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Thread: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

  1. #661

    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    I'm not talking about American Jews, I'm talking about politicians who hold dual citizenship and get to hold a major political office in USA, which should be viewed as unacceptable for obvious reasons. Nobody with dual citizenship should be able to run for a major office.

  2. #662
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    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Okay, and which US politicians hold Israeli or Saudi citizenship? Here's the Wikipedia list of foreign-born politicians.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_foreign-born_United_States_politicians

    Most of them are Indian or Latin American. None are Israeli or Saudi.
    Ignore List (to save time):

    Exarch

  3. #663

    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by Legio_Italica View Post
    I pointed out the fact that the regime itself has proclaimed the spread of Islamic revolution, destabilized the region, and openly called for the overthrow neighboring governments as a Shia Islamist power. Again, I don’t really care whether you personally doubt their motivations or would rather describe the latter as “strategic goals.”
    I'm not trying to convince you, merely pointing out that neither your assertions nor your accusations have manifested themselves. Iran has not overthrown neighboring governments nor installed theocracies anywhere else. Moreover, they are far from the only country to destabilize the region. In fact, considering all of the countries attempting to dominate the region themselves at the expense of Iran, it would be irresponsible for Iran not to respond in kind. In short, there is nothing exceptional about Iran that necessitates a U.S. response. The only thing exceptional about it is how fixated U.S. foreign policy is with it.

    ....and you have the audacity to accuse others of “white-washing.” You brought up Rafsanjani, not me.
    I didn't realize bringing up relevant information is the same as ignoring it. You've painted a picture of a hostile Iran post 1979, yet I've shown evidence of when Iran has attempted to mend bridges. You brought up terrorism and funding of militias, I simply brought up the reasons Iran has committed those actions. Muslim countries being angry at Israel for oppressing Palestinians for, generations now, certainly doesn't

    I can only assume your false accusation of my having taken your words out of context to be yet another deflection. You’ve repeatedly asserted your personal opinion that the US’ response to Tehran’s attacks and destabilization is unwarranted “antagonism.” Support for my position is not contingent on anything you’ve said, nor have you been able to challenge it on any material basis.
    Bringing up relevant facts is not apologism. Pointing out how United States has contributed to the crisis doesn't excuse everything that Iran does nor has anyone said so. The assertion that United States has historically and currently been antagonistic to Iran which hasn't contributed towards a solution despite US claims of doing so

  4. #664
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    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by Love Mountain View Post
    I'm not trying to convince you, merely pointing out that neither your assertions nor your accusations have manifested themselves.
    You have pointed out neither of those things. I’ve indicated the facts of what has taken place regarding Tehran’s attacks on the US and unprovoked destabilization of the region.
    Iran has not overthrown neighboring governments nor installed theocracies anywhere else. Moreover, they are far from the only country to destabilize the region.
    Irrelevant deflections and appeals to consequence.
    In fact, considering all of the countries attempting to dominate the region themselves at the expense of Iran, it would be irresponsible for Iran not to respond in kind.
    Iran already dominated the region and had relatively unchallenged hegemony, as I pointed out repeatedly. Therefore, your framing of the regime as a purely reactionary power seeking hegemony is as irrelevant as it is inconsistent with the facts.
    In short, there is nothing exceptional about Iran that necessitates a U.S. response. The only thing exceptional about it is how fixated U.S. foreign policy is with it.
    You’ve continued to assert this and I have no intention of parting you with your unfounded, counterfactual personal opinion. As I said, my position is not contingent on anything you’ve said, nor have you been able to challenge it on any material basis.


    You've painted a picture of a hostile Iran post 1979, yet I've shown evidence of when Iran has attempted to mend bridges.
    Your evidence is a guy who called for the murder of American and allied civilians.
    You brought up terrorism and funding of militias, I simply brought up the reasons Iran has committed those actions.
    You brought up irrelevant deflections and post hoc appeals to consequence that in no way contradicted my points on any basis of fact.

  5. #665

    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by Legio_Italica View Post
    You have pointed out neither of those things. I’ve indicated the facts of what has taken place regarding Tehran’s attacks on the US and unprovoked destabilization of the region.

    Irrelevant deflections and appeals to consequence.
    What facts have you indicated? Iran hasn't toppled a single regime yet, nor installed a theocratic government anywhere else. Your source material relies on things written in 1980.

    Iran already dominated the region and had relatively unchallenged hegemony, as I pointed out repeatedly. Therefore, your framing of the regime as a purely reactionary power seeking hegemony is as irrelevant as it is inconsistent with the facts.
    What region do they dominate, exactly? They were invaded by Iraq in 1980 with Saddam only being toppled in 2003. By which time, there was a US presence in Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, Afghanistan... not to mention existing presence in Israel, KSA, and Turkey. At what point did Iran exactly dominate the region?

    You’ve continued to assert this and I have no intention of parting you with your unfounded, counterfactual personal opinion. As I said, my position is not contingent on anything you’ve said, nor have you been able to challenge it on any material basis.
    You've ignored existing events, and kept referencing events without the accompanying context. The only thing unfounded here, is your constant insistence that Iran is intent on an Islamic revolution around its borders. Yet this has not happened in any single country surrounding Iran. In fact, the only countries hostile to Iran, are those that have a tense history with it. Like Israel. Or KSA. Or, currently, Iraq.

    Your evidence is a guy who called for the murder of American and allied civilians.
    Your is a document drafted during a time when America was literally helping Saddam gas Iranians.

    You brought up irrelevant deflections and post hoc appeals to consequence that in no way contradicted my points on any basis of fact.
    You haven't established any of your points to a sufficient degree. Where has the Ayatollah toppled a secular regime to install a theocratic one?

  6. #666
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    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by Love Mountain View Post
    What facts have you indicated? Iran hasn't toppled a single regime yet, nor installed a theocratic government anywhere else. Your source material relies on things written in 1980.

    What region do they dominate, exactly? They were invaded by Iraq in 1980 with Saddam only being toppled in 2003. By which time, there was a US presence in Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, Afghanistan... not to mention existing presence in Israel, KSA, and Turkey. At what point did Iran exactly dominate the region?

    You've ignored existing events, and kept referencing events without the accompanying context. The only thing unfounded here, is your constant insistence that Iran is intent on an Islamic revolution around its borders. Yet this has not happened in any single country surrounding Iran. In fact, the only countries hostile to Iran, are those that have a tense history with it. Like Israel. Or KSA. Or, currently, Iraq.

    Your is a document drafted during a time when America was literally helping Saddam gas Iranians.

    You haven't established any of your points to a sufficient degree. Where has the Ayatollah toppled a secular regime to install a theocratic one?
    Your post was already addressed in post #640. My points are established in fact and backed up by many sources.
    Quote Originally Posted by you
    Neither Russia nor Britain persisted antagonizing Iran on the scale that United States has done over the last 100 years. Nor does anything Khoimeni ever did in his life against United States justifies the antagonism the United States has shown post 1979.

