Did the Rome Empire have a Grand Strategy?

[Dick Cheney.]

Grand strategy, one way or another, almost always relates back to long term planning and strategic vision. But can a civilization without a word for strategy and grand strategy possess such a concept or practice in the first place? According to one of the most important and acclaimed scholars on modern strategy, the answer is yes. Rome had a comprehensive and intelligible grand strategy during the imperial era, despite never having coined a word for strategy, and its existence can be inferred by the cost-effective but also logical approach the empire took to managing its frontiers. Such is the argument put forward by Edward Luttwak in his highly provocative book, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire.

While looking at the obvious problem of devising a cost-effective way of securing the Empire’s borders for the long-term, Luttwak argues that the Romans intuitively adopted three great cost-effective grand strategies to meet their growing security needs. Important to the concept of strategy, as known to Luttwak and many practitioners, is the argument that each strategy’s ultimate goal was to provide maximum security benefit for the lowest cost.

Phase 1: The Client State System (Augustus to 1^st Century AD)



The first great cost-effective strategy, or grand defensive strategy if you will, identified in Luttwak’s book is the Client State System, which was based on an invisible frontier of neighboring allied tribes and allied states. Once made a client to Rome, the lands of these allied tribes and allied states along Rome’s border acted as a buffer against foreign invasion, while at the same time their own forces contributed to lessening the overall defense burden on the Roman army for border security. With Roman soldiers free from extended garrison duties along the border, which were now being outsourced to the client states themselves, Rome had enough disposable force to seek new conquests elsewhere which, if successful, would ideally generate new client states. This positive feedback loop of continuing adding new vassals along the periphery of the empire inevitably generated economy of force for the Roman legions which then reinforced a system of manageable frontier expenses and efficiencies. Underwriting all of this of course, and keeping Rome’s clients at bay, was the unassailable quality of the Roman army at war and the near invincible aura of Roman prestige.

Phase 2: Preclusive Defense (Late 1^st - 2^nd Century AD)



Beginning in the late 1^st century AD, changing political circumstances (such as annexation along the border and Romanization of the frontiers) meant Rome could no longer rely on the Client State System for border security. Faced with the new challenge of having to actually defend Roman citizens and the border provinces themselves, Luttwak argues that the Romans gradually adopted a second great cost-effective strategy in Preclusive Defense. According to Luttwak, the Romans once again sought cost saving measures for its limited number of legionnaires and manpower resources by purposely seeking out natural obstacles to foreign invasion: such as the Rhine, Danube, Arab and Sahara deserts, and the Euphrates river. When these “natural borders” however, were not available for conquest or just out of Rome’s reach, the Romans constructed limes and established garrisons, the most famous of which is Hadrian’s wall.


Phase 3: Defense-in-Depth (3^rd Century AD)


Western Empire Map Showing Distribution of Frontier Forces (Limitanei) and Field Armies (Comitatenses) 400AD

The last great defensive strategy identified by Luttwak is Defense-in-Depth. Here, Luttwak argues that multiple high-intensity invasions at multiple points of entry along the empire’s frontier made forward deployment of the legions and Preclusive Defense next to impossible, leading naturally then to the creation of fortified towns and mobile field armies in response. A thick Roman interior and an array of fortified towns and defensive strongholds along the way to Rome would then delay, contain, channel, and hopefully exhaust any barbarian invasions until a Roman field army could arrive. The shift away from Preclusive Defense however, along with the ensuing abandonment of most of the empire’s border provinces, is usually seen then as a desperate move on part of the Romans.


Luttwak, Historians, and the Charge of Anachronism

Despite seminal like work and an undisputable command of both military and national strategy, Luttwak’s views and depictions of Roman grand strategy are generally not accepted in academia. The most frequent charge of all, from both critics and published historians, is of course the charge of anachronism.

The charge is indeed accurate and compelling. For instance, there was no planning staff at the head of the Roman army. There was no formal demarcation of the Roman border. There were no “scientific frontiers” complete with imperial recognition for natural boundaries. Uniformed systems of defenses across all Roman theaters, along with identical roles for army units, cannot be found. Roman garrisons and military buildings equally served a civil and transportation function as well as defense. There were no strategy documents, accurate world maps, a general staff, or defensive whitepapers carried over from Augustus to Tiberius or Nerva to Trajan. And there never was any ridiculous 20^th century notion of escalation theory, mobile defense, or defense-in-depth in the minds, plans, expansionist policies, and ad hoc decisions of the emperors.

