Firstly, providing quotes from authors and citing their works is not plagiarism. Plagiarism would be if I were to claim their works as my own. I do not. I am saying that Sabin et al's works on this subject have influenced my own views. That is not plagiarism. Kindly cease to accuse me of such.
Actually: How would you summarize my views on the Roman Army, in your own words? Because the arguments that I am making and the arguments that you keep saying I am making appear to be two different things.
Talking about incompetence, Picqs view on Roman discipline is exactly the opposite of yours, his is the view that the un brave Roman was compelled to fight from fear of punishment.
Yes, and? Again: I did not cite du Picq for his view on Roman tactics, because I believe they are dated and no longer accurate. I cited du Picq for his views on the effect of fear and the importance of morale on the mechanics of battle, where I think he has important insights. Again: I think Sabin, Zhmodikov, and Quesada-Sanz's papers have the most correct model for Roman tactics and the "face of battle" in Roman times. Du Picq's work Battle Studies is an important work on understanding the impacts of morale and fear in combat, but I don't agree with every aspect of his characterization of Roman or Greek armies. So stop saying that du Picq disagrees with my characterization of the Roman army, I already know that and it's not particularly relevant.
So, they must have abandoned the use of a phalanx for the Legion to create an inferior method of fighting then, acording to you. Greeks gave up the pike phalanx it up to imitate the Roman legion, because it was so inferior. Half of Roman field forces were allies in the period, as Roman citizens were to few on their own, and Rome required Allies to serve the Roman Military machine, because the Roman state that had a small citizen body, and they all ended up using Roman equipment and methods, because they were inferior.
They gave up having 2/3 of the legion with spears, to 1/3 and finally to no spears because pila were inferior then, they gave up using greek straight swords for gladius during the 2nd PW because it was an inferior weapon.
This is a misrepresentation of my views, and I have not said any of these things.
The Roman state, and the Roman military method, had many advantages in war or battle. I can list many of them: The training and equipping necessary for a legion is simpler and easier than the very specialised level of drill needed to handle a sarissa in a phalanx, allowing for more manpower to be mobilized more quickly. The widely distributed system of centurions assigned to conveniently sized sub-units provided a generally very reliable level of local leadership at the sharp edge of battle. The pilum is a very effective weapon, and the scutum's size and strength both physically protects the soldier and provides a psychological feeling of safety to support him as he moves into combat. The gladius is an effective sword for both cut and thrust, and the act of charging with swords drawn would terrify many lesser opponents into flight outright.
The intervals between the maniples let the Romans vary the frontage of a legion for whatever the circumstances required by varying the size of intervals, but still keep reserve lines disposed in depth. Those reserve line leant a very great degree of resilience to frontal pressure upon the legion, as a repulsed attack or a retreat of a few maniples does not turn into a rout of the whole army. Even in battles with phalanxes like at Cynoscephalae and Pydna, the Romans were able to both match frontage with the phalanx and have reserve lines in depth at the same time. This is a very great advantage, keeping reserves well back from the stress of combat, being able to bring up reinforcements wherever a maniple is hard pressed, and at the same time not sacrificing frontage so that the enemy cannot overlap your line. The Roman battle line could bend without breaking, but also had great resilience because of the depth of the triplex acies.
Their light troops and skirmishers had similar aggression to the line infantry, and performed well. Their cavalry particularly is often underestimated but was a very dangerous and important force.
The Romans taught their young men to be brave, and glorified in aggression in battle. They had a great degree of grit and elan, which often let them keep up the pressure until an opponent's will was cracked, or let them keep in the fight even when being driven back until the battle could be won elsewhere on the field (Cynoscephalae and Pydna spring to mind). Their centurions were experienced men of proven courage who could inspire the normal soldier to fight more bravely by leading from the forefront of battle. The social glory that accompanied single combat, and the loose array of the maniple which enabled aggressive individuals to move forward, and at the same time the mass of the century or maniple offered group support to those individuals who lead the charge.
Their distributed system of leadership and the organization of numerous sub-units let the Roman army be very responsive and exploit opportunities swiftly and ruthlessly as they occurred on the battlefield. This is perhaps best shown by the tribune of Cynoscephalae. For my money the most incredible example of it was Claudius Nero's actions at the Battle of the Metaurus, outflanking the Carthaginians by shifting maniples from one end of the Roman battle line to the other, behind the rest of the embattled army.
They were very skilled campaigners, who were diligent about fortifications, watches, and picquets, and this set of skills transfers well over to siege warfare, where they excelled many of their contemporaries. Siege warfare is really the decisive act of ancient warfare, as only by taking the fortified places of an enemy can you truly conquer their lands. In sieges, the Romans did well in the Republic and only became better with more practice later on.
So no, the Romans didn't win out of inferiority. That is a ridiculous statement, and a misrepresentation of my arguments.
Why did the Romans win their Empire? I would argue that the most salient factors include high strategic reserves of manpower, a culture of constant military expansion leading to a high level of experience of warfare present in the society for the legions to draw upon in recruitment, and a lot of aggression of both individual soldiers and of commanding generals combined with enough self-discipline to keep their aggressive behaviour generally (Although not always) within the parameters of militarily useful actions.
