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Thread: Who was Alcibiades?

  1. #1

    Icon1 Who was Alcibiades?

    “All the world’s a stage, And all the men and women merely players;
    They have their exits and their entrances, And one man in his time plays many parts”

    - -William Shakespeare

    “The history of the world is but the biography of great men.”

    - -Thomas Carlyle

    "Not the Son of Achilles, but Achilles himself."
    -Plutarch on Alcibiades.


    Alcibiades (450–404 BC)

    He has been called an Alexander in the wrong place at the wrong time [1][2]. To more serious-minded historians, he was a traitor, a demagogue, and a scoundrel. In his own time however, he may have been known as the greatest Athenian of his generation, while also an archnemesis to Athenian religion and democracy. Born with a huge assortment of many positive traits, including personality, charm, good looks, physical prowess, perseverance, and above average intelligence, along with a privileged background that connected him with the likes of Pericles, Socrates, and members of the Athenian elite, there can be no doubt that Alcibiades fits Thomas Carlyle’s depiction of a great man. However, given the many variations of Alcibiades, including representations by Plutarch, Thucydides, and Plato, along with one of the more bizarre roles ever played in the Peloponnesian War, we are still left to wonder, who was Alcibiades? Did he influence events or did events influence him? Was he all that important? And why, this most colorful figure of all of antiquity, did he fail? Alcibiades biography of course, is as dense and as complicated as the Peloponnesian War, and historians like us will never be satisfied with less than complicated answers.

    Some discussion points:


    Love of Preeminence or Self-Indulgence?


    Any serious discussion on Alcibiades must begin with his love of preeminence, his most important trait. However, it’s not clear if Alcibiades was a megalomaniac hellbent on ruling the Athenian Empire or just a typical aristocrat predisposed towards fame and self-indulgence. In his youth of course, he stood apart from others, hogging the limelight at every opportunity. Whether it was hosting extravagant dinner parties, racing chariots at the Olympics, accepting bribes and gifts, outsmarting teachers, wrestling with other boys, or punching politicians on a dare (then marrying that politician’s daughter), and making spectacular donations before the assembly, it’s quite clear Alcibiades had all the fame and confidence he would need to be a leading man in Athens. His tutor, Socrates, even famously asked a young Alcibiades if he wished to conqueror the world, to which he replied yes. While the exact nature of Alcibiades relationship to Socrates is still somewhat debatable (and may have been a bromance), the character contrast -to the modest but virtuous philosopher- is clear; Alcibiades was a man of notable ambition (along with many passions) and may have seen himself as an anointed successor to Pericles.



    Scoundrel or Loyal Athenian?


    The most interesting parts of Alcibiades biography are the many roles he played in the Peloponnesian War, where he effectively served on all sides. In fact, we can even say there were four sides to the Peloponnesian War; Athens, Sparta, Persia, and Alcibiades.


    While his mercenary roles in Athens, Sparta, and the Ionia are all too lengthy to describe here (along with the many accusations of treason), the most notable event in Alcibiades’s life is arguably the Peace of Nicas.

    Here a debate begins, was Alcibiades a scoundrel or a loyal Athenian? The Peace of Nicas was supposed to mark a 50 year ceasefire between Athens and Sparta, yet Alcibiades (according to Plutarch) seized an opportunity to trick the Spartan delegation into saying things that would offend the Athenian assembly. While the result of Alcibiades treachery was a restoration of hostilities that eventually accumulated into the Battle of Mantinea, it did also push Argos, Mantinea, and the Eleans into Athens’s sphere of influence, a remarkable alliance at the time. Alcibiades, for his part, was also appointed general, and his rival, Nicas, was soundly trashed and humiliated before the assembly. While it is clear that Alcibiades had always planned to benefit politically at Nicas expense, a case can be made that Athens had benefited too. The alliance with Argos was arguably the closest Athens came to directly winning the Peloponnesian War, and it had gained a powerful land army inside the Peloponnese. And if Athens would have won the Battle of Mantinea against Sparta, who knows what would have happened. Alcibiades might have gone down as one of the greatest conquerors of all time. Instead, we’re left to wonder, was Alcibiades really trying to benefit Athens, or was he always planning to benefit himself? Its a question that reoccurs constantly throughout Alcibiades career, along with his many shifting loyalties and power grabs.


    Risk taker or Opportunist?


    Another way to begin deciphering Alcibiades’s character is to argue whether he was an opportunist or a risk-taker. The difference is subtle but can be helpful for choosing how we choose to interpret Alcibiades. An obvious risk-taker, like Alexander for instance, engages in reckless behavior in hopes of generating a positive outcome. Complicated maneuvers, set piece battles, and suicidal cavalry charges of course, only serve to generate a chance of going either right or wrong. The exact odds that come with risk taking, very importantly, are also, more or less unknowable; which is why gambling can never be considered completely brilliant. Opportunists on the other hand, is more closely related to genius (and less so to courage) because it is about spotting and seizing advantages that arise through circumstances. Rather than rolling the dice, opportunists find more dice to roll, which deterministically increases the odds of success. An example of opportunism is Leonidas choosing to hold a narrow pass at Thermopylae, which offered a clear advantage when defending against a larger force.

    When these definitions are applied to Alcibiades, the best case study is the Sicilian Expedition, of which Alcibiades is the principle author. The Sicilian Expedition of course, has a legacy that is comparable to Gallipoli and the Schlieffen Plan; brilliant conceptionally, but flawed in its logistical assumptions. An opportunity for sure at the strategic level, that played to Athens’s naval strength, but a gamble in that it required a huge investment, along with plenty of manpower and an aggressive timetable. Had it succeeded though, Athens would have been the first trans-Mediterranean Empire in history, and probably would have lasted against Macedonia and maybe against Rome. Instead, because of either poor execution, or just ridiculous planning, we’re left to wonder if the whole thing was a blunder.


    Tyrant or Demagogue?

    Its interesting that Alcibiades never tried to take the state, especially when he was more than once accused of crimes while heading an army. Despite this fact, we do know that Alcibiades represented a rebellious and imperialist faction that constantly struggled for more power in Athens. Prior to returning Athens, Alcibiades did help orchestrate a coup that put wealthy Athenian oligarchs in power. Given more time, would Alcibiades have made himself first citizen in Athens? Would he have completely done away with the last elements of democracy to the benefit of his supporters? Or, despite his ambition, would he have been okay to share power with the same citizenry who had once accused him of impiety and high crimes against the state. Its not clear what Alcibiades would have done with more power.


    Competent or Mediocre General?

    Alcibiades made himself useful for each side he fought for. He had a strategic mind and could conceptualize long-term strategies. On the tactical level, he distinguished himself as a naval commander. He was personally brave in battle, yet never reckless. Given the opportunity, he would use deceit and deception to outsmart his opponents. The naval battle of Cyzicus, along with his activities in the Hellespont, show some evidence of military genius. Though he was clearly an imaginative commander, the question is whether he always had the right ideas. Would the Sicilian Expedition had worked had he personally led it? It’s the ultimate stain on an otherwise decent military record, along with the fact that he never quite achieved unity of command.


