Why Hannibal didn't attack the city of Rome?

[twgamer20197]

I just wonder why. Could it have been because he thought he needed more men or more supplies to besiege Rome?

[isa0005]

There are a number of reasons.
First - His army was far too small to either assault let alone secuerly beseige Rome.
Second - Rome was well defended, atleast two legions were stationed within marching distance of the city, plus a conscriptable population.
Third - Logictically speaking, beseiging a cityt, and Rome at that would be a logistical nightmare. Hanibal neither had the right kind of seige weaponry nor the supplies to be able to starve out or assualt the city should he decide to attack Rome.
Four - Realistically speaking, while Rome held onto their Italian and Latin allies Hanibal was more or less fighting alone in Italy. Yes he had some support from the locals but by in large most of Romes allies on the paeninsular remained loyal.
Five - Personally, I've never thought for a moment that Hannibal never intended to attack city Rome. Hanibal's main goal during his Italian campagin was to destabalise the paeninsular and weaken Rome to the degree that they would either A. Submit to Carthaginian hegemony or B. Put Rome in inferior subordinate position. What Hanibal hadn't counted on was someone like Scipio coming along... that and it turned out crossing the Alps did terrible things to elephants

[HannibalExMachina]

it should be noted that carthage never seemed to fully grasp the nature of their enemy. they treated this war, any external war really, as just part of buisness, while rome treated it as all or nothing. rome didnt suffer any equals, only subjects, clients and allies of moderate size.

hannibal likely tried to break up the system of roman "alliances" (in reality, seperating rome from its subjects), to reduce rome to just a strong regional power at least. carthage, meanwhile, never aimed above a compromise. on top of that, they were very wary of commanders gaining too much influence through their military achievements.
to rome, military sucess was essential to political status, to carthage, it was danger to the state. their usual modus operandi was to crucify commanders for incompetence, and retire them for too much sucess.

so, i dont think hannibal ever aimed at hegemony over italy or subjugation, he would have been satisfied with removing any threat to carthagian hegemony in their own sphere of influence. even if he had further goaks, he surely understood the limits of the system he operated under.

it is oc interesting to note that the barcids in general seemed to emulate rome to a certain degree, in expanding territory in spain, instead of just maintaining protectorates over vital outposts and limiting direct territorial rule to the hinterland of carthage.



as for scipio, his ability to adapt did certainly pay off in his iberian campaigns, and mostly negated the tactical disadvantages when facing hannibal himself, but i wouldnt put it on top of any list of factors.

while hannibal was stuck in italy, scipio had more strategic freedom. he campaigned outside of italy while rome was still under threat, while hannibal was recalled once carthage itself was threatend.

scipio had all the resources hannibal was lacking, after mago was ordered to reinforce hannibal and failed, no more substantial reinforcements were ever sent to him.

lastly, zama was decided more by the defection of the numidians than by scipios actions on the field. in the last phase of the battle, he was hard pressed by hannibals veterans, but hannibals newer troops broke at some point (which, crucially, the gauls at cannae did not), and the numidians, both roman allies and defectors from hannibals side, finished him off (the romans may even have had an advantage in cavalry from the start, at least numerically). so, scipios presence evened the odds as far as commanders are concerned, and reorganisation of his troops did so tactically, but it wasnt ultimately decisive.

its also hard to believe a flexible commander like hannibal, with at least some knowledge of what happend in iberia, would not have expected to face scipio eventually, be it in italy or africa.

i do have to point out though that hannibal, at least according to our sources, didnt lose a single elephant in the alps, they all died during the campaign in northern italy.

[Hanny]

It did not fit into his strategic aim in 216, in that he did not want an end to Rome as a state, only a reduction of its influence and control of the rest of Italy.

It did not fit into his operational aims, his was an army based on manoeuvre warfare ( not attrition ), high % of mounted troops, that shaped the battle space, allowing him to determine where a engagement was to be fought, chiefly to his advantage and outomes of a dramatic nature as his mounted arm made no dawn for the defeated, and allowed him to live of the land at the enemies expense as he controlled access to water and fodder/grain and he manoeuvred to where the fodder was, and the crops ready for gathering.

