No, Unternehmen Zitadelle was not a German mistake, and no, it definitely wasn't Hitler's fault.
The battle of Kursk is weird, mostly because the generals on both sides got to write the history and no one thought about challenging them for decades. But now that has largely happened, and most facts are on the table. Both sides misrepresented the battle a lot. I'll give you a run-down through my 11 reasons why in my opinion the often heard claim that "Unternehmen Zitadelle" was a mistake, does not hold up.
1: Arguing as general hindsight is vapid – you either build you case based on the situation as it was known to the parties involved, or you’re simply building a castle in the sky.
Instead of saying: HAHAH! They lost, so it DEFINITELY was a mistake, you need to assess the risks and compare them to the possible profit.
Example: The Sichelschnitt in the battle of France.
Risk: Allied planes spotting and then bombing the German attack through the Ardennes. If they do, we’re screwed.
Profit: If they don’t, we’ll conquer France.
Was the German Sichelschnitt in 1941 a mistake? If it had failed, every armchair general and historian today would say yes.
In "Unternehmen Zitadelle", the German losses were moderate (more on that later) and their goals mostly defensive. The goals were failed, but a K/D ratio of roughly 7:1 was much more favourable to the Germans than at other encounters at this stage of the war.
The third Reich arguably had far less to lose at this stage of the war than they did in France, and the risks were probably less. So how can Zitadelle then be a mistake?
2: A failure/defeat doesn’t automatically mean it was a mistake. It only becomes one if you can prove there was a viable alternative to the action taken. What alternative was there to Unternehmen Zitadelle?
The ones known to me:
A) A frontal attack on the salient, rather than on the flanks. Apparently some German generals thought that to be a better idea. I honestly don't.
B) Hitler was generally in favour of smaller offensives. With the thorn in their side that was the Kursk salient, Germany didn't really have the ability to do so. Nor was there any other objective on the eastern front at that point that could be seen as more important. With a fortress such as the Kursk salient, small offensives were pointless. They had to either go big or go home.
Hitler understood that.
C) "Defense" - whatever that's supposed to mean. Mostly argued for in modern times without really explaining how. There are several principles and circumstances, however, that make that impossible. Just as importantly this argument is directly contradicted by the fact that the Unternehmen Zitadelle, though a large offensive, had almost exclusively defensive goals. It was an extension of manoeuvre defense.
3: You cannot simply redefine the ultimate objective – If the task of person X was to build a bridge, but he didn’t have enough bricks to do so, calling it a mistake that he didn’t build a house with them is simply false, since building that house wasn't what wanted to do.
In this case, the goal of the German commanders wasn’t to just delay the Untergang of the Third Reich, it was to WIN the war. When this is considered, the cost benefit analysis changes immediately in favour of Zitadelle NOT having been a mistake. Even though a success of Unternehmen Zitadelle was unlikely, that small chance of success was still better than no chance of success.
4: A passive strategy does not win the war - especially not when the German war economy is compared to the Allied one, and the strategic situation for the axis becoming direr by the day.
The Germans KNEW that another front in Italy, especially the landing in Sicily, and an invasion of France were forthcoming. Sicily played a major role regarding the German considerations for Unternehmen Zitadelle BUT it was not the reason why further German offensives in the battle of Kursk were called off. By that time, other forces had already been allocated to that theatre, so the troops at Kursk weren't needed for that, and weren't redeployed there. - More on that later.
5: Defense doesn’t mean the defender has it easier. The maxim “the best defense is a good offense” is a viable and time tested one long before WWII. In manoeuvre warfare however, that principle goes doubly. When dealing with a salient, it goes quadruply.
The Soviet salient at Kursk gave them an excellent staging point for future offensives. The Soviets had the advantage of inner lines. German units, if on the defensive, would’ve had farther distances separating them and thus a much harder time supporting each other than they did attacking.
The very lopsided battle at Prokhorovka (only 5 total German tank losses vs. hundreds on the Soviet side) happened due to the Germans FORCING battle where it suited them. The battle was strictly speaking an offensive action taken by the Soviets against waiting Germans, and without question a big mistake on the Soviet part. But it was undertaken because the Soviets felt pressured to do so. The same fact applies to the battle of Kursk as a whole for the German side. The Soviets knew the Germans would feel pressed to attack them there - Hence the very significant, and impressive efforts undertaken by them to fortify the salient. They forced the battle of Kursk as a whole and got the Germans to attack. The Germans on the other hand forced the battle of Prokhorovka in a similar fashion, though it seemed to have come as a surprise.
