We conclude that the security environment in Afghanistan will become more challenging after the drawdown of most international forces in 2014, and that the Taliban insurgency will become a greater threat to Afghanistan’s stability in the 2015–2018 timeframe than it is now.
We conclude that a small group of al Qaeda members, many of whom have intermarried with local clans and forged ties with Afghan and Pakistani in- surgents, remains active in the remote valleys of northeastern Afghanistan.
We conclude that, in the likely 2015–2018 security environment, the ANSF will require a total security force of about 373,400 personnel in order to pro- vide basic security for the country, and cope with the Taliban insurgency and low-level al Qaeda threat.
We conclude that if the United States and NATO do not maintain a training and advisory mission in Afghanistan, the absence of advisors in 2015 is like- ly to result in a downward spiral of ANSF capabilities—along with security in Afghanistan—unless the ANSF can find other patrons to fill the resulting “enabler vacuum.”
We conclude that a significant reduction in the U.S. and NATO commitment to Afghanistan or Pakistan will destabilize the border region, exacerbate ex- isting tensions between the two countries, and jeopardize fragile mechanisms for cross-border cooperation and de-escalation that have been built in recent years.
Finally, we conclude that sustained commitment of the international community in Afghanistan is likely to mitigate tensions in the region and increase prospects for regional cooperation, but that withdrawal of international community support is likely to have consequences up to and including a renewed civil war in Afghanistan and increased instability in the region.
https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DR...6816-Final.pdf