Quote Originally Posted by Abdülmecid I View Post
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I already explained the labels between moderate and conservative. It doesn't depend on your malignity scale about their foreign policy, but it's a standard terminology to distinguish the two dominant factions in Iranian politics. You seem to arbitrarily associate moderation with positive traits and clemency towards the people, a claim neither I nor everyone else that uses these labels ever made. As already mentioned, the naming convention is similar to those employed for the Labour party in the United Kingdom or the Republicans in the United States and it's not a sinister attempt to morally justify the American occupation forces suffered in Iraq. As for your article, most of it I already addressed, since I also recognize the fact that discontent against the moderate faction was already growing before the Donald administration went rogue. The author believes the withdrawal played a marginal role, but, since she never corroborates her reasoning, her opinion is not more valid than mine or Pallock's. Meanwhile, as your second article suggests, inflation, largely the result of the imposed sanctions, is destroying the livelihood of numerous Iranians, further adding fuel to the fire, by undermining the incumbent government and by empowering the more radical opposition.

By the way, as a general tip, I would take the dissertations of any employee of the Tony Blair Institution with a pinch of salt. They are more preoccupied with parroting their donor's narrative than actually contributing to the understanding of Middle Eastern politics.
The claim wasn’t that Rouhani’s political fellows are more or less moderate than other domestic factions, it was
Secondly, the authors warn about the military gaining power at the expense of elected institutions, by measuring the prominence of army officers in said institutions. I genuinely don't understand their reasoning. Anyway, the real image is a bit simpler.....However, once Washington withdrew from the deal, despite Iran abiding with the imposed restrictions, many voters became utterly disillusioned, since they felt (quite justifiably) manipulated and humiliated. Consequently, the more radical elements gained in popularity,
The current government’s definitively immoderate behavior is material to assumptions underpinning this claim, and that is indeed part of the point. To reiterate, mass unrest and popular disaffection with current leadership is rooted not in a rejection of Rouhani’s comparatively moderate political views relative to some other more conservative faction, nor in the idea of disillusionment with diplomatic engagement as a result of US actions, but with the fundamental reality of Tehran’s authoritarian Islamist theocracy, as discussed in relation to current events (let alone over the last ten years). National electoral candidates are determined by approval from Guardians, which are either indirectly nominated by the Supreme Leader (who appoints the official who selects the jurists for confirmation by these pre-approved legislators) or directly appointed by him. You may recall that popular disaffection with that process - if anything the antithesis of disillusionment with respect to moderate politics - was the reason for historically low turnout in the February elections in the wake of mass unrest, military crackdown, and the arbitrary disqualification of thousands of mostly reformist candidates. This also cemented already significant IRGC/Basij dominance in the Majlis.

The idea that hardliners are increasing in popularity among the people relative to moderates as a result of US withdrawal from the nuclear deal or increased sanctions would be functionally irrelevant in terms of the political candidates permitted to run for office, even if true. But the US isn’t the cause of the Supreme Leader/Guardians’ political preferences for who they allow to run for office, much less the unrest and popular animosity towards Rouhani’s government, contrary to suggestions and deflections to the bias of sources for acknowledging this basic fact.

For one thing, as was evidently pointed out by a number of astute protesters, if Iran is unable to do things like subsidize fuel prices as heavily due to fiscal constraints brought about by renewed sanctions, maybe the regime can divert some funds from what they continue to expend on things like funding/arming/training terrorists and Islamic militias, and propping up a brutal dictator in Syria - the whole point of economic sanctions. Or perhaps they could relinquish de facto control of the domestic economy under the Supreme Leader and IRGC in the interest of diffusing some of that wealth to civilians. To the extent US withdrawal from the nuclear deal played a role in this situation, the brief respite from some sanctions appears to have increased Iranians’ appetite for fundamental reforms to their government, and subsequently, opposition to the regime itself. This has only intensified since 2018, the opposite of a desire for more repressive, hardline domestic politics. That Rohani’s government failed to deliver on these reforms, independently of its political leanings relative to domestic alternatives, or of pressure from US sanctions, does not mean the people want more conservative/less moderate leaders just because that’s the status quo permitted by Tehran’s authoritarian system.