The k/D ratio of roughly 40:1 was simply impossible under any other circumstances.
6: It was NOT HITLER who wanted the offensive, but most German Generals, especially Manstein and Model. Have you heard their names before?
Oh right: Those are the German generals who were generally held to be the experts at maneuver defense!
So it is already quite ironic that the very people you’d want to lead the defense actually favoured an attack in this situation! But the claim “they should’ve done maneuver defense instead of the offensive” is downright disproven once you consider their motivations and their approach.
Manstein wanted Zitadelle under all circumstances – even at the price of sacrificing the strategically vital Donbass to the Soviets. It was his brainchild and his main complaints would be that it wasn’t launched earlier, and that he wasn’t allowed to finish it. However, you should take his claims of a “lost victory” with more than just one grain of salt - and he would later change his story to the total opposite. He and Guderian would after the war claim to have opposed the plan.
Guderians opposition is afaik doubtable (he lies frequently in his memoirs too) but possible – Manstein on the other hand has been proven to be a complete liar in this (and many other) regard - and is contradicted amongst others by his own war diary that he didn't intend to publicise to the masses.
Model on the other hand hoped for an offensive by the Soviet forces, so that he would be able to counterattack “aus der Nachhand”. I.e. have the offensive start as maneuver defense – the Soviets, however, wanted to do the same thing and quite content to wait the Germans out. Model thus came to realise they would have to attack first.
Unternehmen Zitadelle was essentially a continuation of maneuver defense.
ALL GOALS were essentially defensive, and aimed at reducing the front, destroying those Soviet forces that would otherwise attack later, and free German troops for other operations.
7: The long run-up had the German generals grow more and more cautious/pessimistic regarding the prospects of the offensive, as the Soviet build-up in the area continued. Manstein would claim they could’ve easily defeated it in March. This is highly unlikely, given they would’ve more likely drowned in a sea of mud.
The claim that Hitler wanted the Germans to wait for Tigers and Panthers is mostly, if not completely false.
The delay was mostly due to other reasons. Only the last few weeks of that delay could potentially be attributed to that. Whether or not attacking those few days earlier would’ve made the German attack more successful or less is debatable. On one hand, they encountered stronger defences and the new tanks were prone to frequent breakdowns and Marders & Panzer IV's were doing the same job just as well at Prokhorovka, but the newer tanks were technically superior in the tactical encounters, and the Soviet defensive lines were pretty much already set by this point. It wasn’t so much Guderian pointing at the technical superiority of the new tanks that settled the argument in favour of a delay, but Model stating his troops weren’t ready yet.
But in spite of their growing scepticism, NONE of the generals who’d been for it in the beginning wanted to my knowledge abandon the plan; nor did Hitler, even though he was likely the one who was the most freaked out:
To summarise that point: Model and Manstein stayed fast and wanted the offensive – even though they knew there would be problems. Hitler knew there would be problems, and saw no other options other than small scale offensives. Which, given the strong Russian defences, were even less viable. The axis had to either go big or go home.Originally Posted by Hitler according to Heinz Guderian in his memoirs
Many other German generals, such as Kurt Zeitzler (chief of the army general staff) and Günther von Kluge (commander of the army group centre) were also firmly in favour of it.
Then we have Hitler, who, according to Guderian was unsure:
Guderian’s claims also have to be taken with a grain of salt, but mostly when his own role and Zeitzler’s are concerned (the two were rivals). He had, however, no particular reason to defend Hitler, and he stayed consistent in that regard.
Even if we believe Guderian to have been against the offensive (though he was the one to offer the Tigers and Panthers), he’s remarkably silent when it comes to offering an alternative.
The alternative Hitler considered according to Guderian and others was a frontal assault on the salient, rather than one against the flanks. That attack would’ve been easier, but I personally can understand why they favoured flanking attacks. The frontal attack is honestly rather pointless and would've had a wide range of further problems.
But most German generals had a lot of time to think about it, were well aware of the Soviet build-up of forces, and yet remained in favour of the offensive.
8: Those assuming a German defensive approach would have been more likely to succeed, fail to consider many factors. The initiative would’ve been with the Soviets, the Germans would’ve had a much harder time to concentrate their forces for the counterattack necessary in manoeuvre defence, as once again, the Germans would’ve had the outer lines, not the inner lines, and the Soviets would at least initially forced battle on their terms. This is why the Germans were so obsessed with regaining the initiative in the first place.
