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Thread: POTF 13 - Winners

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    Default POTF 13 - Winners


    The winner of POTF #13 was sumskilz, earning 1 competition point and 5 rep points. Well done!

    Winning Post
    To my surprise, I just learn today a Jew can discriminate another Jew racially in Israel
    Quote Originally Posted by Papay View Post
    You cannot measure "jewish DNA". What that even means? Can you expain it to me? I understand white DNA or black DNA but Jewish DNA? I guess you promote the idea that Jews are gods chosen people and this is proved by their DNA? Sorry i am dumb and i dont get it
    What can be measured is common ancestry back to a relatively small population of individuals who lived in the Levant during the Iron Age. This ancestry constitutes about 50% of the genome of the average Polish or Irish Jew (to use your example). Whereas the average ethnically Polish or Irish person doesn't have any of this ancestry. Although it's not uncommon for a Polish or Irish person to have a very small percentage of this ancestry, say 1 or 2%, indicating they have some Jewish ancestors within the last several hundred years who presumably converted to Christianity. Most Jewish diaspora populations have about 50% ancestry from the original Levantine Jewish population, although it's higher in Iraqi Jews. This is because most diaspora populations were founded mostly by Jewish males and local women, whereas the Iraqi Jewish population was established by forcibly relocated populations from Israel and Judah during the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian periods.

    In addition, the non-Levantine ancestry of a Polish or Irish Jew is rarely more than a couple percentage points Northern European, it is usually close to 50% Southern European (so unlikely to be from ethnically Polish or Irish people). This is not surprising because uniparental markers indicate that all European Jews are descended from a very small number of individuals. The male lineages are for the most part identical to the male lineages of other Jewish diaspora groups. This can be traced accurately because the Y-chromosome is passed down from father to son usually unchanged. The occasional mutation is rare enough that giant family trees can be constructed going back thousands of years. The same is true for mitochondrial DNA passed from mother to child usually unchanged. So we know for example, that 60% of Ashkenazi Jews are the direct maternal descendants of just four women. We know that the majority of all Jewish Kohenim males in almost all diaspora groups descend from just a few men who lived about 3,000 years ago.

    Counter to your unsupported assertion earlier that a Polish and Irish Jew have nothing in common except being white, they in fact have so much in common that they are at least as similar to each other as an Irish person is to his/her Irish fourth cousin and at least similar to each other as a Polish person is to his/her fourth cousin. This is because only about 350 individuals have contributed to the Ashkenazi gene pool. When Ashkenazi Jews get their DNA tested by commercial testing companies, these companies literally identify every other Ashkenazi Jew in their database as a close relative. This is because such systems are calibrated for typical customers rather than those from traditionally endogamous enthoreligious groups.


    Runner-ups this week are Lord Oda Nobunaga and Dick Cheney. See you next time!

    Lord Oda Nobunaga
    What if D day had failed
    Quote Originally Posted by Cyclops View Post
    Fair enough and my perception of Rundstedt is very likely coloured by his first two campaigns. Not sure about him "following a script" though, the so called Manstein plan was prepared on Runstedt's orders as a reaction to Fall Gelb. of course everyone claimed responsibility for the plan after it had succeeded and I accept the argument that German tactical capability plus French morale problems may have meant the original plan (if it had ot fallen into WAllied hands) might have worked too.
    Rundstedt approved of Mansteins suggestions. But the actual war plan was largely put together on OKW's initiative and by the OKH and its officers as the workers. Largely the decision to carry out an Ardennes attack and to draw the plans which are based on Manstein's suggestions was due to a series of war games which were organized. The German team won by a landslide and then every officer supported it. But the final plan was based on the Manstein Plan. I guess this speaks favorably of Rundstedt for recognizing that the original plans were insufficient. Rundstedt's real credit goes towards carrying out the final plan but it is worth considering that when the operations were actually carried out, French deployments prevented the Allies from actually doing anything about it.

    Quote Originally Posted by Cyclops View Post
    I do think Runstedt's classic Prussian (OK he was a Saxon by Prussian style) leadership allowed the feisty subordinates in Guderian Rommel etc to burst through and, disobeying orders, exploit around the rear of the WAllied forces.

    I am assuming you are referring to the events after Sedan had already fallen? If I recall Rundstedt actually ordered all Panzer units to halt (and this is also around the events of Dunkirk). The plan was to take Sedan and move up the rivers towards the coast. I don't think Rundstedt was in support of their later actions, which were insubordinate. Rommel and Guderian are often glorified in the historiography but in my opinion it can be debated how necessary their independent actions really were.

