Drug of Ionia

[Abdülmecid I]

This thread aims to discuss how realistic was the hope of Greek nationalists to annex the region of Izmir (roughly corresponding to the western portion of the Vilayet of Aydin), according to the principles of Megali Idea, which is the irredentist dream about a Greater Greece, determined by its "historical" borders and inspired from a restoration of the Byzantine kingdom. It stemmed from an old suggestion with Alastor, but only now did I remember about it, to be honest. Summarily put, during the romantic era of the 19th and early 20th centuries, nationalist irredentism dominated the public discourse of the young nation states of the Balkans, with Greece being no exception. As a result, after the particularly successful outcome of the two Balkan Wars, the attention of the society and the government itself was orientated towards Izmir (Smyrna, in Greek). The main reason for this was that Izmir boasted a large Greek population, mainly thanks to internal migration during the 18th and 19th centuries, a prosperous port that controlled a large percentage of the Ottoman exports and also qualified for an illustrious past, as it was connected to the ancient colonies of the Antiquity, like Miletus, Ephesus and etc.. The only comparable alternative, the Ottoman capital of Istanbul, was still unthinkable for at least the more sober Greek politicians.


Consequently, during the early stages of WWI, after the Ottoman Empire had already joined the Central Powers, the prospect of a territorial expansion towards the east captivated the imagination of the Greek public. Unsurprisingly, the Entente exploited the fascination with Izmir, by promising it to Greece, in exchange for an alliance. The society and the political world were divided on the issue: Many, orbitting around king Constantine I preferred neutrality, due to a belief that either Germany and co. would win the war or that neutrality was the most caution path, in an uncertain conflict marked by military stalemates. However, others were enthusiastic about the offer and were ready to accept the Entente's proposals. Central figure among those was the prime-minister Venizelos, a rather controversial figure, famous for his diplomatic skills and statemanship, but also notorious for his role in the eventually disastrous Sèvres Treaty and his authoritarian and often violent tactics. Unfortunately, Venizelos enjoys such a positive contemporary reputation in modern Greece (purely for domestic political purposes) that historical debate is seriously hampered by taboos and an official historiographical line.



Anyway, on topic, Venizelos was so excited about the prospects of cooperating with France and Britain that actually agreed to surrender Eastern Macedonia (pretty much the old Sanjak of Drama from the Rhodope mountains to the Aegean), to the Bulgarians, who had still not joined the central powers, in exchange for a promise to be given the Vilayet of Aydin, in the future peace conference. Of course, the king rejected the suggestion, Metaxas, a high-ranked military officer and expert in matters related to the general staff (as well as future fascist dictator), simply concluded that the annexation of the western coast of Anatolia was strategically suicidal. In the end, Venizelos prevailed, the Ottoman Empire sued for peace and, during the negotiations, because of Venizelos' brilliance, French indifference, Lloyd George's (the British Prime-Minister at the time) extreme hellenophilia and turkophobia and, last but not least, Italian diplomatic ineptitude, Greece grabbed eastern Thrace from the Ottomans and was given the temporary control of Izmir and the surrounding area, until a referendum took hold.

However, many protested against the decision for completely ignoring the demographics, while Sir Henry Wilson, together with several army officers, agreed with Metaxas described the verdict as stupid and short-sighted, from a purely military perspective. Meanwhile, gradually Britain remained the only ally of Greece, Venizelos lost the national elections, but this didn't have major repercussions in the country's international relations or the performance of the army, contrary to the popular myth, the power of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey increased dramatically and, in 1922, the Greek Army was crushed and Greece was forced to accept the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, recognizing eastern Thrace and the entirety of Anatolia as parts of the Republic of Turkey.