Sieges, (which are attritional in nature, force you to bring the food/fodder to you at a certain place) require long periods of time in the same place, being fixed in place to effect, and force you to defend your siege works in place and consume fodder from the same place, which rapidly becomes unavailable.

[Hanny]

"Magister Elephantorvm": A Reappraisal of Hannibal's Use of Elephants
Michael B. Charles and Peter Rhodan


https://www.jstor.org/stable/2543404...n_tab_contents

[conon394]

It did not fit into his strategic aim in 216, in that he did not want an end to Rome as a state, only a reduction of its influence and control of the rest of Italy.

It did not fit into his operational aims, his was an army based on manoeuvre warfare ( not attrition ), high % of mounted troops, that shaped the battle space, allowing him to determine where a engagement was to be fought, chiefly to his advantage and outomes of a dramatic nature as his mounted arm made no dawn for the defeated, and allowed him to live of the land at the enemies expense as he controlled access to water and fodder/grain and he manoeuvred to where the fodder was, and the crops ready for gathering.

Sieges, (which are attritional in nature, force you to bring the food/fodder to you at a certain place) require long periods of time in the same place, being fixed in place to effect, and force you to defend your siege works in place and consume fodder from the same place, which rapidly becomes unavailable.

Still you are running interference for the man. Operational? To what end a war he started and had no plan to end. I hope the man is chilling with Pericles in the circle of hell side entrance reserved for fools who start decades long wars of choice with no plan to end them.

[twgamer20197]

Maybe the carthagianian polititans can also be blamed because they refused to send reinforcements to Hannibal according to a movie I watched. If that is true, could it have been because of jealousy? Or fear that he might get to grab the absolute power of the carthaginian civilization?

[HannibalExMachina]

as i said above, yes, they were notoriously mistrustful of sucessful generals, and oc there was the standing political rivalry between the barcids and other parties.

[Abdülmecid I]

I wouldn't attribute it to mistrust or paranoia, but to the particular structure of Carthaginian internal politics. Their government was based on a fragile cooperation between the native aristocracy. The entire system could be easily overthrown if a single magnate or family gathered enough military and financial power to launch a coup and purge the city from potential opponents. Several ancient city states, from to Mesopotamia to Tunisia had crafted several legal provisions curtailing the powers of the potentially most powerful magistrates, exactly in order to prevent such a possibility. Thanks to the benefit of the hindsight the sack and destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C. gives us, we can criticise the Carthaginian regime from hesitating to reinforce or even actively sabotaging Hannibal's endeavour. However, the Barcids increasing their sphere of influence in Iberia and Italy was posed a very real threat to the balance of power in Carthaginian politics.

I wouldn't be surprised if a portion of the Carthaginian elite genuinely preferred a weakened Carthage subject to Numidian raids to a powerful kingdom, where the power is monopolised by the Barcid dynasty, while the rest of the noble families are ostracised or completely removed. It's a mistake to believe that territorial expansion was the priority or even a minor objective of the Carthaginian citizenry, because such rapid geopolitical changes may have unexpected consequences. After all, was really the fate of the expelled or massacred Carthaginians much worse than that of the Roman patricians proscribed by Sulla, Marius and their subsequent imitators?

[Hanny]

Maybe the carthagianian polititans can also be blamed because they refused to send reinforcements to Hannibal according to a movie I watched. If that is true, could it have been because of jealousy? Or fear that he might get to grab the absolute power of the carthaginian civilization?

Try reading books, if you want to learn history, movies are for entertainment not education.

