Russia, US, Ukraine, and the Future

[z3n]

Although we don't have great visibility of Ukrainian losses at any level, apart from high level rough estimates from Zelenskyy. If we're seeing up to 100 KIA per day for Ukrainian forces, and many of the KIA are coming from Russian fires, then there's probably a spread of ranks.

And we have also seen indications over time that Ukraine (and perhaps with US intelligence assistance) has been deliberately targeting administrative nodes in Russia's command structure (easy to do when they're using cellphones ), so Russian generals don't have to be face to face with Ukraine's infantry. Just at the wrong forward base at the wrong time. I mean, Zelenskyy himself has spent time over the last week, within Russian artillery and air range so even he is one unlucky moment away from catastrophe.

The cellphone thing is very widespread among all armies in the world, in fact many of USAs military bases were fully mapped out using data from an exercise app.

Ukraine of course also uses cellphones, with Ukranian troops describing it as a necessary way to pass time in the trenches by playing video games.


____

While the West loses interest in the war, China has become more alarmed by the West's actions and harsher in its tone. Its messaging has been described as less impartial and it could be due to the study it ran about the economic ramifications of a similar sanctioning effect on its country to Russia. We now have China calling the sanctions "economic weaponisation" and "financial terrorism".

[AqD]

While the West loses interest in the war, China has become more alarmed by the West's actions and harsher in its tone. Its messaging has been described as less impartial and it could be due to the study it ran about the economic ramifications of a similar sanctioning effect on its country to Russia. We now have China calling the sanctions "economic weaponisation" and "financial terrorism".

CCP has always seen the West as the enemy. On the other hand it's great we showed them what the West is capable of doing if pushed too far - they need to be constantly reminded of that in order to behave.

[conon394]

The cellphone thing is very widespread among all armies in the world, in fact many of USAs military bases were fully mapped out using data from an exercise app.

Depends. Its not anyone could not use sat data anyway to map out US bases. But say in boot cap you do practice no devices and only approved communications methods. The question really is why has Russia's secure comms fared so poorly after much toted nominal implementation.

[Cyclops]

Russia still not declaring a war as they rain missiles on Kyiv. No wonder Putin leaves the propaganda to apologists, the man is made of lies.

...Russia's lack of NCO corps isn't the real problem. People don't realize the Ukrainians themselves don't have a large NCO corps. They still somewhat fight based on Soviet doctrine.

From what I've been told the last 6-8 years have been about changing the doctrine to be compatible with NATO and EU models, and shortening command chains, so I think they do have relatively more in terms of function.

Yet the Ukrainians don't seem to have their generals dying at the same rate as the Russians...

The discussion about phones has been interesting, but its clear there's a huge intel imbalance: the sheer weight of western intel capability including boots on the ground means the Ukrainians are far more likely to know where the Russian generals are (as they knew where the VDV were, and where the fuel trucks were in the invasion columns, where the Moskva's blindspots were etc etc).

The low morale of Russian troops unaware of the war's purpose or the plan until moments before they entered Ukraine is probably a factor, Ukrainian morale has been boosted by a lot of resources, specific planning, and training so they haven't had to walk their generals around the front to boost morale. There's nothing like knowing what you're doing to instil confidence.

The lack of specific training, public doublespeak ("no war in Ukraine"), poorly communicated plans etc has made the Russians look far worse than they probably are: if you started an invasion of Russia I think they'd fight like hell, but I'm guessing the ordinary Russian can see this operation is bull****.

[Love Mountain]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-g...181140936.html

A reporter of the Russian state media is claiming that another Russian general has been killed in Ukraine. How many is that now confirmed?

Unknown, but the number of generals killed in this war has been unreliable. A major general is typically a commander of an individual division or brigade. It is a sub-component of an Army, which is commanded by a Colonel or Lieutenant General, which is a sub-unit of a military district, which will be commanded by an Army or a Colonel General.
The loss of generals is not necessarily crippling, and Russian generals do tend to operate from the front, so I don't think it is unusual for Russian generals to be on the front-line or a sign of weakness. It's a different managerial style. I imagine many Western troops would prefer this kind of management, as I am friends with a few servicemen myself, the "out-of-touch" senior command is not an uncommon trope.

