Who won the Battle of the Hydaspes?

[Dick Cheney.]

"I do not pilfer victory." - Alexander the Great

The Battle of the Hydaspes (326 BC) was the last major battle of Alexander the Great. A truly remarkable battle, fought near the end of the known world in modern day Pakistan, the battle resulted in a decisive Macedonian victory over King Porus and the surrender of the Paurava kingdom in India.

Today however, that narrative is being challenged by Indian professors, army generals, Pakistani bloggers, defense writers, and Indian nationalists who say the primary sources have it all wrong, Alexander was defeated at the Hydaspes and was forced to end his Indian campaign after fighting King Porus to a draw. Lending support to this theory, whose name is enough to elicit an eyebrow or two, is Marshal Gregory Zhukov of the USSR, who is reportedly to have claimed that Alexander had “failed to gain position” in India.

While many of the above challenges to the established narrative are easily explained when viewed through a nationalist lens, perhaps Alexander's disputed withdraw is enough to warrant a cautious return to the source material.

What then happened at the Battle of the Hydaspes? Is there enough evidence to prove that Porus defeated Alexander? And why was this the last great battle of Alexander the Great?





The Case Against Alexander

The revisionist case against Alexander almost certainly begins with Alexander’s withdraw from India. If Alexander won the Battle of the Hydaspes, -so say the revisionists-, and did so decisively, why did he ultimately turn back? An undefeated army, made up now of mostly mercenaries, does not get homesick, and what lay ahead was still the heart of India, including large powerful Indian tribes who -if left unconquered- could threaten Alexander’s holdings around the Indus river valley. Its here of course, where revisionists make their stand, quoting both Plutarch, and more importantly, Megasthenes, who themselves say Alexander’s army was afraid of advancing further for fear of confronting the Nanda Empire and its armies that consisted of thousands of war elephants. This fear of combating Indian war elephants, as one might expect, is linked back to the Battle of the Hydaspes, and the losses Alexander likely sustained in his battle against Porus.

While we don’t know the exact number of Macedonian casualties, many historians agree that the battle was uniquely costly, especially to the Macedonian phalanx and cavalry. If Theodore Dodge is to be believed, then the Macedonian army likely suffered over 10,000 casualties (killed or wounded). An astonishing number, once we consider that this was 73% of Alexander’s attacking force. [1] If true, it would seem at least credible, to revisionists as well as objective historians, that unique combat losses to the core of Alexander’s army made the army less incline to advance further into India. If Porus had 100 war elephants and was able to inflict 10,000 casualties to Alexander’s best troops, just imagine then what 6,000 elephants could do.

Though the withdrawal and suspected mauling of the Macedonian army in India is the essential enabler to this debate (because a completely conquered India would obviously mean no case), to get from victory to defeat at the Hydaspes river requires challenging the general narrative put forward by Greek and Roman historians. Here, the 2^nd half of the revisionist argument rests on attacking the credibility of the existing sources and the conclusions reached by European historians. For this, they claim both bias and European colonialism, while also offering new interpretations; based on alternative texts and battle analysis.

For starters:

• How does Coenus complete a circuit around Porus’s army in time to deliver a decisive blow when Porus’s army occupies a 4 to 5 mile front. How also does Alexander know, prior to giving his orders to Coenus, that Porus will move all his cavalry to his left wing? [2]
  

• How does Alexander win when he is outnumbered at least 2:1 in infantry, and 5:1 when counting only the phalanx? How does an attacking army win against such odds?
  

• How does Alexander cross the Hydaspes river with less ships then he used to cross the Hellespont?
  

• With no surviving contemporary accounts of the battle to go on, why dismiss the Alexander Romance as a source? Ethiopic texts, translated by E.A.W. Badge, say Alexander lost the Battle of the Hydaspes.
  

• Why are Muslim, Persian, Arab, and Turkish texts less credible than those produced by hero worshipping Europeans?
  