    Iran is no more responsible for instability in the region than any other regime.
    Your points are established by the fact you asserted them, nothing more. That’s why you’re unable to counter my points on any material basis, despite having begun this discussion ostensibly by responding to my post.

  7. #667

    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by Legio_Italica View Post
    Your post was already addressed in post #640. My points are established in fact and backed up by many sources.

    Your points are established by the fact you asserted them, nothing more. That’s why you’re unable to counter my points on any material basis, despite having begun this discussion ostensibly by responding to my post.
    Quote Originally Posted by Legio_Italica View Post
    Your post was already addressed in post #640. My points are established in fact and backed up by many sources.

    Your points are established by the fact you asserted them, nothing more. That’s why you’re unable to counter my points on any material basis, despite having begun this discussion ostensibly by responding to my post.
    Fine.

    Let’s start with your deflection of Wahhabism. To refresh our memories, I originally brought up Wahhabism because I find it to be far more dangerous than Iran’s religious ambitions (which have neither materialized nor proven to exist beyond inflammatory rhetoric). Your deflected this, and I quote,

    “Wahhabism was used for centuries as a tool for domestic political control by the House of Saud and was overtly isolationist as a matter of religious “purity.” As Saudi oil revenues grew, so did Wahhabi influence within Islam. When Tehran began exporting Shiite “global Islamic Revolution, the Saudis began exporting their own Sunni/Wahhabist version powered by oil wealth as a counter to protect their oil interests from Tehran’s destabilizing efforts. Obviously religious fanaticism of any kind is awful, but here again, the latter is responsible for the direction taken by Iran and subsequently the entire region, independently of the US.”

    The first link references the founder of Wahhabism, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a theologist who lived in the 18th century. This is about as relevant as arguing over the current role of the Vatican by referencing pre-Renaissance Papal politics. Furthermore, neither of these allegations,

    “As Saudi oil revenues grew, so did Wahhabi influence within Islam. When Tehran began exporting Shiite “global Islamic Revolution,” the Saudis began exporting their own Sunni/Wahhabist version powered by oil wealth as a counter to protect their oil interests from Tehran’s destabilizing efforts.”

    Hold up to scrutiny. At the very least, you’ve omitted other reasons and geopolitical circumstances that have lead to exportation of radical Islam from Saudi Arabia. Referencing Khaled Abou El Fadl, the author of The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, an expert on Islam

    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 
    Importantly, throughout the various stages that led to the creation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932—the failed so-called first Saudi state (1745–1818), the failed second state (roughly from 1824 to 1891), or the third, successful state (commencing in 1902 and continuing until 1932)—the Al Sa‘ud family and the Wahhabis had formed a considerable legacy of intolerance, hate, and fanaticism, resulting in atrocities, massacres, and cruelty. This inhumane legacy became part of the past that would forever haunt the Saudi state and would also shape the ethical sensibilities of the type of Islam that the Wahhabis preached and spread around the Muslim world. The list of Saudi-Wahhabi sins of intolerance and cruelty is long indeed. For example, the various Wahhabi rebellions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were very bloody, as the Wahhabis indiscriminately slaughtered Muslims, especially those belonging to Sufi orders and the Shi’i sect. In 1802, for example, the Wahhabi forces massacred the Shi’i inhabitants of Karbala,46 and in 1803, 1804, and 1806, the Wahhabis executed a large number of Sunnis in Mecca and Medina, whom they considered for one reason or another heretical. The number of those executed or massacred by the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance has never been counted, but from historical accounts it is clear that it is in the tens of thousands if not more. In the course of the second conquest of the Arabian Peninsula, for instance, acting under orders from Ibn Sa‘ud, the Wahhabis carried out 40,000 public executions and 350,000 amputations.


    “Overtly isolationist”.

    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 
    Through the 1930s and 1940s the Saudi government overcame all sense of restraint regarding the fanatic practices of Wahhabism, and strengthened its claim over the holy cities of Medina and Mecca. With that claim came the exclusive right to define the rituals that could legitimately be performed in the holy cities. By the 1950s the Saudi government no longer made conciliatory statements toward Muslim countries or apologized for the practices and excesses of the Wahhabis. While the Saudi government continued to rely on the support of the British government (and increasingly the American government as well), it no longer needed the support of other Muslim countries. Wahhabism had become firmly established in Saudi Arabia and also in the nerve center of Islam, Mecca and Medina.


    Wahhabis tightening their grip as an authority in Islam, and finally,

    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 
    Wahhabism had become firmly established in Saudi Arabia and also in the nerve center of Islam, Mecca and Medina. Because of the twin factors of non-Muslim support and the discovery of oil, the Saudi government was in a position to withstand the criticism of moderate Muslim countries. There was no way that those countries could exert effective pressure on the Saudi government and influence the kind of Islam that had become dominant in the holy land, and the Saudi government simply had no incentive to modify or moderate the creed to which it adhered. However, the 1970s became truly transformative for Saudi Arabia and the Muslim world. Before the 1970s, the Saudis acted as if Wahhabism was an internal affair well adapted to native needs of Saudi society and culture. The 1970s became a turning point in that the Saudi government decided to undertake a systematic campaign of aggressively exporting the Wahhabi creed to the rest of the Muslim world.


    In short, Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi sects always had aspirations of global Islamic dominance, of becoming the main power in Islam. Iran’s revolution likely contributed, but was not a decisive factor in Saudi’s support and efforts to export Islam. In fact, the much more likely factors were underlying Wahhabi ambitions, oil extraction which was quickly rising in the 1970s before peaking in in 1980 (the oil crisis), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and solidification of Saudi’s and Wahhabi position in the Arabian peninsula.

    Even centrist, neo-liberal Brookings supports such conclusions about Saudi Arabia,

    While some of the examples we cite below—such as Saudi Arabia leveraging its custodianship of Islam’s two holiest sites to foster Muslim goodwill—would seem to fit within Nye’s conventional soft power formula, many of our examples involve narrow and quite instrumental uses of religious actors and ideas to accomplish tactical objectives—a less comfortable fit for soft power in Nye’s standard formula. We nonetheless find a focus on religious soft power useful for demonstrating that states see value—and, seemingly, results—in using religion to engage and influence populations in other countries. This resort to religion is particularly salient in the context of an emerging “post-liberal” world order.22 In other words, as we witness a breakdown in the global consensus around liberalism, it is worth paying attention to how geopolitical actors are pushing ideological alternatives and forms of transnational cultural solidarity. Turning now to the scope of this paper, we want to clarify that we are not focusing on direct state support for militant Islamist groups. This includes funding from various Gulf countries for militants in Syria and Libya, which is something more akin to the projection of hard power via proxy organizations. Rather, our focus here is on how states deploy various entities that propagate religious messages, religious education, or discourses of religious solidarity. We are of course aware that in some cases there is a great deal of fungibility when it comes to this distinction. It is, for example, difficult to separate Iran’s support for Hezbollah qua militant proxy from Iran’s broader cultural outreach to Lebanese Shia. We explore the complexity around this issue in more detail below.
    .
    .
    .