    Quote Originally Posted by Cyclops View Post
    In 1941 Rundstedt methodically tackled the enormous cmcetration of Soviet forces in Ukraine, driving them back and setting them up for the horrifying kesselschlact at Kiev ( albeit aided by Guderians fateful wheel to the right. Yes Stalins orders crippled the Soviets but it was Hitler's orders that drove the Werhmacht beyond sensible and fensible positions for the crippling Winter counterattack. I thought Runstedt's Barabarossa campaign was textbook and thorough, which annoyed Hitler who was expecting unrealistic results.

    [edit] Just a comment about my PoV, I've tried a few table top games (Columbia, TK and TK2, bunch of others) so i definitely have a western bias. The Eastern Front is a nightmare to represent and to conduct. My particular perception is the narrow front south of the Pripyet marshes where Rundstedt faced the largest concentration of armoured and mechanised forces in the world in 1941 is a very tough nut to crack. Yes Stalin's stupid "no aggro" orders mean there's a rapid push back in the first month but it develops into relatively open country with a terrible supply net for the Germans and a great supply net (into the huge hub at Kiev) for the Soviets. The advances into Ukraine may not have occurred at the same pace as the northern blitz but it faced more opposition in greater depth.
    ah, If you mean operationally then sure. Rundstedt did well enough at Kiev but in large part the success was due to orders issued from above. At the time Rundstedt was asking for immediate reinforcements and support. Something which Hitler was willing to do, but which went against the desires of people like Guderian, von Bock etc. Yet later Rundstedt seems to have joined the "attack Moscow" clique. In his memoires he also claims to have supported and strongly urged an attack on Moscow. His later performance on the Don was by no means exceptional. Was he correct about not being able to take Rostov? Yeah maybe. But I think above all his removal was actually about Hitler's desire to remove the more traditional Wehrmacht "Prussians" after the debacle of Operation Typhoon. Despite Rundstedt's nay saying the campaign in the Don was necessary and this is demonstrated by Stalin's fervent defense of the region simultaneous to Typhoon.

    Minor side note but I always found it interesting that Rundstedt was given command of the main attack in 1939 and 1940 but in 1941 he was given the secondary Army Group South and von Bock was given the main thrust instead of playing support.



    Dick Cheney
    How important was Thermopylae?
    For starters, no Thermopylae did not change the world, the Greeks did not win, freedom and democracy were not preserved, and the Persian invasion was not significantly halted. In truth, Athens still burned and the Spartans did not die alone.

    Now that these popular myths are out of the way, how important was Thermopylae?



    Militarily, Thermopylae was a well-planned battle that maximized the advantages of holding narrow terrain. A narrow pass meant that Xerxes could not deploy his entire army around the Greek phalanx. Thermopylae’s location also helped force the naval battle at Artemisium, which for obvious reasons, threaten the resupply and longevity of Xerxes army in the field if successful.

    In short, Thermopylae did make sense as a holding action if the intent was to win the navy battle at Artemisium. As a delaying action, general engagement, or even a last stand (as popular histories go) not so much. In fact, given the performance of the Phocians at guarding the pass around Thermopylae, the battle could even be described as a blunder. No one should have been surprised -least of all Leonidas- that the Persians would try to find a way around Thermopylae after having failed with frontal assaults. Not appointing quality sentries to guard such a critical juncture then is hard to excuse.

    Having said that, Thermopylae arguably did provide some shock value. The greatest land army ever seen -in the presence of Xerxes himself- was stopped for three days. However, its not clear exactly -as its been argued intelligently on these forums before- how many Persians died at Thermopylae (only Herodotus says 20,000). No matter the blow to Persian morale (or loss of troops), it was not enough to dent the Persian advance, and probably still not as significant as the death of a spartan king or the sack of Athens.

    In short conclusion, I’d argue Thermopylae was mostly insignificant. The entire war was still left to be determined. And more than decisiveness, the battle of Thermopylae should be defined more by mistakes and opportunities lost then any kind of earth-shattering turning point for either side.

    Go tell the Spartans, oh stranger passing by, that Thermopylae, more or less, was something just to pass by.
    Last edited by Love Mountain; December 15, 2019 at 05:19 PM.

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