Whatever grand strategies Luttwak thus found in his rigorous survey of the Roman Empire, they were not Roman strategies. Too many inconsistencies in both narrative and archaeological evidence disproves of the notion that any imperial plan or strategic vision —short of ideological expansion and the personal security of the emperor— ever carried over from one emperor to the other. And if sustainable economics and cost saving goals were really the concern of all charged with imperial strategy, then one should also address Rome’s political economy, which, far from balancing most government and economic systems with ends, ways, and means, stumbled on falteringly and unwittingly into ever increasingly expansionist policies and expenses until finally, the whole system collapsed. The need to extract surplus economic resources from the conquered territories to support the growing mechanisms of state —and the ridiculous cost of the Roman army— culminated in a redistributive exchange system that operated on a massive scale, and its size and expense defies normal economic logic. Underwriting the costs of the logistics, the Roman army, and infrastructure requirements, along with the economic greed of the elite, were of course costly government expenditures and subsidies.


Was there ever a Roman Grand Strategy?

If important parts of Luttwak’s thesis, such as defense-in depth, preclusive defense, and the client state system, cannot be supported by the available evidence, did the Roman Empire then ever have a grand strategy? Can strategic purpose not be derived from the long-term positioning of the legions? How then did the Romans deal with constant threats from Parthia and the Germanic tribes for the long term? And how do historians even begin to account for the remarkable efficiency of the Roman army. Can only 28 to 30 odd some legions really begin to guard and defend the entirety of the Roman Empire without strategy, resource allocation, and economy of force? And isn’t strategy practiced and learned intuitively anyway?

As wrong and imperfect as his thesis is, Luttwak does do for historians what they and their reductionist methods failed to do for themselves. It takes a generalist and systems approach to recognize the strategic environment and all its individual actors, and by avoiding specialization and a rigid selection of historical methods, Luttwak takes into account the entirety of the Roman world and all its security challenges. Yet this satellite view of Rome’s geography and security problems leaves Luttwak knowing more than the Romans ever did. In the Roman world, strategy, planning, and long-term systems thinking were in their infancy, not even close to the level of sophistication of a modern general staff, but present and far above their peers nonetheless. In his book, Luttwak shows how the Romans acted and responded intelligently to different problems, creating complex systems, allocating resources, establishing goals, and executing strategies and plans for provincial security. At their best, the Romans even combined military effectiveness with political astuteness. But Luttwak gives the Romans too much credit when he identifies consistent grand strategy narratives and not more precise regional-military strategies used to maintain order and maximize efficiencies in the various provinces. Rome, after all, was sustained through its incredible military commanded by military governors in administrative districts. The emperor decided where to put the legions and how many to allocate, but that was mainly it. Individual mandatas issued to Roman governors took over from there, followed by each governor’s own response and management style to specific regional challenges (of the areas he controlled). A permanent military presence (arguably without a peer competitor) is all that strategically carried over from one emperor to the next, and from there each Roman emperor generated his own policies and established his own priorities. However, without clear lines of succession, imperial policies as a whole remained largely immune to the possible benefits of strategic thought and long-term planning.

In end, perhaps the most important step still left unconcluded between Luttawk and historians then, is not what the Romans were able to do or achieve for the long-term, but the entire notion and importance of grand strategy.

[Cookiegod]

Science theory discerns two types of knowledge: Implicit and explicit. The fact that one of them isn't expressed explicit, doesn't stop it from being knowledge. E.g. you know how to bike, whether you can explain to someone why precisely you don't fall off or not.

The same can be said about decisionmaking. Decisions were made. Whether a grand strategy was ever expressed loudly or only made intuitively sense, there are clear vectors that one can discern.

They aren't the only ones, btw. You can go even further back to the Peleponnesian wars and it is very, very obvious that both Athenians and Spartans (and Thebans and most of the rest) were clearly pursuing strategies. Especially Sparta and Athens, who did not have to rely on their soldiers as farmers and thus were able to operate their armies year round, with the consequence of being able to choose their battles, rather than having to pursue a decisive battle asap.

However, with the Romans you can argue that the defensive structures built around the cities might have been constructed by local concerned governors, rather than the empire as a whole. And then the last point, the defense in depth, becomes a bit more dubious. I honestly don't know how the decision making was carried out in that regard, but I'd assume it to have been somewhat of a mix of both.

As anecdotal evidence I'll give you the roman city I grew up close to and got to excavate on as a teenie:
This is Augusta Raurica in its heyday:

With the river being the Rhine, but the other side still being firmly within Roman control due to the Limes Germanicus further north, and the city being unwalled, with amphitheater and theater, and being the capital of a province.

Aaaand...

Here's Castrum rauracense. Once the Limes had been abandoned, German Alemanni moved in, so all of a sudden the city was located right across the border. It still had a very important bridge, so several emperors launched their punitive campaigns against the Alemanni from here, and the castrum was built to house a legion (the I Martia). But other than that it went downhill. An earthquake and some plundering presumably by the Alemanni, or by Roman soldiers because of the crisis of the third century, and a much diminished population moved into the castrum. This castle thus fundamentally became a city.