The bigger issue for Russia is clearly OPSEC and intelligence in general. They have been completely outwitted in this area and I wouldn't be surprised if U.K. and USA intelligence is continually feeding very reliable intel to Ukrainians. Clearly, the edge has gone heavily in the West's corner.

Although we don't have great visibility of Ukrainian losses at any level, apart from high level rough estimates from Zelenskyy. If we're seeing up to 100 KIA per day for Ukrainian forces, and many of the KIA are coming from Russian fires, then there's probably a spread of ranks.

And we have also seen indications over time that Ukraine (and perhaps with US intelligence assistance) has been deliberately targeting administrative nodes in Russia's command structure (easy to do when they're using cellphones ), so Russian generals don't have to be face to face with Ukraine's infantry. Just at the wrong forward base at the wrong time. I mean, Zelenskyy himself has spent time over the last week, within Russian artillery and air range so even he is one unlucky moment away from catastrophe.

I don't think moving Zelensky to the salient was necessarily a great challenge. It's not hard to keep a secret when only a few men know it. It is also likely that Russia prefers Zelensky to an uncertain alternative. The risk here was great simply because something could always go wrong, and your only upside is a photo-op.

Honestly, the issue with Russian generals is heavily overplayed, as are a lot of things about this conflict. There are a lot of weaknesses that have been exposed in Russia's army, but the causes behind these failures have been self-inflicted much more often than not. This has been a catastrophic campaign for Russia, but to this day, Russia continues to severely tie its hands because they believe they can win without resorting to damaging their economy and political stability even further. To be fair, it does indeed appear that Russia can still win this fight, and even achieve more goals than merely Donbass.

A couple other things that have been heavily overplayed, in my opinion, is the idea that the West has lost interest. Yeah, the public may have, but all the important policy-makers obviously haven't. Aid continues to be plentiful and regularly delivered. Furthermore, nobody in the West appears to be reluctant to seriously cut off the flow of aid or negotiate with Putin without Zelensky's consent. So this idea that the West is getting bored with Ukraine is, in my opinion, just not true.

From what I've been told the last 6-8 years have been about changing the doctrine to be compatible with NATO and EU models, and shortening command chains, so I think they do have relatively more in terms of function.

It's wishful thinking. Ukraine's military has transformed since 2014, but it hasn't surpassed Russia's or transformed into a NATO army. In fact, all the analysts touting how Ukraine's "small-unit" tactics have outclassed Russia's military rely solely on clips of ATGM teams taking down Russian columns. Literally every major offensive that Ukraine has made, failed to achieve its operational objectives. Strategically Ukraine has been a decent player, but that's kind of my point. For example, Russia withdrew from Kiev because it became strategically untenable to maintain that offensive, not because Russia ran into a brick wall and were forced out by 4D chess moves from Ukraine's army.

In fact, I would argue that tactically, Russia is generally better than Ukrainian forces and have shown the ability to take heavily contested ground despite not having anywhere near the amount of forces you'd want for offensive actions they are making.

The low morale of Russian troops unaware of the war's purpose or the plan until moments before they entered Ukraine is probably a factor, Ukrainian morale has been boosted by a lot of resources, specific planning, and training so they haven't had to walk their generals around the front to boost morale. There's nothing like knowing what you're doing to instil confidence.

I don't think we can know anything about Russian morale. Certainly, there are troops with low morale, but there are plenty of motivated troops. A fierce battle like Popasna, would not be possible by troops who do not want to fight. Majority of Russian troops are contract soldiers, and whatever their discipline issues are, they are professional soldiers. A lot of commentary and analysis regarding this war is coming from sources that simply did not specialize in this area before and are relying on a limited data sample.

This is literally the mistake Germany made in the aftermath of the Winter War. I don't think we want to emulate the side that lost the Second World War.

The lack of specific training, public doublespeak ("no war in Ukraine"), poorly communicated plans etc has made the Russians look far worse than they probably are: if you started an invasion of Russia I think they'd fight like hell, but I'm guessing the ordinary Russian can see this operation is bull****.