Over the course of later years, many excuses have been developped, in order to explain the disaster and try to argue for alternative hypotheses, but, in my opinion, these interpretations lose the wider picture. The Greek conquest of even the tiniest parts of Anatolia was simply unfeasable, because of geographic considerations and the great disparity in strength between Greece and Turkey/Ottoman Empire. Demographics were also a factor, but, as the Balkan Wars demonstrated, what mattered in the demarcation of national borders was military advance, not religious or ethnic composition. Izmir is strongly connected to the interior of Anatolia and, although a naval power can establish a supply route across the Aegean, this still doesn't overcome the advantages of the inland borders. Even if Greece was capable of installing impregnable fortifications around Izmir (practically impossibe, because of modern artilllery and lack of easily defensible heights), continued occupation would still be impractical. Trade would collapse immediately, while state expenses would easily surpass the capacity of the national budget. Meanwhile, the much larger and richer Turkey would still be able to maintain a light siege over the city, until Greece bankrupts itself and its armed forces disintegrate.

Apart from the testimony of military experts, like Wilson and Metaxas, Greece's strategic dilemma is also illustrated by the problems the army faced during the campaign. Initially, passive defense proved insufficient, as discipline eroded and the soldiers fell victims to the guerrila tactics of the Turkish light cavalry squadrons. Then, the army advanced, but its ultimate objective, the dissolution of the Turkish center of command in Ankara and beyond was unattainable. The Greeks were repulsed in the battle of the Sakarya river and chose what was probably the best position, along the Eskişehir-Afionkarahisar raliway. Moreover, the battle of Dumlupinar proved so decisive, because the Greek units immediately lost their cohesion and discipline (officers included, like the future quasi-dictator Plastiras), while Greek politicians and foreign analysts had already predicted a future retreat from Anatolia (probably in 1923), due to financial concerns (essentially inevitable bankruptcy).



The above conclusively indicates the Greek adventures in Anatolia were suicidal from the beginning, according to the most basic concepts of strategy. Greece was momentarily stronger than the Ottomans/Turks, due to the Moudros armistice, but this geopolitical balance would only be temporary, given the obvious discrepancy between the two powers. In my opinion, nationalist leaders, such as Venizelos, were fooled by the drug of Ionia, which encouraged them to neglect reality and experienced advice, in favour of wishful thinking. For example, Venizelos was certain about the civic obedience of the massive Muslim populations inhabiting the newly conquered territories, predicted that Turkey/Ottoman Empire would never rise again and even claimed that the birth rates of the Greek Smyrniotes are destined to overcome those of the totality of the Anatolian Muslim population... Given such delusional statements and the fact that Venizelos had actually decided to give the (admittedly poorer, but also already annexed and much more defensible) Sanjak of Drama for the promise of future territorial gains, provided of course that the Entente not only keeps its word, but also that the Ottomans surrender without terms, it's safe to conclude that even a very intelligence diplomat had allowed himself to be manipulated by wishful thinking.

In reality, in 1920 Greece was found in a deadend, as it could neither secure its foothold nor neutralise the Turks. Money was exhausted, morale declined the administrations were too scared to order a withdrawal with unkown repercussions in the domestic and international front, even though Lloyd George adopted a very Hellenophile policy to his own detriment (the Greek defeat costed him his premiership). If Venizelos had endorsed a more flexible and moderate stance in the peace negotiations, Greece could have maintained eastern Thrace (Muslims were a majority there too, but, as mentioned above, demographics played minor role in these affairs), but the gamble of Ionia costed them everything, as they behaved in an irrational manner. Even if the defense of the region was theoretically possible after Dumlupinar, the subsequent coup d'état by army officers, who desired to use the government as a convenient scapegoat for the disaster, not to mention the establishment of a totalitarian regime and the summary execution of political enemies (and one superior officer) meant that Greece was simply too disorganised to offer effective resistance.

[paleologos]

This is a good post for the most part.
I don't think it is entirely correct in the details but it is none the less a solid basis for a discussion.
It may not be the discussion you were hoping for but I do hope it is a discussion that you will find more meaningful.

I find myself unwilling to disagree with most of what you are contending, yet there are two issues that I will contest and a few more that I can contest but I won't.

The first of those - but not the most important one - is the claim that the proposed alternative reasons for the Greek failure are simply scapegoating and blame shifting.
It seems that you have isolated the Asia Minor Campaign from the rest of historical events unfolding concurrently.

