Americans don’t like the idea of spheres of influence. The idea that large nations should push around small ones offends our sense of fair play.
We envision a world of plucky Davids, squaring off against autocratic Goliaths, with only American might available to right the balance and liberate the oppressed. And so when my colleague
Robert Kagan sounds a clarion call to deny spheres of influence to countries like Russia and China, he appeals to a basic and laudable American instinct.
Despite this instinct, this is not a concept that has long informed American practice. To the contrary, the U.S promulgated the Monroe Doctrine specifically to establish a sphere of influence. Similarly, Franklin Roosevelt’s “Four Policemen” concept for the post-World War II order, which evolved into the UN Security Council, saw the world run by great powers.
In the words of historians
Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, “[t]his distinction between great and small nations quickly became a fundamental element of all U.S. postwar planning.” Even during the Cold War, the U.S. rarely challenged the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, essentially standing aside as Soviet forces crushed uprisings in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.
But after the Cold War ended and the Soviet sphere of influence collapsed, the United States began to champion a new idea in international relations: even small countries have the right to determine their own foreign policy and join any alliance they like. It is an idea with inherent moral appeal. But it is not a coincidence that this new idea came at a time when there were no U.S. peer competitors, that is when there was no other game in town.
For potential regional powers watching this advance, the issue is not whether great powers get to have a sphere of influence. Being relatively powerful countries, they accept as inevitable and even desirable that the powerful will have special privileges in geopolitics. Rather, the issue is whether the U.S. sphere of influence will continue to go right up to their doorstep and threaten their autonomy, or whether they will be able to push it back.
Conflict is only inevitable if the United States behaves as great powers often have in the past and seeks to deny rising powers what they is feel their due, thus contributing to their sense of insecurity. Spheres of influence, in contrast, have the capacity to make great powers feel more secure and to increase their willingness to cooperate within the larger liberal world order.