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Thread: How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

  1. #1

    Default How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

    What if Hitler abandoned his ideological predisposition against USSR and focused his energies against Britain and United States? How plausible is that possibility and could Germany and USSR eventually win?

  2. #2

    Default Re: How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

    Not really plausible. USSR and Nazi Germany was alliance of convenience. But as two radically ideologically different but inherently hostile to differing ideologies totalitarian regimes, their alliance could only be maintained as long as there is a greater threat or convenience (Poland) binding them. The moment partitioning was done and they shared borders, it was virtually inevitable, unless both faced too great threat.

    The most plausible way would probably be US allying with Finland before the Winter war and honoring that alliance after Soviet attack on Finland, which would most likely lead to incredibly brutal land grinddown at Finnish borders, and at sea if Germany assisted the USSR by attempting to close off the supply routes through Baltic.

    Who would win in that case is a complicated question. US operating from Finland against USSR would make it virtually impossible for them to resist the same way they did in reality, as they'd have no material assistance and they wouldn't be capable to build an industrial base out of range of any attack. But especially if Japan attacked the same way they did, or even earlier, US would be overstretched. On the other hand, it would probably mean that Germany would be denied successful attack on Denmark and Norway.

    I dare to say that resulting war would be, at least in European theatre, shorter but just as bloody. In the end, allies would probably prevail, as they'd keep staging grounds on the European mainland.

  3. #3

    Default Re: How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

    I just don't see he US allying with Finland in any realistic circumstances. The isolationist sentment in the US was too strong. It took Pearl Harbor and Germany declaring war on the US for the US to enter the the war in Europe. If the dire sistuation of long time ally like Britain couldn't drag thr US into the war, I don't see an attack on Fnland.having any hope.

    It was really Britain that stood out against Germany's total dominance in Europe, and the Soviets didn't have either rhe ships or planes to help Germany overcome the British. And given their ideological differences, it was only a matter of time before the Nazis and Communist fell out and attacked each other.

  4. #4

    Default Re: How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

    Quote Originally Posted by Common Soldier View Post
    I just don't see he US allying with Finland in any realistic circumstances. The isolationist sentment in the US was too strong. It took Pearl Harbor and Germany declaring war on the US for the US to enter the the war in Europe. If the dire sistuation of long time ally like Britain couldn't drag thr US into the war, I don't see an attack on Fnland.having any hope.

    It was really Britain that stood out against Germany's total dominance in Europe, and the Soviets didn't have either rhe ships or planes to help Germany overcome the British. And given their ideological differences, it was only a matter of time before the Nazis and Communist fell out and attacked each other.
    Very unlikely, yeah. But it's most likely scenario in which the Germany-USSR alliance would hold, because they'd both need a threat, and US were the only one free at that time. Japan attacking Russia would also be possible, but it would just lead to Barbarossa.

  5. #5
    Abdülmecid I's Avatar ¡Ay Carmela!
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    Default Re: How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

    The plausibility is pretty much zero. Firstly, there were ideological reasons that made an alliance between the Nazis and the Bolsheviks completely unfeasible: The domestic rise of fascism is largely explained by the fear of the upper and middle class about the threat posed by Communism. In both Italy and Germany, industrial magnates, traditional institutions (like the Savoy monarchy or the Weimar Chancellery) and relatively moderate conservatives, tolerated and eventually encouraged and greenlighted the rise of right-wing extremists to power, as the most efficient measure to combat the activists and the trade unions controlled by the Communist Parties. Therefore, passionate anti-communism was a principal ingredient of fascism's principles, but also directly contributed to Hitler and Mussolini installing tyrannical regimes, without facing any serious opposition from mainstream politicians. After all, it's not a coincidence that Germany and Japan were the two initial signatories of the Anti-Comintern Pact and were later joined by the likes of Italy, Francoist Spain and their various allies and satellites, such as Hungary and Manchukuo respectively.