Other cities that spontaneously come to my mind, such as Aventicum, have the same thing in common in that to my knowledge the city walls weren't constructed as part of a grand strategy but rather simply guided on the decision that the location was worth being defended. In the case of Castrum Rauracense obviously the city itself was not deemed worth defending, but the bridge itself was. But the remaining population was still taken in as well.
Both the population itself and the authorities had the choice to resettle the city with or without walls for a long time. In spite of all the structural damage the decaying must have taken some time, so just moving in wouldn't have been particularly hard. So even though the fall of the city was abrupt, with clear traces of fighting in the streets having been found, the choice not to move back in was still a choice, one that was stuck to even though it was ad hoc.

But this example doesn't mean all decisions were ad hoc. Clearly the Limitanei/Comitatenses split was a clear decision to do defense in depth, in my opinion.

Another thing I want to point out as a former hotseat player, is that I did strategic decisions implicitly (and quite successfully), and only later when thinking about it some more realised how I had followed some strategic principles very well. This doesn't mean I didn't strategise, I had the same strategic thoughts, just implicitly, like most strategy players do and also like most military personnel probably do. There's a percentage of decision making based on explicit knowledge always, and there's also always a percentage of decision making based on intuition. The ratio can vary, but clearly just because one isn't expressed doesn't disqualify it as a decision.

With regards to the economic decisions of the Romans I'd go easy on them. For one I see the economic forces occuring then as having been beyond any emperors control. They did not have most of the financial instruments central banks have today to control the market.

The emperor was not able to print money without having the gold, silver and bronze to do so. I'd argue even countries today do a pretty atrocious job at it today.

[Cyclops]

Very interesting OP and comments by Cookie.

Perhaps the Republican Senate as a deliberative body of experienced ex-officials was capable of formulating a grand strategy? The various popular leaders who used violence to achieve control of the states (variously Dictators, Dictators for life and Princeps) seem to have spent some energy thinning the ranks of the Senate, largely because it contained enemies of their cause, but perhaps as an institution it opposed a lot of tyrants precisely because it was a poor strategic direction for Rome to take?

I certainly buy the idea the Cursus Honorum was a fame engine that kept ambitious men busy while training and containing them, and fitting them for oligarchic participation, and that it evolved slowly over time, and that its evolution was not always thoughtfully directed (and in fact rotted somewhat despite well meaning reforms, ie showed at times a lack of strategic direction). That said Rome did not achieve pan-Mediterranean hegemony as an accidental by-product of public service pathways. I think the Senate as a body was capable (and probably fitted, with ad hoc bodies arrogating or delegated the task) of formulating grand strategy for the Republic, so preserving a longer view than say the Makedonian Kingdom could.

Cookies point that meta decisions like the Constantinian (was it all Con the Greats work? Not sure) army reforms reflect Grand Strategic thinking is well made. A well advised and wise emperor could well make important decisions that reflect coherent and self-consciously grand strategic thinking. Others I think drifted or found attempts at Grand Strategy overwhelmed by circumstance: in the ERE the shift from the educated/professional types of emperors (often military types by usually the product of public education or institutions) to a series of east Anatolian Aristoi (the Komnenoi and Palaeologoi) who brought a great deal of able military leadership but a catastrophic ignorance of economic matters led to a really serious strategic blindness (eg handing Venice huge trade concessions).

He is credited as having made the biggest conscious strategic decision in roman military history "ne plus ultra" (is it in Suetonius? or Tacitus?) but maybe Augustus simply acted as his money and manpower supply dictated, fighting numerous wars in Germania Iberia and the Balkans until Varus threw away three legions, making a contraction necessary. Is there any indication he would have withdrawn from Germania otherwise, and not kept on gambling more and more legions on more and more real estate? Certainly the buffer zone of Amici states was a republican policy of long standing.

Maybe Claudius made a Grand Strategic decision pushing the frontier out onto Britain (i want to believe in Derek Jacobi wise Clau-Clau-Claudius and not Suetonius aged pussy-hound Claudius), I'm not sure Trajan was doing much more than pursuing glory against Parthia but Hadrian's contraction looks like a Grand Strategic decision.

I have a feeling US Grand Strategy suffers similar bouts of capacity and incapacity. Well advised presidents in favourable circumstances could make world shaking strategic changes of course (FDR's reversal the Monroe Doctrine to the point of establishing hegemony over much of the world), others mash the controls like fools (Kennedy playing nuclear poker, or reviving the Vietnam War because...something something...). I think Bush Snr and Jnr illustrate Grand Strategic competence and incompetence, Obama shows how paralysed an administration can be. Strategically Trump played some idiotic games but pulled off a neat coup in Israel: time will tell how strategically important it ios but now it looks like a big win and strategically very important.

[Gigantus]

I do have to pop in here more often, extremely refreshing to read an actual discussion. Thanks for all the efforts here.

Personally I thought the whole was more of a pyramid scheme as DC seemed to have touched upon: "The need to extract surplus economic resources from the conquered territories to support the growing mechanisms of state —and the ridiculous cost of the Roman army— culminated in a redistributive exchange system that operated on a massive scale, and its size and expense defies normal economic logic."
Collapsing when new occupations stopped\faltered. But that's a tad simplistic, I guess.