The average Russian believes in their country and believes Putin, and even if they were fiercely opposed to the war, they will support the troops and the war effort if the alternative is the Treaty of Versailles, which, just looking at this Forum specifically, plenty of users want. Do you think the average Russian would be agreeable to such an outcome? Of course not.

Speaking for myself, if United States was found fighting an immoral war (*cough* *cough*), on a backfoot, and in danger of losing that war, I would definitely not vote for a Politician who would surrender on bad terms when I think we could find until the end. Regardless of what immoral thing somebody is alleging that United States did, I would not agree to a complete humiliation and destruction of my country. I'm sure many people here can sympathize with that position.

[conon394]

In fact, I would argue that tactically, Russia is generally better than Ukrainian forces and have shown the ability to take heavily contested ground despite not having anywhere near the amount of forces you'd want for offensive actions they are making.

Not sure that statement is justified. They have shown the ability to contested ground when they limit themselves to an ever shrinking set of goals and effectively abandoning lots of or allowing other axis of attack in the now small encirclement to grind to a halt.

Literally every major offensive that Ukraine has made, failed to achieve its operational objectives

Given that only very recently has the Ukraine started to have something close to the scale of artillery Russia brought to the fight and Russia almost certainly can achieve local air superiority near Russian boards, Russia has had a real edge vs any Ukrainian advance.

edit I would think to really achieve a significant advance Ukraine would things like a US comparable armored brigade and more than one. So far as June 1st it only Maybe 18 - 20+ modern 155 SP systems delivered (around April to may) and just 4 MRLS for training in recent weeks. Sure if all the deliveries and what not pan out they might have 150+ modern SP to use by mid to late June. But still I think thay also have to risk massing the Air defense to cover any such advance even by rested and upgraded units. That means stripping other areas. unless Germany actually manages to deliver the IRIS-T SLs in some kind of timely manner I be a little risk adverse about running out my nifty new SP out of a solid air defense shield.

[Lord Thesaurian]

Not sure that statement is justified. They have shown the ability to contested ground when them llimit themselves to a ever shrinking set of goals and effectively abandoning lots of or allowing other axis of attack in the now small encirclement to grind to a halt.

Given that only very recently has the Ukrain started to have something close to the scale of Russian artillery and Russia almost certainly can achieve local air superiority near Russian boards, Russia has had a real edge vs any Ukrainian advance.

Kremlin talking points can be laundered any number of different ways, and one of them is to argue via “analysis” that Russia isn’t underperforming but actually getting stronger to achieve justifiable objectives, that Ukrainian forces are the ones underperforming and will collapse any day now so they ought to just give up, and btw what about America doing something bad, etc. It deserves about as much attention as any of the other generic appeals to hypocrisy emanating from the Kremlin for the last century.

[conon394]

Kremlin talking points can be laundered any number of different ways, and one of them is to argue via “analysis” that Russia isn’t underperforming but actually getting stronger to achieve justifiable objectives, that Ukrainian forces are the ones underperforming and will collapse any day now so they ought to just give up, and btw what about America doing something bad, etc. It deserves about as much attention as any of the other generic appeals to hypocrisy emanating from the Kremlin for the last century.

Well in reality it seems will know as Severondonetsk plays out. It informative that Russia has chosen to directly assault the city seems a mistake and sign they could not pull off an encirclement and isolation of it. The counter claims would seem to suggest at best we can say the fighting in continuous. Only some time will clear up if Russia is getting suckered into a meat grinder. Or if Ukraine is making the mistake and contesting someplace at too high a cost and they should keep trading space for time and a better fight with the Russian having a longer logistical line and maybe out running their artillery.


If the industrial district that seems like the one Ukraine very much still holds is like the one in Mariupol the ideal of Ukraine pinning Russian forces might be thing since here the town is range both sides artillery. So he who has the better bunkers might be the winner. But again who knows.

[fkizz]

This is literally the mistake Germany made in the aftermath of the Winter War. I don't think we want to emulate the side that lost the Second World War.

This is my biggest fear in the middle of all of this.

