POTF 22 - Nominations

[Lord Thesaurian]

POTF is about recognising the very best posts, the best arguments and discourse in the D&D, and appropriately rewarding it.


You shall progressively earn these medals once you achieve enough wins, but first you must be nominated in threads such as this one. And it works like this.

Post of the Fortnight - Rules

-Each user can nominate up to 2 posts per round, and the only valid form of nomination is by quoting with a link as shown below the chosen post in the PotF thread designated for it.

Looking forward to getting this kicked off for real!

-Each 15 days there will be a new Nomination thread put up, and all the posts written during this period are considered eligible, if properly nominated. Exception are posts who are somewhat breaking the ToS; upon being acted by Moderation, they are always considered uneligible.


- Remember: It is possible to nominate up to 2 posts each round of the competition; it is also possible to change a nomination anytime before the actual round of nominations ends.


- There will be two competitions held every month, with a period for nominations followed by a period of voting. The submitted posts can be discussed in a dedicated space.


- Only posts that have not participated in a previous poll and that have been published in the current period of given time in any section of the D&D area may be nominated.


- The authors of the nominated post will be informed so they can withdraw the candidacy if that is their wish.


- The maximum number of participating posts in the final vote will be ten. If more than ten nominations are submitted, seconded nominations will take priority. After seconded nominations are considered, earliest nominations will take priority. If the number of posts submitted to the contest is less than ten, the organizing committee may nominate posts if it considers it appropriate.


-The members of the committee will never nominate a post belonging to one of them, but the rest of the users can nominate their posts (organizers posts), and vice versa.


-In the event of a tie, both posts will be awarded and both posters will receive rep and 1 competition point.


- Public or private messages asking for a vote for a candidate post are forbidden. Violators (and their posts) may not participate in the running contest.


- People are expected to consider the quality and structure of the post itself, more than the content of the same. While it's certainly impossible to completely split the two aspects when making our own opinion on a post, it remains intended, as also explained in the Competition Commentary Thread, that commenting and discussing on the content rather than on the form/structure of the post is considered off-topic for the purpose of this competition. You are free to nominate and vote for whatever reason you want, but what happens in public has to strictly follow up with the competition rules.


A nominated post should:


1. Be focused and relevant to the topic(s) being discussed.
2. Demonstrate a well-developed, insightful and nuanced understanding of the topic(s) it is discussing.
3. Be logically coherent, well organized and communicate its points effectively.
4. Support its contentions with verifiable evidence, either in the form of links or references.
5. Not be deliberately vexatious to other users.

Good luck everyone!

[Flinn]

There was also the isopolity between Thebes and Megara: two states, one voice ( )

I think this touches on an interesting point about Hellenic state extension.

Athens established a larger version of itself through synoikos, binding the attic plain into the Polis of Athena (seen as a victory for the demos over the aristoi in traditional historiography). IIRC Thebes briefly imposed something similar on Boeotia in their all too brief hegemony.

I suspect Argos had imposed something similar in at least part of the Argolid as it was such a wealthy and powerful state until repeatedly kicked down by Sparta-there's a link between states conducting a Synoikism and a move to democracy (along with the rise of the hoplite) so possibly it was undertaken by the populist anti-oligarchic Tyrant-King Pheidon?

Sparta conversely imposed direct rule by the Spartiates on the perioiki, and together on the Messenians probably representing a victory of a military faction of old farme-soldiers over the royalty, oligarchy and demos alike.

Both models proved to be local powerhouses capable of regional importance at times (Athens Argos Thebes and Sparta all had their moment in the sun) but none was able to impose lasting hegemony over a substantial portion of Hellas.

This contrasts with the monarchies of Makedon and Persia, based on the King as nexus of personal loyalties, justice and military leadership. Persia established long term rule over many Hellenic city states in Ionia, and was able to decisively interfere in Hellas proper (eg supporting Sparta to victory over Athens): their one significant foray deep into Hellas saw many locals swear allegiance and they were only defeated by an unusual combination of traditional enemies and some pretty strong leadership. The Persian model sustained an extensive empire outside Hellas that was reasonably stable for a couple of centuries.

Makedon as also able to impose rule over much of Hellas proper for several centuries and dominate the rest through the "fetters of Greece". Famously Alexander III exported the Makedonian monarchic model to the Persian Empire where it was less stable and supported smaller fractions of territory than the Great King had typically ruled.