I am referring to the Bolshevist revolution in Russia with the participation of Greece in the campaign of Western monarchies to assist the "Whites".
As the attempt to restore Tsarist autocracy was thwarted by the "Reds", the Bolshevist regime found themselves naturally inclined to a friendly attitude toward the regime of Mustafa Kemal - who had remained neutral to that conflict - and the rest of Greece's western allies were rather apprehensive - to say the least - of the possibility that Bolshevism would find fertile ground in the fledging de-Ottomanized state of Turkey.
So they had reason to shift the allocation of their assistance from Greece to Turkey in an attempt to cajole it's new regime.

I don't believe that this was the cause of the Greek defeat.
I do believe that it was the cause of the catastrophic nature of the military collapse during the campaign and consequently a major factor in the formulation of the military and political aftermaths.
It is either naive, or outright disingenuous to presume that the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne and therefore the terms of the ensuing peace, territorially, diplomatically and politically could possibly be irrelevant to the specifics of the military defeat.
When or where did anything like that ever happen?

My other disagreement -which is the most important of the two- is your seeming conflation of the Greek occupation -and hopeful annexation- of Smyrna and it's surroundings with the mounting of a campaign in the interior of Asia Minor.
Again, I find it either naive, or outright disingenuous to presume that the two are the same or that one would inevitably generate the other.
In the case that someone acknowledges there is a difference, we could have an argument on whether the sustainable occupation and permanent annexation of Smyrna was achievable.
In my opinion it would be much more meaningful to discuss under which circumstances that would be possible, what the price would be and whether the Greek side should be willing to pay the price of such an endeavor.

However, history is history and in the evidence of it there is no controversy in asserting that the Greek side were not contend with staying in the vicinity of Smyrna's deep water port.
I won't beat around the bush regarding this one: Greek politicians of the time were fantasizing a state that would border Armenia and Mesopotamia in it's easternmost expanses.
Whatever the reasons - and in those reasons one ought as always to include war merchants bribing Greek politicians - I have no qualms declaring that such strategic goals were not only unfeasible but outright atrocious.
Perhaps it is the fact that English is not my native language but I am at a loss of adjectives that adequately characterize just how ill conceived the goals of this campaign were.

And I am explaining:
In every case when a party must decide on whether to commit resources to a conflict, it is imperative to visualize and articulate with the utmost detail what both the ideal and the least acceptable feasible outcome would look like. And they have to be realistic about it.
For example, the war planners on the Greek side should be able to articulate the exact method of pacifying the Turkish population, in case of a military victory over the forces of Mustafa Kemal, what exactly the political landscape would look like after the implementation of the "pacification" and what it would cost, in terms of money, human resources, the political and diplomatic standing of the nation and last but certainly not least in terms of peace of mind for a largely Christian and rather pious population. And this is a conversation that we never did have in Greece.

Assist me in this of you can because I can only think of a very limited number of ways in which the Turkish population could be pacified:

A: Democratic Assimilation
The loftiest of ways I can think of, to bring peace among the communities, would be to grand them full franchise and include them as full citizens in the new state.
Yet, since the Turks would be the numerical majority (in the case of complete military success), the national character of the resulting state in the aftermath of the war would certainly not be a Greek one. Correct me -you Greeks- if I am wrong but did we not have a rebellion against the Ottoman Empire because we did not want to be an ethnic and political minority in the land of our nativity?
Or is it written anywhere that the goal of Epanastasi was to bring Democracy to the empire?
I believe it is reasonable to assume that the Greek nation of the 1920s would not have chosen the solution of Democracy.

B: The Armenian Solution
Meaning, employing the same methods and tactics that the Ottomans employed in order to solve their Armenian "problem": exterminate the leaders in a swift strike and then round up everybody else and force-march them without supplies and logistical support to the middle of the Syrian desert, where they would be allowed to "fend for themselves". In the aftermath of such a solution we would need to put in place laws that would prohibit anyone from mentioning this within the domain of the state because "nobody should have the right to assault the reputation of the state, or the good standing of our ancestors".