That said, Russian morale can be estimated to be low, hipothetically. One thing is russian soldiers killing foreigners on syria, another is russian AF using their weapons to kill ethnic russians en mass with the background story of "fascism", badly defined casus belli that many believed and is easily dispelled in anyone's minds after a while.

Gives a flavour of civil unrest/civil warfare rather than conquest.

[Lord Thesaurian]

Well in reality it seems will know as Severondonetsk plays out. It informative that Russia has chosen to directly assault the city seems a mistake and sign they could not pull off an encirclement and isolation of it. The counter claims would seem to suggest at best we can say the fighting in continuous. Only some time will clear up if Russia is getting suckered into a meat grinder. Or if Ukraine is making the mistake and contesting someplace at too high a cost and they should keep trading space for time and a better fight with the Russian having a longer logistical line and maybe out running their artillery.


If the industrial district that seems like the one Ukraine very much still holds is like the one in Mariupol the ideal of Ukraine pinning Russian forces might be thing since here the town is range both sides artillery. So he who has the better bunkers might be the winner. But again who knows.

I don’t doubt things may end up making s turn for the worse for the Ukrainians operationally, especially if Putin is compelled to order a general mobilization by the risk of running out of resources to prosecute his war. It’s a war of attrition at this point and IMO that will come down to the speed and efficiency with which Ukrainian forces are able to learn and deploy western weaponry. Wester intel is certainly a great boost but neither would I undersell the excellence of Ukraine’s human intel network in their own country and potentially even in Russia. The Ukrainians will have to continue punching well above their weight if they’re going to outlast the Russians, and that will become more difficult as supplies of the most effective western weapons are depleted and Russian artillery completely levels more and more civilian infrastructure. In any event the West must ensure Russian expansion ends in Ukraine for good and is unable to entertain any of Putin’s broader aims in the former Soviet bloc. Otherwise, the risk of a confrontation with NATO becomes all but certain.

[Love Mountain]

Not sure that statement is justified. They have shown the ability to contested ground when they limit themselves to an ever shrinking set of goals and effectively abandoning lots of or allowing other axis of attack in the now small encirclement to grind to a halt.

I'm not sure what exactly has been "abandoned" since the withdrawal from Kiev. It doesn't appear that any of the goals surrounding Donbass have been scaled back. On the other hand, Ukraine has achieved what exactly, tactically speaking? I suppose they managed to push Russia back about 10-15 kilometers further back from Kharkiv, but their own stated goal of pushing Russia back to its own borders in Kharkiv (a perfectly reasonable benchmark) has not been met.

Given that only very recently has the Ukraine started to have something close to the scale of artillery Russia brought to the fight and Russia almost certainly can achieve local air superiority near Russian boards, Russia has had a real edge vs any Ukrainian advance.

edit I would think to really achieve a significant advance Ukraine would things like a US comparable armored brigade and more than one. So far as June 1st it only Maybe 18 - 20+ modern 155 SP systems delivered (around April to may) and just 4 MRLS for training in recent weeks. Sure if all the deliveries and what not pan out they might have 150+ modern SP to use by mid to late June. But still I think thay also have to risk massing the Air defense to cover any such advance even by rested and upgraded units. That means stripping other areas. unless Germany actually manages to deliver the IRIS-T SLs in some kind of timely manner I be a little risk adverse about running out my nifty new SP out of a solid air defense shield.

Ukraine has had lots of artillery before the war, and the exact same inventory that Russia had. Ukraine had questionable ammo stockpiles for it, and they were clearly not as prepared for attrition. On the other hand, they had much better Western intelligence and even better Western equipment as time went on.

So if anything, Ukraine has more tactical options when it comes to artillery, spotting, and battery fire. Of course Russia has much more freedom thanks to air superiority, but all I hear from Western analysts is that Russia is unable to suppress Ukraine's artillery. So which one is it? Is Russia's edge in air superiority ineffective or does Ukraine have a tremendous disadvantage in the artillery they have an how they can employ it? You can't have it both ways.

Kremlin talking points can be laundered any number of different ways, and one of them is to argue via “analysis” that Russia isn’t underperforming but actually getting stronger to achieve justifiable objectives, that Ukrainian forces are the ones underperforming and will collapse any day now so they ought to just give up, and btw what about America doing something bad, etc. It deserves about as much attention as any of the other generic appeals to hypocrisy emanating from the Kremlin for the last century.