For another, the Supreme Leader has installed increasingly conservative and namely IRGC/Basij leaders in the government over time not because of the US nor because they are popular, but to protect the Islamic theocracy from reforms that would weaken the security apparatus and authoritarian system that theocracy relies upon to survive, at the expense of nominally democratic civilian processes. This has been a trend for years amid sporadic mass unrest. By engineering an increasingly hardline government with a growing reliance on a powerful IRGC nexus of economic and political power, including the overt connections of likely and declared candidates for next year’s elections to the IRGC, Tehran has made it clear she is, if anything, opposed to popular preferences. There is very little real basis for an attempt to flip causation here and assume this is what the people want as a rhetorical device to juxtapose with US actions.

All of which informs my original point: Given the background situation, it seems like these high profile assassinations, including the regime’s failed cover up of al-Masri’s killing, will further weaken the regime. Tehran has denied her citizens desired reforms with brute military force, as the normal method of diffusing that desire via ornamental elections has increasingly failed to do the trick. Like any authoritarian system, if the regime cannot even deliver on the alternative, that being strength, stability and security, there is even less room for the civilian government to maneuver domestically as control by the IRGC becomes more and more visible. This control means the IRGC will be the key player in the selection of the next Supreme Leader due to the current one’s reliance on them in order to protect the theocracy. The question is, therefore, at what point this control will become more or less comprehensive, and what challenges and opportunities that presents for US policy and geopolitics.

In light of these factors, the regime’s first challenge after Khamenei will be to create a united voice in the IRGC. The Revolutionary Guard is not ideologically monolithic, especially within the rank and file. Since Khamenei came to power, he has tried to marginalize the IRGC’s leftist, pro-Montazeri factions in favor of officers close to him.29 And whether or not each indi- vidual guardsman is loyal to Khamenei and the ideals of the Islamic Republic, they all generally view the clergy as a fading sociopolitical force. In their eyes, the clergy is not as competent as they are in running the country. They also believe that they should be the regime’s primary beneficiaries given how much they have sacrificed for the Islamic Republic compared to the clerics. Accordingly, the main question post- Khamenei will be how to distribute power (political, economic, and social) among influential IRGC com- manders while keeping it from civilian politicians.
As for foreign policy in the wake of Khamenei’s pass- ing, some IRGC commanders—whether out of genuine belief or as leverage in their internal fights—will seek to reverse Iran’s hostile stance toward the West and look for opportunities to change the government’s current course on certain issues. Yet the regime’s posture has been deeply entrenched by Khamenei, so outsiders must temper their hopes for major change after his death.

Regarding the process of actually choosing succes- sion candidates, the separation of religious and politi- cal authority that began with Khamenei’s appointment would make it easier for the IRGC to champion a low- level cleric if it so desired. Although Khamenei’s heir would probably be under heavy IRGC control and hence have little power of his own (at least at first), he would still be the figure responsible for formally main- taining the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy and divine authority. Accordingly, Khamenei and senior military leaders no doubt already have their lists of successors in hand. Rafsanjani stated that the Assembly of Experts has made a list of potential qualified candidates to replace Ayatollah Khamenei whenever necessary.30

Although Ayatollah Khomeini’s death enabled techno- crats to assume executive power for several years, the IRGC under Khamenei’s leadership gradually pushed them out of government. The next succession will no doubt enable the IRGC and the military and security apparatus in general to extend their dominance over the regime as a whole. If the IRGC remains united despite the conflicting interests of its various factions, post- Khamenei Iran will maintain a democratic facade but move further toward a de facto military regime—one that could survive as long as it avoids both war and revo- lution. Under such a regime, the Supreme Leader would hold a ceremonial position and, for the most part, be instructed by the IRGC. Therefore, the future of velayat-e faqih and the Islamic Republic’s founding iden- tity depends on the IRGC’s actions post-Khamenei.

Since the next Supreme Leader will likely hold a ceremonial position, the question of whether he would be willing to engage with the West is not especially important. The real question is whether the IRGC would refashion Iranian politics by negotiating with the United States and dropping its defiant attitude. Mounting pressure over the regime’s nuclear policies is seriously harming the country’s economy, and the IRGC would likely need to take action on this issue post-Khamenei in order to strengthen its position. Opening up to the West and, especially, the United States would help military leaders gain domestic popu- larity and international legitimacy while also restoring the broken economy. Yet it is unclear whether the IRGC would be prepared to roll back Iran’s nuclear progress to reach this goal.

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/...cyFocus117.pdf