[Morticia Iunia Bruti]

I think Cyclops is on the right track. The republican Senate seemed to have had something like a grand strategy at least in the Eastern Mediterranean: A balance of power between the hellenistic powers there.

After the treaty of Apameia in 188 BC Rome built up Pergamum and Rhodes as medium powers against the Seleucid Empire.

Or the day of Eleusis in 168 BC , where Rome forced Antiochos IV to withdraw from Ptolemaic Egypt and prevented a annexion of Egypt.

So as the republican senate was not splitted in political factions there was an authority, which controlled the foreign policy /strategy. Later this got lost and with the emperors there was only short living reactions to an actual crisis.

[Deribas]

Augustus supposedly advised Tiberius to not expand further, and following emperors took that to heart until Trajan. In Trajan's case there was the opportunity of transposing Roman rule onto two settled states: Dacia with plentiful resources to plunder that had been a pain in the arse for a long time and Parthia which was basically collapsing onto itself. The Romans only liked to expand into regions that already had towns so they could use these as centers of control and incorporate the local elites into Roman administration. There were no towns in Caledonia, Hibernia, central Germania or Arabia Magna, so maybe pragmatism was the cause of static frontiers rather than Augustus' testament.

[Cookiegod]

I think Cyclops is on the right track. The republican Senate seemed to have had something like a grand strategy at least in the Eastern Mediterranean: A balance of power between the hellenistic powers there.

After the treaty of Apameia in 188 BC Rome built up Pergamum and Rhodes as medium powers against the Seleucid Empire.

Or the day of Eleusis in 168 BC , where Rome forced Antiochos IV to withdraw from Ptolemaic Egypt and prevented a annexion of Egypt.

So as the republican senate was not splitted in political factions there was an authority, which controlled the foreign policy /strategy. Later this got lost and with the emperors there was only short living reactions to an actual crisis.

Yeah there's definitely a lot of grand strategy documented for the eastern half, given the relatively strong and highly developed states existing there. Grand strategy was clearly practiced with long term goals and future balances of power in mind. Also later with Caesars and Antonius's administrative decisions there at the very end of the republic.

I do have to pop in here more often, extremely refreshing to read an actual discussion. Thanks for all the efforts here.

Personally I thought the whole was more of a pyramid scheme as DC seemed to have touched upon: "The need to extract surplus economic resources from the conquered territories to support the growing mechanisms of state —and the ridiculous cost of the Roman army— culminated in a redistributive exchange system that operated on a massive scale, and its size and expense defies normal economic logic."
Collapsing when new occupations stopped\faltered. But that's a tad simplistic, I guess.

As far as I'm aware, the Roman taxation system at least was quite lean and capitalist. Taxation was privatised and performed by those willing to pay the most for the licence, with them then being able to keep the difference.

I see more of a problem in that the Roman empire gained a great quantity of wealth through the act of conquest in form of plunder, slaves and land distributions. These weren't available later on. And with precious metals being in limited supply, the only way for the empire to create more currency was through reducing the value of the coins.

Finally, given that the Roman empire before the crisis of the third century had a very vibrant trade system, with long distance trading and local specialisations very common, the empire certainly did a lot right. These trade dependencies between even farflung provinces created cohesive forces. This ceased to be the case once the third century crisis came in full swing. The economy would never recover. Instead of specialised productions such as glass from Syria in Britain the regions started to regionalise and produce things locally at lower quality.

One should keep the limits of taxation in prepaper times in mind. For example, we like to think of early medieval Constantinople as a very rich city, because it was, and like to assume that the emperors would have simply taxed the trade there. But the Byzantines had no real idea as to how to do it with their own. Their entire taxation system was focused on land owners, so they forced successful merchants to purchase estates, which were the only thing they knew how to tax. The Romans in my opinion acted quite capable with those limitations in mind. At least proficiently enough that even in distant provinces such as Judaea, taxes were a constant complain.

[Common Soldier]

I do not see the Roman Empire having any grand strategy. The creation of the empire was a piecemeal affair.

In some cases, when local rulers proved capable, the Romans were content to rule through local rulers like Herod, rather like the British use of princely states in India. At other times, the Romans preferred direct rule. But like British India, there was a tendency over time to turn kingdoms ruled indirectly into direct Roman rule.

The reasons the Romans conquered certain provinces varied. Some were important to Rome and provided essential material, like Egyptian wheat to Rome. Others, like Britain, were conquered mainly for prestige and only secondarily for their material benefits to the empire.

[Cyclops]

...

As far as I'm aware, the Roman taxation system at least was quite lean and capitalist. Taxation was privatised and performed by those willing to pay the most for the licence, with them then being able to keep the difference.

I see more of a problem in that the Roman empire gained a great quantity of wealth through the act of conquest in form of plunder, slaves and land distributions. These weren't available later on. And with precious metals being in limited supply, the only way for the empire to create more currency was through reducing the value of the coins.