But even more damning is the fact that the defensive approach had already been tried. Model hoped for a Soviet attack, so that he could counter attack. The Soviets simply waited them out. Time was clearly running in their favour. They were still capable of attacking elsewhere, whereas the Germans were not. And any attack elsewhere could only be repelled by weakening those very forced that were in that sector.
It is extremely unlikely that the Soviets would’ve simply run out of patience and attacked exactly there. Instead, they would’ve done, what they had done to great success many times both before, during and after Kursk. Attacking elsewhere, and force the Germans to withdraw forces from that sector to others. The most likely attack would’ve been the one that ended Unternehmen Zitadelle: No, not the allied landings on sicily – no German troops from the battle of Kursk were relocated there. The Donez-Mius offensive. The Germans were forced to stop their offensive at the Kursk salient to beat the Soviets back. Meanwhile, the Soviets started their counter offensives Kutuzov and Rumyantsev, and the salient was effectively no more. When the Germans redeployed once again to counter those, the Soviets used that opportunity to conquer the Donbass one final time.
9: The German offensive cannot be called a total failure.
Don’t get me wrong: The often heard claim, also started by German generals, that their victory was imminent, is false. Some generals claimed so due to wanting to again, portray themselves as the smart ones and blame everything on Hitler. Others simply weren’t that well informed. One German general thought he’d achieved a total breakthrough, when in actuality, he had only broken through the first two lines.
I also don’t think a German victory was ever realistic. A continued offensive could have possibly led to a defeat (speculation), and would definitely have come at the cost of the Donbass (which was lost regardless, but a few weeks later).
Still: The Soviet losses were very high, compared to the Germans. And whilst yes, they were much more able to absorb those losses, the overall K/D ratio of roughly 7:1 was far above the average that could be expected against an enemy who by now had become battle-hardened. The German claims (once again by Manstein) regarding the third battle of Kharkov were a complete lie.
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
The victories that had happened earlier in the war, were simply no longer achievable, even though the Soviets were still doing some mistakes. Nor would the Soviets have become weaker if they had waited.
So I would argue the Unternehmen Zitadelle to have had a rather “good” outcome, when the circumstances are considered.
They would not have been able to fight the battle under equally favourable circumstances, had the attacks been carried out by the Soviets, at a location and time of their choosing.
In defensive battles such as that of the Seelower Höhen or Hürtgen forest, Germany was unable to get a better K/D-ratio than 3:1. And whilst the German army was very much weakened at this point, they also had no comparable natural obstacles in the southern and central area, apart from the river Dniepr much further west, which would've meant giving up on a lot of industrially vital territory that'd strengthen the Soviet Union significantly whilst no longer benefitting the Germans.
10: The battle of Kursk is in so far even a bit bizarre, in that even some German generals, such as Guderian and Mellenthin depict them as having been worse than they were (Roman Töppel, in his book “Kursk 1943: Die größte Schlacht des Zweiten Weltkriegs” goes through many reasons why their claims are simply false). But the Germans weren’t bled dry by the battle, even though so many made that claim. What makes Kursk so weird in a historiographical context, is that it’s history was for decades written by those responsible for it on both sides. And it took some decades on both sides before people thought about verifying their claims.
11: Finally: It is of course speculative when thinking about what would've happened, if the Germans hadn't attacked. But not even that speculative.
I think the only real alternative to an attack would have been a large scale withdrawal to the Dniepr river. This would have come at the cost of losing what were arguably the richest lands in the Soviet Union: Kharkov and the Donbass. This is what happened historically, and I see no way that the Germans could have prevented it. Every time the Germans reallocated their reserves to counter a Soviet offensive, the Soviet would simply use that to launch another offensive elsewhere. The Soviets were masters at that, and the most famous example of that is likely operation Bagration. To expect a different course on the other hand is a bit far fetched imo. If you see it differently, tell me how and why.
TL;DR: The Germans were doomed either way, they fared much better in their offensive than is often believed, they were much worse at defense than people often believe, and the attack was their way of trying to defend.
Ergo: No, Unternehmen Zitadelle was not a mistake.
There were a whole range of myths surrounding Kursk that I thought about adressing (many lies by those responsible on both sides, who inexplicably weren't challenged at all even though archives on both sides disprove them), but that would be too much.
Once again I'd recommend Roman Töppel, who has focused a lot on this specific battle.
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