-To prevent the division of Europe, which would be detrimental primarily to Russia because it would involve a gradual slide towards her isolation - a source of her political elite’s fear;
- To stop the deterioration of Russia - West relations, from which Moscow continues to derive experience, values, technology as well as financial resources;
-To normalise relations with the ECE countries, relegated to the last place in Moscow’s foreign priorities since their appeal for NATO membership. Their, and Russia’s,past is marked by historical prejudices but also by the common fate of nations caught under the Communist steamroller. Moscow should not forget that in a few years it is they who will decide whether to let Russia into the EC and NATO;
-To delete from Russia’s domestic and foreign policy agenda a problem (NATO enlargement) which is not worthy of so much attention and which is diverting the society from really vital tasks. Washing away the ‘enemy’ image would remove the possibility of seeing it as the source of all Russia’s problems and difficulties;
-To obtain much greater opportunities to influence the formulation and implementation of NATO policy, above all in constructing a new security system in Europe;
-To begin military reform in more favourable conditions, making the necessary resources and time available for this purpose. Closer contact between the military structures in Russia and NATO can contribute to establishing civil control over the Russian army, bringing about its democratisation;