    Additionally, there were also inevitable conflicts of interest in Eastern Europe that could never be conciliated. Germany and the Soviet Union competed ruthlessly against each other for the domination of the area between the Baltic and the Black Seas, in a conflict that, especially after the economic crash of the '30s, would never be realistally solved through peaceful negotiations. Communists and fascists clashed regularly on the streets of major cities, the Soviets were the only ones to strongly defend the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia during the Sudetenland Crisis and the USSR was the most loyal ally of the legitimate and democratically elected Spanish government, when Britain and France (at a smaller extent) endorsed a policy of strict neutrality, which greatly benefited the Italian-German intervention in favour of the reactionary rebels. Meanwhile, Germany lacking any tangible colonial ambitions, could never substantially profit from a war against Britain or the United States. The Nazis remained confident about the chances of a ceasefire with Britain, after the quick surrender of France, because they were prepared to propose lenient terms, as there was no serious conflict of interests between the two states. The Germans were always aware that the main benefactors from the disintegration of the British Empire would be the Japanese in the Far East, the Soviets in Asia and the Italians in Africa, not Germany.

    Hitler and Stalin also recognized that a war between the two countries was simply unavoidable, although the former managed to make the classic mistake of invading the USSR, without firstly clearly defeating the United Kingdom. There's lately a tendency, espoused by the European Parliament, to describe the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as a cordial alliance between two evil empires (typical example of politics meddling into history), but, although it is true that common, offensive action against third parties, like the partition of Poland, was involved in the agreement, the character of the treaty was much closer to a non-aggression pact. Hitler's goal was to escape from the dim prospects of a two-fronts war, while Stalin was desperate to delay the inevitable conflict as much as possible, so that he can reform and improve the Red Army, which had still not recovered from the purges. Undeniably Stalin opportunistically exploited the chaos, in order to integrate several former imperial regions to the Soviet Union, but there's no doubt that his main incentive was to gain time.

    In fact, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was essentially the result of the remarkable ineptitude of British diplomacy, which demonstrated exemplary short-sightedness throughout the 1930s, which eventually costed them their overseas dominions. Summarily put, the United Kingdom was so paranoid about Communist Russia and so obsessed about a mutually suicidal war between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union that it constantly refused to cooperate with the Soviets, even when Hitler's unsatiable apetite became obvious. The French Republic followed a more reasonable and flexible foreign policy, but the fact that she prioritised British over Soviet assistance meant that she allowed herself to be manipulated by "Perfidious Albion". Apart from all the instances mentioned above, it should be noted that, despite the persistent attempts of the Soviets, London repeatedly rejected any offer of military alliance of the USSR in 1939, because it wished to maintain a neutral stance, while Berlin and Moscow exhausted each other. Consequently, Stalin totally outmanoeuvred the British with the non-aggression protocol of Ribbentrop-Molotov.

    Stalin is correctly reprimanded for cynicism and Machiavellianism, because of the Ribbentrop-Motolov affair, but, to be sincere, the pact was a brilliant initiative for the survival of the Soviet Union and was only made possible, thanks to British stubborness and intransigence.

  6. #6

    Default Re: How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

    +Rep Abdul. Thank you for the phenomenal answer. Highly informative.

    What about the time period 1939-1941? German losses to Britain and the eventual signing of a non-aggression pact between USSR and Japan are reasonable reasons for pursuing an extended NAP between Germany and USSR, or perhaps even an alliance? No? Or is Hitler's ideology too influential to be swayed by pragmatic geopolitical realities? I can certainly see why decisive victories and success during this period emboldened Hitler to start a war with USSR, but was an alliance or at least a commitment to destroy the British before attacking USSR truly out of the question?

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    Default Re: How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

    Quote Originally Posted by Love Mountain View Post
    +Rep Abdul. Thank you for the phenomenal answer. Highly informative.

    What about the time period 1939-1941? German losses to Britain and the eventual signing of a non-aggression pact between USSR and Japan are reasonable reasons for pursuing an extended NAP between Germany and USSR, or perhaps even an alliance? No? Or is Hitler's ideology too influential to be swayed by pragmatic geopolitical realities? I can certainly see why decisive victories and success during this period emboldened Hitler to start a war with USSR, but was an alliance or at least a commitment to destroy the British before attacking USSR truly out of the question?
    Problem was the cost to Germany. The USSR wanted payment for its raw materials in hard cash or tech. Germany was fast running out of the former and was loath to sell the latter. Again you have the hard ideological issue of Hitler and the Nazis. This is not one accidental death away from being altered. Also Stalin wanted a host of USSR gains in eastern Europe from Romania and Bulgaria to Finland and some kind of recognition of joint German and USSR control of the Baltic and Black Sea (shouldering out Turkey). The cost to prove to Stalin Germany was not biding its time and probably hoping the UK would fall in with a war on the reds was I think to high for the Nazi state to pay. Also it seems doubtful Stalin could have even been stupid enough to enter the war. Had Hitler agreed he would incrementally made Germany all that much dependent on the USSR and likely helped both Japan and Germany with resources and as a conduit for them to coordinate and trade and laughed all the while as the UK and US slugged it out with a stronger axis.
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  8. #8
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    Default Re: How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