    Saudi Arabia’s export of Wahhabism has been a focus of discussion and debate for decades. What is not disputed is that since the 1960s, various entities within or connected to the Kingdom have spent tens of billions of dollars to promote an ultraconservative and austere interpretation of Islam around the world. Observers remain divided over the significance and impact of these activities, with some drawing a direct causal line from Saudi support for conservative religion to terrorism, while others see little more than the transnational circulation of religious ideas that yield widely varying and often limited effects.30 The motivations for Saudi Arabia’s involvement in this kind of religious export activity have evolved over time, with shifts in both the regional environment as well as Saudi domestic politics shaping its promotion of religious soft power. In the 1960s, Saudi projection of conservative religion formed part of an Islamic—and monarchical—response to the more secular nationalism emanating from Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt, then the Kingdom’s chief regional rival. While Saudi Arabia has traditionally been associated with Salafism31 and Wahhabism, the common enemy of the socialist left (when it still seemed dominant) led Saudi officials to help broker a thaw between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Muslim Brotherhood leaders in the early 1970s.32 Even in the infancy of Saudi religious soft power, there were motivations other than realpolitik at work. For example, many within the Kingdom’s religious establishment and royal family viewed the global propagation of Islam as a religious obligation (fard) deeply intertwined with Saudi Arabia’s privileged role as custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites. During the 1970s and 1980s, Saudi religious outreach was driven by a combination of the country’s Cold War alignment with the United States (which saw in Islam an ideological counterbalance to Soviet influence) and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The latter development, and more specifically the new Islamic Republic’s efforts to export its revolution, marked a new phase of “geo-religious” competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran—each of them vying to assert supremacy among Muslim countries. Saudi Arabia also worried about Iran’s influence on its own significant Shia minority population, a community subject to high levels of discrimination and de facto second-class citizenship. In the eyes of some of Saudi Arabia’s most hardline clerics, the Shia weren’t even legitimate Muslims.
    And here are their comments about Iran’s exporting its own brand of Islamism,

    First, the Iranian Revolution was welcomed by many mainstream Sunni Islamists, who might have otherwise been suspicious of Shia Islam. They saw Iran as a potential ally against their own repressive regimes; The “Islamic” nature of the Islamic revolution took precedence over any perceived sectarianism. Sunni Islamists had more in common with Shia Islamists than they did with Sunni secularists. This religious soft power would decrease over time, with geopolitical considerations driving revolutionary Iran to forge an alliance with Syria’s secular Baath regime. Second, Iran succeeded, again especially at first, in tapping into a persistent yearning among many recently decolonized countries for an alternative to the twin poles of U.S. capitalism and Soviet communism. For some of these countries—including non-Muslim nations in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia—the Iranian Revolution was viewed in the broader context of non-alignment.53 Third, those aspects of the revolution that emphasized overcoming inequality, injustice, and neo-imperialism allowed Khomeini to be perceived as a Third Worldist visionary and to gain support throughout the developing world. As Rashid Ghannouchi, leader of Tunisia’s Ennahda party, once explained, the Iranian Revolution “enabled us to Islamize some leftist social concepts and to accommodate the social conflict within an Islamic context.”54 A number of Sunni-dominated countries such as Indonesia and Nigeria saw pockets of conversion to Shia Islam due to Iran’s perceived anti-imperialist credentials in the wake of 1979.55 To this day, for example, Islamic Republic International Broadcasting—Iran’s radio world service—broadcasts in Hausa to northern Nigeria.

    In short, the Islamic Republic has adopted a broad-based approach to cultural diplomacy. Its appeal is, to a significant degree, ideational in nature and not strictly a function of power projection. Sometimes it draws on Islamic narratives; sometimes Islamist narratives; and, increasingly over time, sectarian narratives. Certainly the Islamic Republic has sought to portray itself as the protector of embattled Shia minorities and sometimes even—in the cases of Iraq before 2003, Azerbaijan before the fall of the Soviet Union, and, presently, the Kingdom of Bahrain—Shia majorities. 56 As the chief international sponsor of Hezbollah, a mainstay of Lebanon’s Shia community, Iran has cultivated a powerful proxy force capable of exerting considerable political and military influence across the Levant. Witness, for example, the movement’s recent role in Syria defending the Assad regime; even here, we find a religious framing in the form of Hezbollah explaining its presence in Syria in terms of defending religious shrines
    Note that there is very little that would indicate that Iran’s “export” of its Islamic sect would destabilize the region. The word used to describe Iran’s conduct? “Cultural Diplomacy”. I mean following your narrative so far, one would think that Iran is trying to overthrow every single government around it.

    Like I said, you can start the timeline whenever you want depending on who you want to blame for whatever. I choose to start from the beginning. Iran was a close US ally after having more or less been a British and Soviet chess piece during the first half of the 20th century. CIA support for the Shah was a condition of averting yet another British invasion of Iran. Tehran was to the West what Saudi Arabia is today, only more powerful and arguably more wealthy. Even in the 70s, she was one of the fastest growing economies in the world at a time of widespread stagnation. There was no “anti-Iran” policy in the US until Khomeini decided to initiate one and end the relationship that had been a pillar of regional stability. Today, Tehran still wants to have what she had before, and until she gets it, she’s a woman scorned. Alas, there are downsides to having religious nutjobs make your foreign policy.
    What absurd reductionism. United States toppled a fledgling democracy in 1953 and you’re hinting at some sort of Kudos because we didn’t let the British do it instead.