• Why trust the routes Alexander used in India, when they were mapped originally by British surveyors who had an interest in discovering new trade routes for the British East India Company, along with invasion routes that could be used by the Russian military.
  

• Why are there no accounts of the Macedonian army carrying booty through India, and why does a mad man like Alexander not seek revenge for the death of his horse?
  

• Why is Porus seemingly rewarded after the Battle of the Hydaspes? And why is he left in power?

• Why is Alexander not mentioned in any Indian text. Where are the cities and monuments he founded? And why is Macedonian influence east of the Indus river valley seemingly short lived?
  

Altogether these arguments help create a new narrative that Alexander was defeated at the Battle of the Hyadespes, and that Greek and Roman historians were lying. After being forced to withdraw from India, Alexander thus produced the famed Elephant Medallions, no doubt an early form of propaganda where he claims to have defeated an elephant army led by Porus, which of course, is just another continuation in the incredible history of Alexander, written purposely by historians to inspire awe, wonder, and obedience. With so many holes and inconsistencies in the mythology of Alexander however, why would there not be room for a revisionist argument?


Elephant Medallions from Babylon.
Possibly 324 B.C.E.


Defending the Narrative

Though revisionists are right to point out to historians that no Indian accounts of the battle have been found, the fact remains, the invasion of India is a highly sourced event in the history of Alexander, backed by collaborating sources, including those independent of Alexander’s campaigns. Porus, for instance, appears in more than one history not related to Alexander, as do the monuments Alexander left behind at the Beas river prior to leaving India. While still not yet discovered, Bucephala and Nicaea are referred to in Roman geographical surveys, conducted many centuries after Alexander. The former city of Bucephala (which Alexander founded) even appears in the Peutinger Table, which is likely a copy of a Roman road map. The fact that Porus is mentioned in the Partition of Babylon, and again at Triparadisus, means, quite literally, that Alexander did not submit to Porus. And while archeological evidence remains sketchy at best, revisionists must still explain evidence of Greek influence, to include stone building and religious art as far away as Madurai. Would the future presence of the Indo-Greeks around Taxila, Sirkap, and elsewhere, to include also the rapid rise of the Maurya Empire into North-Western India, have been possible had Alexander lost the Battle of the Hyadspes? And though technically correct to question the battle narrative and its many falsehoods, a reasonable analysis still gives Alexander a sufficient chance at victory. If Alexander is able to destroy Porus’s cavalry or bring Craterus and Meleager into battle behind Porus’s lines, he wins. Given an 8-hour battle (as claimed by Plutarch), this is likely what happened.

Finally, perhaps the most glaring and most painfully obvious elephant in the room is the charge of Indian nationalism. While holes and questions in the narrative put forward by Europeans allow for alternative hypotheses, the fact remains, much of the intellectual basis of what we know about ancient India comes from the very sources revisionists accuse of lying. The great Indian king Ashoka is mentioned more in Greek sources than he is in Indian ones, and though history is often written incorrectly by the victors, the lack of comparable Indian sources does not give revisionists permission to write an uncontested political history of India. Their case must acknowledge the limits of theory and speculation, and all good theory must be unified, consistent, and open to the possibility of being tested.

The line between interesting speculation and valid historical argument is wide.


Did Porus Defeat Alexander?

The answer as to whether Porus actually defeated Alexander the Great is a resounding no. The fact that Alexander is believed to have campaigned in India for another 8 months following the Battle of the Hydaspes is not consistent with any argument that says Porus had defeated Alexander. However, it is also reasonably safe to conclude that Alexander did not conqueror India. The fact that Alexander’s venture is still said to have been short lived, and the rapid collapse of Greek and Macedonian influence following his immediate death, means his invasion into the heart of India was by no means complete or extensive, which is no doubt a source for Zhukov's thesis and many competing histories.

