Nuclear weapons and NFU policy

[AqD]

Wouldn't the entire problem, total destructions etc be gone if we just give up, instead of some silly pledges?

If some country launches massive nukes on you, your termination is already certain and at that moment there is no more defense, only revenge, but since there would be no one surviving to see the aftermath, why not just give up and let your enemies live? What's wrong with, e.g. US letting a mad Russia live? Having some humans live is still better than everyone dead.


Isn't it pretty obvious? After all it's called national defense, not national vengeance or justice.

[Flinn]

Because humans are vindictive by nature, my dude ... and that's why we never had a nuclear war.. you can only lose that kind of war, there's no chance you will win, nobody will.

[Morticia Iunia Bruti]

Thats the so called balance of terror.

[sumskilz]

The function of a credible policy of massive retaliation is deterrence. Therefore, the policy is defensive. A refusal to waver on commitment to the policy is meant to avoid the situation in the first place.

[antaeus]

The danger comes about when countries whom don't have the capacity to destroy the entire world (including themselves), deploy battlefield or tactical, rather than strategic nuclear weapons.

For example, China, India, Pakistan probably don't have the capacity to entirely destroy the United States or Russia, or even the retaliatory nuclear warfighting capability of each other with their strategic arsenals. But they do have the potential to do significant infrastructural damage to each other with tactical or short range weapons. This leaves a small window of temptation to actually first strike, or retaliate.

In this respect the potential for a limited scope nuclear war is more worrying than the possibility of total annihilation. Because 'limited scope' comes with a price tag in billions of lives. How Malthusian.

[AqD]

But why would anyone press the button if asked to? It's common sense

[Vanoi]

The danger comes about when countries whom don't have the capacity to destroy the entire world (including themselves), deploy battlefield or tactical, rather than strategic nuclear weapons.

A lack of a large arsenal of nuclear weapons isn't the reason tactical nuclear weapons are used or even fielded today.

There are two main reasons tactical nuclear weapons came to be.

One is that it is thought (and some still do) that using a tactical nuclear weapons instead of strategic ones could avoid escalation that leads to much larger nuclear war. I'm not a big believer in that.

Second is for it's military value. Both Russia and the US had plans to use tactical nuclear against each other's forces. In the US's case they wanted to stop that Soviet tank advance through the Fulda Gap. Tactical nuclear weapons would be involved in that. The US also deployed them in South Korea as a deterrent against North Korea. Tactical weapons allow for less civilian and friendly casualties when deployed. Another selling point for it's military value.

A more modern example of this though is Pakistan.

https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/0...lity-pub-63911

The majority of military strategists and decisionmakers in Pakistan agree that TNWs complete so-called full spectrum deterrence and, as such, are a necessary counterweight to India’s Cold Start, or proactive military operations, doctrine5—which calls for up to eight independent armored brigades to penetrate up to 50 kilometers (about 31 miles) into Pakistan without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds

Pakistan's TNWs are meant to deter the Indian Cold Start strategy. Though Pakistan did develop nuclear weapons in response to India having them, the TNWs are made in regards to different.

My point being here that the number of nuclear weapons in a country's arsenal doesn't influence another country's choice into developing tactical nuclear weapons themselves.

Even Russia and the US having the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, they still developed and still are actively developing tactical nuclear weapons.

[Morifea]

Those TNWs just seem to give you more options in regard of escalation of a conflict. If those really offer an option, that would not lead to an "all out kill everyone nuclear war" is debatable.

Its always the question, if and how you want to escalade a conflict and what would be the expected answer of your enemy. This can lead to some interesting (theoretical) situation like the "Nuke the Carriers"- Strategy for Team Red in the Cold War wargames of the US-Staffs.

[EmperorBatman999]

But why would anyone press the button if asked to? It's common sense

Unfortunately the Milgram Experiment and the behavior of German troops in World War II (perhaps most exemplarily documented in Browning's Ordinary Men), indicate that most people will rely on the command of authority and peer pressure (a "We're all in this together" mindset, of sorts) to quiet personal doubts and guilt about specific actions. Common sense and personal conscientiousness might not be enough of a barrier to prevent the button-pusher from doing the deed, especially if they have the knowledge at the moment that the other side might have pressed their own button. The Soviet nuclear defense officer Stanislav Petrov had tremendous difficulty defying orders and breaking protocol to refuse launching the nuclear missiles at the US after seeing what appeared to be multiple American missiles flying towards the USSR on his computer screen, but deciding that this was a false alarm. He was correct, and we live in the universe where he did not launch those missiles, and we wouldn't exist if he had fired back.

[conon394]

Your also gets to why the current rush for hyper sonic weapons is destabilizing. Not only do thay create ambiguity about what the payload might be they cut down the time to think through whats happening. Thus somebody might not have to pick up to a red phone hot line call between the now three major ICBM powers so they either get 'no' answer or no pick up (which would presuppose an an attack). Or just think through the situation and verify the data etc.