    Significance to History

    Its hard to say what Alcibiades true legacy is. His skill and acumen in the political area is obviously complicated by a record that was absolutely terrible for Athens. More than once he steered the assembly into war, often for his own personal gain. Having said that, Alcibiades was a survivalist and showed he could reinvent himself and his city after failure, even when limited by a system that did not favor a single leader. Many historians think, in the long run, Alcibiades faults simply outweighed his positives. A point that is backed by his habit for making enemies. Yet, in the end, it was perhaps Alcibiades failure to control events that were too big for any one person to control. A rivalry between Athens and Sparta would have continued with or without Alcibiades. But without Alcibiades, there might not have been a Sicilian Expedition, and Athens might never have lost so much of its navy. For one person, capable of so much, and then so little, perhaps Alcibiades ultimate legacy is to show us how the virtues and vices of great people can and cannot influence history.

    ------------------------------------------------
    Comparison to Alexander

    [1] Edmund F. Bloedow 'AN ALEXANDER IN THE WRONG PLACE' ALCIBIADES 'THE ABLEST OF ALL THE SONS OF ATHENS'?
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/241...108cbdb9548d42

    [2] Adolf Holm. The History of Greece from Its Commencement to the Close of the Independence of the Greek Nation (1893).
    http://www.historydiscussion.net/his...to-sicily/5756

    That Alcibiades was a man more sinned against than sinning goes without saying. His ambition was unbounded no doubt, but in ability and intellect, in generalship and statesmanship he was unrivalled. He anticipated matters which came to be realised later in time. He was an Alexander in the wrong, place as Athens was premature Macedonia.

    Henderson and other writers of his opinion feel that if Alcibiades had been left in his command the expedition to Sicily, he would have indubitably captured Syracuse. As to the question whether the Sicilian expedition was justified from Athenian interests, it must be said that it was a policy of Alcibiades’ willful ambitions. It had no shadow of moral justification. After all, Alcibiades sought to rule more than Athens. – Adolf Holm (1893)


    Last edited by Dick Cheney.; January 17, 2020 at 09:45 AM.
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  2. #2
    conon394's Avatar hoi polloi
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    He was unfortunately somebody the Athenians should have sent not an arrest warrant for but an order of execution.

    Alcibiades made himself useful for each side he fought for. He had a strategic mind and could conceptualize long-term strategies. On the tactical level, he distinguished himself as a naval commander. He was personally brave in battle, yet never reckless. Given the opportunity, he would use deceit and deception to outsmart his opponents. The naval battle of Cyzicus, along with his activities in the Hellespont, show some evidence of military genius. Though he was clearly an imaginative commander, the question is whether he always had the right ideas. Would the Sicilian Expedition had worked had he personally led it? It’s the ultimate stain on an otherwise decent military record, along with the fact that he never quite achieved unity of command.


    Most of his solo plans failed or failed to live up to his claims. In the Ionian war it is I think clear Thrasybulus was key architect of Athenian victories (and creating the Athenian democratic government in exile - oh and of course toppling the 30 tyrants later with what 70 men at the start).

    On Sicily probably not much. With only 60 ships I think he would have been as ineffectual as always but have done little to harm Athens and maybe his failure to save Segestia would have been the political end of him. On the mission he was sent on he lack of military skill is clearly in evidence for not voting for Lamachus' plan when he had the chance and that it was the obvious the size of the venture precluded a political/diplomatic affair.

    Egotistical traitor of the first order, who clearly however was in person who was hugely charismatic and could talk is way out failure or half success quite well, and if we believe Plutarch met his end with flourish and courage.

    But without Alcibiades, there might not have been a Sicilian Expedition, and Athens might never have lost so much of its navy. For one person, capable of so much, and then so little, perhaps Alcibiades ultimate legacy is to show us how the virtues and vices of great people can and cannot influence history.


    Well to be fair to the man his own plan was a low risk operation, not without merit that lived up to treaty obligations of long standing.

    His failure was to loose control of the debate to Nicias and then as I said above fail to adjust his thinking about what the assembly ended up ordering. In any case it was Nicias who doomed the ideal which in either form was realistically a good one. Had Nicias died in the siege and not Lamachus I am rather sure we be talking about how the Spartan's lost the war, and Alcibiades was something of a after thought as soon as the mission changed and he was on the run.

    When these definitions are applied to Alcibiades, the best case study is the Sicilian Expedition, of which Alcibiades is the principle author. The Sicilian Expedition of course, has a legacy that is comparable to Gallipoli and the Schlieffen Plan; brilliant conceptionally, but flawed in its logistical assumptions. An opportunity for sure at the strategic level, that played to Athens’s naval strength, but a gamble in that it required a huge investment, along with plenty of manpower and an aggressive timetable. Had it succeeded though, Athens would have been the first trans-Mediterranean Empire in history, and probably would have lasted against Macedonia and maybe against Rome. Instead, because of either poor execution, or just ridiculous planning, we’re left to wonder if the whole thing was a blunder.


    Thing is you as I said missed his plan was small. It was his failure to control the debate in the Assembly that allowed Nicias to inflate the plan. That he seems not to have opposed it or tried to counter it or in the failed recognize what Lamachus rightly saw as the only good option exposes him as no really good military leader nor political leader. Just rather that guy who wins arguments in bars with his eloquence but really can't fix your car no matter how many stories he told you in his cups even if he can recall the model numbers and which one was a manual.

    On balance a self serving jerk, but a clever one but one unable to commit to anything but himself and certainly one lacking the courage to own up to his own failures with any dignity until the very end when it did not matter.





    Last edited by conon394; January 12, 2020 at 01:52 PM.
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  3. #3

    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    Quote Originally Posted by Dick Cheney. View Post

    Alcibiades (450–404 BC)

    He has been called an Alexander in the wrong place at the wrong time.


    A gross exaggeration if there ever was one. He doesn't hold a candle to Alexander in terms of achievements, and his own character flaws limited what achievements he was capable of, not just being in the wrong place and time


    To more serious-minded historians, he was a traitor, a demagogue, and a scoundrel.
    Alcibiades was all the historians claimed. He was a turn coat, demagogue, and generally a scoundrel.

    In his own time however, he may have been known as the greatest Athenian of his generation
    Proclaimed the greatest Athenian of his generation probably by himself and those he bribed to say that. Who of his contemporaries was saying he was the greatest Athenian of his generation after his defection to Sparta? I would like to see their names.




    Love of Preeminence or Self-Indulgence?


    Both are true, He had both a love of preeminence and was self-indulgence. I don't see a conflict in being both, and Alcibiades was both.


