This report examines a range of possible means to extend Russia...we seek to define areas where the United States can do so to its advantage
these steps are conceived of as elements in a campaign designed to unbalance the adversary, leading Russia to compete in domains or regions where the United States has a competitive advantage, and
causing Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or causing the regime to lose domestic and/or international prestige and influence.
The Ukrainian military already is bleeding Russia in the Donbass region (and vice versa).Providing more U.S. military equipment and advice could lead Russia to increase its direct involvement in the conflict and the price it pays for it.
In the Caucasus, the United States has fewer options to extend Russia.
Likewise, the United States is not in a strong position to challenge Russian influence in Central Asia for similar geographic reasons.
Increasing military advice and arms supplies to Ukraine is the most feasible of these options with the largest impact
The best cost-imposing strategies are those that would incorporate a combination of approaches that are affordable for the United States, and generate enough anxiety in Moscow that Russia would be prompted to invest in costly defensive (or counteroffensive) measures.
More-aggressive U.S. and allied patrolling near Russian naval base areas could cause Russia to adopt expensive countermeasures.
The principal limiting factor in most of these maritime strategies is that Russia could simply choose not to compete.
Blue-water navies are expensive, and Russia, primarily a land power, might not want to invest significant resources into challenging the United States and NATO for command of even nearby seas.
The most promising measures to stress Russia are those which directly address these vulnerabilities, anxieties, and strengths, exploiting areas of weakness while undermining Russia’s current advantages.
Sanctions can also limit Russia’s economic potential. To be effective, however, these need to be multilateral, involving (at a minimum) the European Union, which is Russia’s largest customer.
Russia is not seeking parity with the United States across the military spectrum.
For instance, Russia is not going to challenge U.S. dominance of the world’s oceans. Targeted measures focused on threatening what limited maritime access Russia enjoys to the Arctic, Baltic, and Black Seas, however, could lead Russia to invest in costly and largely ineffective countermeasures.
Most of the steps covered in this report are in some sense escalatory, and most would likely prompt some Russian counterescalation.
The United States can select from a range of approaches for extending Russia that emphasize different strategic objectives.
some of these measures would require the participation of allies to be effective.
This report examines a variety of measures that the United States and its friends and allies
might take to extend Russia. Most fall into the category known as cost-imposing strategies, the purpose of which is to place a burden on a potential adversary that is greater than would have been imposed otherwise and is ideally less than the burden undertaken by the imposing side.
Importantly, increasing Russian fear and anxiety are only instruments in encouraging Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically.
Chapter four- Geopolitical measures, page 95
This chapter describes six possible U.S. moves in the current geopolitical competition: providing lethal arms to Ukraine, resuming support to the Syrian rebels, promoting regime change in Belarus, exploiting Armenian and Azeri tensions, intensifying attention to Central Asia, and isolating Transnistria. There are several other possible geopolitical moves...including intensifying NATO’s relationship with Sweden and Finland.
Measure 1: Provide Lethal Aid to Ukraine
Expanding U.S. assistance to Ukraine, including lethal military assistance, would likely increase the costs to Russia, in both blood and treasure, of holding the Donbass region.
Russia might counter-escalate, committing more troops and pushing them deeper into Ukraine. Russia might even pre-empt U.S. action, escalating before any additional U.S. aid arrives.
Such escalation might extend Russia; Eastern Ukraine is already a drain. Taking more of Ukraine might only increase the burden, albeit at the expense of the Ukrainian people.
From a U.S. policy standpoint, Belarus’ unrest might present an opportunity to extend Russia by aiding the opposition. Promoting regime change in Belarus is one of the most escalatory options considered in this report. Such an effort probably would not succeed and could provoke a strong Russian response, including the possibility of military action. Such a reaction might extend Russia by requiring the nation to commit resources to preserve its grasp over Belarus, thereby provoking the United States and its European allies to respond with harsher sanctions