    Had the Germans waited a couple of years to start WW2 by respecting the Munich agreement, I think the USSR would have probably declared war on Nazi Germany or forced the Nazis to war. Perhaps the Soviets would attack Czechoslovakia themselves and grab the areas Hitler wanted (Prague) or even Push (through militias or the Red Army) in the German-occupied lands. Perhaps they would provoke war through subversive campaigns in the occupied lands (Austria, Sudetenland etc) or the allies of the Germans (Romania, Bulgaria etc and perhaps even Spain).
    But IMO, it would have been war anyway.

    As such, all Hitler had to do, was sit and wait after the Munich agreement and by 1941-1942 he would have his reason to go to war with USSR with UK and France being much more timid (as he would not have violated the Munich Agreement by grabbing Czechoslovakia) and even less willing to support the USSR, or even move against it.
    Of course, I can't be sure that Hitler would have managed to fend off against a prepared for war USSR in 1941.
    Last edited by alhoon; January 11, 2020 at 02:29 PM.
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  9. #9
    Lord Oda Nobunaga's Avatar 大信皇帝
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    Default Re: How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

    It was actually a lot more plausible than people seem to think. For starters Germany had been drawn closer to the Soviets due to the Versailles Treaty and the Russian Civil War. Both were seen as rogue states by the Western Powers/League of Nations. The key geopolitical issue was the question of Poland, as an example. There was also quite a bit of German-Soviet cooperation after WW1 which lasted even into Hitler's earlier terms of office. A German-Soviet alliance was favored by the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht. So the Conservative elements in Germany were openly calling for an alliance with Stalin. Anything from exchange of officers, material support, weapons, doctrines, were ongoing even after Hitler took power.

    It is not really accurate to say that because the Nazis took power using middle class shop owners and upper class magnates that this necessarily determined whether there could be a Soviet-German relationship. After all their opposition to Communism was first and foremost internal and so long as Stalin did not violate that they were not opposed to an alliance of pragmatism. Keep in mind that after the Battle of Warsaw the Soviets were seen as being exceedingly weak and impotent. Regardless of whether the Red Army was a joke, everyone in Europe regarded it as such. For example during the 1930's the OKH claimed that it could fend off a Soviet invasion with only half as many divisions as that which the Soviets would field. As a reference that would be about 30 to 50 German Divisions, which is frankly an absurd claim on their part. But the point is Stalin was not expected to be able to overrun Poland or threaten Europe any time soon. Which made an alliance of convenience between Germany and the Soviet Union quite plausible at that time as well.

    The other part which no one takes into account in these discussions is the radical element within Nazism. The most notable being Ernst Roehm but which also included Goebbels and the Strasser brothers. These individuals and their vast columns of support had all advocated a formal alliance with the Soviet Union in order to defeat France and Poland. Indeed the idea of Germany being a natural Russian ally goes back to Bismarck (Three Emperors League) and Kaiser Wilhelm II (Russo-Japanese War as an example). This didn't really change at all under the Weimar Republic. But in the case of Roehm, Goebbels and the Strasserites, this was largely due to their radical position that the USSR and Bolshevism were the correct response to Capitalism and undoing the European status quo which had been imposed by France and Britain. They also saw a national revolution (as Stalin had claimed that he was only interested in revolution in Russia) as a good way of purging the Wehrmacht and German society of Liberalism and Monarchism/Conservatism. This may well have led Germany down the path of Civil War, if it were attempted, but either way it ended abruptly when Hitler purged the SA (including many of the Strasserites and many other potential factions within the NSDAP).