    [quote]
    Scoundrel or Loyal Athenian?
    [/quote}

    Scoundrel, clearly. His defection to Sparta proved he was not a loyal Athenian. Had he really been a loyal Athenian, he would never have defected. Socrates could have fled Athens and avoided his fate, but he did not, because unlike Alcibiades, Socrates was a loyal Athenian.

    Whatever service Alcibiades rendered Athens was in his own self serving interest.

    [quote]
    Risk taker or Opportunist? [
    /quote}

    Again, why the conflict? Alcibiades was both a risk taker and an opportunist, there is no conflict in being both. Although the risk Alcibiades took were not really that great, they were risk that it was really others took the brunt of if the risks didn't work out. Alcibiades knew when to cut and run, and limit his losses. He managed to survive the Athenian Sicilian expedition which he pushed when so many of his fellow Athenians did not, for example.



    Tyrant or Demagogue?


    Again, why can't Alcibiades be both? Alcibiades was never in a position where he was so firmly in control that he could have become the tyrant he might have liked to be. Doesn't mean he wouldn't have become a tyrant if he had the chance, everything I know of his character said he would have become one if he could. Egotistical people like Alcibiades are like that.

    As for being a demagogue, I think that is beyond dispute.


    Competent or Mediocre General?


    For the times, he was an OK general, but not great, which is why the comparison to Alexander is so ridiculous. Alexander was a great general, Alcibiades never was. He was competent, no more.

    The Sicilian expedition would not have been a success, even if Alcibiades had led it. Alcibiades would have defected then and there to avoid capture or death, he was that kind of guy. What doomed the Sicilian expedition was the difficulty of logistics, which the capacities of Athens were not really up to. Although it didn't help that Alcibiades, in his usual self serving and sleaze bag fashion, betrayed Athenian plans to their enemies. Typical Alcibiades in action.


    Significance to History


    His significance is overrated. He certainly was no Alexander, and while Athens leadership might have lasted longer without the bad policies he helped push, like being more aggressive against Sparta, I don't think anything Alcibiades did made a major difference in the long run. Given the nature of Greece and the Greek city states, I don't see Athens ever forging an empire like Rome's.

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    conon394's Avatar hoi polloi
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    he was that kind of guy. What doomed the Sicilian expedition was the difficulty of logistics, which the capacities of Athens were not really up to
    Rather they were - it was Nicias who doomed the venture.

    His significance is overrated. He certainly was no Alexander, and while Athens leadership might have lasted longer without the bad policies he helped push, like being more aggressive against Sparta, I don't think anything Alcibiades did made a major difference in the long run. Given the nature of Greece and the Greek city states, I don't see Athens ever forging an empire like Rome's.


    Did it have too, in that empire the republic lost itself. Athens might well have avoided or survived the Pelopennsian war and forged on making a quite different polity that was not based on the map painting Sargon bequeathed to the western world.
    IN PATROCINIVM SVB Dromikaites

    'One day when I fly with my hands - up down the sky, like a bird'

    But if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads, chopped off in battle, shall join together at the latter day and cry all 'We died at such a place; some swearing, some crying for surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly left.

    Hyperides of Athens: We know, replied he, that Antipater is good, but we (the Demos of Athens) have no need of a master at present, even a good one.

  5. #5

    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    Quote Originally Posted by conon394 View Post
    Rather they were - it was Nicias who doomed the venture.
    Ok, I could be wrong. But putting in charge the man who argued against the expedition in the first place migut no have been Athen's smartest decission. Nicias pessimist attitude could have been a self-fulfilling.

    Still, Nicias was correct in the expedition being a significanly more taxing undertaking than anything Athens had previously done, projecting power at a much further distance.

    Did it have too, in that empire the republic lost itself. Athens might well have avoided or survived the Pelopennsian war and forged on making a quite different polity that was not based on the map painting Sargon bequeathed to the western world.
    It is unclear to me what your point is. Rome was able to absorb and harness the entire manpower of the Italian pennisula in a way that I don't see Athens being able of doing. The identity of the various Italian city states and republics were subsumed under the Roman idenity and I don't see Athens being able to doing the same.

    Sooner or later Athens would have been conquered, by the Macadonians and Romans, they would not have been able to muster the manpower to resist.

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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    I mean Athens had form for suicidal missions when already on top of the game: in the first Peloponessian war they had whipped Thebes and taken Megara they sent a massive force to Egypt because...well, not sure really, seemed like a good idea at the time I suppose. Sicily was the same sort of thing, Spartans captured at Sphacteria? double down! The mob in the Agora definitely had a predisposition for insane gambling.

    That said Hannibal and to an even greater extent Caesar show an adventurer with some skill and an ounce of luck could go very far indeed. Alcibiades on an Athenian throne with a reworked Delian league could have been another regional strongman like Jason of Pherae or Phillip II.
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    Wasn't it Aristophanes who said about Alcibiades (at the final stage of the war, when Alc got back to Athens) that "it is better to never allow a lion to reach adulthood in the city, but if it does it is better to not go against it"?
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    I'm somewhat under the impression Caesar's moddeled himself after Alcibiades. The provocative fashion and flamboyant lifestyle, a tendency for narcissism, a lover of the ladies and a political beast. Coincidence or not?

    Conspiracy theorists might even argue Caesar arranged his own assassination to emulate his hero. In that light the 'Es tu, Brute?' might even have been a exclamation of joyous surprise.
    Last edited by LaMuerte; January 14, 2020 at 11:15 AM.

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    Ἀπολλόδοτος Α΄ ὁ Σωτήρ's Avatar Yeah science!
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    Quote Originally Posted by conon394 View Post

    Athens might well have avoided or survived the Pelopennsian war and forged on making a quite different polity that was not based on the map painting Sargon bequeathed to the western world.
    Maybe, however Athens did forge a relations with dependent Greek city-states in somewhat similar matter Rome did with Italic ones, also Athens created military colonies like Rome. We can only assume into what kind of wars would they, like the Romans did, stumble in, actual or not, defense of their allies and end up conquering more land. Map painting is map panting, even if the borders aren't that of a nicely shaped polity bound by geographic constraints. For example Carthage did that kind of map painting.

    That said due to certain factors I don't think Athens would ever be able to reach the size of the Roman Republic.
    Last edited by Ἀπολλόδοτος Α΄ ὁ Σω January 14, 2020 at 12:01 PM.
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    Quote Originally Posted by Ἀπολλόδοτος Α΄ ὁ Σωτήρ View Post
    Maybe, however Athens did forge a relations with dependent Greek city-states in somewhat similar matter Rome did with Italic ones, also Athens created military colonies like Rome. We can only assume into what kind of wars would they, like the Romans did, stumble in, actual or not, defense of their allies and end up conquering more land. Map painting is map panting, even if the borders aren't that of a nicely shaped polity bound by geographic constraints. For example Carthage did that kind of map painting.