This is quite literally the other way around. I've been hearing about the imminent Russian collapse any day now. Some, in this very thread. Of course it is possible that Russia could give up tomorrow, but after 90 days of hearing "Russia's defeat is imminent" it's quite obvious that the analytical power behind such predictions is no better than that of trained parrot.

[fkizz]

I'm not sure what exactly has been "abandoned" since the withdrawal from Kiev. It doesn't appear that any of the goals surrounding Donbass have been scaled back. On the other hand, Ukraine has achieved what exactly, tactically speaking? I suppose they managed to push Russia back about 10-15 kilometers further back from Kharkiv, but their own stated goal of pushing Russia back to its own borders in Kharkiv (a perfectly reasonable benchmark) has not been met.

Russia's army can take a lot of casualties and regard it as normal, not as casualty adverse as western armies, and in a way russia is too big to fail.

The issue is that current status of war denial at home but "special military operation" puts Putin's face in this even more than in the Chechen wars. Meaning the war is fueled by Political Capitial that Putin acumulated all these years. The curious is how long can Putin's Political Capital be spent in a war of attrition, leading to a Kremlin Political defeat even if Russia doesn't colapse, or remains entrenched in Eastern Ukraine; an unpopular protracted war can have serious political effects at home.

I say this based on Portuguese Colonial War, where despite Military Victory, the populace was so fed with the whole issue we had a Political and therefore Strategic Defeat. (counter intuitive, we won in the fighting part for the colonies but populace was fed of issues around them putting it in tl;dr)

The issue isn't how long can Russia last but how long can Putin last without suffering penalties in Kremlin's power game. The neutralization of his political/power rivals done has a limit in terms of buying some time, so if the war drags on to long term, it's a different game.

[Love Mountain]

The Russian Army has taken heavy casualties relative to modern conflict, but it hasn't taken crippling casualties in personnel yet, and it doesn't appear to be bleeding that many men in the last 60 days. The war effort is still, at least on the surface, well maintained and sufficiently manned. Yes, there is a clear shortage of manpower and infantry, but Russia appears to be willing to work within these limitations for the sake of not declaring war. This appears to be sustainable in the near-term.

On the other hand, we still don't know anything about Ukrainian casualties, but they are steadily losing ground, even if this progress is very slow.

[conon394]

The Russian Army has taken heavy casualties relative to modern conflict, but it hasn't taken crippling casualties in personnel yet, and it doesn't appear to be bleeding that many men in the last 60 days. The war effort is still, at least on the surface, well maintained and sufficiently manned. Yes, there is a clear shortage of manpower and infantry, but Russia appears to be willing to work within these limitations for the sake of not declaring war. This appears to be sustainable in the near-term.

On the other hand, we still don't know anything about Ukrainian casualties, but they are steadily losing ground, even if this progress is very slow.

They are steady loosing ground except where they are not...

But I think one thing is abundantly clear is that more or less nobody was ready for a peer war or effectively a peer war on the scale of Korea or Vietnam. Certainly NATO should consider how thin its system of reserves are or stockpiles or days of ammunition and production or repair capacity. etc. Even the US umm well so Raythion when do think you could build more stingers??? (although seem like the US should just buy the Polish Piorun).

I agree we don't no what casualties the Ukrainians are taking.

Unless Ukraine moral collapses or Russia does score a true breakthrough someplace, it does seem to me Russian incremental progress now has to tempered against what Ukraine might do in say another 4-6 weeks when the real flood gate of NATO equipment has a general impact.

[Love Mountain]

They are steady loosing ground except where they are not...

The only meaningful ground Ukraine has taken is in Kharkiv, and that was over a month ago. Plus, they failed to achieve their objective there.

We can all look at the most pro-Ukraine maps published by Western think tanks. May 3rd. June 6th.

It's in vogue to be in collective denial about Ukraine's lack of progress and how bad Russia's military is, but I think we can all do a little better than that.

