman model by setting the tax low it essentially encouraged most all the league members to drop military service. While Athens itself was thus stronger, in also maximized the potential human cost to Athens of a war vs to its allies. Rome's military only service created just the opposite by quickly producing allied military force that was larger than the Roman citizen one. Thus Rome minimized the risk to itself from aggressive wars and also the cost to field the army it was using and incentive to just keep expanding (since that was only way it could use the indirect 'tax' in imposed on it allies and the only way they rewarded for being loyal and chance to get somebody else's stuff.

On not constructing a larger state system. You got to be fair the Athenians never really had time. With ever hostile Persian and Sparta hanging about they less margin for error trying to turn the Delian league into a larger state. But you fail to consider different cultures. The Greeks by in large were not usually interested in integrating similar to the Roman model. compare for example how rare a successful Synoecism (verse just some sort of federation) by the classical era even just inside say Boeotia. The closest thing Athens could have done was use ispolities and that was an offer really only another democracy would likely consider.

Also the Roman oligarchy ended up with a excellent system for expansion. Basically both Comitia Centuriata and the rustic tribes allowed Rome to bury new citizens and the plebs in the system in such a way that the elite power was not threatened. Finley's "Politics in the Ancient World" as a pretty good and succinct run down on that. But also again it can't be overlooked Rome was an Oligarchy and thus pretty much got buy in from the local elites of the cites/polities it turned into allies. That can't be overstated. Consider the whining of the Mytileneans to Sparta on why they just had to rebel: They admit Athens was making no attempt to take their ships or impose democracy but the fear of such meant that they seemingly could not sleep at night and probably had to check under their beds for some hoi polloi boogeyman with a knife waiting to strike them down and vote in a democracy (oh and Athens would probably stop their bid the unite Lesbos by force under their rule).

Or in other words I think Rome got lucky. A Greek Polis be it Athens or Thebes or Syracuse all who had shots stepping up to the next level faced a generally hostile audience in a way Rome did not. It would be like like if Rome was surrounded by the apathy of Samnites on all sides, and the Samnites were dialed up to 11 and Carthage for reasons bankrolled them all the time.

* Too put that in perspective a skilled Flute girl at Athens also doing sexual services (in addition) could earn that in potentially only about 6 months work

[Cyclops]

" in which members had to pay exorbitant fees that maintained the Athenian navy"

...

It was too exorbitant for them, although you point about Big Brother Xerxes breathing down necks is a very fair one.

On not constructing a larger state system. You got to be fair the Athenians never really had time.

Yes and by the same token Athens never gave it time, absolute ADHD trainwreck Democratic decision making "find a way to win Sphakteria, parley that into a pretty strong upper hand I know, LETS TAKE SICILY" ffs they did it the first time round too, conquered most of Boeotia and pivoted into alliances in Cyprus and then invaded Egypt... trying to follow the decision making in the Boule is exhausting. The lack of domestic stability was of course a relic of Persia burning the joint but that kind of nervous energy was often self destructive. The genius that let them swim in the more troubled waters of the Aegean also drove them aground.

Also the Roman oligarchy ended up with a excellent system for expansion.

Yes the combination of buy in from elites you describe (so much better than me), as well as the nuanced buy in from lower levels made the borg work.

Or in other words I think Rome got lucky.

Oh no doubt. The Roman regional power wasn't the heavy handed Persia but a pretty distant Carthage with little interest in direct colonisation (indeed the were largely friendly to Roma for the first ~400 years I'm guessing) and one (1) itinerant Diadochi-lite monarch who went to Sicily and got rekt by Daddy Carthage. I love the Roman retcon of Pyhrrus, "haha we cleaned his clock by getting beat three times hahaha" Kutusov tier self aggrandisment.

That position tho. The first wave of Roman assimilation was the Latin League (100% culture match), then semi Hellenized Etruscans (75%? match) and Hellenic Poleis (maybe 50%?), both familiar with Poleis state structure, including tribal divisions, clientela systems, public priesthoods and magisterial offices and so on. The colony system was developed to bulldoze the Oscans out of the area, I imagine it wasn't so different to Phillip II's military colonies in Thrace so the Hellenes knew of it, even if they generally chose not to dilute their purity with foreigners or metics [spits].

Nothing new under the Roman sun, the just combined the ideas of others and made them work.