In the end, the collapse of Macedonian morale at the Beas river means Alexander had likely suffered a Pyrrhic victory at the hands of Porus. Porus was thus kept alive and made a satrap out of necessity. An unbelievable act of self-restraint, but reluctant acceptance of the limitations India had imposed on a man who had none. During his mad quest to reach the Eastern sea, Alexander battled many Alexanders, and among the Asian peoples, the Indians were said to have been the bravest. It is no doubt true, had he continued beyond the Beas, he would eventually have met his end. The armies and distances beyond were too great, and the challenges too much. Among the foes still left unconquered were the actual victors of the Battle of the Hydaspes, standing in quiet but historic opposition to the son of Zeus. The biggest and most crucial mistake Alexander could have made would have been to have insisted that he had in fact won any battles at all.

.....

[1]Appendix B: Losses in Some Ancient Battles
Alexander: A History of the Origin and Growth of the Art of War …, Volume 1
By Theodore Ayrault Dodge.

[2] Coenus's circuit:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

[Cookiegod]

I was going to write a half annoyed "No!" regarding the question in the title, but then I saw you came to the same conclusion. Too much of the later history would not have worked out at all if the battle had occurred differently than described. Too many sources report the same, the few dissenting ones being the least credible ones. Not to mention the fact that had Alexander lost the battle, his army would have been wiped out. Deep in hostile territory, on the wrong side of a river, we have many examples of how that would turn out.

Now my knowledge of the battle is a bit rusty, so I can't add much to the details, but for one, the British surveyors mapping out the route are a semi-credible source. Areas and roads of strategic import don't change as much as one might possibly expect. It is quite possible that the Russians would have used the same route as Alexander, just as the Muslim invaders all chose the Khyber pass a bit further north. The Himalaya and the Indus rivers were formidable obstacles, and there were only so many places to cross it. This is why we, for example, have 3 battles of Panipat which all happened on the exact same field at very different times. A 19th century surveyor concerned with the geostrategic realities of his time in an area that hadn't changed significantly since, would also get a fine understanding of the geostrategic realities faced by Alexander.

Secondly, the initial formation by Alexander appears to be a classic example of the oblique order. Him then changing his mind and sending Koinos (or in latin: Coenus) to the other flank makes some sense, as Poros had recognised Alexanders initial plans and probably immediately started to counter it, ultimately ordering his right flank cavalry to support the left, with Alexander probably realising early on what was happening. It was not necessary for Alexander to tell Koinos to do the entire maneuver. Koinos as a capable general knew how to act on his own. He might have simply followed the Indian cavalry, or just acted in the knowledge that the enemy cavalry had to be defeated first before any action against the infantry were to be undertaken.

A last note: The Indogreek kingdom is, as far as I know, independent from the battle at the Hydaspes. The Seleucids sold a large part of the area for 500 Indian war elephants, and the Indo-Greek kingdom was established by the Baktrian king Demetrios crossing the Khyber pass in the 2nd century BC.

[conon394]

I find it a silly theory.

A few thoughts vs the bullet points:

Why is Porus seemingly rewarded after the Battle of the Hydaspes? And why is he left in power?

Why not? Alexander (As Philip before him as well) was sometimes a harsh victor, he was not always such. Athens was left alone more or less and became stronger than it had been in 338 BC. Potential hostile Greeks states like Aitolia and Sparta while perhaps constrained were not paved over. Same for Persia sometimes place X or people Y suffered and sometimes thay did not. Nothing in Alexander's record says you can make a tautology out of Fight and lose to Alexander and thus will be destroyed, loose power or some combination.

With no surviving contemporary accounts of the battle to go on, why dismiss the Alexander Romance as a source? Ethiopic texts, translated by E.A.W. Badge, say Alexander lost the Battle of the Hydaspes.

Because the Alexander Romance is rubbish. Why not argue Athens had some sort of constitution monarchy/democracy in the 8th century run by Theseus because Athenian dramatists put him as the head of Athenian democracy?