I don't believe that they had perfect, unbreakable discipline, or better close order drill, or that they needed superior methods to cover up for less manpower. I believe they had a greater cultural system for bringing out the courage of their men, enough discipline to keep said aggression under control, a better system for mobilizing the manpower of their territories, a simpler, but very resilient array for battle, and superior campaigning and siege skills. They had morale, numbers, organization, and leadership, and these are considerable advantages. There are trade offs in that their armies were at times disobedient in their aggression, but overall they had more advantages than disadvantages.
Appointment made by Caeser from Allesia/ Bibracte, who wants a word with you about how to count, 15 mins later, you have an appointment with Marius who wants a word about Aquae Sextiae/Vercellae, 15 mins later Paulinus is coming back from watling street to have a word, oh, he is double/treble booked with Lucullus on his way back from Armenia and Scipio from Magnesia.
Why, yes, the Romans could be outnumbered in a given battle. Now the exact numbers claimed in ancient sources are a matter of controversy, because often they strain credibility (Herodotus claiming that Xerxes invaded Greece with a million men, for perhaps the most classic example), so we don't precisely know what was the level of outnumbered an army could be in a single battle. But we have a pretty good idea that, say, the Seleucids outnumbered the Romans at Magnesia. The Romans had the same logistical challenges and limits as anyone else, so yeah they could be outnumbered in a given battle.
But just as often, they had armies of comparable size to their enemies. You cite Alesia, Bibracte, Aquae Sextiae, Vercellae, Watling Street, and Magnesia as incidences when the Romans were outnumbered. I could cite Asculum, Bagradas, Adys, Trebia, Dertosa, the Metaurus, Zama, Cynoscephalae, and Pydna as incidences when the Roman army is estimated to have been similarly sized to their opponents. I could also cite Heraclea, Cannae, the Siege of Carthage, or the Battle of Corinth as incidences where the Romans outnumbered their enemies. So whether the Romans outnumbered their enemies or were themselves outnumbered was always a matter of the fortunes of war, the skill of the general, the logistical challenges of the campaign, but the Romans were just as capable of meeting these challenges as anyone else, and had similar resources to their opponents, and so they usually seem to have deployed armies of comparable size to their enemies.
Above the tactical level, however, the Romans always had similar or superior strategic resources in manpower to their opponents. A defeat like Cannae could have shattered other polities, much less four crushing defeats in a row like Trebia, Trasimene, Cannae, and Silva Litana. Fear and panic and sorrow certainly affected the Romans after slaughters like these in the Second Punic War, yet they raised new legions and carried on until Carthage was defeated.
"For the conquest of Italy, the system perpetuated itself, as the more Rome expanded, the larger its collective army became. Some states even joined the alliance system voluntarily, recognizing its benefits. Newly conquered areas were also made safe by series of colonies that Rome planted throughout Italy, many of which went on to become large cities in their own right and provided Rome with even more troops. The confederacy provided immense resources of manpower which go a long way towards explaining Rome’s military success during the mid-Republic. The system allowed Rome both to conquer large parts of the Mediterranean and to defend Italy from incursions by the Gauls and by Pyrrhus and Hannibal. They could now fight wars on multiple fronts and survive bitter and costly defeats, as the human capital of Italy gave them enough resources virtually to guarantee eventual success"
Cambridge History of Greek & Roman Warfare, Volume 1, 2007, Pg 486
"Just as gainful military campaigns account to a degree for the lack of internal stasis in mid-Republican Rome, this type of warfare was also necessary for Rome’s relationship with its Italian allies, as the latter were taxed not in money or kind but in men for the communal army. This alliance system served as indirect financing for the Roman state at war, as the costs of combat for Rome itself were greatly reduced due to the large presence of the allies, who met their own expenses. The system accounts for much of Rome’s success on the battlefield, as the vast reserves of Italian manpower saw the Republic through many long and bitter conflicts. Furthermore, many of the allies did not serve by compulsion, as they saw for themselves the economic benefits brought about by plundering others."
Ibid, Pg. 495
"Rome of the mid- Republic went to war nearly every year. The Roman people voted wars in assembly – the comitia centuriata, itself a body with military origins – and no case is known of its refusing a war the Senate wanted. Individuals might have resisted the call to arms with impunity, since the Roman state was quite incapable of compelling the unwilling to serve in the army, but Roman men did not (Polyb. 6.26.4). When there was widespread resistance to the callup in 151 Polybius reports that this was new to Roman experience. And comparison of the size of Roman armies to census numbers reveals that the Romans were able to mobilize a remarkably large proportion of their men for war. From 200 to 168, when the Republic faced nothing we would accept as a threat to its security, nearly one out of six adult male citizens was in the field every year. During the crisis of the Second Punic War (218–201) the proportion had been higher – more than a quarter."
Ibid, Pg. 511-512
"On a practical level the societal urge to demonstrate virtus produced brave armies (Polyb. 1.64.6), large armies, and armies that could be reconstituted year after year even in the wake of bloody defeats, as during the Second Punic War. Roman manpower poured forth like a fountain (a Greek might observe); fighting the Romans was like fighting the hydra, cut one head off, and others sprung forth in its place"
Ibid, Pg. 514-515
Manpower and mobilization was a major strategic Roman advantage, not a disadvantage that they needed to cover up.
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