    PRI

    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 
    American diplomat Averell Harriman was dispatched to Tehran.
    "We had admitted, as a nation, the right of a country to nationalize foreign-held properties providing they were paid for promptly and adequately. The British finally accepted the right of the Iranians to nationalize but then it was rather too late," Harriman said.
    By then, Mossadegh and his followers were beyond dealmaking. In the end, the British set out to overthrow him. In October 1952, Mossadegh discovered their plot. He ordered the British Embassy shut and its diplomats expelled. A few weeks later the British asked the Americans to help them with a coup. The request came just after Dwight Eisenhower had been elected, but before he took office. The outgoing Truman Administration opposed the idea of a coup. But Eisenhower did not, according to Gasiorowski.
    "Key Eisenhower officials began to talk about carrying out a coup even before Eisenhower was inaugurated. The key figures there were John Foster Dulles, the secretary of state, and his brother Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA. They clearly came into office in January 1953 with the idea that they would carry out a coup," Gasiorowski says.
    They chose CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt to run the operation. He was the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, and the head of covert operations in the Middle East.
    Kinzer says he was a perfect fit.
    "He slipped clandestinely across the border and in a period of just three weeks, really through his own wits, Kermit Roosevelt organized the overthrow of the government of Iran. He was truly a real life James Bond," Kinzer says.
    Roosevelt started by tapping into the intelligence networks the British and Americans had built up inside Iran. A few key Iranians proved willing to do his bidding. They unleashed a ferocious propaganda campaign against Mossadegh. They bribed newspapers to print slander; they paid clerics to denounce him at Friday prayers. They hired thugs to organize mobs and riots. Meanwhile, Roosevelt had to persuade Iran's young Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, to participate in the coup. Roosevelt told the story in an interview in 1980.
    "It was difficult to set up because the Shah was extremely suspicious, I guess, is the right word about what British and American intentions toward him really were," Roosevelt said.
    This was the same Shah who was thrust onto the throne during World War Two. His father had ruled Iran with a strong hand and kept parliament under his control. But the younger Shah started out weak. And Mossadegh's movement to nationalize the oil industry had put the Shah on the defensive. Now the British and the Americans wanted Mossadegh out and the monarchy back in control. They needed the Shah to sign a royal decree dismissing Mossadegh. But the Shah hesitated. He wanted to make sure the whole thing wasn't a trick. Roosevelt arranged for high level emissaries to make the case. But in the end Roosevelt had to persuade the Shah himself. He made a secret midnight visit to the place. It worked.
    "He recognized me. And he figured that you know a Roosevelt wasn't going to come to lie to him," Roosevelt said.
    In the end the coup came down to four dramatic days in August 1953. The head of the Shah's imperial guard was supposed to go to Mossadegh's house, present him with the royal decree dismissing him, and then arrest him. But when the Colonel arrived at Mossadegh's house he found himself surrounded by troops loyal to Mossadegh. The prime minister had him arrested instead of the other way around.
    Gasiorowski says things didn't look good for the American plotters.
    "And indeed when the CIA station in Tehran sent a cable to Washington telling them what happened they soon got a cable back from Washington saying stop the coup attempt and evacuate Roosevelt and other key people. This has failed," Gasiorowski says.
    The Shah fled the country. But Roosevelt refused to give up.
    "You know you had a job to do. Our studies convinced us that if you could bring about a clear cut unmistakeable confrontation between the Shah on one side and Mossadegh on the other the army and the people would throng to the support of the Shah. And that did turn out to be correct," Roosevelt later said.
    So Roosevelt set about stage-managing that confrontation. He had copies of the decree dismissing the prime minister plastered around town.
    Kinzer says Roosevelt went back to the Iranians he was working with and had them organize fresh mobs.
    "He would have them surge through the streets of Tehran, break windows, beat up people, shoot their guns into mosques and shout, "We love Mossadegh. Up with Mossadegh and communism." And as if that wasn't enough he then hired another mob to attack this mob to show that Tehran was in such chaos that anarchy was threatening and that just to bring Iran back to a measure of stability, Mossadegh had to be overthrown," he says.
    The strategy worked. The demonstrations escalated. Clashes broke out between opposing military factions. On August 19, 1953, anti-Mossadegh forces seized power and Mossadegh went into hiding. An army general was installed as prime minister. The Shah made a triumphant return home.
    Gasiorowski says the US action changed the course of Iranian history.
    "The coup succeeded and began a series of events that over the next couple of years transformed Iran from a sort of a populist political system moving in the direction of democracy to a very strong dictatorship," Gasiorowski says.
    The coup was celebrated in Washington. But in Iran it sowed a resentment and distrust of US power that still exists.


    But as I said before, this is a white-washing of history.
    Last edited by Love Mountain; January 24, 2020 at 08:49 AM.

  8. #668
    Legio_Italica's Avatar Lost in Limbo
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    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Rehashing the discussion will not salvage your non-existent argument against my position. The “What about Saudi Arabia” text wall is not scrutiny of anything. The KSA’s evolving reliance on and support of Wahhabism, and the extent of its religious prevalence within modern Islamic theology, is not contradictory to my comments on the matter, which are backed up by evidence and sources, nor supportive of your “US antagonism” claims.

    Per your own source:
    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

    Quote Originally Posted by your source
    Saudi Arabia’s export of Wahhabism has been a focus of discussion and debate for decades. What is not disputed is that since the 1960s, various entities within or connected to the Kingdom have spent tens of billions of dollars to promote an ultraconservative and austere interpretation of Islam around the world. Observers remain divided over the significance and impact of these activities, with some drawing a direct causal line from Saudi support for conservative religion to terrorism, while others see little more than the transnational circulation of religious ideas that yield widely varying and often limited effects.30 The motivations for Saudi Arabia’s involvement in this kind of religious export activity have evolved over time, with shifts in both the regional environment as well as Saudi domestic politics shaping its promotion of religious soft power.

    During the 1970s and 1980s, Saudi religious outreach was driven by a combination of the country’s Cold War alignment with the United States (which saw in Islam an ideological counterbalance to Soviet influence) and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The latter development, and more specifically the new Islamic Republic’s efforts to export its revolution, marked a new phase of “geo-religious” competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran—each of them vying to assert supremacy among Muslim countries. Saudi Arabia also worried about Iran’s influence on its own significant Shia minority population, a community subject to high levels of discrimination and de facto second-class citizenship.

    First, the Iranian Revolution was welcomed by many mainstream Sunni Islamists, who might have otherwise been suspicious of Shia Islam. They saw Iran as a potential ally against their own repressive regimes; The “Islamic” nature of the Islamic revolution took precedence over any perceived sectarianism. Sunni Islamists had more in common with Shia Islamists than they did with Sunni secularists.
    This religious soft power would decrease over time, with geopolitical considerations driving revolutionary Iran to forge an alliance with Syria’s secular Baath regime. Second, Iran succeeded, again especially at first, in tapping into a persistent yearning among many recently decolonized countries for an alternative to the twin poles of U.S. capitalism and Soviet communism. For some of these countries—including non-Muslim nations in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia—the Iranian Revolution was viewed in the broader context of non-alignment.53 Third, those aspects of the revolution that emphasized overcoming inequality, injustice, and neo-imperialism allowed Khomeini to be perceived as a Third Worldist visionary and to gain support throughout the developing world.
    Quote Originally Posted by me
    As for the KSA, like I said, Wahhabism was used for internal control by the House of Saud, until it became something else in the wake of Tehran’s Revolution. One can theorize about how the Muslim Brotherhood, Arab nationalism, or internal extremism might otherwise have pushed the formerly isolationist doctrine focused primarily on obedience to the King to become the externalized political force that Wahhabism is today. Three things are certain: The Shah was on good terms with the Saudis. Lots of countries sell weapons to and buy oil from KSA. The Ayatollah’s Islamic revolution and calls for the overthrow of especially neighboring Sunni governments provided both the inspiration and the fear which drove Tehran’s Sunni/Wahhabist rivals to copy her model for religion as a low cost, high impact foreign policy tool.
    Quote Originally Posted by your source
    In short, the Islamic Republic has adopted a broad-based approach to cultural diplomacy. Its appeal is, to a significant degree, ideational in nature and not strictly a function of power projection. Sometimes it draws on Islamic narratives; sometimes Islamist narratives; and, increasingly over time, sectarian narratives. Certainly the Islamic Republic has sought to portray itself as the protector of embattled Shia minorities and sometimes even—in the cases of Iraq before 2003, Azerbaijan before the fall of the Soviet Union, and, presently, the Kingdom of Bahrain—Shia majorities. 56 As the chief international sponsor of Hezbollah, a mainstay of Lebanon’s Shia community, Iran has cultivated a powerful proxy force capable of exerting considerable political and military influence across the Levant. Witness, for example, the movement’s recent role in Syria defending the Assad regime; even here, we find a religious framing in the form of Hezbollah explaining its presence in Syria in terms of defending religious shrines
    Quote Originally Posted by me
    To this day, much of Tehran’s quest for hegemony can be called a quest for Shia hegemony, from Syria to Iraq and beyond. It is the latter crusade which shattered the relative tranquility between Sunni and Shia that had characterized the period between the fall of the Ottomans and the 1979 Iranian Revolution, destabilizing the region and drawing in western powers.