Why are there no accounts of the Macedonian army carrying booty through India, and why does a mad man like Alexander not seek revenge for the death of his horse?

Because while a drunkard and emotional and apt to go over the top is was not always 'mad.Umm on booty. Err what the whole trip down the Indus is full of Alex taking everything from slaves to plunder to gifts. Weill sourced for quick reference in say Holt 'The Treasures of Alexander the great' around page 123 if the kindle version is one to one with the book not sure.

I'll some more later.

[Abdülmecid I]

Actually, the Indian/Pakistani nationalists have a point, regarding the fact that Alexander not only did not punish Porus, but he instead awarded him. The alleged generosity and leniency of Alexander is largely a myth, firstly established by Romantic Germans and Victorian British. The Persians who were integrated into the new Macedonian hierarchy were those that submitted to him, despite still having a legitimate chance to resist. Mithrenes, Mazaeus and Aboulites casually surrendered the citadels of respectively Sardis, Babylon and Susa, although there was still the possibility of resistance. From those three, Mithrenes disappears from the historical record, just as he got sent to his new satrapy of Armenia, Aboulites gets executed during the notorious purge after Gedrosia and only Mazaeus and his sons actually profited from their opportunism. So, given how Porus' case stands out, I'm inclined to believe not that Porus actually defeated the invaders, but that his defeat was not as crushing as ancient historiography implies. Thus, he remained strong enough that Alexander preferred to approach him as a potential ally and pillar of the Macedonian domination in India, rather than prolonging the hostilities.

How does Alexander win when he is outnumbered at least 2:1 in infantry, and 5:1 when counting only the phalanx? How does an attacking army win against such odds?

The numbers of Alexander's enemies are always inflated. Porus does not reach the millions of Gaugamela, but I doubt he was numerically superior, at least in such a dramatic degree, to Alexander, given the vast resources, human, military and financial, the latter commanded.

Why is Alexander not mentioned in any Indian text. Where are the cities and monuments he founded? And why is Macedonian influence east of the Indus river valley seemingly short lived?

Lack of long-term impact does not necessarily imply defeat. In the end, Alexander only crossed the westernmost extremity of India and failed to advance further, because the morale of his army had declined, as a result of continious campaigning, determined resistance, fragile logistical lines and finally exhaustion. Macedonian influence might have been short-lived, but that was mostly the result of its vulnerable stability. Authority and central control essentially collapsed, once Alexander passed away and there was no sufficiently powerful heir to take his place. Porus was assassinated, while Eudamus, the local satrap gathered the garrisons to participate in the Successors' conflicts in the west. The fact that Eudamus was assassinated by Antigonus, as a potentially dangerous partisan of Eumenes, probably didn't contribute either. Given all the above, it's not surprising that Macedonian influence gradually eroded, as it can also be confirmed by the stationing of the politically suspect Silver Shields in the front of Arachosia, whose satrap, Sibyrtius, was also loyal to the Antigonids, but wich was also considered something like what the Iberian Peninsula and Russia were in the Napoleonic and World wars, respectively.

[conon394]

So, given how Porus' case stands out, I'm inclined to believe not that Porus actually defeated the invaders, but that his defeat was not as crushing as ancient historiography implies. Thus, he remained strong enough that Alexander preferred to approach him as a potential ally and pillar of the Macedonian domination in India, rather than prolonging the hostilities.

So you are suggesting a case of post chaeronea of channeling his father to win a hard fought battle than do an even better job of negotiating after?

[Mamlaz]

The entire narrative is asinine for the sole reason of the obvious argument that Alexander did not in fact go back, but went southwards.

The following conquest of the Indus valley nearly immediately after the battle gives a clear set conclusion as to what happened.