This model was sustained by the ability of its monarch more than anything else: I would argue only Alexander I and Philip II imposed seriously persistent institutions that persisted beyond their deaths. Typically infants or incompetent kings were killed and able relatives (or later just generals) took power in the state. I think state persistence was tied in Makedon to the traditional aristocracy (in Makedon proper, typically they chose the king from among their number) and the army (which came to choose the kings especially the first generation of diadochi).

The Persian monarchy was sustained by Median warrior culture (similar to but on a much larger scale to Makedonian aristocratic warrior culture) and existing Mesopotamian Imperial appartus like the Aramaic speaking administrative class. I think the diadochi were also supported by a wider Hellenic educated culture as well, surely the Mouseion and other libraries supported a literate administrative elite.

Perhaps there was a moment in the archaic period when successful synoikic states could have spread their model further but AFAIK these movements never jumped dialect lines (Argives and Korinthians were both Doric, all the other synoikists were of the same language group too).

This archaic model worked very well for the Romans and they seem to have just continued to use it, albeit less discriminatingly. As a Hellenised city state they were exposed to ideas like Synoikos both second hand through the Hellenophile Etruscans and directly through their Campanian neighbours like Neapolis. However Roma was formed (three tribes? or a fusion of Latin and Sabine villages?) for some reason they decided to continue the synoikic process.

Its possible that like so much of the Roman political inheritance it was imposed by an Etruscan conqueror. I favour the theory that Rome was "made" when the last of the Tarquins was defeated by Lars Porsena who imposed the rule of several (three?) Praetors (local Quislings retconned as anti-monarchic Consuls by Livy) and he may have extended their power over a wider portion of Latium. When Porsenna as defeated by the Latin league the new Roman establishment clung to power, resisting a return to royal rule or surrendering annexed territory; of course that's all imagination, the real events are lost to us.

However it happened Rome started with more than one "domestic culture" so uniting with Latin and Sabine communities was possible: there was also elite Etruscan elements in the city from its earliest days as well. There was no seal of purity (that is to say obstinate chauvinism) preventing other cultures joining as well. It seems to have allowed for both communities and individuals to become Roman: this is demonstrated well by the naturalisation in the 5th century of the Oscan Attius Clausus as Appius Claudius, ancestor of the Claudian gens and the family that returned Rome to Monarchy.

The nexus of isonomy and elected magistrates and synoikos is found in Rome as in Athens. perhaps the availability of access to mpower increases a general level of competence, as well as satisfaction? Whatever the case, it worked.

I 'd argue the mixed (and less than elite) culture of Rome's original population made Borging others easier. The Attic plain, the Argolid and the valley of the Eurotas proved the true boundaries of their respective polities, whereas the Tiber eventually flowed from windswept Prytain to hoary Kemet, and lapped the shores of Iberia and...umm...Iberia...

&

It was actually a lot more plausible than people seem to think. For starters Germany had been drawn closer to the Soviets due to the Versailles Treaty and the Russian Civil War. Both were seen as rogue states by the Western Powers/League of Nations. The key geopolitical issue was the question of Poland, as an example. There was also quite a bit of German-Soviet cooperation after WW1 which lasted even into Hitler's earlier terms of office. A German-Soviet alliance was favored by the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht. So the Conservative elements in Germany were openly calling for an alliance with Stalin. Anything from exchange of officers, material support, weapons, doctrines, were ongoing even after Hitler took power.

It is not really accurate to say that because the Nazis took power using middle class shop owners and upper class magnates that this necessarily determined whether there could be a Soviet-German relationship. After all their opposition to Communism was first and foremost internal and so long as Stalin did not violate that they were not opposed to an alliance of pragmatism. Keep in mind that after the Battle of Warsaw the Soviets were seen as being exceedingly weak and impotent. Regardless of whether the Red Army was a joke, everyone in Europe regarded it as such. For example during the 1930's the OKH claimed that it could fend off a Soviet invasion with only half as many divisions as that which the Soviets would field. As a reference that would be about 30 to 50 German Divisions, which is frankly an absurd claim on their part. But the point is Stalin was not expected to be able to overrun Poland or threaten Europe any time soon. Which made an alliance of convenience between Germany and the Soviet Union quite plausible at that time as well.

The other part which no one takes into account in these discussions is the radical element within Nazism. The most notable being Ernst Roehm but which also included Goebbels and the Strasser brothers. These individuals and their vast columns of support had all advocated a formal alliance with the Soviet Union in order to defeat France and Poland. Indeed the idea of Germany being a natural Russian ally goes back to Bismarck (Three Emperors League) and Kaiser Wilhelm II (Russo-Japanese War as an example). This didn't really change at all under the Weimar Republic. But in the case of Roehm, Goebbels and the Strasserites, this was largely due to their radical position that the USSR and Bolshevism were the correct response to Capitalism and undoing the European status quo which had been imposed by France and Britain. They also saw a national revolution (as Stalin had claimed that he was only interested in revolution in Russia) as a good way of purging the Wehrmacht and German society of Liberalism and Monarchism/Conservatism. This may well have led Germany down the path of Civil War, if it were attempted, but either way it ended abruptly when Hitler purged the SA (including many of the Strasserites and many other potential factions within the NSDAP).