Finally, given that the Roman empire before the crisis of the third century had a very vibrant trade system, with long distance trading and local specialisations very common, the empire certainly did a lot right. These trade dependencies between even farflung provinces created cohesive forces. This ceased to be the case once the third century crisis came in full swing. The economy would never recover. Instead of specialised productions such as glass from Syria in Britain the regions started to regionalise and produce things locally at lower quality.

One should keep the limits of taxation in prepaper times in mind. For example, we like to think of early medieval Constantinople as a very rich city, because it was, and like to assume that the emperors would have simply taxed the trade there. But the Byzantines had no real idea as to how to do it with their own. Their entire taxation system was focused on land owners, so they forced successful merchants to purchase estates, which were the only thing they knew how to tax. The Romans in my opinion acted quite capable with those limitations in mind. At least proficiently enough that even in distant provinces such as Judaea, taxes were a constant complain.

Very good points again.

Classical economic theory was a mess, Oeconomica by the pseudo-Aristotle reads like a low tier conman's playbook, stuff about debasing coinage and tricking people into revealing wealth and then grabbing it.

Once again it looks like the Republican Senate contained enough expertise to set certain policy outlooks: they implemented tax farming as mentioned, and generally ruled through urban elites and the polis structure as the Roman's own Hellenistic state structure was fairly compatible with Punic, Etruscan and Hellenic models. They also used the amici model for alliance to monarchies and tribal states, or imposed Hellenic/Latin polis/civis structures on them, so there was an evolving set of relations created.

These structures remained under the classical emperors although it may be there was a dearth of experienced administrators in the later periods, as centralisation starved local leaders of opportunities to profit, learn and gain experience. I imagine civic leaders were left with obligations rather than powers and emigrated to the countryside to form the late classical proto-feudal magnates.

My vague recollection of ERE economic history is they had a few firm "don'ts" handed down from the late Western Empire, and debasing the currency was a huge no-no. IIRC Constantine established the solidus as a trustworthy currency and generally it was let alone so people didn't waste their time meta-gaming the debasement spiral and hording purer coins (which spun up the inflationary cycle viciously).

I think the more bureaucratically minded emperors in the ERE had some sort of handle on macro economics but the later dynasts washed their hands of trade policy altogether. The theme structure is a but of a dumbing down of the old professional Roman military but it was fine tuned, and something like a proffesional tagmata emerged as well. This speaks to an adaptable administration with some expertise: the school system in the three great East Mediterranean Poleis (New Rome, Antioch and Alexandria) seem to have remained functional even in the dark days of the Islamic invasions and supplied expertise to the ruling elites, posily including strategic advice..

[conon394]

Classical economic theory was a mess, Oeconomica by the pseudo-Aristotle reads like a low tier conman's playbook, stuff about debasing coinage and tricking people into revealing wealth and then grabbing it.

Could read Xenophon instead who proposes a grand (mostly economic) strategy.

I would also argue 4th century Athens had a what amounts to a consistent strategy that it supposedly mob rule democracy did more or less pursue fairly constantly - which would seem to qualify as grand strategy. By which in every decade or so the leading elites seem to have had a basic general agreement on where policy was going. Not really broken until the last face off with Macedonia.

-------------

@ Common Soldier

I do not see the Roman Empire having any grand strategy. The creation of the empire was a piecemeal affair.

Not sure in the moment you can really prove any country/nation/empire has a grand strategy. I think you can pick out some leaders some times who do and have the ability to maintain it over a career. Bismark is a good example he clearly had a grand strategy but passing from the field his successors clearly were not following the same playbook. I also think that retrospect you can like Luttwak pick your evidence for any polity and find a grand strategy.

[Cookiegod]

Could read Xenophon instead who proposes a grand (mostly economic) strategy.

I would also argue 4th century Athens had a what amounts to a consistent strategy that it supposedly mob rule democracy did more or less pursue fairly constantly - which would seem to qualify as grand strategy. By which in every decade or so the leading elites seem to have had a basic general agreement on where policy was going. Not really broken until the last face off with Macedonia.

It wasn't just Xenophon. When we talk about US vs China today, we call it the Thukydides trap for a reason.

It also wasn't just Athens, though obviously especially Athens. Athens and Sparta had both the luxury of being able to field armies around the year. The others had to stick to campaigning seasons. Athens meanwhile could rely on its Delian tributaries, whilst Sparta was fed by its helots. Sparta was arguably the state that thought the least ahead, with no initial strategy as to how to deal with the Athenian walls, and being perplexed by the fact that they were not offered battle. But on the other hand, they did for example attack and seize the Athenian silver supplies in the north of Greece. And in the later part of the war, once Athens had failed miserably in its Sicilian expedition, you'd see Sparta and Corinth implement a concise strategy, which defeated Athens gradually by cutting its supply lines. Athens wasn't defeated at home in a land battle, it was finally defeated at sea in the Bosporus, with the loss of its final grain supply route to Byzantion.