A defeated army does not simply proceed to conquer nearly a million square kilometers southwards in three months lol

Not to mention that satraps of the Indus and modern day Punjab were indeed set and Porus was likely merely a puppet figure of the ruling general Eudamus;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eudemus_(general)

while Peithon ruled in the Indus;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peithon_(son_of_Agenor)

The entire theory is merely pathetic copeage.

[Common Soldier]

I think the theory has a possibility, but at present, we have no solid justification for rejecting the Greek history and calling the writers liars.

There were thousands of soldiers and had Alexander really lost, it is not realistic the true story Alexander's.defeat would not have leaked out if Alexander had lost. There were many who did not like Alexander and his enemies would have had a field day if a defeat of Alexander was tried to be hidden.

Greek historians, while.they did spin stories in a positive light, as did everyone else did, seldom lied totally outright, and it is unlikely they would have made up a story that could be contradicted by thousands of eyewitnesses.

Alexander had a history of treating his defeated foes well, so his generous treatment of Porus can't be taken as proof of a defeat. So while the proposition that Alexander lost is not completely without merit, it must be rejected due to lack of any real evidence to support it. All we have to go on is what the Greek historians said, and we don't have grounda to call them liars without better evidence.

[The Despondent Mind]

Another thing to add on the soldiers wanting to not go further, as far as I understand a huge number of Alexander's soldiers were vets that fought as far as back as with Phillip, definitely at least from Chaeronea, and as soon as Daries III died they made their feelings known several times, that they are tired of war and want to go home and rest.

Understand that I do not see it as a crazy stretch that they were just sick of it all, fighting some weird people in a far distant land and they don't know what awaits them if they go further.

Also after Alex we have many examples of such behavior and scientific evidence that "soldier fatigue" is a real deal, and there is only so much a man can take of fighting, even pre-modern fighting. Just a rough example comes to mind, Bayezid the II was popular among the Turkish military cause he was against offensive wars, and the military was exhausted after the wars of Mehmed II.

[Cyclops]

...but...but...muh narrative! Surely the entirety of history depends on the whims of one man?

OP makes good points. It makes plain sense to see Alexander's "deflection" after Hydaspes as the result of a strategic check, although its hard to see it as lost battle for Alexander. Trust a Russian to spot a case of Borodino-itis.

...
There were thousands of soldiers and had Alexander really lost, it is not realistic the true story Alexander's.defeat would not have leaked out if Alexander had lost. There were many who did not like Alexander and his enemies would have had a field day if a defeat of Alexander was tried to be hidden.
...

...unless he swore a pact of secrecy with his generals and some of his men, and the blabbermouths who were prepared to reveal the truth were marched into the Gedrosian Desert to perish...that poor fella with his last helmet full of water offering it to his King who empties it out in front of him with a smirk.

Plot twist!

[conon394]

Back to the OP

In the end, the collapse of Macedonian morale at the Beas river means Alexander had likely suffered a Pyrrhic victory at the hands of Porus

Not sure you can conclude that. He was facing the rumored size of larger armies - emphasis rumors. He was at the end of a very long logistical trail. Its not like replacements and supplies were sailing to the mouth of the Indus and then to him. And he had kinda left everything rather ramshackle back in existing conquests. Can't say how much mail he was getting but His mother and Antipater were feuding (the latter seemed to be plotting) some of his governors were off the reservation, a lot men sent to the new cities and garrisons were not exactly excited, etc. In some ways while Its seems he personally would gone forward no matter and probably did care how big his next potential foes army was. But with the mutiny probably did him a service in that it made him stop a consider the need to consolidate his rule(*). I would suspect rather then the slightly theatrical accounts we have there were a lot senior advisors pointing out the need to settle what they had and even things like hay logistics across water is easy - there is Carthage to deal with and that allows more freedom for the freedom of the Greeks rhetoric which a is a good cover for dealing with the Greeks who are plotting with Antipater (and he should go).

* personally I as a fan Athens I would have preferred a reckless charge off to disappear with most of his solid generals and his core of veterans over the edge of the map...