    Under Khomeini, Iran began an experiment in Islamic rule. Khomeini tried to inspire further Islamic revival, preaching Muslim unity, but supported groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Pakistan that had specific Shia agendas. Sunni Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, admired Khomeini’s success, but did not accept his leadership, underscoring the depth of sectarian suspicions.

    Saudi Arabia has a sizable Shia minority of roughly 10 percent, and millions of adherents of a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism (an offshoot of the Sunni Hanbali school) that is antagonistic to Shia Islam. The transformation of Iran into an overtly Shia power after the Islamic revolution induced Saudi Arabia to accelerate the propagation of Wahhabism, as both countries revived a centuries-old sectarian rivalry over the true interpretation of Islam. Many of the groups responsible for sectarian violence that has occurred in the region and across the Muslim world since 1979 can be traced to Saudi and Iranian sources.

    https://www.cfr.org/interactives/sunni-shia-divide#!/

    Citing sources that further evidence my points is an interesting but counterproductive way to try and support yours or counter mine. I haven’t omitted or white washed history. I haven’t claimed the US does or does not deserve kudos for anything. I’m not sure why you would cite a source and quote it extensively, just to then dismiss it as “white-washing” because you don’t like what it says.

    As I said,
    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 
    Quote Originally Posted by me
    The US was ready to deal with Mossadegh or the Shah or the Ayatollah, or frankly any government not aligned with Moscow. Distribution of monetary profits from oil production is at best a tertiary concern. The geopolitics of averting a British invasion of Iran or rumors of Soviet intrigue in exchange for lending the support of US intelligence services to the Shah is not the watershed moment claimed by Tehran or her apologists. It is merely a part of the post hoc narrative used to assign nefarious god-like power to the US government, and deflect criticism of a brutal theocracy whose arrival was by no means preordained.

    “From his home in exile outside Paris, the defiant leader of the Iranian revolution effectively offered the Carter administration a deal: Iranian military leaders listen to you, he said, but the Iranian people follow my orders.

    In a first-person message, Khomeini told the White House not to panic at the prospect of losing a strategic ally of 37 years and assured them that he, too, would be a friend.
    "You will see we are not in any particular animosity with the Americans," said Khomeini, pledging his Islamic Republic will be "a humanitarian one, which will benefit the cause of peace and tranquillity for all mankind".

    "Khomeini explained he was not opposed to American interests in Iran," according to a 1980 CIA analysis titled Islam in Iran, partially released to the public in 2008.
    To the contrary, an American presence was necessary to counter the Soviet and British influence, Khomeini told the US.

    On 9 November 1978, in a now-famous cable, "Thinking the Unthinkable," the US ambassador to Iran, William Sullivan, warned that the Shah was doomed. He argued that Washington should get the Shah and his top generals out of Iran, and then make a deal between junior commanders and Khomeini.
    Sullivan's bold proposal caught President Carter off-guard, and caused their relationship to go sour.
    But by early January, the reluctant president concluded that the Shah's departure was necessary to calm the opposition.
    Amid reports of an impending military coup, the president summoned his top advisors on 3 January. After a brief discussion, they decided to subtly encourage the Shah to leave, ostensibly for a vacation in California.
    "A genuinely non-aligned Iran need not be viewed as a US setback," the president said, according to minutes of the meeting.

    Khomeini also vowed not to destabilise the region.
    "Non-interference in other people's affairs", he wrote, would be the policy of the future government.

    The Islamic Republic, unlike the Shah's regime, would not act as the policeman of the Gulf, but it would not get into the business of exporting the revolution either.

    Less than a year later, Khomeini - while holding the US Charge d'Affaires and dozens of other Americans during the Iranian hostage crisis - declared: "America can't do a damn thing."

    https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36431160


    Why would Tehran attack the most powerful country in the world, unprovoked, surrounded by rivals, when she could have had regional hegemony, nukes, oil money, development contracts, etc, simply by refraining from destabilizing her own sphere of influence? Why would Khomeini attempt to overthrow Saddam, a potential ally? Why would Tehran launch terror attacks across the world in countries that had never harmed her people? Because, as Khomeini said, “America can’t do a damn thing.” The Iranian regime is a violent, rogue power. Whether what she wants in the end is Shia hegemony, territorial hegemony on her own terms, the proselytization of her own brand of Islam, or something else entirely, the dynamic is the same.

  9. #669

    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by Legio_Italica View Post
    Rehashing the discussion will not salvage your non-existent argument against my position. The “What about Saudi Arabia” text wall is not scrutiny of anything. The KSA’s evolving reliance on and support of Wahhabism, and the extent of its religious prevalence within modern Islamic theology, is not contradictory to my comments on the matter, which are backed up by evidence and sources, nor supportive of your “US antagonism” claims.
    The "what about Saudi Arabia" text is entirely brought on by your insistence that Iran is an expansionist power who's main goal is to expand Islam. You've alluded this a number of times.

    Post #156

    “Tehran, as a theocratic Islamist regime, has engaged in terrorism and attacks against the US and her allies as part of her 40 year ongoing quest to export “global Islamic Revolution.” This includes terrorism and attacks launched indirectly through terrorist proxies like Hezbollah, as well as directly through Tehran’s diplomatic, military and intelligence services.”

    # 284

    “Once he felt he was out of the woods, the Ayatollah attacked our embassy and launched “global Islamic revolution.”
    .
    .
    .
    Yeah, radical Islamic extremism and anti-US brinkmanship designed to direct public discontent toward foreign enemies and away from domestic oppressors while advancing the regime’s external ambitions.”