Athens on the other hand was more accustomed to grand strategy, but it vastly overestimated itself and repeatedly stumbled into overseas expeditions that crippled it. But on the other hand, those overseas expeditions happened for a reason. By attacking Sicily, Athens hoped to defeat Sparta where Sparta couldn't help.

I would also argue 4th century Athens had a what amounts to a consistent strategy that it supposedly mob rule democracy did more or less pursue fairly constantly

It is very much valid to speak of mob rule with regards to Athens, in spite of the Spartaphilia of many of our sources. The reasons can be found in the societal structures.

When the Spartans marched up in front of the walls of Athens, the fields they burned belonged to the wealthy landowners. The wealthy just wanted to go about doing business and not wage costly and risky wars.
On the other hand, once wars did happen, the pay in the Athenian navies and armies was very good for the common man. As such, the poor people had every incentive and desire for wars to be declared, as the military service would provide a steadier and better income to their family, in addition to all the patriotic reasons where you get to feel you're somehow doing better because your state is winning something.

As such Athens is a stark contrast to e.g. the US today, where most military adventures were extremely unpopular and had to be forced by the elites against a population that is very much against it.

Anyways, the TL;DR is that Athens without question did pursue a grand strategy, but like the grand strategies of every country in the world since it was subject to frequent changes, with different factions arguing for very different approaches to deal with the strategic challenges they had to face.

The same goes for the Romans. It can't be argued that the client system was simply a product of convenience and accident, when Roman leaders, including Caesar, Anthony and Augustus, spent considerable thought on how to draw the borders between the client states to optimise the benefit for Roman interests, and/or the resilience against Persian/barbarian invasions, etc.

[Derc]

Excuse my language, but what kind of stupid question is this? Of course Rome had a grand strategy. Adapt and overcome. Divide et impera. And blablabla, so much more.
The parallels between back then and today are haunting, and they will eventually catch up upon us. Once more. Just wait for it.

[antaeus]

Grand strategy, or a grand assemblage of strategies... I don't know if it's the right question to ask if there was a grand strategy. Perhaps it might be better to ask if there was any sort of long standing approach to empire.

I think the modern US is analogous in this situation, and we have a much clearer idea of it's growth and strategies behind it's development. US expansion was sometimes desirable, sometimes avoided, sometimes it was opportunistic, sometimes it was deliberate. Sometimes it was bought, sometimes it was fought for. From leader to leader there was an expressed idea, a direction to go that was differing, and sometimes contradictory. But in the longer term, as Cookie has hinted at, there doesn't need to have been an explicit deliberate muti-generational strategy project for there to be a semblance of a quasi grand strategy: a consistent evolving idea of empire, that people buy into and evolve over long periods of time. US identity changes over time, but it comes with a framework of ideas, a loose structure that allows it to maintain itself. Rome was the same, but on a grander scale.

An explicit grand strategy over hundreds of years is destined to fail in the end. It's entropy. Rome's 5th century neighbours along much of it's borders had lived, traded, worked both for and against Rome for the best part of a thousand years. Their cultures and governance structures had literally evolved alongside and in response to Rome's. Any strict explicit strategy that is kept in play for that long will fall away as it is picked apart from all sides. Instead there was a constantly evolving set of principles of governance, a set of obligations and responsibilities, and ultimately a collection of changing ideas of Roman-ness that held the empire together across vastly differing circumstances.

If anything the grand strategy was to not be explicit: to be responsive and opportunistic in the face of new challenges. To learn from challenges, and to adopt anything that keeps the empire going. That might have meant adopting a weapon type from Iberia or a farming technology from Africa. It might have meant literally adopting people and customs into the empire. In the end it meant evolving society itself to the point where even after central authority was ended in the 5th century west, there was still a sense of empire that was bought into for generations after it was gone. Perhaps the simple idea of maintenance and continuity of 'Empire' itself was the basis for grand strategy.

[Cookiegod]

Excuse my language, but what kind of stupid question is this? Of course Rome had a grand strategy. Adapt and overcome. Divide et impera. And blablabla, so much more.

Those are strategies/strategems.

Grand strategy is where you plan years or decades ahead and think of a strategy to e.g. deal with the red scare or yellow devil or threats to democracy or whatever the cool kids these days call rivals.

Though again as Morticia exemplified and as was also exemplified by a number of other points, we have enough recorded evidence to say that very, very often the Romans did not simply improvise, but put a lot of effort into thinking decades ahead.

The parallels between back then and today are haunting, and they will eventually catch up upon us. Once more. Just wait for it.

No. To reference Italian Fascists, Pasta makes men weak, and thus any present or future Italian ambitions are foiled by their delicious and irresistible cuisine.

Grand strategy, or a grand assemblage of strategies... I don't know if it's the right question to ask if there was a grand strategy. Perhaps it might be better to ask if there was any sort of long standing approach to empire.

Any such rigid definition makes it impossible to ascribe grand strategy to any country whatsoever. Every country, every empire changed its minds very frequently. One can just look at all the very frequently changing alliances in pre-WWI Europe as an example.