So what was the key issue? When Hitler took power in 1933 he immediately changed course. He made a non-aggression pact with Poland, which he intended eventually to form an alliance with Poland. This ran contrary to the desires of the Conservatives who controlled the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht. To be fair much of the populace was also very strongly anti-Polish. Hitler's key position was that the threat posed by Bolshevism was the top priority, and it made more sense to reclaim the Brest-Litovsk boundaries than to pursue a pointless war against France and Britain, which he believed saw the USSR as a primary threat anyway. To this end he signed the British Naval Treaty and concluded pacts with France and Poland, as well as making alliances with Italy and Japan, aimed first and foremost to waging war against the Soviet Union by the year 1938. All three states hoped that this alliance would expand to include Poland, Hungary and Romania. With France and Britain basically giving them free reign, ideologically at least it made sense since the British and French regimes at the time were wary of Communist expansion (although for France it was really more an internal issue about radicals I guess).

In addition to this Hitler also opened up to the Western Powers, this was interpreted by the Soviets as his having become a puppet of the West. While not really true that Hitler was controlled, it is a fact that Chamberlain hoped to use Nazi Germany as part of a greater chess piece in his game against the Soviet Union. It was largely due to Conservative/Tory ideological reasons that Britain resisted so long to collaborate with the USSR (as seen in 1938 and 1939). This refusal was in large part what led to the Molotov-Ribbentrop and a huge strategic victory for Stalin (in which he gobbled up the Baltic, Poland, Bessarabia, and pretty much made Hitler his satrap with barely a shot being fired). It is therefore ironic that Hitler removed Neurath in favor of Ribbentrop (and many others, as he removed internal threats, the SA et all, and external threats, Conservatives/Monarchists), in order to steer the Foreign Office away from talks of Soviet alliance and invasion of Poland, only to have Ribbentrop negotiate that very pact.

I suppose the alternative was simply to wait for the USSR to collapse. This was something that many Conservatives and Liberals were claiming would happen as they did not believe the Soviet Union to be economically viable. This sentiment was also influenced by the "White Emigrés" which had fled the USSR. Surely if there were so many famines then the Soviet Regime would be overthrown. This went hand in hand with the claims that the Red Army had been completely degraded after 1920, after all their only state opponents in Poland defeated them, and most of their enemies had been mutineers, anarchist farmers and the hollowed out remains of the White Army. It is very much the case that the Soviet Union was seen as being very weak, while various state actors across the world regarded them as a geopolitical threat, but a very impotent one (it was more the threat of Revolution). However the results of the Spanish Civil War did not appear to convince anyone that this was not the case. Hitler and the Nazis were somewhat of a Black Sheep in calling for the USSR to be considered a priority. As other than Germany the USSR had very few serious rivals with the other one being the British Empire, and this ultimately boils down to the Great Game, the Tory/Chamberlain position, and then the Cold War.

Still the possibility of a Soviet-German rapprochement during the war is seldom considered, even though it was still possible. It was clear that in 1939 and 1940 Hitler's policy of Western appeasement had collapsed (and that is to say also German attempts to appease the West). Not even the victory in 1940 was enough to bring Britain to the negotiating table, even the defeated France was apprehensive about German alliance (the French didn't even make peace technically). Britain was then cast as the main enemy with the inevitability of American intervention. The British naval blockade strangled continental Europe and made it inevitable for the Germans to lose a war that turned out longer than they bargained for. As an aside this is really why it made no sense for the Germans to wait, since they had been ahead in their rearmament program by 1939 and had a cutting advantage over Poland. Where as Britain and France were still mobilizing even into 1940.