    #356

    “The idea this is merely coincidental to the current and historical aims of the “global Islamic Revolution” is naive, to put it mildly. There is no divorcing Islamism and theology from an Islamic theocracy’s geopolitical ambitions, regardless of any generic strategic framework subsequently devised to counter US containment of those ambitions.”

    And so on. Yet you have not produced any compelling evidence to prove it. However, what this does suggest, is that you consider expansionist radical Islam to be a threat that has to be dealt with. If that is the case, then your attention should be on Wahhabism. Far from addressing my argument and the text covering Wahabbism, you’ve opted not to. Well I’ll say it again. If a theocratic expansionist power is a threat United States should confront, then the attention shouldn’t be on Iran, who hasn’t managed to topple or expand their religious influence in a significant way since he 1979 Revolution, but on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, who’s monarchy doesn’t just tolerate expansionist Wahhabi ideology, but provides them with the resources and manpower to continue doing so. Like Iran, KSA has been the source of many different militant groups that work against U.S. interests, and unlike Iran, KSA has actually invaded a neighbor.
    So no, this isn’t whataboutism, this is merely pointing out another double standard.

    As for my “non-existent” claims of US antagonism, despite 30-40 pages your only rebuttal to the U.S. sponsored coup in 1953, which is frequently cited as the source of anti-American sentiment in Iran, has been to claim that U.S. has only done so to prevent the British from doing the same. Well this doesn’t address any kind of grievance Iran might have against United States. It is a legitimate cause of resentment, and no amount of US apologism for the Shah’s regime or demonization of the current Islamic Republic is going to change that. U.S. has not made a sufficient effort to bury the hatchet, opting to double down on the conflict.
    Citing sources that further evidence my points is an interesting but counterproductive way to try and support yours or counter mine. I haven’t omitted or white washed history. I haven’t claimed the US does or does not deserve kudos for anything. I’m not sure why you would cite a source and quote it extensively, just to then dismiss it as “white-washing” because you don’t like what it says.
    I didn’t dismiss the source as white-washing. I specifically said that “even a centrist, neo-liberal source like” Brookings doesn’t support your conclusions. Because it doesn’t, especially if you read the quoted sections (and the rest of the document) carefully instead of focusing on the parts that “appear” to agree with your opinion.
    This section in particular,

    Even in the infancy of Saudi religious soft power, there were motivations other than realpolitik at work. For example, many within the Kingdom’s religious establishment and royal family viewed the global propagation of Islam as a religious obligation (fard) deeply intertwined with Saudi Arabia’s privileged role as custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites. During the 1970s and 1980s, Saudi religious outreach was driven by a combination of the country’s Cold War alignment with the United States (which saw in Islam an ideological counterbalance to Soviet influence) and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The latter development, and more specifically the new Islamic Republic’s efforts to export its revolution, marked a new phase of “geo-religious” competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran—each of them vying to assert supremacy among Muslim countries.
    Explicitly cites global expansion of Wahhabism as a goal of clerics and the royal family. Meanwhile, while the comment about it also being a reaction to the Iranian Revolution may seem to initially support your narrative the next section I quoted pokes holes in that narrative,
    The “Islamic” nature of the Islamic revolution took precedence over any perceived sectarianism. Sunni Islamists had more in common with Shia Islamists than they did with Sunni secularists. This religious soft power would decrease over time, with geopolitical considerations driving revolutionary Iran to forge an alliance with Syria’s secular Baath regime. Second, Iran succeeded, again especially at first, in tapping into a persistent yearning among many recently decolonized countries for an alternative to the twin poles of U.S. capitalism and Soviet communism. For some of these countries—including non-Muslim nations in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia—the Iranian Revolution was viewed in the broader context of non-alignment.5Third, those aspects of the revolution that emphasized overcoming inequality, injustice, and neo-imperialism allowed Khomeini to be perceived as a Third Worldist visionary and to gain support throughout the developing world. As Rashid Ghannouchi, leader of Tunisia’s Ennahda party, once explained, the Iranian Revolution “enabled us to Islamize some leftist social concepts and to accommodate the social conflict within an Islamic context.” A number of Sunni-dominated countries such as Indonesia and Nigeria saw pockets of conversion to Shia Islam due to Iran’s perceived anti-imperialist credentials in the wake of 1979.
    It specifically paints the Iranian Revolution as an anti-imperialist movement and as an alternative to the two Cold War spheres, both in general, and as it relates to the context within Middle East (Nationalist Secularism vs Sunni Islamism). As the publication describes Iran’s policy, “Cultural Diplomacy”. The rest of the Iran section is woefully at odds with your account of what you purport to be, to quote your own words in post #156,

    “Tehran, as a theocratic Islamist regime, has engaged in terrorism and attacks against the US and her allies as part of her 40 year ongoing quest to export “global Islamic Revolution.”

    The section’s final word on Iran’s policy,

    Perhaps the defining feature of Iran’s soft power strategy since the revolution has been its flexible character. Even Khomeini’s seemingly rigid interpretation of Shia Islam as the bedrock of Iran’s identity was more complex in reality; Khomeini’s political theology, which diverged from much of the traditional Shia religious establishment, did not hinge on the return of the Imam, making it seem less distinctly “Shia” than it otherwise might have been.59 Regardless of how ideological individual politicians might be, states have interests that they pursue by tailoring their message for different audiences and drawing on different sources of religious, ethnic, linguistic, and historical legitimacy. Not surprisingly, then, Iran’s cultural diplomacy has proven to be rather nimble.”

    Hardly an expansionist Islamic power hell-bent on exporting its religious sect. And again, this is from Brookings, a centrist and neoliberal publication that’s about as charitable to your interpretation as you can get without delving into conservative propaganda that some shills write on The National Review

    As I said,
    Naïve. Considering that Americans spent the last 20 years helping the Shah maintain his power.
    Last edited by Love Mountain; January 24, 2020 at 05:05 PM.

  10. #670

    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Tehran, as a theocratic Islamist regime, has engaged in terrorism and attacks against the US and her allies as part of her 40 year ongoing quest to export “global Islamic Revolution.” This includes terrorism and attacks launched indirectly through terrorist proxies like Hezbollah, as well as directly through Tehran’s diplomatic, military and intelligence services.
    USA, as an expansionist globalist regime, has engaged in terrorism and attacks against the Iran and her allies as part of her 40 year ongoing quest to export “global liberal democracy.” This includes terrorism and attacks launched indirectly through globalist proxies like Israel/Saudi Arabia, as well as directly through America’s diplomatic, military and intelligence services.