But I think one thing is abundantly clear is that more or less nobody was ready for a peer war or effectively a peer war on the scale of Korea or Vietnam. Certainly NATO should consider how thin its system of reserves are or stockpiles or days of ammunition and production or repair capacity. etc. Even the US umm well so Raythion when do think you could build more stingers??? (although seem like the US should just buy the Polish Piorun).

I agree we don't no what casualties the Ukrainians are taking.

Unless Ukraine moral collapses or Russia does score a true breakthrough someplace, it does seem to me Russian incremental progress now has to tempered against what Ukraine might do in say another 4-6 weeks when the real flood gate of NATO equipment has a general impact.

I think there are some really good parallels to draw from this conflict to Vietnam and 2003 Iraq.

1) Vietnam won that war. Does that mean Vietnam was tactically better than United States?
2) What planning, capabilities, and proficiencies did United States have in 2003 that Russia did not have today?
3) Was Vietnam winnable and could Iraq have put up a much tougher fight?

I think an honest answer or discussion of those questions highlights a lot of the points and arguments I've been making about Russia's military in this conflict.

Lastly, I'm honestly a lot less concerned about NATO's ability to fight, and a lot more concerned about whether United States is ready for an actual conflict of our choosing where we have to manage the humanitarian damage. The woefully inadequate response to the refugee crisis from both Venezuela and Ukraine, demonstrates to me that we neither have the ability to take leadership in this area, nor do we want to. Which is a layer of disgusting all by itself but I digress.

[Ludicus]

Boris said today that Ukraine should not be pushed to accept a peace deal, because it might be a bad deal. I say a bad deal is better than a good war. (Mass scale devastation)

[z3n]

Not sure that statement is justified. They have shown the ability to contested ground when they limit themselves to an ever shrinking set of goals and effectively abandoning lots of or allowing other axis of attack in the now small encirclement to grind to a halt.



Given that only very recently has the Ukraine started to have something close to the scale of artillery Russia brought to the fight and Russia almost certainly can achieve local air superiority near Russian boards, Russia has had a real edge vs any Ukrainian advance.

edit I would think to really achieve a significant advance Ukraine would things like a US comparable armored brigade and more than one. So far as June 1st it only Maybe 18 - 20+ modern 155 SP systems delivered (around April to may) and just 4 MRLS for training in recent weeks. Sure if all the deliveries and what not pan out they might have 150+ modern SP to use by mid to late June. But still I think thay also have to risk massing the Air defense to cover any such advance even by rested and upgraded units. That means stripping other areas. unless Germany actually manages to deliver the IRIS-T SLs in some kind of timely manner I be a little risk adverse about running out my nifty new SP out of a solid air defense shield.

Ukraine definitely does not have anywhere close to Russias artillery, only USAs entire artillery arsenal has anything remotely close to matching Russias artillery. We in the West have largely relied on airstrikes instead of artillery, Russia conversely believes in its anti air batteries and artillery batteries.

Last I checked the situation on the ground was for every one Ukranian artillery shell Russia fires back 10 or 15. It's very demoralizing for Ukranian troops as you can see by the link, they're going into shell-shock and it's said there's 500 wounded Ukranian troops a day. The troops complain wounded men are worse than dead ones. Long story short, Ukraine isn't doing well in the artillery war.


___
To pull a few quotes from the article:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Here's the commentary about ten or fifteen artillery shells hitting them:

He said facing down such artillery bombardments is daunting and devastating for Ukrainian soldiers.



“Russian artillery is shooting from morning until evening,” said Volodymyr Pohorilyy, 43, intelligence commander of the Dnipro-1 battalion, which holds several key positions in the region. “If our side shoots one their way, we get 10 or 15 back.”

And then the commentary about the amount of firepower from the Russian artillery:

“The amount of firepower, the number of explosions, the length and duration of the attacks — all of that together, and the fact that you can’t defend against it, you can’t shoot down the rounds, means it’s a lot of casualties and it is also incredibly demoralizing,” Kagan said. “It is disorienting. This is where ‘shell shock’ comes from.”

Surprisingly, Washington Post is the only western media outlet I've seen that acknowledges the range differential is favourable to the Russian artillery like the Iskander in comparison to the HIMARS systems lesser range.