    That said due to certain factors I don't think Athens would ever be able to reach the size of the Roman Republic.
    I can;t agree. One of those factors thens could not sustain success was they did not treat allied or conquered city states in the way Rome did. Rome was inclusive (to the point certain civic rights and duties were imposed on their allies and defeated enemies alike), the Athenian model like all the Hellenic City states was exclusive so even the large reservoir of tablet in the form of the metics was untapped.

    Also Carthage specifically did not indulge in map painting. The City itself sought exclusive trade access usually without concomitant political interference: only the most intransigent Hellenes were wiped from the map in Sicily, and typically when the Carthaginian generals went home their armies disbanded and only their proxies remained, not as Carthaginian colonies but as allies.

    In Iberia the Barcids engaged in complex military relationship building relating to securing mineral resources as well as trade entrepots. I imagine being heavily armed was a precondition of doing business in Iberia, but probably the Barcids had an eye on Rome as well. Either they were prepared for the inevitable Roman backstab/fake CB or Hannibal really did want to bring fire and steel into the Senate House (and frankly who could blame him?).
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    Athens could never ever expand in the way the Roman Republic did, because Athens restricted citizenship to strictly 100 % pure blooded Arians... ehm Athenians.

    In 451 B.C. Pericles introduced one of most striking proposals with his sponsorship of a law stating that henceforth citizenship would be conferred only on children whose mother and father both were Athenians. Previously, the offspring of Athenian men who married non-Athenian women were granted citizenship. Aristocratic men in particular had tended to marry rich foreign women, as Pericles' own maternal grandfather had done. Pericles' new law enhanced the status of Athenian mothers and made Athenian citizenship a more exclusive category, definitively setting Athenians off from all others. Not long thereafter, a review of the citizenship rolls was conducted to expel any who had claimed citizenship fraudulently. Together these actions served to limit the number of citizens and thus limit dilution of the advantages which citizenship in Athens' radical democracy conveyed on those included in the citizenry. Those advantages included, for men, the freedom to participate in politics and juries, to influence decisions that directly affected their lives, to have equal protection under the law, and to own land and houses in Athenian territory. Citizen women2 had less rights because they were excluded from politics, had to have a male legal guardian3 (kurios), who, for example, spoke for them in court, and were not legally entitled to make large financial transactions on their own. They could, however, control property and have their financial interests protected in law suits. Like men, they were entitled to the protection of the law regardless of their wealth. Both female and male citizens experienced the advantage of belonging to a city-state that was enjoying unparalleled material prosperity. Citizens clearly saw themselves as the elite residents of Athens.

    http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/...subsection%3D1


    So only a minority of inhabitants of the Athenian League participated from the benefits of the Athenian democracy. Athens made the same mistake the Spartiates did. Rome on the other side was generous with its citizenship (the nobility of conquered tribes and city states get it quite easily, the common people by serving in the Roman military).

    Who was Alcibiades?
    He was a typical demagogy like most athenian politicians were after Perikles. Perikles was the first one, who corrupted the democracy

    He continued what Perikles already started.

    Appealing to the low insticts of the citizenship to gain power. But he was not so successful like the former one.
    Last edited by Morticia Iunia Bruti; January 14, 2020 at 03:09 PM.
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    Carmen is spot on about why Rome succeeded where Athens failed (of course, the fact that they were also opposed by an oriental empire proportionately stronger than Augustus' Principate also played a crucial role), although I personally wouldn't necessarily describe the Athenian practice as a mistake, as it depends on your perspective. Restricting citizenship and essentially access to political power and financial privileges has the undeniable disadvantage of rendering your rule extremely unpopular to foreign elites, who are not integrated into the upper echelons of the hierarchy. Your "empire" is thus quite vulnerable to foreign threats, your manpower is almost always inadequate, your auxiliary forces cannot be trusted completely, disloyalty is an omnipresent issue and separatist revolts are pretty much guaranteed in times of distress. On the other hand, such a restrictive system ensures the exclusive exploitation of resources and your dominant position in administration and society. The benefits can be summarised by the saying "Better reign in hell than serve in heaven" or to put it in more Mediterranean terms: Sparta may have never controlled Anatolia, but its organisation at least ensured that the office of the ἁρμοσταί will be monopolised by blue-blooded Lacedaemonian families and not a naturalised Equite from mountainous Iberia.

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    Ἀπολλόδοτος Α΄ ὁ Σωτήρ's Avatar Yeah science!
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    Quote Originally Posted by Cyclops View Post
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    I can;t agree. One of those factors thens could not sustain success was they did not treat allied or conquered city states in the way Rome did. Rome was inclusive (to the point certain civic rights and duties were imposed on their allies and defeated enemies alike), the Athenian model like all the Hellenic City states was exclusive so even the large reservoir of tablet in the form of the metics was untapped.

    Also Carthage specifically did not indulge in map painting. The City itself sought exclusive trade access usually without concomitant political interference: only the most intransigent Hellenes were wiped from the map in Sicily, and typically when the Carthaginian generals went home their armies disbanded and only their proxies remained, not as Carthaginian colonies but as allies.

    In Iberia the Barcids engaged in complex military relationship building relating to securing mineral resources as well as trade entrepots. I imagine being heavily armed was a precondition of doing business in Iberia, but probably the Barcids had an eye on Rome as well. Either they were prepared for the inevitable Roman backstab/fake CB or Hannibal really did want to bring fire and steel into the Senate House (and frankly who could blame him?).
    Quote Originally Posted by Carmen Sylva View Post
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    Athens could never ever expand in the way the Roman Republic did, because Athens restricted citizenship to strictly 100 % pure blooded Arians... ehm Athenians.

    In 451 B.C. Pericles introduced one of most striking proposals with his sponsorship of a law stating that henceforth citizenship would be conferred only on children whose mother and father both were Athenians. Previously, the offspring of Athenian men who married non-Athenian women were granted citizenship. Aristocratic men in particular had tended to marry rich foreign women, as Pericles' own maternal grandfather had done. Pericles' new law enhanced the status of Athenian mothers and made Athenian citizenship a more exclusive category, definitively setting Athenians off from all others. Not long thereafter, a review of the citizenship rolls was conducted to expel any who had claimed citizenship fraudulently. Together these actions served to limit the number of citizens and thus limit dilution of the advantages which citizenship in Athens' radical democracy conveyed on those included in the citizenry. Those advantages included, for men, the freedom to participate in politics and juries, to influence decisions that directly affected their lives, to have equal protection under the law, and to own land and houses in Athenian territory. Citizen women2 had less rights because they were excluded from politics, had to have a male legal guardian3 (kurios), who, for example, spoke for them in court, and were not legally entitled to make large financial transactions on their own. They could, however, control property and have their financial interests protected in law suits. Like men, they were entitled to the protection of the law regardless of their wealth. Both female and male citizens experienced the advantage of belonging to a city-state that was enjoying unparalleled material prosperity. Citizens clearly saw themselves as the elite residents of Athens.

    http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/...subsection%3D1


    So only a minority of inhabitants of the Athenian League participated from the benefits of the Athenian democracy. Athens made the same mistake the Spartiates did. Rome on the other side was generous with its citizenship (the nobility of conquered tribes and city states get it quite easily, the common people by serving in the Roman military).