    So what was the key issue? When Hitler took power in 1933 he immediately changed course. He made a non-aggression pact with Poland, which he intended eventually to form an alliance with Poland. This ran contrary to the desires of the Conservatives who controlled the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht. To be fair much of the populace was also very strongly anti-Polish. Hitler's key position was that the threat posed by Bolshevism was the top priority, and it made more sense to reclaim the Brest-Litovsk boundaries than to pursue a pointless war against France and Britain, which he believed saw the USSR as a primary threat anyway. To this end he signed the British Naval Treaty and concluded pacts with France and Poland, as well as making alliances with Italy and Japan, aimed first and foremost to waging war against the Soviet Union by the year 1938. All three states hoped that this alliance would expand to include Poland, Hungary and Romania. With France and Britain basically giving them free reign, ideologically at least it made sense since the British and French regimes at the time were wary of Communist expansion (although for France it was really more an internal issue about radicals I guess).

    In addition to this Hitler also opened up to the Western Powers, this was interpreted by the Soviets as his having become a puppet of the West. While not really true that Hitler was controlled, it is a fact that Chamberlain hoped to use Nazi Germany as part of a greater chess piece in his game against the Soviet Union. It was largely due to Conservative/Tory ideological reasons that Britain resisted so long to collaborate with the USSR (as seen in 1938 and 1939). This refusal was in large part what led to the Molotov-Ribbentrop and a huge strategic victory for Stalin (in which he gobbled up the Baltic, Poland, Bessarabia, and pretty much made Hitler his satrap with barely a shot being fired). It is therefore ironic that Hitler removed Neurath in favor of Ribbentrop (and many others, as he removed internal threats, the SA et all, and external threats, Conservatives/Monarchists), in order to steer the Foreign Office away from talks of Soviet alliance and invasion of Poland, only to have Ribbentrop negotiate that very pact.

    I suppose the alternative was simply to wait for the USSR to collapse. This was something that many Conservatives and Liberals were claiming would happen as they did not believe the Soviet Union to be economically viable. This sentiment was also influenced by the "White Emigrés" which had fled the USSR. Surely if there were so many famines then the Soviet Regime would be overthrown. This went hand in hand with the claims that the Red Army had been completely degraded after 1920, after all their only state opponents in Poland defeated them, and most of their enemies had been mutineers, anarchist farmers and the hollowed out remains of the White Army. It is very much the case that the Soviet Union was seen as being very weak, while various state actors across the world regarded them as a geopolitical threat, but a very impotent one (it was more the threat of Revolution). However the results of the Spanish Civil War did not appear to convince anyone that this was not the case. Hitler and the Nazis were somewhat of a Black Sheep in calling for the USSR to be considered a priority. As other than Germany the USSR had very few serious rivals with the other one being the British Empire, and this ultimately boils down to the Great Game, the Tory/Chamberlain position, and then the Cold War.

    Still the possibility of a Soviet-German rapprochement during the war is seldom considered, even though it was still possible. It was clear that in 1939 and 1940 Hitler's policy of Western appeasement had collapsed (and that is to say also German attempts to appease the West). Not even the victory in 1940 was enough to bring Britain to the negotiating table, even the defeated France was apprehensive about German alliance (the French didn't even make peace technically). Britain was then cast as the main enemy with the inevitability of American intervention. The British naval blockade strangled continental Europe and made it inevitable for the Germans to lose a war that turned out longer than they bargained for. As an aside this is really why it made no sense for the Germans to wait, since they had been ahead in their rearmament program by 1939 and had a cutting advantage over Poland. Where as Britain and France were still mobilizing even into 1940.