  11. #671
    Legio_Italica's Avatar Lost in Limbo
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    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by Love Mountain View Post
    The "what about Saudi Arabia" text is entirely brought on by your insistence that Iran is an expansionist power who's main goal is to expand Islam. You've alluded this a number of times.
    The “What about Saudi Arabia” text was brought on because you are apparently no more able to counter my sourced, factual position than you were 30 pages ago. You then restate the same red herring claim about Tehran’s motivations and goals (most recently addressed in posts 668, 644, and 640), assign it to me as an “allusion,” and reference a bunch of my posts that do not say anything like what you’ve ascribed to them.
    And so on. Yet you have not produced any compelling evidence to prove it.
    Even if one ignores the entire thread prior to this page, the fact you yourself provided more source material supporting my position in an attempt to counter it renders your assertion here demonstrably false.
    However, what this does suggest, is that you consider expansionist radical Islam to be a threat that has to be dealt with. If that is the case, then your attention should be on Wahhabism.

    Far from addressing my argument and the text covering Wahabbism, you’ve opted not to.
    I have addressed it. Repeatedly. Most recently, using your own sources, which it turns out, support, rather than counter, my position.
    Well I’ll say it again. If a theocratic expansionist power is a threat United States should confront, then the attention shouldn’t be on Iran, who hasn’t managed to topple or expand their religious influence in a significant way since he 1979 Revolution, but on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, who’s monarchy doesn’t just tolerate expansionist Wahhabi ideology, but provides them with the resources and manpower to continue doing so. Like Iran, KSA has been the source of many different militant groups that work against U.S. interests, and unlike Iran, KSA has actually invaded a neighbor.
    So no, this isn’t whataboutism, this is merely pointing out another double standard.
    It is whataboutism. I don’t care whether you prefer Shia Islamism to Sunni Islamism, or where you believe people’s “focus” should be. The USG’s defensive response to Tehran’s attacks does not oblige any link to policy toward the KSA just to satisfy your claims of moral contradiction.
    As for my “non-existent” claims of US antagonism, despite 30-40 pages your only rebuttal to the U.S. sponsored coup in 1953, which is frequently cited as the source of anti-American sentiment in Iran, has been to claim that U.S. has only done so to prevent the British from doing the same.
    Your assertion here is false. If in 30-40 pages, you’re now admitting that the basis for your claims of “US antagonism” toward Iran is the 1953 coup, I appreciate your concession that your claims amount to a post hoc fallacy that directly conflicts with the historical record, as I indicated in my last post and numerous times prior.
    Well this doesn’t address any kind of grievance Iran might have against United States. It is a legitimate cause of resentment, and no amount of US apologism for the Shah’s regime or demonization of the current Islamic Republic is going to change that. U.S. has not made a sufficient effort to bury the hatchet, opting to double down on the conflict.
    US apologism? Demonization? What are you talking about? At what point between getting attacked in 1979 and getting attacked in 2019 was the US supposed to “bury the hatchet?”
    I didn’t dismiss the source as white-washing. I specifically said that “even a centrist, neo-liberal source like” Brookings doesn’t support your conclusions. Because it doesn’t, especially if you read the quoted sections (and the rest of the document) carefully instead of focusing on the parts that “appear” to agree with your opinion.

    This section in particular,

    Explicitly cites global expansion of Wahhabism as a goal of clerics and the royal family. Meanwhile, while the comment about it also being a reaction to the Iranian Revolution may seem to initially support your narrative the next section I quoted pokes holes in that narrative,

    It specifically paints the Iranian Revolution as an anti-imperialist movement and as an alternative to the two Cold War spheres, both in general, and as it relates to the context within Middle East (Nationalist Secularism vs Sunni Islamism). As the publication describes Iran’s policy, “Cultural Diplomacy”. The rest of the Iran section is woefully at odds with your account of what you purport to be, to quote your own words in post #156,
    “Tehran, as a theocratic Islamist regime, has engaged in terrorism and attacks against the US and her allies as part of her 40 year ongoing quest to export “global Islamic Revolution.”

    The section’s final word on Iran’s policy,
    “Perhaps the defining feature of Iran’s soft power strategy since the revolution has been its flexible character. Even Khomeini’s seemingly rigid interpretation of Shia Islam as the bedrock of Iran’s identity was more complex in reality; Khomeini’s political theology, which diverged from much of the traditional Shia religious establishment, did not hinge on the return of the Imam, making it seem less distinctly “Shia” than it otherwise might have been.59 Regardless of how ideological individual politicians might be, states have interests that they pursue by tailoring their message for different audiences and drawing on different sources of religious, ethnic, linguistic, and historical legitimacy. Not surprisingly, then, Iran’s cultural diplomacy has proven to be rather nimble.”
    Hardly an expansionist Islamic power hell-bent on exporting its religious sect. And again, this is from Brookings, a centrist and neoliberal publication that’s about as charitable to your interpretation as you can get without delving into conservative propaganda that some shills write on The National Review
    Your source is poking holes in its own narrative now? All you’ve managed to do is quote further evidence for another of my points, ie that your false dichotomy over labeling Tehran’s methods, goals, and motivations is as irrelevant now as it was 30 pages ago. Repasting the very same source I addressed in my last post does not imply a contradiction on my part. Baselessly asserting the existence of contradictions on my part doesn’t change the fact your own sources are entirely consistent with my position, as quoted in full context in my previous post. And that’s without even mentioning the sources I’ve provided up to now. Denigrating and cherry-picking from your own source because it is consistent with my position reflects on the credibility of your position, not mine.

  12. #672
    Cookiegod's Avatar Vicarius
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    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    That's a nice country you have there. Would be a shame if someone were to cut it into pieces and sanction it to death if it were told to leave...
    "The project is American, not Sunni. The presence of the American forces has been the guarantor for the Sunnis and the Kurds, so if the US has to leave Iraq, then establishing a Sunni region in western Iraq is its plan to curb Iran and its arms in the Middle East,” he added.

    “We are talking about establishing a country, not an administrative region.”
    https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-seeking-carve-out-sunni-state-its-influence-iraq-wanes
    We're noble liberators. Now do what we say or else!

  13. #673
    Vanoi's Avatar Dux Limitis
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    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by Cookiegod View Post
    That's a nice country you have there. Would be a shame if someone were to cut it into pieces and sanction it to death if it were told to leave...


    We're noble liberators. Now do what we say or else!
    At this rate, the US isn't going to have to do anything. Iraq is doing a great job of tearing itself apart.

    https://news.yahoo.com/iraq-protest-...092626139.html


    And funny enough it seems the idea to form a Sunni autonomous state came from the Sunnis themselves.

    https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ori...ni-region.html

    They don't seem to agree with Iraq ending its security agreement with the US.

  14. #674

    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by Vanoi View Post
    At this rate, the US isn't going to have to do anything. Iraq is doing a great job of tearing itself apart.
    As a result of invasion and occupation by USA.
    And funny enough it seems the idea to form a Sunni autonomous state came from the Sunnis themselves.

    https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ori...ni-region.html

    They don't seem to agree with Iraq ending its security agreement with the US.
    US has also a long history of relying on Sunni jihadists, so that doesn't really surprise anyone.