[Abdülmecid I]

Well, at least one senior advisor, general Coenus, advised Alexander to listen to his soldiers' demands, by pointing out the dismal state of logistics. The quality of the armour had completely declined by then, which is a reasonable estimation, given the circumstances. Unfortunately, as our sources rather ironically underline, a bit later, new, shiny equipment arrived and Coenus unexpectedly died. Very sad, it reminds me of how that royal page, Dimnus, died out of the blue, just when he was about to publicly reveal Philotas' involvement in the conspiracy.

In all seriousness, though, logistical concerns were probably the main factor for the abandonment of the Indian campaign. Even the mutiny can be interpreted as a sign of the failure in the lines of supplies and communication that fatally undermined the morale of the troops. I doubt that internal politics and geopolitics played a major role though. No foreign power posed any serious threat to the empire. Carthage, like Arabia, were just the next, long-term targets of Alexander's imperialist plans, they hadn't even diplomatically confronted the Macedonian king. Domestic affairs were also underestimated by Alexander. After all, if he intended to return as soon as possible to Babylon, he wouldn't waste his time crossing the Gedrosian desert, which not only undermined the cohesion of his army, but also delayed his progress, in a time, when supposedly disloyal satraps were running amok.

[Morifea]

I still don`t get the Reason behind this Gedrosian Death march… at least the upper echelon could (and should) have taken a ship.

[Abdülmecid I]

As far as I know, four theories exist that attempt to interpret the reasons behind the crossing of Gedrosia.

1. The first one and most hostile to Alexander is that the Macedonian king intentionally tried to punish his soldiers for their mutiny in India. That could match Alexander's often vengeful and vindictive nature, but it still seems a tad hyperbolic and is never attested by our primary sources. The next two belong to the opposite side, they are trying to rationalise it as a strategically sound decision, which backfired, due to logistical misfortunes.

2. The army's objective was to collect provisions for Nearchus' fleet. That excuse doesn't make any sense whatsoever. Sending a large army in the desert, where it could not even feed itself, in order to collect supplies for the fleet is suicidal. It's a task that could have been achieved much more efficiently by a smaller and more flexible detachment. After all, our primary sources confirm that the opposite is true: Nearchus was supposed to watch over the army.

3. Alexander intended to subdue Gedrosia, which remained de facto independent. That hypothesis has some merit, because the royal authority over Gedrosia must have been almost absent. Alexander had never been in the region before and not even in the neighboring satrapy, Carmania, as he had only accepted the Persian satrap's surrender (that's only an inference from the fact that the satrap Astaspes welcomed him after his Gedrosian desert; Arrian and Quntus Curtius are very laconic about the stay of Alexander in Persis and are primarily concerned with the devastation of Persepolis). However, sending a large army to conquer a sparsely populated region is very unreasonable. The Macedonians essentially never met any resistance, so the third theory doesn't hold much ground either.

4. The fourth and most convincing, in my opinion, interpretation is that Alexander wished to emulate and eventuallly surpass Cyrus II and Semiramis, the legendary queen of Assyria. Both Cyrus and Semiramis enjoyed an extraordinary reputation in pre-Hellenistic Asia and even Greece. They were credited with unprecedented conquests and military achievements (in the case of Semiramis, totally fictional, she must have been a fusion of the tradition revolving around the rulers of the Neo-Assyrian Empire), a legend which is very appropriately reflected in Ctesias' Persica. Cyrus and Semiramis were said to have managed to cross Gedrosia, but only after suffering tremendous losses, basically only them and a hanful of followers allegedly survived. Alexander has consistently tried to overcome his illustrious predecessors in world domination, so there's a considerable chance that he took the risk, either for ideological propaganda or in order to satisfy his ego and megalomania. The advantage of this hypothesis is also corroborated by ancient historiography. Not only the contest between Alexander and Cyrus/Semiramis, but also the former's fixation of succeeding where the other two had "failed".