[conon394]

@Cyclops

I think we risk wondering to far OT. But my initial observations got me working an a batch of different posts that amount to Pericles and his war throwing Athens off the the trajectory they could have had partialy inspired by various recent publications so if you don't mind I think a further response to your points might be better had there more topically. But in passing - but for Nicias the Sicilian mission was perfectly fine. Do not buy the anti democratic rhetoric of the aristocrats and their look look democracy is erratic. Also note the Athenians never intended to take Sicily that is a fantasy of Thucydides creation. But be patient with me I maybe a day or two away from a better post for replying.

It was too exorbitant for them

Was it? It was less than any possible minimum cost of the military contribution Athens would have excepted as part of the League. Nor was the military contribution Rome demanded some how cost free to the locals - demanded absoultly for whatever war Rome decided to fight a war quite without any input. Note we seem to lack a Thucydides to preserve what discontentment Samnites thought of being Roman Allies.

[Laser101]

I guess you could say not all but most native folk living under Hellenistic states didn't have much of a stake in things, and only occasionally intermarried with the Greek elite or were accepted as legal citizens of a local polis city-state within a larger kingdom under a basileus. Ptolemaic Alexandria comes to mind, where incredibly wealth native Egyptians were able to become "legally" Greek (Burstein, Reign of Cleopatra, 2004), but only after jumping through bureaucratic hoops, renouncing their original Egyptian culture, embracing the Greek pantheon, etc. The Ptolemies recruited native Egyptians only out of necessity, but for nearly a century after Ptolemy I Soter ignored them as a pool of recruits in favor of Greeks, Jews, and Galatian Celts as kleruchoi landholder soldiers. Native Egyptians to the south also rebelled in Upper Egypt for several decades during Ptolemaic rule with their own rival pharaohs. Most native Egyptians were simply farming peasants along the Nile, while the wealthy Egyptian priesthood remained loyal to the Ptolemies due to royal patronage.

The Seleucids in West Asia were perhaps far better at incorporating native Persian subjects and the monarchy itself was one of mixed Greek and Persian ancestry. However, their form of governance in Hellenistic kingship suffered from all the limitations that the Antigonids experienced in Macedon and that Cyclops outlined above. Pre-Marian and for that matter post-Marian Romans simply did not have these disadvantages. Rome had a highly motivated core of upper and middle class citizen soldiery whose entire lives were invested in keeping the Republic alive as a way to advance their own careers and families. Meanwhile, their allied auxiliaries were ruled with a relatively light hand with economic incentives to retain their military alliance and civic relationship with Rome.



That's a really fascinating subject to explore!

Aside from the personal, familial, career, and financial reasons for regular Roman citizens or allied auxiliaries to support the Republican Roman state, there were surely psychological factors as well. I'm suddenly reminded of Octavian's propaganda aimed at Mark Antony and his wife Cleopatra VII of Egypt, depicting Antony as being a brainwashed sycophantic tool of a dangerous sorceress and mysterious easterner whose revolting animal-headed gods were poised to destroy the good honest deities worshiped by the Romans. This sort of xenophobic stuff was preserved in Augustan era literature, despite the same Cleopatra being generally adored by the Roman public as "Venus Genetrix" when she was attached to Julius Caesar as his mistress (well, aside from figures like Cicero, who always hated her and was insulted that she failed to let him borrow books from the Library of Alexandria).


With that in mind, we shouldn't forget that the Romans were a religiously devout people. Some of their most impressive edifices were temples dedicated to the gods and goddesses. The state was responsible for their maintenance and care. For that matter, religion was woven into the state itself with institutions like the Vestal Virgins and College of Pontiffs led by the Pontifex Maximus. Considering how the latter was an elected position that eventually became open to plebeians, not just patrician families, this was yet another incentive for regular Romans to support the state, since the state itself upheld their polytheistic religion.

Also yes, the Roman military was incredibly harsh and disciplined, something that seemed to awe the historian Polybius a bit when he explained how Rome came to dominate affairs in the Mediterranean during the mid-2nd century BC. However, most Roman citizen soldiers didn't seem to buck at the thought of harsh discipline and were motivated by more than just shared spoils. As for the psychological factors in accepting this harsh military discipline, you could argue that for some Romans it was because they had an eye for politics and becoming a praetor or even a consul one day. In most states at the time moving up the social ladder was extremely difficult or even impossible, but in Rome a plebeian could serve out a military career, get elected to a series of offices, and have his family become prestigious after becoming a senator. People descended from consuls were the nobiles of the Republic, and this was generally open to everyone who had citizenship, was ambitious enough to climb the career ladder, and fortunate enough to win elections (also wealthy enough to win over voting blocks).