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Bye-bye freedom of speech, bye-bye democracy, bye-bye scientific method in the appraisal of history...

C: The Zionist Solution
People who know anything about the way the state of Israel is treating Palestinians they know exactly what I mean by that:
Evacuate the Turks from cities we would want to occupy with safety, move them to other parts of the country, build a wall of "separation" around them and their villages and shoot them whenever they would attempt to break out.
Needless to say, Greece of the 1920s did not have the resources to pull out such a demographic maneuver.
It should be noted that the Zionist colonists of Palestine were not the first to apply this type of "solution" to a similar problem. Even without the massive use of preconstructed slabs of concrete, the government of the United States was able to pacify the countryside by forcibly marching the natives of their domain to purposely put aside "reservations". The trail of these poor wretches was one of tears.

Now, any of you who may have read this post so far with adequate care and attention are likely to have guessed what I am about to type in for the rest:
I would not have advocated for any of the above solutions if I had the chance.
I would have advocated for not placing ourselves in the position of having the problem to begin with.
Which means not mounting a campaign to the interior of Asia Minor.
Whether the region of Smyrna could be held is not for me to say, not because I don't have an opinion but because I suspect this would be a matter of tactical shrewdness on the part of those organizing the defense.

Well, that's what I think.

[Beorn]

I also agree with Paleologos that while the OP is not entirely impartial, and chooses to attend the Greco-Turkish war as an isolated event, nevertheless it's a very good basis for a meaningful discussion

This topic deserves a more detailed answer, but in lieu of enough time I would say that yes, the Greek dreams of expansion past the original Smyrna Occupation Zone (SOZ) were based on euphoria based on the successful wars of the last decade and irresponsible nationalism, and above all outright idiocy and stupidity. Greeks were ~30 of the population of the SOZ, and, generally speaking, the further you were getting from the coastlines, the lesser the % of Greek inhabitants. Considering the era and how democratic "referendums" tend to end up in similar cases, had the Greek state not gone into the offensive there was a good chance that Eastern Thrace, Imbros, Tenedos and Western Anatolia would remain in their possession.

Non-Instabul Thrace was a different beast, with the exception of Komotini/Gumuldjina province in Western Thrace Greeks were the more populous element, especially across the shores of Marmara, Aegean and Black Seas. I am putting the table of the 1910 and 1912 censuses by the Ottoman authorities and the Greek Patriarchate respectively.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

I don't want to spend more time writing about the shifting international alliances post-WW1, paleologos did a good job too.


In my opinion, the whole Anatolian campaign and the Greco-Turkish war was a huge monstrosity, a war that Greece had no moral right to pursue, could not fund and was relying on pillaging and war crimes on the conquered territories in order to pay for it, and ended into huge civilian massacres, horror and destruction.

[Ἀπολλόδοτος Α΄ ὁ Σωτήρ]

Didn't read the OP since I don't have the time right now, will do later, nevertheless my opinion is that it was mildly realistic given the historical circumstances. However concluding a treaty with Turkish NA recognizing such potential gains likely wouldn't ensure that it would be a done deal and might potentially lead to war with a resurgent Turkey.

EDIT: After reading the OP I now see it goes further than discussing the plausibility of maintaining and annexing all or parts of the SOZ. Therefore I'm inclined to largely agree with OP points. That said I do believe that maintaining coastal parts of SOZ would be possible, especially if an population exchange deal were to be made. Lastly, I still concede that such an agreement might be only temporary.

Change of Turkish and, to a degree, Russian internal politics is in my humble opinion a significant factor that reduced the possibility of this happening. I will admit that I'm not particularly good at military strategy, therefore I'm not certain how defenses of the coastal cities would be carried out, or whether it would be completely impossible to maintain them. Additionally there's the international factor to be recognized, if Turkey were to agree by treaty with letting parts of the coastline to Greece, subsequent Turkish change of hart may, or may not, elicit some kind of third party response.