    He was a typical demagogy like most athenian politicians were after Perikles. Perikles was the first one, who corrupted the democracy

    He continued what Perikles already started.

    Appealing to the low insticts of the citizenship to gain power. But he was not so successful like the former one.
    Quote Originally Posted by Abdülmecid I View Post
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    Carmen is spot on about why Rome succeeded where Athens failed (of course, the fact that they were also opposed by an oriental empire proportionately stronger than Augustus' Principate also played a crucial role), although I personally wouldn't necessarily describe the Athenian practice as a mistake, as it depends on your perspective. Restricting citizenship and essentially access to political power and financial privileges has the undeniable disadvantage of rendering your rule extremely unpopular to foreign elites, who are not integrated into the upper echelons of the hierarchy. Your "empire" is thus quite vulnerable to foreign threats, your manpower is almost always inadequate, your auxiliary forces cannot be trusted completely, disloyalty is an omnipresent issue and separatist revolts are pretty much guaranteed in times of distress. On the other hand, such a restrictive system ensures the exclusive exploitation of resources and your dominant position in administration and society. The benefits can be summarised by the saying "Better reign in hell than serve in heaven" or to put it in more Mediterranean terms: Sparta may have never controlled Anatolia, but its organisation at least ensured that the office of the ἁρμοσταί will be monopolised by blue-blooded Lacedaemonian families and not a naturalised Equite from mountainous Iberia.
    You are right, with one caveat. There was a somewhat tangential thread a few years back regarding what would the Mediterranean turn out if it was conquered by a Hellenistic power or Carthage instead of Rome. I've analyzed the traits of a various polities and concluded that something like that was implausible in part due to the reasons You three give.

    However, You also presume that Athenian internal politics would be set in stone denying all the political and diplomatic advantages Rome had. For my part I put the emphasis on, in my opinion, Latium being a much better staging ground than Attica when it comes to having resources for a militaristic expansion, therefore if Athens would have developed a political and diplomatic approach akin to the Roman one they'd still have a harder time "painting the map", but I do believe they could do a fair amount of it.
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    Only the autochtones are greek anyway - which is what Demosthenes claims, essentially that the people of Athens simply sprung from the earth itself.
    A concurrent cynic philosopher (not Diogenes) famously noted that grasshoppers and cicadas were also autochtonous.
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    Quote Originally Posted by Abdülmecid I View Post
    ...The benefits can be summarised by the saying "Better reign in hell than serve in heaven"...
    Yet in the end the offspring of die hard Hellenes who scorned barbaroi called themselves Romans and some aspired to Hospodarates and concomitant Romanian ethnic identity. I think the metaphor of alloys is a good one, steel is stronger and more beautiful than (more or less) "pure" iron. I know pure iron doesn't occur in nature, but I guess that matches the metaphor as ethnic purity is also non existent in the real world.

    I think Philip II would have said "better to have multiple wives from different backgrounds than marry my sister". Obviously the Lagids didn't agree.
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    Quote Originally Posted by Cyclops View Post
    Yet in the end the offspring of die hard Hellenes who scorned barbaroi called themselves Romans and some aspired to Hospodarates and concomitant Romanian ethnic identity. I think the metaphor of alloys is a good one, steel is stronger and more beautiful than (more or less) "pure" iron. I know pure iron doesn't occur in nature, but I guess that matches the metaphor as ethnic purity is also non existent in the real world.

    I think Philip II would have said "better to have multiple wives from different backgrounds than marry my sister". Obviously the Lagids didn't agree.
    Heh. Those Ptolemies. They were seen as oddballs by the other Greeks for inheriting the royal Egyptian practice of incest, but they legitimized it by comparing it to Zeus and Hera being divine siblings who married each other like Osiris and Isis.

    As for a Hellenistic power possibly building an empire like that of Rome, none of them were geared for that but had the Antigonids of Macedon become powerful enough to secure all of Greece, Illyria, and Thrace then it stands to reason they could threaten Italy like Hannibal did and Pergamene/Seleucid Anatolia like Alexander had done. They'd still have to contend with Rome's monstrous never-ending supply of allied auxiliary manpower produced in Italy, though, the ultimate undoing of Hannibal's campaign along with the patient scorched earth strategy of Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus. I think if the Antigonid dynasty was able to secure the Balkans and keep the Greek city-states quiet, they'd at least be able to wrestle Sicily away from Rome.

    As for Alcibiades, he was no Alexander the Great, so that's a huge exaggeration, but he whether or not he was a scoundrel shouldn't deflect from the fact that he was a fairly brilliant commander and negotiator who was often able to force the surrender of his enemies without much of a fight. I could see him either defecting to his enemies in Sicily during the failed expedition there just as much as I could imagine him opening the gates of Syracuse to his army through treachery or deceit.

  17. #17

    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    I went ahead and added the footnotes for the Alexander comparison. Here again is one of the opinions I was referring to:


    "That Alcibiades was a man more sinned against than sinning goes without saying. His ambition was unbounded no doubt, but in ability and intellect, in generalship and statesmanship he was unrivalled. He anticipated matters which came to be realised later in time. He was an Alexander in the wrong, place as Athens was premature Macedonia.

    Henderson and other writers of his opinion feel that if Alcibiades had been left in his command the expedition to Sicily, he would have indubitably captured Syracuse. As to the question whether the Sicilian expedition was justified from Athenian interests, it must be said that it was a policy of Alcibiades’ willful ambitions. It had no shadow of moral justification. After all, Alcibiades sought to rule more than Athens."

    Adolf Holm. The History of Greece from Its Commencement to the Close of the Independence of the Greek Nation (1893).
    http://www.historydiscussion.net/his...to-sicily/5756


    I’m curious though, what were Athens exact war aims in Sicily? And to follow up on the points made here, where would Alcibiades have fallen in that debate? And for record, I would say Alcibiades was an opportunist (a positive in my view).

    If we go by Thucydides, then Alcibiades secretly wanted to conqueror Sicily and eventually Carthage, both for wealth and for glory. Thucydides seems to imply too, that it was always Athens intent to conqueror Sicily. Most likely to enrich itself and add to the empire.

    Going by pragmatic war aims, then Athens wanted to break the will of the Spartans. By conquering Sicily, Athens would control the major trade routes throughout the Mediterranean, enriching itself while starving Sparta of critical food supplies. Even at the naval war college, students who reenact the Peloponnesian War will invade Syracuse in order to secure a food base that is not dependent on Black Sea trade routes or threatened by the Persians.

    However, we should also consider the goals and ambitions of the first Sicilian Expedition (20 then later 60 ships). This is somewhat an unknown, and opinions vary from mapping a future invasion, to assisting Athenian allies, protecting trade routes, to a modest naval blockade. I definitely like the idea of a naval blockade more so then invading Sicily, and wonder why this wasn’t argued more if the goal was to mainly strangle Sparta. Less investment, and less risky after a manpower drain caused by war and plague.