[Common Soldier]

I still don`t get the Reason behind this Gedrosian Death march… at least the upper echelon could (and should) have taken a ship.

Alexander might not have wanted to abandoned his army because it would not have been good for morale. And likely they did not have enough ships to transport all his men by sea.

And looking at the map, to avoid the Gedrosia would mean detouring much further inland, and losing contact with his fleet. Alexander may have preferred to risk the Gedrosia to be closer to his fleet.

[Mamlaz]

* personally I as a fan Athens I would have preferred a reckless charge off to disappear with most of his solid generals and his core of veterans over the edge of the map...

Would have been a far more epic and proper death for him compared to withering away in Babylon.

Also if Hephastion died in battle it would have been much easier for Alexander to accept.

Heck, considering just how easy the Nanda fell to the Maurya just years after, he could have even pulled it off, and died properly in eastern India.

The IRL ending was such a massive let down in comparison.

I still don`t get the Reason behind this Gedrosian Death march… at least the upper echelon could (and should) have taken a ship.

As far as I know, four theories exist that attempt to interpret the reasons behind the crossing of Gedrosia.

From what I have read, the most reasonable explanation is that the army was supposed to march near the coast and the fleet was supposed to supply the army, however the fleet construction was slower than expected and both the size of the fleet and the navigating of the coast resulted in the ships not being able to follow the army.

This happened while Alexander already was marching westward, so he decided that turning back eastwards towards the Indus was not an option.

Also, the very fact that he was returning home from the mouth of the Indus again clearly shows that he won the battles in India.

[conon394]

Well, at least one senior advisor, general Coenus, advised Alexander to listen to his soldiers' demands, by pointing out the dismal state of logistics. The quality of the armour had completely declined by then, which is a reasonable estimation, given the circumstances. Unfortunately, as our sources rather ironically underline, a bit later, new, shiny equipment arrived and Coenus unexpectedly died. Very sad, it reminds me of how that royal page, Dimnus, died out of the blue, just when he was about to publicly reveal Philotas' involvement in the conspiracy.

In all seriousness, though, logistical concerns were probably the main factor for the abandonment of the Indian campaign. Even the mutiny can be interpreted as a sign of the failure in the lines of supplies and communication that fatally undermined the morale of the troops. I doubt that internal politics and geopolitics played a major role though. No foreign power posed any serious threat to the empire. Carthage, like Arabia, were just the next, long-term targets of Alexander's imperialist plans, they hadn't even diplomatically confronted the Macedonian king. Domestic affairs were also underestimated by Alexander. After all, if he intended to return as soon as possible to Babylon, he wouldn't waste his time crossing the Gedrosian desert, which not only undermined the cohesion of his army, but also delayed his progress, in a time, when supposedly disloyal satraps were running amok.

I may have have overstated political factors. But I think they did exist. Realistically I think there was just a general recognition of the logistical end of tether issues had reached a maximum length. I did not mean imply Carthage was a problem but it was low hanging fruit and had a good PR value over fighting way of where nobody in the Empire or Greece cared about. Also potential easily added and the med allowed one to more easily be in touch with his core Empire.

On the desert trip. Its important to consider that Alexander might not have had the best information and data at hand. As OK it thay say it bad but maybe not so bad. It not like he call up google maps or Landsat data.

@Mamlaz

I agree I am no Alexander fan but I think he earned the right ride off into the sunset or least die in the saddle. Caesar I have less sympathy for. He was actually a good general administrator and knew republican history he should have had a body guard if he was going to visit the Senate.

[Morifea]

On the desert trip. Its important to consider that Alexander might not have had the best information and data at hand. As OK it thay say it bad but maybe not so bad. It not like he call up google maps or Landsat data.

That for sure, no Anabasis (Xenophons Version) as travel guide this time.

And Alexander really did everything to try to die in the saddle, it just didn`t work.