Ukraine’s losses are mounting as Ukraine awaits further assistance from the West. The Biden administration is sending Ukraine M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, commonly known as HIMARS, but U.S. officials have said it will take about three weeks to train Ukrainian forces after they arrive. Russia possesses artillery with longer ranges, allowing Moscow to strike Ukrainian troops from afar. Kyiv lacks such equipment, and has less ammunition.



In interviews with nearly two dozen troops in recent days, many bemoaned their lack of adequate ammunition, saying they will be unable to push back the Russians and regain Ukrainian territory without significant assistance. Several troops reached by phone Friday said major shelling attacks were underway in the key hubs of Slovyansk and Bakhmut.


The situation has been challenging for Ukrainian military morale. Artillery shells cover a wide radius when they explode, sending life-threatening shards of metal in all directions. Russia also has been using TOS-1A systems firing thermobaric warheads, sometimes called vacuum bombs, which can kill soldiers even in trenches by unleashing multiple pressure blast waves.

Here's some casualty figures from a local fighter in Rubizhne:

Alexiy Holovko, 29, who belongs to the Dnipro-1 battalion, spent more than a month working as a doctor in the trenches in Rubizhne, where he said at least 10 soldiers were wounded each day. Sometimes, he said, they would be patched up and then head right back out to fight. The wounds were almost entirely from long-distance shelling.


“We haven’t seen the enemy in the eyes a lot,” he said.

About artillery strikes:

“They’re in hell,” Bereza called out from across the room
.


The Russians are “firing everything at them,” Bazulin said of his troops in Zolote. “We don’t always understand where they’re shooting from.”





Even after they come under intense shelling, he said, they are sometimes left with no option but to stay put and risk being hit again.



“I can’t go left or right because then I’ll have an empty space,” he said. “I can’t go forward because there are Russians there. I can’t go backward because then I’d be pulling back.”

The constant artillery attacks are also challenging Ukraine’s ability to reinforce positions and hold current territory.

All in all, this is an artillery war now. Everybody recognizes that. The problem is, Ukraine won't have enough artillery unless USA sends literally their entire arsenal; which I don't think is going to happen.

[Ludicus]

I say this based on Portuguese Colonial War, where despite Military Victory, the populace was so fed with the whole issue we had a Political and therefore Strategic Defeat

A military victory in Angola in 1973.But..for how long?... A painful stalemate in Mozambique and a total defeat in Guinea. Remember, in the 1970's, colonies were an anachronism. Your/our country, being the first to acquire an overseas empire, was the last European country to renounce it, able to resist the growing tide of the African nationalism for well over a decade longer than other European powers. Enough was enough.Only hegemonic powers can have the luxury of possessing colonies without appearing to be colonies.

--
Russian assault on Sievierodonetsk redoubled .

[conon394]

Boris said today that Ukraine should not be pushed to accept a peace deal, because it might be a bad deal. I say a bad deal is better than a good war. (Mass scale devastation)

So you are chill with living in Putin occupied whatever country you are in? I'm sure there are tons of people in the ROK who are glad Truman did not have you for an advisor.

[fkizz]

A military victory in Angola in 1973.But..for how long?... A painful stalemate in Mozambique and a total defeat in Guinea.

Angola and Mozambique were feasible. Guiné was a very different matter because of amphibious warfare and the island being supplied with the newest AA artillery by USSR.

Kinda the same dilema/problem China would have with an invasion of Tawain, despite size difference.

Enough was enough.Only hegemonic powers can have the luxury of possessing colonies without appearing to be colonies.

There was a lot of dumb in policy making, like not giving the colonies their own parliament and representative government, or not striking a deal with Goa/Diu. India was willing for diplomatic resolution and didn't want to resort to force due to Gandhi ideas still being freshly popular among populace. Our policy makers seriously screwed it up.

There was also some self sabotage in the AF. But the representatives of Estado Novo kept for the most irrealistic and rigid expectations possible.. which led to an inevitable exaustion and colapse of the country's moral and therefore political defeat after 13 years.. to the point not even military victory would stir up morale and willingness to fight anymore.