Thing is, that occurances of opportunism and changes of mind cannot disprove the existance of grand strategy. Several examples prove the existance of grand strategy in Rome's republican and imperial decision making. So the grand strategy existed, no matter the occasional changes or opportunistic approaches.

[conon394]

It is very much valid to speak of mob rule with regards to Athens

No it is in fact not.

When the Spartans marched up in front of the walls of Athens, the fields they burned belonged to the wealthy landowners. The wealthy just wanted to go about doing business and not wage costly and risky wars.
On the other hand, once wars did happen, the pay in the Athenian navies and armies was very good for the common man. As such, the poor people had every incentive and desire for wars to be declared, as the military service would provide a steadier and better income to their family, in addition to all the patriotic reasons where you get to feel you're somehow doing better because your state is winning something.

Honestly none of that makes any sense compared to the historical record. Please do me a favor which wars did the democracy start?

As such Athens is a stark contrast to e.g. the US today, where most military adventures were extremely unpopular and had to be forced by the elites against a population that is very much against it.

You have a read basic text on Athens and history?

Anyways, the TL;DR is that Athens without question did pursue a grand strategy, but like the grand strategies of every country in the world since it was subject to frequent changes, with different factions arguing for very different approaches to deal with the strategic challenges they had to face.

Nope rather really the mob of Athens pursued a fairly constant policy with swings. Over the long term.

[Cookiegod]

Lol, are you one of those who believe democracies never start wars?!

Early in the spring of the following summer the Athenian envoys arrived from Sicily, and the Egestaeans with them, bringing sixty talents of uncoined silver, as a month's pay for sixty ships, which they were to ask to have sent them. The Athenians held an assembly and, after hearing from the Egestaeans and their own envoys a report, as attractive as it was untrue, upon the state of affairs generally, and in particular as to the money, of which, it was said, there was abundance in the temples and the treasury, voted to send sixty ships to Sicily, under the command of Alcibiades, son of Clinias, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Lamachus, son of Xenophanes, who were appointed with full powers; they were to help the Egestaeans against the Selinuntines, to restore Leontini upon gaining any advantage in the war, and to order all other matters in Sicily as they should deem best for the interests of Athens.

Athens started tons of wars. Especially as a democracy. For the reasons explained in the post before, most of those wars were not in the interest of the aristocracy, for whom they were simply expensive risks.

Now it is your turn. Gainsaying is not an argument, so do your due diligence.

Nope rather really the mob of Athens pursued a fairly constant policy with swings. Over the long term.

Ah yes, the famous constant policy of Athens, where Alcibiades went from top dog to exiled to top dog to exiled again. Of course every country does policy changes, but Athens alone is the great exception.

[Cyclops]

I think Conon makes a fair point that our principle source (an Athenian of the upper class) seems to be of the opinion Athens and Sparta had fairly persistent strategic outlooks. I don't think Thucydides explicitly outlines it as such, but he does put suggestive observations into his fictitious speeches about how (for example) Archidamus thinks the war will proceed based on past Athenian action.

Athens is extremely aggressive (initiating provocations like assisting the Corcyrans and bulldozing Melos) but from a technical viewpoint they did not start the second Peloponnesian war (that was decided by the Spartans and their allies), and while the first Peloponnesian war (during the pentacontaetia) was properly initiated by the Athenian attack on the Spartans at Tanagra, some sort of war was already fizzing nicely, and in any case Athens was more properly an isonomy, not the more radical Democracy, at that point. Its just a technicality, but Athens received declarations of war from other powers in both the PWs. That said they included other polities in the wars once they were on, by savagely attacking them with little to no regard for the form of war or treaties signed.

Worst. Democracy. Ever...but by the same token best Democracy ever, because they were the only Democracy ever.

Athens does seem to have some sort of common approach: maintain the fleet, fight hard for the northern grain routes, seize opportunities as they arise. Does this amount to a Grand Strategy? Despite the nervous and irritable nature of the Boule and the washing machine turnover of the Prytany its very clear there was some self conscious consistency in certain key areas (above all the primacy of the fleet). I imagine the decision making took place in the context of self-appointed political cabals, but maybe it took place in some "deep state" committee, say permanent administrators attached to the Prytany? No such is attested but leaders as different as Cleon and Pericles are described as plainly pursued the same strategic goals: the difference was in the aggression and recklessness they were pursued.

These are reasonably marked across the 5th century. The first PW saw the conquest of Megara and Boeotia: no such opportunities arose in the second one, but despite the hard lesson of Coronea they were sucked into seeking a decisive land battle with Sparta and its allies (with the same result-a blood nose and no conclusive strategic outcome) at Mantinea. Both PWs saw wild adventures to Hellenised islands (Cyprus and Sicily) which came to sticky ends (the first one in the marshes of Egypt lol, don't ever change Athens). The first war led to stalemate, from which Athens emerged with a more strongly established naval hegemony, and the second only ended when that was brought low by the intervention of the Great King (a surprising outcome in my view, Athens probably expected another pause from the dumbarse Dorians while the boys from Attica refitted their even larger fleet, which they sort of got a second time from the peace of Nicias).