Obviously, the Soviet Union had no chance that it would collapse, as we know it lasted until 1991. Although this possibility was still entertained by the German staff, military intelligence did not seem able to discover the real strength of the Red Army and its ability to mobilize huge armies. Hence we have the rotten house of cards quote. But even before Barbarossa and after, the Germans were willing to formalize their alliance with the USSR. The problem in the former case is that Hitler would just be acting as a sort of satrap for Stalin. Stalin's conduct during that time made the Soviets appear untrustworthy, for instance he put the Germans on the spot multiple times and renegotiated the Molotov-Ribbentrop to give the USSR more concessions. Every time the offers became more absurd with Stalin asking for more territory. This together with German dependency on Soviet oil and materials, as well as the threat of being caught on the receiving end of a Soviet invasion, made Barbarossa all the more likely. But in spite of that the Germans and Soviets still negotiated secretly from 1941 until 1943, though neither was willing to concede any territory, a key part of these negotiations involved Stalin joining the Axis and abiding by certain conditions. However this was not to the liking of Germany's other allies who had also signed the anti-Comintern Pact and so for all these reasons the decision made in 1939 was reversed back to Hitler's anti-Soviet policies of the 1930's.

Although it seems that as the war went on it was less to do with ideological differences rather than geopolitical differences. One thing that doesn't seem to be explored what so ever, is the evolution of the ideological concerns between Germany and the Soviets. Key factors in understanding this would have to be Hitler and Stalin's respective stances towards the West, as well as the pro-Soviet stances within the Nazi party. For instance what was Stalin's reaction and ideological justification to the Night of the Long Knives and that whole purge? Here we have Hitler purging quasi-Bolshevists who wanted an alliance with the USSR. Seeing this how did Stalin deal with it ideologically and why would he think that the Germans would not invade the USSR? The only other explanation is that Stalin didn't care because he always saw it as sheer pragmatism and probably was planning to go to war against Germany eventually. He certainly was willing to in 1938, in alliance with the Czechs, French and British, and made overtures to Poland, Britain and France in 1939, all of which were rejected.

[Abdülmecid I]

From what you can tell, did their shift from Democratic Socialism to Social Democrat result in any significant policy shifts? Not obliging you for a detailed answer, just wondering if you noticed anything.

I noticed they sold 18% of the state owned Danish Oil and Natural Gas company to Goldman Sachs.

I pointed out the fact that the regime itself has proclaimed the spread of Islamic revolution, destabilized the region, and openly called for the overthrow neighboring governments as a Shia Islamist power. Again, I don’t really care whether you personally doubt their motivations or would rather describe the latter as “strategic goals.”

I'm not trying to convince you, merely pointing out that neither your assertions nor your accusations have manifested themselves. Iran has not overthrown neighboring governments nor installed theocracies anywhere else. Moreover, they are far from the only country to destabilize the region. In fact, considering all of the countries attempting to dominate the region themselves at the expense of Iran, it would be irresponsible for Iran not to respond in kind. In short, there is nothing exceptional about Iran that necessitates a U.S. response. The only thing exceptional about it is how fixated U.S. foreign policy is with it.

....and you have the audacity to accuse others of “white-washing.” You brought up Rafsanjani, not me.

I didn't realize bringing up relevant information is the same as ignoring it. You've painted a picture of a hostile Iran post 1979, yet I've shown evidence of when Iran has attempted to mend bridges. You brought up terrorism and funding of militias, I simply brought up the reasons Iran has committed those actions. Muslim countries being angry at Israel for oppressing Palestinians for, generations now, certainly doesn't

I can only assume your false accusation of my having taken your words out of context to be yet another deflection. You’ve repeatedly asserted your personal opinion that the US’ response to Tehran’s attacks and destabilization is unwarranted “antagonism.” Support for my position is not contingent on anything you’ve said, nor have you been able to challenge it on any material basis.

Bringing up relevant facts is not apologism. Pointing out how United States has contributed to the crisis doesn't excuse everything that Iran does nor has anyone said so. The assertion that United States has historically and currently been antagonistic to Iran which hasn't contributed towards a solution despite US claims of doing so.

[Aexodus]

You do understand that when you cross the line into the realm of legislating thought crime, you can't come back from that?



It's the nature of a human group to have the "other" and that "other" will be laughed at. This has always been the case and always will be.
No amount of artifice or legislation can truly overcome nature, it can obfuscate it and in some sense corrupt it.

When you've had your fun with all of your witch hunts and your two minutes hate, yelling at Goldstein and so on... what goes around, comes around: The mechanisms of prosecuting those who deviate from the orthodox thought will remain, but those in power will change and the mouse will chase the cat. All of those former allies that you hunted and drove into the arms of right wing ideologies will now hunt you, energised by righteous vengeance. Then you'll hunt them and round and round it'll go.



No, we should create a fair and equal society. Political correctness, at best, retards that process and at worse is the primary phenomenon fuelling its reversal.
Eliminating/taming political correctness is essential if we are to achieve a lasting fair and equal society.