    Obviously, the Soviet Union had no chance that it would collapse, as we know it lasted until 1991. Although this possibility was still entertained by the German staff, military intelligence did not seem able to discover the real strength of the Red Army and its ability to mobilize huge armies. Hence we have the rotten house of cards quote. But even before Barbarossa and after, the Germans were willing to formalize their alliance with the USSR. The problem in the former case is that Hitler would just be acting as a sort of satrap for Stalin. Stalin's conduct during that time made the Soviets appear untrustworthy, for instance he put the Germans on the spot multiple times and renegotiated the Molotov-Ribbentrop to give the USSR more concessions. Every time the offers became more absurd with Stalin asking for more territory. This together with German dependency on Soviet oil and materials, as well as the threat of being caught on the receiving end of a Soviet invasion, made Barbarossa all the more likely. But in spite of that the Germans and Soviets still negotiated secretly from 1941 until 1943, though neither was willing to concede any territory, a key part of these negotiations involved Stalin joining the Axis and abiding by certain conditions. However this was not to the liking of Germany's other allies who had also signed the anti-Comintern Pact and so for all these reasons the decision made in 1939 was reversed back to Hitler's anti-Soviet policies of the 1930's.

    Although it seems that as the war went on it was less to do with ideological differences rather than geopolitical differences. One thing that doesn't seem to be explored what so ever, is the evolution of the ideological concerns between Germany and the Soviets. Key factors in understanding this would have to be Hitler and Stalin's respective stances towards the West, as well as the pro-Soviet stances within the Nazi party. For instance what was Stalin's reaction and ideological justification to the Night of the Long Knives and that whole purge? Here we have Hitler purging quasi-Bolshevists who wanted an alliance with the USSR. Seeing this how did Stalin deal with it ideologically and why would he think that the Germans would not invade the USSR? The only other explanation is that Stalin didn't care because he always saw it as sheer pragmatism and probably was planning to go to war against Germany eventually. He certainly was willing to in 1938, in alliance with the Czechs, French and British, and made overtures to Poland, Britain and France in 1939, all of which were rejected.
    Last edited by Lord Oda Nobunaga; January 22, 2020 at 09:05 PM.

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  10. #10
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    Default Re: How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

    Yeah Hitler defined himself as an anti-Communist, all parties involved knew the Molotov pact was a cynical ploy on both sides. A Nazi Soviet war was a lock from 1933, the only question was when. The Nazis were allowed to seize power by the army and German big business (and tolerated by Western Powers) because they promised just that.

    Its about as likely that Hitler would have helped establish the State of Israel as to remain at peace with Stalin.
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  11. #11

    Default Re: How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

    Quote Originally Posted by Cyclops View Post
    Yeah Hitler defined himself as an anti-Communist, all parties involved knew the Molotov pact was a cynical ploy on both sides. A Nazi Soviet war was a lock from 1933, the only question was when. The Nazis were allowed to seize power by the army and German big business (and tolerated by Western Powers) because they promised just that.

    Its about as likely that Hitler would have helped establish the State of Israel as to remain at peace with Stalin.
    Wouldn't Hitler likely have been (more) okay with helping establish israel, since at first they were merely trying to deport/get rid of all the jews in Germany at first?

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  12. #12
    Lord Oda Nobunaga's Avatar 大信皇帝
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    Default Re: How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

    Strangely Hitler actually entertained the idea of forming a Jewish state in Madagascar. He actually had the Foreign Office forward this offer to France with the intention of purchasing Madagascar either through German money or international funding. France for whatever reason rejected the offer, not sure what was so special about Madagascar. I've seen a copy of the document but I find the idea hilarious. But the plan wouldn't have worked because Zionists were dead set on Palestine and non-Zionists didn't want to leave. It would have only been possible if the Germans rounded up all the Jews and deported them.

    In addition to this there was the Havara Agreement which coincided with the Nuremberg Laws, the boycott of Jewish business and led to Kristallnacht and the attempt by the Polish government to deport their Jews. Attempts by Mussolini to form an alliance with the Zionists didn't work either and this is partly because the Zionists preferred to be on Britain's side. After all Britain controlled the seas... as well as Palestine.

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  13. #13

    Default Re: How plausible was a Nazi-Commintern Allaicen?

    It could have been plausible. Ideological differences between the two countries were hardly an issue. Germans really like the idea of having access to Russian resources - Baku oilfields, Donbass coal, etc. There were negotiations between the two powers, that went as far as USSR being offered to join Axis and getting dibs on British colonies in Middle East and India.
    At the end of the day, Germans just presumed that rather bad performance of USSR in Finland would make invasion simply easier, underestimating Soviet industrial potential.
    I think most interesting aspect is that there were secret negotiations between Germany and USSR after Barbarossa begun, where Brest 2.0 was discussed.

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