    Going by Alcibiades personal statements however, along with the most clear casus belli, then the most obvious argument was to defend allies. Alcibiades himself says when our allies ask for help we need to assist or run the risk of losing them. No doubt however, everyone was predicting an easy campaign, that Sicilians were only mixed rabble, and that Segesta would pay for it. No one in the assembly or in the history books actually says the real goal is to conqueror Syracuse, and it’s a shame Thucydides is our only source on the matter. As oxford history notes, the only directive given to the generals was to relieve Egesta, restore Leontini, and take measures in Sicily they thought best for Athens [1]. Alcibiades, Lamachus, and Nicias were given pretty free reign, and could do whatever they wanted. Yet, rather then conquering the island again, Alcibiades and company seem to think the whole thing would be for practice.

    For sure though, there were plenty of good reasons for intervening in Sicily, so I do not consider it a blunder when given modest goals. Alcibiades likely saw these reasons along with an opportunity to increase his status and enrich himself. He would have succeeded with more modest goals, but he would not have conquered Syracuse, even with full authority and a better system. No Alcibiades however, no Sicily invasion, and the assembly for its part could not decide on what it wanted other than meaningless improvision. Alcibiades however, knew he wanted it all.

    [1] https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view...195304657-e-32]
    Last edited by Dick Cheney.; January 18, 2020 at 08:13 AM.
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    So only a minority of inhabitants of the Athenian League participated from the benefits of the Athenian democracy. Athens made the same mistake the Spartiates did. Rome on the other side was generous with its citizenship (the nobility of conquered tribes and city states get it quite easily, the common people by serving in the Roman military).
    Athens could never ever expand in the way the Roman Republic did, because Athens restricted citizenship to strictly 100 % pure blooded Arians... ehm Athenians.
    Well of course not really. The Assembly could and did suspend it (the Pericles Law) when it chose. It had exceptions for Eubeoa (Thebes was added for example as part of alliance with Athens against Philip). It obviously did not apply to places where Athens had an iso-polity like Plateaea or Samos. It could and did enfranchise slaves when it wanted to. Its enforcement was somewhat looser than people think. Take for example Piasion when he married Archippe a metic he if you read the existing law should not have been able to but seemingly she became a citizen for well reasons... She must have else her son Apollodorus should never have been a lawyer or undertaking liturgies (and certainly his rivals would made note of that fact over and over again). Also of course interestingly the mother of Demosthenes did not remarry after his father died but retained control of the family estate herself rather than via a male relative (obviously she loose control of the business operations to D's uncles).

    I would suggest Edward Cohen's Athenian Nation as a good corrective to the typical CW narrative you are citing. Is a shot gun approach and some of the buckshot is polemical but at is core it has solid points.

    see below

    -------

    Restricting citizenship and essentially access to political power and financial privileges has the undeniable disadvantage of rendering your rule extremely unpopular to foreign elites, who are not integrated into the upper echelons of the hierarchy. Your "empire" is thus quite vulnerable to foreign threats, your manpower is almost always inadequate, your auxiliary forces cannot be trusted completely, disloyalty is an omnipresent issue and separatist revolts are pretty much guaranteed in times of distress. On the other hand, such a restrictive system ensures the exclusive exploitation of resources and your dominant position in administration and society. The benefits can be summarised by the saying "Better reign in hell than serve in heaven" or to put it in more Mediterranean terms: Sparta may have never controlled Anatolia, but its organisation at least ensured that the office of the ἁρμοσταί will be monopolised by blue-blooded Lacedaemonian families and not a naturalised Equite from mountainous Iberia.
    Thing is the Republic was shell game. How many participants in the civil wars were aristocrats who traced their family linage to say Capua (and that citizenship without voting? And oh yes the loyalty thing?). Yes Rome could hand out various kinds of limited citizenship in its growth. About that loyalty - social war ring a bell?

    Rome to Athens is an defective comparison. Athens was a democracy, Rome an oligarchy. First Rome could and did manipulate the voting system to make Freedmen or newly added citizen votes trapped in few voting tribes (*). Rome also had a whole host not real citizenship grades to hand out. Second Athens was dealing with Greek polis and was a democracy surrounded my aristocratic oligarchies. Carmen's quote makes Athens seem closed but in context its worth remembering Plutarch. He noted that Alexander at first sneered at being offered citizenship at Megara. The leaders of Megara replied he was just the second after Hercules. How many wealthy elites in Delian league really wanted Athenian citizenship? The burden of liturgies, loosing the right to beat non citizens in the street (of their home city), the possibility of being tried in a public court designed to be bribe proof for raping some foreign prostitute? Recall its not anger at not getting Athenian citizenship the elite leaders of Mytilene elaborate but the fear of democracy, oh and of course the bit where that what to be the master of Lesbos while being a small citizen body atop an un armed mass of the poor. The men who lead Mytilene made it very clear that chance to be an Athenians under a democracy was very much not an offer Athens needed make or would be welcomed. The same happened with Corinth and Argos when they implemented an iso-polity during the Corinthian War. Corinth had brief flirtation with some kind moderate democracy which tried merging itself with its ally Argos. Thing is it simply fanned dissent. Even many Corinthian elites in favor of the war and the new somewhat democratic government wanted no part of a more radical democracy and melding with Argos - even at the cost of loosing what would have been a much stronger state. Rome had a much better deal to offer one Elite to another and citizenship that was unlikely to ever impact the wishes of the Roman elite in Rome. The system worked well enough to take of Italy and win the Punic wars. But the tyrants of the late Republic and the Empire never really stood on a well balanced machine again and its ability to defend itself declined because of it.

    I don't think the Arche is really well described as an empire, but neither do I think the polity it might have become has to be judged as if it was or would not be a reflection of the Republic. In the later 4th century in made some really significant but oft unnoticed political legal reforms. Nothing suggests that if it might not had it retained the Arche it might in time figured out some kind of federalism to keep prickly Greek cites happy while slowly binding them tighter. After all the was the fear of the elites in Mytilene that in another generation the situation would be normal and the men in favor of democracy would supplant them because thay worked with the Athenian Arche. I might also note their system was in many less restrictive than the US at its inception, but where is the US now quite different than 1776 Its just the US got lucky and the UK was not interested to destroying it when it had the chance and two reckless decisions - twice, and that nobody maybe France could have had the same opportunity but once.

    Contra Common Soldiers opinion I also don't "Sooner or later Athens would have been conquered, by the Macadonians and Romans, they would not have been able to muster the manpower to resist. " I don't think that would be certain. The second certainly since Macedonia without Athens being ejected from the Strymon area is never a powerful country or least the one able to provided for Philip's ambitions.



    *Ancient Politics by MI Finley covers this in more detail but specifically ~ chapter 4. Altogether as Rome expanded its not clear to me that many/most of new generously created citizens were as well of as Athenian Metics.