  15. #675
    Vanoi's Avatar Dux Limitis
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    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by Heathen Hammer View Post
    As a result of invasion and occupation by USA.
    Occupation ended years ago. Its not the US who fostered corruption in the government. Funny enough those protesters are blaming the Iraqi government for their troubles, not the US.

    US has also a long history of relying on Sunni jihadists, so that doesn't really surprise anyone.
    Are you claiming they are jihadists? Source please.

  16. #676

    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by Vanoi View Post
    Occupation ended years ago. Its not the US who fostered corruption in the government. Funny enough those protesters are blaming the Iraqi government for their troubles, not the US.
    Um, US basically destroyed the country and through it into state of constant conflict and resulted with rise of ISIS. US is primary reason behind most of Iraq's problems.
    Are you claiming they are jihadists? Source please.
    When you demand to create a separate theocratic state it kinda implies ones religious fundamentalism.

  17. #677
    Morticia Iunia Bruti's Avatar Vicarius
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    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Its nice, that the US still can pull the good old tricks out of the hat for their bases in Iraq:




    At this time, the President and the Senate of the United States were interested in establishing a canal across the isthmus, with some favoring a canal across Nicaragua and others advocating the purchase of the French interests in Panama. Bunau-Varilla, who was seeking American involvement, asked for $100 million, but accepted $40 million in the face of the Nicaraguan option. In June 1902, the US Senate voted in favor of the Spooner Act, to pursue the Panamanian option, provided the necessary rights could be obtained.[27]

    On January 22, 1903, the Hay–Herrán Treaty was signed by United States Secretary of State John M. Hay and Colombian Chargé Dr. Tomás Herrán. For $10 million and an annual payment, it would have granted the United States a renewable lease in perpetuity from Colombia on the land proposed for the canal.[28] The treaty was ratified by the US Senate on March 14, 1903, but the Senate of Colombia did not ratify it. Bunau-Varilla told President Theodore Roosevelt and Hay of a possible revolt by Panamanian rebels who aimed to separate from Colombia, and hoped that the United States would support the rebels with US troops and money.
    Roosevelt changed tactics, based in part on the Mallarino–Bidlack Treaty of 1846, and actively supported the separation of Panama from Colombia. Shortly after recognizing Panama, he signed a treaty with the new Panamanian government under terms similar to the Hay–Herrán Treaty.[29]
    On November 2, 1903, US warships blocked sea lanes against possible Colombian troop movements en route to put down the Panama rebellion. Panama declared independence on November 3, 1903. The United States quickly recognized the new nation.[30] On November 6, 1903, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, as Panama's ambassador to the United States, signed the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty, granting rights to the United States to build and indefinitely administer the Panama Canal Zone and its defenses. This is sometimes misinterpreted as the "99-year lease" because of misleading wording included in article 22 of the agreement.[31] Almost immediately, the treaty was condemned by many Panamanians as an infringement on their country's new national sovereignty.[32][33] This would later become a contentious diplomatic issue among Colombia, Panama, and the United States.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panama...es_acquisition


    But i guess its ok, because:

    If the US "rescues Sunni of Iraq from shiite oppression" its "liberation".

    If Russia intervenes on Crimea because of "helping the on the Crimea living Russians against ukrainian oppression", its evil "occupation and conquest".

    I'm really curious, if we will learn in some years, that the "Sunni Independence Fighters" were paid by the Agency.
    Last edited by Morticia Iunia Bruti; January 25, 2020 at 06:38 PM.
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  18. #678
    Vanoi's Avatar Dux Limitis
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    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by Heathen Hammer View Post
    Um, US basically destroyed the country and through it into state of constant conflict and resulted with rise of ISIS. US is primary reason behind most of Iraq's problems.
    And ISIS is gone. Iraq is re-building and has been since 2003. You can keep trying to pin the blame on the US bur it comes to a time when they have to take responsibility for themselves. The US isn't forcing them to keep the current government the protesters want ousted so bad.

    When you demand to create a separate theocratic state it kinda implies ones religious fundamentalism.
    The only plan here is an autonomous state, not an independent one. No where in my source does it state they plan to establish a theocratic state. They'd simply be an autonomous territory just like the Iraqi Kurds and would still be part of Iraq.

  19. #679
    Cope's Avatar Have you no decency?
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    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by Vanoi View Post
    And ISIS is gone.
    The caliphate and al-Baghdadi are gone and instances of Islamist terror attacks in the US are down. Credit to (among others) Trump.

    Iraq is re-building and has been since 2003. You can keep trying to pin the blame on the US bur it comes to a time when they have to take responsibility for themselves. The US isn't forcing them to keep the current government the protesters want ousted so bad.
    Bush/Cheney/Blair painted a target on the back of the Anglo-American mission by lying to the public (and the world) about the Hussein regime's alleged WMDs. They also failed to communicate (or simply didn't understand) how difficult nation building actually is in parts of the world scarred by sectarian violence. The impression I get is that they foolishly thought the Iraq War would follow a similar pattern to the war in Bosnia.

    In any case you're right that the insurgency in Iraq isn't really the fault of the US. It's being perpetuated by groups (Ba'athists, Islamists and Iranian militias) who have prioritised - as they have always prioritised - their own power over the interests of Iraqi people. You say that the Iraqi government has to take responsibility for itself (which to an extent is true) but the fact is that it isn't strong enough to remain stable without the presence of US forces. We saw what happened last time American troops left Iraq.

  20. #680
    Vanoi's Avatar Dux Limitis
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    Default Re: Iraqi protesters storm U.S. embassy in Baghdad

    Quote Originally Posted by ep1c_fail View Post
    The caliphate and al-Baghdadi are gone and instances of Islamist terror attacks in the US are down. Credit to (among others) Trump.
    Of course.

    Bush/Cheney/Blair painted a target on the back of the Anglo-American mission by lying to the public (and the world) about the Hussein regime's alleged WMDs. They also failed to communicate (or simply didn't understand) how difficult nation building actually is in parts of the world scarred by sectarian violence. The impression I get is that they foolishly thought the Iraq War would follow a similar pattern to the war in Bosnia.
    Yep it was a mistake. Nation building is complex and there just wasn't a real good reason to ever be in Iraq.

    In any case you're right that the insurgency in Iraq isn't really the fault of the US. It's being perpetuated by groups (Ba'athists, Islamists and Iranian militias) who have prioritised - as they have always prioritised - their own power over the interests of Iraqi people. You say that the Iraqi government has to take responsibility for itself (which to an extent is true) but the fact is that it isn't strong enough to remain stable without the presence of US forces. We saw what happened last time American troops left Iraq.
    The insurgency has winded down. Its really just ISIS cells with the couple Baathhists left helping them. Iranian militants aren't insurgents but they do cause problems of their own.

    The Iraq government could definitely remain standing without American troops. Stable is a matter of interpretation. The Iraq government won't fall to insurgents. However if the protests continue and intensify then stability would be a real problem.

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