There were few states like this or even remotely comparable to this in antiquity. Regular citizens of Democratic Athens saw the fortunes of their household rise and fall, and they did have a stake in upholding their democratic state. However, Democratic Athens never constructed an allied support system like the socii Italici mentioned above, only the Delian League, in which members had to pay exorbitant fees that maintained the Athenian navy and enriched state coffers in Athens (the Romans did the opposite by not levying such taxes). While Athens did colonize and establish new poleis as a mother polis (for instance, Amphipolis along the Strymon River in Macedonia), this was hardly comparable to the widespread Latin Roman colonization of Italy coupled with Latin Roman colonization of distant regions like Iberia (Spain) as far back as the 2nd century BC.

The difference in recruitment capabilities between Rome and the Hellenistic monarchies and why that difference existed is pretty clear. However, that leaves the question of Carthage, which was a city-state republic with a large number of allied clients and colonies, as Rome was. Yet clearly, Rome had the ability to recover from the defeat at Cannae (and previous similarly catastrophic defeats by Hannibal), while the defeat at Zama broke Carthage's war effort. So, why did Carthage lack Rome's apparent resilience? Why did Carthage not develop similar structures to Rome for its army?

[conon394]

The difference in recruitment capabilities between Rome and the Hellenistic monarchies and why that difference existed is pretty clear. However, that leaves the question of Carthage, which was a city-state republic with a large number of allied clients and colonies, as Rome was. Yet clearly, Rome had the ability to recover from the defeat at Cannae (and previous similarly catastrophic defeats by Hannibal), while the defeat at Zama broke Carthage's war effort. So, why did Carthage lack Rome's apparent resilience? Why did Carthage not develop similar structures to Rome for its army?

Probably impossible to answer given we don't have sufficient sources to really understand the the nuts and bolts of the Carthaginian polity. That said Zama was hardly a bolt from the blue. Carthage had been fighting for a long time by the time Zama happened. But I suppose sorta looking from the outside places like Libya and Spain were mostly held as vassals and the Deal was not such that Rome's potential competing offer was no worse. Same kind of goes for Numidia. Its not clear to me how much it was a vassal but as soon as another power could come knocking clearly Carthage did not provided a sufficiently good deal to make it deaf to the possibilities of hitching a ride with somebody else. As for the various Phoenician colonies again seems like Carthage did not truly have a Synoecism or even strong federation with them so again perhaps just not willing to last to the bitter end.

[Cyclops]

Probably impossible to answer given we don't have sufficient sources to really understand the the nuts and bolts of the Carthaginian polity.

This is a great shame. We have oblique references to Hanno's Gardening Book and I think the Romans burned the rest.

That said Zama was hardly a bolt from the blue. Carthage had been fighting for a long time by the time Zama happened. But I suppose sorta looking from the outside places like Libya and Spain were mostly held as vassals and the Deal was not such that Rome's potential competing offer was no worse. Same kind of goes for Numidia. Its not clear to me how much it was a vassal but as soon as another power could come knocking clearly Carthage did not provided a sufficiently good deal to make it deaf to the possibilities of hitching a ride with somebody else.

For me the lesson of Zama is Carthage could produce a killer army if they had a killer general, but their "stock standard" army 9and B tier armies down the list) couldn't match Rome's stock standard army, and Roman could cookie cut them out to dismantle the Barcid's colonial enterprise as well as face down the big guy. Scipio Africanus was obviously an above average general (I don't buy the "greater than Napoleon" line but certainly very competent), but Rome had more guys on the roster Hannibal had trouble with eg ol' Cunctator.

The lack of tighter bonds inside Libya showed up in the first Punic war, I believe Utica offered Rome alliance which would have been a fly in Carthage's ointment, except the Senate didn't want to be entangled at that point (they were still digesting Sicily, and maybe the theft of Corsica and Sardinia was on the cards).

As for the various Phoenician colonies again seems like Carthage did not truly have a Synoecism or even strong federation with them so again perhaps just not willing to last to the bitter end.

The history of Rome should be called "The Little Synoecism that Could". Its a fascinating political development in Hellas and Italy. Athens gets their right and leverages it to a local Empire. Sparta enacts one and gets a killer phalanx, but their political horizon is shorter than Athens There is some like a Synoecism in Boeotia when Thebes has its short day. Thessaly's loose union might have become tighter, and behaved pretty tightly under Phillip II's hand (thats the only foreign imposed Synoecism I can think of, and its not really one). Euboea never makes it, but I think it was a candidate. Megalopolis is the result of one. The Achaean and Aetolian Leagues could have tightened into Synoecisms I think. Maybe Krete and Kypros.