    -------------

    Ok, I could be wrong. But putting in charge the man who argued against the expedition in the first place migut no have been Athen's smartest decission. Nicias pessimist attitude could have been a self-fulfilling.
    But he was not in charge as designed. They sent the two most powerful faction leaders and an experienced apolitical professional general (who as far as we know was a solid democrat and supporter of policy). I not sure their was a better choice really. Neither Nicias nor Alcibiades had been able to command a solid majority consistently aside from getting rid of Hyperides as a one off join thing. The solution of the demos was not unreasonable with Lamachus and the two foremost political leaders really at worst nothing catastrophic should have happened. I will agree Demosthenes should have been a clear mandate to be the last word in what to do when he arrived.

    Still, Nicias was correct in the expedition being a significanly more taxing undertaking than anything Athens had previously done, projecting power at a much further distance.
    Well if you forget the Persian wars I suppose.

    It is unclear to me what your point is. Rome was able to absorb and harness the entire manpower of the Italian pennisula in a way that I don't see Athens being able of doing. The identity of the various Italian city states and republics were subsumed under the Roman idenity and I don't see Athens being able to doing the same.
    I think my point was clear. The Republic killed itself. It did absorb Italy but with much war and a social war. And over a longer time than the democracy the opportunity to have. Say what will but but circa 338 if Rome had the misfortune to be sitting next to Macedonian of Philip and Alexander I don't think it would be anything but a vague memory.

    My point was had Pericles stepped away from the war Athens would have had the time and space to develop the Arche. Who knows maybe the succession war ~402 in Persia or an Evagoras would have seen the opportunity to dismember the Persian empire. But like I said above as a democracy Athens always had a more difficult road than the Roman aristocratic oligarchy.
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  19. #19
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    The examples you have cited are still excemptions to the general rule of the strict Athenian citizenship law.

    And still athenian rule benefited only the Athenians:

    [3] For the tax which Aristides laid amounted to four hundred and sixty talents only; but Pericles must have added almost a third to this, since Thucydides1 says that when the war began the Athenians had a revenue of six hundred talents from their allies. And after the death of Pericles the demagogues enlarged it little by little, and at last brought the sum total up to thirteen hundred talents, not so much because the war, by reason of its length and vicissitudes,became extravagantly expensive, as because they themselves led the people off into the distribution of public moneys for spectacular entertainments, and for the erection of images and sanctuaries.

    Plutarch, Aristides, 24.3:

    http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0009%3Achapter%3D24%3Asection%3D3

    See also Pseudo-Xenophon Consitution of the Athenians - even if its not unbiased because its origin were athenian oligarchs:

    [16] Also in another point the Athenian people are thought to act ill-advisedly: they force the allies to sail to Athens for judicial proceedings.1 But they reason in reply that the Athenian people benefit from this. First, from the deposits at law they receive their dicastic pay through the year. Then, sitting at home without going out in ships, they manage the affairs of the allied cities; in the courts they protect the democrats and ruin their opponents. If the allies were each to hold trials locally, they would, in view of their annoyance with the Athenians, ruin those of their citizens who were the leading friends of the Athenian people.

    http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/...3Asection%3D16

    [17] In addition, the people at Athens profit in the following ways when trials involving allies are held in Athens: first, the one per-cent tax in the Peiraeus brings in more for the city1; secondly, if anyone has lodgings to rent, he does better, and so does anyone who lets out on hire a team of animals or a slave; further, the heralds of the assembly do better when the allies are in town.

    http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0158%3Achapter%3D1%3Asection%3D17

    [18] In addition, were the allies not to go away for judicial proceedings, they would honour only those of the Athenians who sail out from the city, namely generals, trierarchs, and ambassadors. As it is now, each one of the allies is compelled to flatter the Athenian populace from the realization that judicial action for anyone who comes to Athens is in the hands of none other than the populace (this indeed is the law at Athens); in the courts he is obliged to entreat whoever comes in and to grasp him by the hand. In this way the allies have become instead the slaves of the Athenian people.

    http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0158%3Achapter%3D1%3Asection%3D18

    And every city, which tried to leave the once free Athenian League, was military punished:

    Samos: 440 BC

    Lesbos: 428, 412 BC

    They forced free polis in the Athenian League / Attic Empire:

    Aigina, 456 BC

    The free isle of Melos in 431 BC:


    HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
    by Thucydides


    CHAPTER XVII.