[Abdülmecid I]

I didn't insist much on the international aspect for the sake of keeping the original post a bit shorter. I generally agree that the Soviet help and the changing French attitude after their unexpected defeat in Cilicia definitely contributed to the Greek disaster, although they were not the main factors. However, my argument is that Venizelos relied excessively on the exceptionally favourable and obviously temporary diplomatic climate of 1919. He grossly overestimated the capacity of the Entente to impose her will and failed to realise how dependent was Greece's fortunate position in the negotiation table of a war, during which it essentially fought against the Ottomans, on luckily choosing the correct camp.

It was common knowledge that the Ottomans/Turks were financially and numerically much more powerful than equally exhausted Greece and that, with the absence of a common enemy, the quadruple alliance between France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy would gradually fragment. It could be argued that we enjoy the benefit of hindsight, but not only there were already reports from British officers about the lack of order in Anatolia and the growing Turkish willingness to resist against ridiculously harsh terms, but the signs of discord between the allies had already appeared. In fact, Greece was allowed to capture Izmir, only because the Italians quit the negotiations after a childish tantrum about their colonial privileges in Anatolia. All this indicated that over-extension to Anatolia could be rather dangerous, in the long term, but Venizelos ignored the issue, either because of his nationalist euphoria or because of his determination to exploit the outcome of the Sèvres Treaty in the upcoming domestic elections.

Again, I find it either naive, or outright disingenuous to presume that the two are the same or that one would inevitably generate the other.

Well, the need to protect the Smyrna Occupation Zone did generate the campaign to the east, which was a decision unanimously approved. Actually, the Greek generals wanted to march eastwards from the beginning, but were prevented by the Big Four from crossing the Milne Line. The subsequent campaigns were not launched out of a desire for territorial expansion, but with the aim of neutralising the threat posed by the Turkish National Assembly. The defense opted for after Sakarya was a pretty reasonable decision, as it provided the Greeks with total control over the vital railway communications. I personally don't think that passive defense was a more appropriate alternative:

Morale was disintegrating and money evaporated, just when Greece was most desperate for the end of the hostilities. Holding small portions of the coastline may have been tactically possible (I personally doubt it, given the advances in artillery), but it would also cause economic ruin. Greece would be in a perpetual state of a war of attrition that Turkey was much more suited for, financial life would be disrupted, including agricultural harvests and the newly conquered territories would offer zero profit, as trade would have collapsed. This is why offense was the only viable option. I believe that the alleged advantages of a defensive strategy were originally invented by Venizelists, who wished to blame the opposition exclusively for the catastrophe, despite the fact that they had also argued for the fruits of an aggressive approach, before losing the 1920 elections.

Non-Instabul Thrace was a different beast, with the exception of Komotini/Gumuldjina province in Western Thrace Greeks were the more populous element, especially across the shores of Marmara, Aegean and Black Seas. I am putting the table of the 1910 and 1912 censuses by the Ottoman authorities and the Greek Patriarchate respectively.

It's interesting to note the relative insignificance of demographics, in what concerns the demarcation of modern, national borders. Dedeağaç and Gümülcine remained in Greece according to the Treaty of Neilly, despite their Muslim majorities, while Chataldja or Gallipoli stayed in Turkey. Similarly, the Muslim majority in western Anatolia could not and actually did not impede severely the Greek occupation of the region, partially thanks to the unusually enlightened and secular administration of the appointed governor, Aristides Stergiades. Subsequently, Greece could have ameliorated the cohesion of the native demographics, by forced assimilation, population exchange or outright ethnic cleansing, as Paleologos suggested, but I doubt this would have played a crucial role in the maintenance of the Greek overseas provinces. Ultimately, what threatened and finally doomed the Asia Minor adventure was not internal insurrection from the usually indifferent rural population, but the power of the regular army and the Turkish state.

[paleologos]

I didn't insist much on the international aspect...
...in the upcoming domestic elections.