The mechanism was there. The Carthaginians knew about it.

JHave I got this right, the Roman/Latin colonae were genocide engines for oscans and later others, weren't they?" I don't mean they are death factories, but armed camps from which Roman culture creeped the countryside. The locals either zerged up to partake or were economically sidelined/lawyered off their land, is that right? So the Synoecism/Romanisation was for poleis and the like, but tribes got wiped or shaped up.

[conon394]

This is a great shame. We have oblique references to Hanno's Gardening Book and I think the Romans burned the rest.

Not sure how I stand on what internal information was lost per say directly at Roman hands. After all Utica was not sacked you would think if there were a ton of Punic texts to had Utica would have copies? In any case I am thinking that more like the bottle neck for a lot non christian text or 'pagan' text not valued by the christian church faced was just time and expense of copying. First what was transposed to codex (from rolls) and than of that what was deemed most important to recopy first. By that I mean one fine day in the 9th century when Brother Maynard maybe was looking at what new codex to copy pretty sure even if he said to himself well maybe somebody might want to read Aristotle's 158 constitutions (including Carthage but I mean even Athens did not make the cut), or Establiuos' epitome (I making that epitome up) of Clitomachus book about Carthage he wrote after he heard of its destruction (while head of the Academy at Athens) that would get pushed right out when the Abbot came down and said we trying open a new abbey near some pagan spot we need to rush some new bibles stat - I mean you Maynard stop what your doing nobody can even find Carthage on a map or least I could not when I saw the one in Rome on a Pilgrimage.

The lack of tighter bonds inside Libya showed up in the first Punic war, I believe Utica offered Rome alliance which would have been a fly in Carthage's ointment, except the Senate didn't want to be entangled at that point (they were still digesting Sicily, and maybe the theft of Corsica and Sardinia was on the cards).

Does suggest Carthage did not really achieve a some full isopolity with its fellow Phonetician colonies. When done with buy on both sides those relationships did not crack under pressure. Thus Samos, Plataea and Eleutherai, Hysiai, Oinoe and Oropos all stayed with Athens to the bitter end of Pericles' war.

Its a fascinating political development in Hellas and Italy. Athens gets their right and leverages it to a local Empire. Sparta enacts one and gets a killer phalanx, but their political horizon is shorter than Athens There is some like a Synoecism in Boeotia when Thebes has its short day. Thessaly's loose union might have become tighter, and behaved pretty tightly under Phillip II's hand (that's the only foreign imposed Synoecism I can think of, and its not really one). Euboea never makes it, but I think it was a candidate. Megalopolis is the result of one. The Achaean and Aetolian Leagues could have tightened into Synoecisms I think. Maybe Krete and Kypros.

The history of Rome should be called "The Little Synoecism that Could

'The Little Synoecism that Could plus' maybe. Your list of the Greeks is instructive. Although first I would drop Sparta they really conquered Lakonia and treated it as such. I would add Rhodes as a success (and surprisingly sold and late). But what emerges is that by the classical period is hard to even get a Synoecism in just inside of tradinal ethno-reginal limits amd there are lot of counter winds. Even a strong federation like in 4^th century Boeotia got enough push back that Thebes had to use some serious polis sacking muscle to hold it together. Really of all the examples only Athens stands out as washing past traditional regional/ethnic bounds (as something more than a federation/league). With the list I noted above into Boeotia and abortively with the failed democratic revolt it supported in Aigina. Given the steps Athens had taken to declare Aigina part of Athens up to the approval from Delphi and the fact the refugees from that were settled as citizens in Athens it seems clear it was a Synoecism attempt. But all those happened in the late archaic/very early classical period. The survival of a marriage exception in the Periclean citizenship law for Euboea seems to be a relic of that era as well.

The comparison to Rome is stark. Somehow Rome hit upon just the right deal and one that worked even beyond the Latins. There appears to have been less resistance to joining Rome than a Greek state faced expanding beyond its traditional ethno – regional boundary for many of the other Italian communities. That certainly allowed the republic to snowball to be large enough that even when it than ran into harder nuts (Samnites) or the culture gap that was wider (Greek colonies) there was nobody around to really make not picking Rome a viable choice (err only rational choice?). Maybe I suppose if Alexander had gone west (*) but no poorly resourced Spartan general or easily distracted (and under resourced) vainglorious fop like Pyrrhus was going to save you.

* I don't know why he would but just saying. And no Pyrrhus' failure says nothing about Alexander. Rome was weaker at the time and Alexander both as General and in terms of manpower and money vastly beyond killed by an old women guy.