    Sixteenth Year of the War - The Melian Conference - Fate of Melos

    THE next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to Argos and seized the suspected persons still left of the Lacedaemonian faction to the number of three hundred, whom the Athenians forthwith lodged in the neighbouring islands of their empire. The Athenians also made an expedition against the isle of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, sixteen hundred heavy infantry, three hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers from Athens, and about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies and the islanders. The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not submit to the Athenians like the other islanders, and at first remained neutral and took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon the Athenians using violence and plundering their territory, assumed an attitude of open hostility. Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, son of Tisimachus, the generals, encamping in their territory with the above armament, before doing any harm to their land, sent envoys to negotiate. These the Melians did not bring before the people, but bade them state the object of their mission to the magistrates and the few; upon which the Athenian envoys spoke as follows:
    Athenians. Since the negotiations are not to go on before the people, in order that we may not be able to speak straight on without interruption, and deceive the ears of the multitude by seductive arguments which would pass without refutation (for we know that this is the meaning of our being brought before the few), what if you who sit there were to pursue a method more cautious still? Make no set speech yourselves, but take us up at whatever you do not like, and settle that before going any farther. And first tell us if this proposition of ours suits you.
    The Melian commissioners answered:
    Melians. To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as you propose there is nothing to object; but your military preparations are too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we see you are come to be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect from this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side and refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery.
    Athenians. If you have met to reason about presentiments of the future, or for anything else than to consult for the safety of your state upon the facts that you see before you, we will give over; otherwise we will go on.
    Melians. It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn more ways than one both in thought and utterance. However, the question in this conference is, as you say, the safety of our country; and the discussion, if you please, can proceed in the way which you propose.
    Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences- either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us- and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they canand the weak suffer what they must.
    Melians. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient- we speak as we are obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of interest- that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right, and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got to pass current. And you are as much interested in this as any, as your fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for the world to meditate upon.
    Athenians. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten us: a rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This, however, is a risk that we are content to take. We will now proceed to show you that we are come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we are now going to say, for the preservation of your country; as we would fain exercise that empire over you withouttrouble, and see you preserved for the good of us both.
    Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as for you to rule?
    Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you.
    Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side.
    Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power.
    Melians. Is that your subjects' idea of equity, to put those who have nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels?
    Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the other, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea.
    Melians. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours, and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at case from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it?
    Athenians. Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but little alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves, outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into obvious danger.
    Melians. Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and your subjects to get rid of it, it were surely great baseness and cowardice in us who are still free not to try everything that can be tried, before submitting to your yoke.
    Athenians. Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an equal one, with honour as the prize and shame as the penalty, but a question of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger than you are.
    Melians. But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more impartial than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose; to submit is to give ourselves over to despair, while action still preserves for us a hope that we may stand erect.
    Athenians. Hope, danger's comforter, may be indulged in by those who have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only when they are ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them to guard against it, it is never found wanting. Let not this be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions thatdelude men with hopes to their destruction.
    Melians. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the difficulty of contending against your power and fortune, unless the terms be equal. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians, who are bound, if only for very shame, to come to the aid of their kindred. Our confidence, therefore, after all is not so utterly irrational.
    Athenians. When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as fairly hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do. Thus, as far as the gods are concerned, we have no fear and no reason to fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we come to your notion about the Lacedaemonians, which leads you to believe that shame will make them help you, here we bless your simplicity but do not envy your folly. The Lacedaemonians, when their own interests or their country's laws are in question, are the worthiest men alive; of their conduct towards others much might be said, but no clearer idea of it could be given than by shortly saying that of all the men we know they are most conspicuous in considering what is agreeable honourable, and what is expedient just. Such a way of thinking does not promise much for the safety which you now unreasonably count upon.
    Melians. But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their respect for expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians, their colonists, and thereby losing the confidence of their friends in Hellas and helping their enemies.
    Athenians. Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes with security, while justice and honour cannot be followed without danger; and danger the Lacedaemonians generally court as little as possible.
    Melians. But we believe that they would be more likely to face even danger for our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as our nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our common blood ensures our fidelity.
    Athenians. Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to is not the goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of power for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than others. At least, such is their distrust of their home resources that it is only with numerous allies that they attack a neighbour; now is it likely that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over to an island?
    Melians. But they would have others to send. The Cretan Sea is a wide one, and it is more difficult for those who command it to intercept others, than for those who wish to elude them to do so safely. And should the Lacedaemonians miscarry in this, they would fall upon your land, and upon those left of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach; and instead of places which are not yours, you will have to fight for your own country and your own confederacy.
    Athenians. Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may one day experience, only to learn, as others have done, that the Athenians never once yet withdrew from a siege for fear of any. But we are struck by the fact that, after saying you would consult for the safety of your country, in all this discussion you have mentioned nothing which men might trust in and think to be saved by. Your strongest arguments depend upon hope and the future, and your actual resources are too scanty, as compared with those arrayed against you, for you to come out victorious. You will therefore show great blindness of judgment, unless, after allowing us to retire, you can find some counsel more prudent than this. You will surely not be caught by that idea of disgrace, which in dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same time too plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind; since in too many cases the very men that have their eyes perfectly open to what they are rushing into, let the thing called disgrace, by the mere influence of a seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they become so enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall wilfully into hopeless disaster, and incur disgrace more disgraceful as the companion of error, than when it comes as the result of misfortune. This, if you are well advised, you will guard against; and you will not think it dishonourable to submit to the greatest city in Hellas, when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally, without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to you; nor when you have the choice given you between war and security, will you be so blinded as to choose the worse. And it is certain that those who do not yield to their equals, who keep terms with their superiors, and are moderate towards their inferiors, on the whole succeed best. Think over the matter, therefore, after our withdrawal, and reflect once and again that it is for your country that you are consulting, that you have not more than one, and that upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or ruin.

    The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, left to themselves, came to a decision corresponding with what they had maintained in the discussion, and answered: "Our resolution, Athenians, is the same as it was at first. We will not in a moment deprive of freedom a city that has been inhabited these seven hundred years; but we put our trust in the fortune by which the gods have preserved it until now, and in the help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians; and so we will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to retire from our country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both."
    Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians now departing from the conference said: "Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from these resolutions, regard what is future as more certain than what is before your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as already coming to pass; and as you have staked most on, and trusted most in, the Lacedaemonians, your fortune, and your hopes, so will you be most completely deceived."

    The Athenian envoys now returned to the army; and the Melians showing no signs of yielding, the generals at once betook themselves to hostilities, and drew a line of circumvallation round the Melians, dividing the work among the different states. Subsequently the Athenians returned with most of their army, leaving behind them a certain number of their own citizens and of the allies to keep guard by land and sea. The force thus left stayed on and besieged the place. About the same time the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius and lost eighty men cut off in an ambush by the Phliasians and Argive exiles. Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos took so much plunder from the Lacedaemonians that the latter, although they still refrained from breaking off the treaty and going to war with Athens, yet proclaimed that any of their people that chose might plunder the Athenians. The Corinthians also commenced hostilities with the Athenians for private quarrels of their own; but the rest of the Peloponnesians stayed quiet. Meanwhile the Melians attacked by night and took the part of the Athenian lines over against the market, and killed some of the men, and brought in corn and all else that they could find useful to them, and so returned and kept quiet, while the Athenians took measures to keep better guard in future.
    Summer was now over. The next winter the Lacedaemonians intended to invade the Argive territory, but arriving at the frontier found the sacrifices for crossing unfavourable, and went back again. This intention of theirs gave the Argives suspicions of certain of their fellow citizens, some of whom they arrested; others, however, escaped them. About the same time the Melians again took another part of the Athenian lines which were but feebly garrisoned. Reinforcements afterwards arriving from Athens in consequence, under the command of Philocrates, son of Demeas, the siege was now pressed vigorously; and some treachery taking place inside, the Melians surrendered at discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for slaves, and subsequently sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited the place themselves.

    https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/melian.htm

    Interestingly the Athenian League/better: Athenian Empire became much quicker a shortsighted, despotic tyranny of a few than the late Roman Republic.

    And i guess this was caused by the direct democracy, which was restricted only to a few athenian citizens, which were only interested in their personal gains than in the common interests of all members of the Athenian League.

    So as the Athenian Empire was only centered around the interests of the citizens of Athens it could never expand the way Rome did.

    Roman citizenship was tied on common interests, not common blood.
    Last edited by Morticia Iunia Bruti; January 19, 2020 at 07:06 AM.
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    Default Re: Who was Alcibiades?

    Athens didn't exactly collapse when it lost the war. A few years later it had a second, similar arche with the usual ionian states. Also, it is obviously false to argue it was doomed to fail to Phillip II: Phillip's Macedonia became more of a power only when the rather convoluted and at times chaotic (eg Theban army sent for a gig in Persia) events of the third sacred (amphictionic league) war allowed Macedonia to take the role of protector of Delphoi and then arrange some deal with the defeated party, Phocis. It seems Phocis agreed to allow the macedonian army passage south of Thermophylae. It is doubtful that if detected, the mac army could force its way through there, when met by the usual Athens-Thebes on the other side.
    Λέων μεν ὄνυξι κρατεῖ, κέρασι δε βούς, ἄνθρωπος δε νῷι
    "While the lion prevails with its claws, and the ox through its horns, man does by his thinking"
    Anaxagoras of Klazomenae, 5th century BC










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