HB recieved from N Africa 000s of troops for his use in Spain before the war with Rome, this was only possible with the consent of the leading men in Cartahge, who ratified war with Rome with only a a single dissenting voice, after winning at Cannae HB requested money and troops from Africa, he got the money, as his armies would rise from the 26k he arrived with, to over 70k, he got elephants and Numidians, the two troops types he could not acquire in theatre, but only after gaining a port. Other troops raised in Africa went to Spain, Hasdrubals forces had a large African contingent, or to Sicily or to Sardinia as circumstances made doing so seem a good idea.

HB already had the absolute power as suffete, the authority to raise troops, wage war and so on,there was no higher authority except membership of the 104. The Barcid political faction was the dominate one during the PW, the choices made in Carthage were those of the Barcids faction, it set state policy.

[conon394]

Try reading books, if you want to learn history, movies are for entertainment not education.

HB recieved from N Africa 000s of troops for his use in Spain before the war with Rome, this was only possible with the consent of the leading men in Cartahge, who ratified war with Rome with only a a single dissenting voice, after winning at Cannae HB requested money and troops from Africa, he got the money, as his armies would rise from the 26k he arrived with, to over 70k, he got elephants and Numidians, the two troops types he could not acquire in theatre, but only after gaining a port. Other troops raised in Africa went to Spain, Hasdrubals forces had a large African contingent, or to Sicily or to Sardinia as circumstances made doing so seem a good idea.

HB already had the absolute power as suffete, the authority to raise troops, wage war and so on,there was no higher authority except membership of the 104. The Barcid political faction was the dominate one during the PW, the choices made in Carthage were those of the Barcids faction, it set state policy.

Again I don't think he pre march forces count. After that Carthage was all over the map in sending stuff willy nilly this way and that. Seizing Rome would have been the decisive blow and all of Carthage's efforts should have been aimed at that.

[Anna_Gein]

Try reading books

Speaking of books, is there any good book that details the Second Punic War in Italy post Cannae ? Something that would explain in depth the events from tactical fight and operational level, all the way to the general politic in the conflict ?

[Common Soldier]

Again I don't think he pre march forces count. After that Carthage was all over the map in sending stuff willy nilly this way and that. Seizing Rome would have been the decisive blow and all of Carthage's efforts should have been aimed at that.

Trying to sieze Rome would have tied his forces down, and a siege can be harder on the army conducting the siege than the people inside, and it can take a long time for a siege to work. I don't think Hannibal could afford his army to be pinned down like that.

While Hannibal's army was camped outside of Rome, Rome could have raised new troops and attacked Hannibal, trapping Hannibal l's army between the Roman army and the walls Rome. The nature of siege warfare wouldn't give Hannibal scope to excercize his military genius. If Hannibal had tried ro conduct ansiege, he would have risked destroying his army, in my opinion. Plus many of his allies would likely not have been good at siege warfare, and without the lure of immediate loot and pillage, likely would have deserted him.

[Hanny]

Speaking of books, is there any good book that details the Second Punic War in Italy post Cannae ? Something that would explain in depth the events from tactical fight and operational level, all the way to the general politic in the conflict ?

Check your local university, see what they have online for the period, usually a source packet and the reading lists of works. Many have theses online for you to look at https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/vie...history_theses theses area good way to save money on books, https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/fil...3396.pdfMaster theses


Which became his book.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Colossal-Cr.../dp/0811733831
Colossal Cracks: Montgomery's 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-45

For the 2nd PW I would go for modern:

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hannibals-W.../dp/0806130040
Hannibal's War: A Military History of the Second Punic War Lazenby

Second choice would be Bagnal https://www.amazon.co.uk/Punic-Wars-.../dp/0312342144

Short on military detail, but strong on other aspects.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hannibals-D.../dp/041529911X
Hannibal's Dynasty: Power and Politics in the Western Mediterranean, 247-183 BC


Primary sources, Livy and Polybios.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/War-Hanniba.../dp/014044145X
The War with Hannibal Livy

[Mamlaz]

IMO the only chance Hannibal had was Philip not getting tied down in Greece and somehow marching into Italy.

Hellenistic armies were the greatest experts in siege assaults on Earth at the time, even at that period.