I believe I have addressed this objection well in advance:

I don't believe that this was the cause of the Greek defeat.
I do believe that it was the cause of the catastrophic nature of the military collapse during the campaign and consequently a major factor in the formulation of the military and political aftermaths.
It is either naive, or outright disingenuous to presume that the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne and therefore the terms of the ensuing peace, territorially, diplomatically and politically could possibly be irrelevant to the specifics of the military defeat.
When or where did anything like that ever happen?

Well, the need to protect the Smyrna Occupation Zone...
...the 1920 elections.

It seems you take for granted that there can only be two modes of defense, the passive and the total war.
I believe there are always a number of graduations in the intensity and pro-activity of a response.
The fact that the Greek folly was unanimous is not evidence that it was inevitable.
Like I said, the Greek side did not bother to think and visualize the full outcome of what would constitute a military victory on the field.
This would certainly include the necessity to deal with a hostile population in the land of their nativity.

...
In every case when a party must decide on whether to commit resources to a conflict, it is imperative to visualize and articulate with the utmost detail what both the ideal and the least acceptable feasible outcome would look like. And they have to be realistic about it.
For example, the war planners on the Greek side should be able to articulate the exact method of pacifying the Turkish population, in case of a military victory over the forces of Mustafa Kemal, what exactly the political landscape would look like after the implementation of the "pacification" and what it would cost, in terms of money, human resources, the political and diplomatic standing of the nation and last but certainly not least in terms of peace of mind for a largely Christian and rather pious population. And this is a conversation that we never did have in Greece.

Assist me in this of you can because I can only think of a very limited number of ways in which the Turkish population could be pacified:

A: Democratic Assimilation
...
B: The Armenian Solution
...
C: The Zionist Solution
...

I am fully aware just how bold the following statement must read coming from a Greek but it is merely good sense in my opinion:
The outcome for the Greeks of the Asia Minor Campaign was not the worse possible.
The final disaster for both nations would have been worse had Greece won on the field.

[Cyclops]

Very interesting discussion thx all around. I know very little about Venizelos and the power structures within early 20th century Hellas, although I have done a little reading about the larger Empires and their policy regarding the Near East. Great Britain liked to come away from a congress with at least an island or two (eg Cyprus), Italy and France both wanted substantial portions of the Mediterranean littoral, and various ethno-states wanted to carve out homelands in a process familiar in the region to this day.

I am interested in Abduls point about "the relative insignificance of demographics, in what concerns the demarcation of modern, national borders." I nearly choked on my morning coffee,when i read that, as I had in mind the help given to say the newborn Hellenic state by Western romantics and power politicians alike. Surely that was based on demographics? Perhaps the demographics of the fourth century BC rather than the census of 1912 though. Hard to deny what you say once you look at the picture on the ground, it was after all the Megali Idea and not the Megali Real. I recall the importance of Kosovo to our Serbian friends, it occupies a tremendous position in their national story, but on the ground the demographics tell another story. Typically the demographics get adjusted after the military conquest...

@ palaeo, sensible points and a very bold statement. I visited Istanbul and its a lovely city, the Turks and many other ethnicities there are good people. For it to become a Hellenic capital would have taken a tidal wave of blood. While it might have been good to untie the knocker in the patriarch's bell it would have sounded a death knell for so many.

[Beorn]

I will come back to discuss some of the interesting point in the previous posts, but considering that it's a conflict whose details are mostly unknown to the people not living across the shores of the Aegean sea, here's a good overview of the affair



(the whole The Great War-Between Two Wars-WW2 series of videos from that team is the pinnacle of youtube history channels IMO)

[athanaric]

My takeaway from this thread is that it would have been more sensible for Greece to forget about holding Ionia and focus on retaking the European part of Turkey, including Constantinople and the Dardanelles.
I think that outcome would have been a desirable one for all European powers (as well as any other foreigners) in the long run. It would've meant that you'd have had two powers sharing control over the access to the Black Sea, and hence less potential for just one of them to subject other powers (say, NATO) to extortionate demands. Of course, the major powers at the time might not have allowed that, short-sighted as they were.