Sparta's grand strategy probably amounted to "have weak neighbours" (so obvious as to be more like an axiom than a strategic apporach), but they had an extremely enduring deliberative body in the Gerousia. This may have served to decide and adhere to Grand Strategy.

[Cookiegod]

It was extremely erratic at times, as exemplified multiple times during the Sicilian expedition, like the leadership question. The voter base was also completely unable to do anything but double down. As a general rule, the people as a whole had very much to gain from wars, whereas the wealthy, who had to fund these ships, did not.

The various leaders (Alkibiades, Nikias, Perikles, Cleon, etc.) did indeed have visions and plans, but they differed very significantly from one another.

That and conon's ridiculous assertion that the democratic Athens didn't declare wars seriously has me asking what "basic literature" he purports to have read.

Sparta's grand strategy could indeed be pointed that way as you state. Generally speaking the Spartans were well aware of their limited resources, and thus much more decentralised in their alliance compared to the mighty Athenian empire. They generally speaking just wanted to avoid anyone being bigger than them.

But (!) again they had to adapt their general approach to it all during the Peleponnesian war and after. They arguably started overreaching after the end of the war, just like Athens had before them. And their institution of the oligarchy in Athens didn't happen for nothing, but for the reasons I mentioned before.

[conon394]

Athens started tons of wars. Especially as a democracy. For the reasons explained in the post before, most of those wars were not in the interest of the aristocracy, for whom they were simply expensive risks.

Now it is your turn. Gainsaying is not an argument, so do your due diligence.

Why? You have not. In fact you supposed explanation works far better for say Rome since its only via war the Republic gained from it conquests and allies.

Ah yes, the famous constant policy of Athens, where Alcibiades went from top dog to exiled to top dog to exiled again

A feat he manged with other polities as well. The man was clearly personalty extremely charming and a very quick thinker and talker.

So you are really offer is Thucydides. I was rather expecting a survey of entire 6th, 5th and 4th centuries. Sub actions inside of a Total War Athens did not start and one Sparta made clear was in fact total withing 2 years do really count as starting wars.

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It was extremely erratic at times, as exemplified multiple times during the Sicilian expedition, like the leadership question. The voter base was also completely unable to do anything but double down. As a general rule, the people as a whole had very much to gain from wars, whereas the wealthy, who had to fund these ships, did not.

Hostile sources and the midst of long Total war. Good thing US policy in contrast was so consistent during the forever war on Terror or the Cold war. Odd the way the wealthy who saw it you were tiny minority. What did the people gain from war again?

That and conon's ridiculous assertion that the democratic Athens didn't declare wars seriously has me asking what "basic literature" he purports to have read.

I did not say that I said it did not recklessly declare nor was the democracy prone to declare wars a single quote from Thucydides does in fact say much of anything. If anything it was conservative. You are applying the logic of the Roman republic to wrong system


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and bulldozing Melos

So if Iceland gave money to NAZI Germany and failed to try and stop German U boats to dock and be supplied (and in fact was happy to do it) and than decided to fight to the bitter end when the US and UK said err nope. You would still be crying for them now? When the first offer was just join the allied side? Never forget Melos was not poor and it had been a free rider on the Athenian Arche out deference to Sparta for decades. They chose to violate their neutrality. Compare Thera which more or less got treated very much like like Iceland in WW2 by the UK and US neutrality was not option in Total war if you to small to defend it.

[Abdülmecid I]

Αthenian policy towards Persia was sometimes unnecessarily aggressive. In the beginning of the 5th century, they helped the Ionian rebels, despite never having been provoked by the Persians. In fact, Athens had most probably accepted the suzerainty of the Persians, after the Athenians themselves requested Persian help to dissuade the Spartans from plundering Attica and overthrowing the nascent democracy. At the end of the same century, Athens helped the rebel Amorges, thus encouraging Tissaphernes and the Spartans to establish an alliance. This is confirmed not only by the rather polemical Andocides, but by Thucydides too.

Granted, there was most probably already tensions between the two regarding the control of various cities in the coastline, but the alliance with Amorges was an unnecessary escalation and short-sighted as well, given how easily Tissaphernes and the Spartans eventually disposed of him. An Athenian commander, Lycon, also reinforced the rebel forces of Amorges' father, Pissouthnes, but, to be fair, there is a very strong possibility that he acted on his own and not under the orders of his native city. In the 4th century, there were a few cases of the Athenians intervening in internal Persian affairs, like the rebellion of Evagoras I in Cyprus, with the sole aim of financial rewards, in order to sustain their troops. It made sense economically, but also threatened to destabilise their relationship with the Great King. The Spartans and the Thebans (with Pammenes and Artabazus) used the same tactic, but at a smaller extent.