POTF 13 - Nominations

[Flinn]

POTF is about recognising the very best posts, the best arguments and discourse in the D&D, and appropriately rewarding it.
You shall progressively earn these medals once you achieve enough wins, but first you must be nominated in threads such as this one. And it works like this.

Post of the Fortnight - Rules

-Each user can nominate up to 2 posts per round, and the only valid form of nomination is by quoting with a link as shown below the chosen post in the PotF thread designated for it.

Looking forward to getting this kicked off for real!

-Each 15 days there will be a new Nomination thread put up, and all the posts written during this period are considered eligible, if properly nominated. Exception are posts who are somewhat breaking the ToS; upon being acted by Moderation, they are always considered uneligible.

- Remember: It is possible to nominate up to 2 posts each round of the competition; it is also possible to change a nomination anytime before the actual round of nominations ends.

- There will be two competitions held every month, with a period for nominations followed by a period of voting. The submitted posts can be discussed in a dedicated space.

- Only posts that have not participated in a previous poll and that have been published in the current period of given time in any section of the D&D area may be nominated.

- The authors of the nominated post will be informed so they can withdraw the candidacy if that is their wish.

- The maximum number of participating posts in the final vote will be ten. If more than ten nominations are submitted, seconded nominations will take priority. After seconded nominations are considered, earliest nominations will take priority. If the number of posts submitted to the contest is less than ten, the organizing committee may nominate posts if it considers it appropriate.

-The members of the committee will never nominate a post belonging to one of them, but the rest of the users can nominate their posts (organizers posts), and vice versa.

-In the event of a tie, both posts will be awarded and both posters will receive rep and 1 competition point.

- Public or private messages asking for a vote for a candidate post are forbidden. Violators (and their posts) may not participate in the running contest.

- People are expected to consider the quality and structure of the post itself, more than the content of the same. While it's certainly impossible to completely split the two aspects when making our own opinion on a post, it remains intended, as also explained in the Competition Commentary Thread, that commenting and discussing on the content rather than on the form/structure of the post is considered off-topic for the purpose of this competition. You are free to nominate and vote for whatever reason you want, but what happens in public has to strictly follow up with the competition rules.

A nominated post should:

1. Be focused and relevant to the topic(s) being discussed.
2. Demonstrate a well-developed, insightful and nuanced understanding of the topic(s) it is discussing.
3. Be logically coherent, well organized and communicate its points effectively.
4. Support its contentions with verifiable evidence, either in the form of links or references.
5. Not be deliberately vexatious to other users.

Good luck everyone!

[Flinn]

Plus the officers and generals defending Normandy were some of the biggest stooges in Germany. Everything that they could have done wrong they ended up doing. For instance the day of they completely let down their guard, presumably because OKW had warned them weeks prior and no invasion materialized.

The guys in France really were the B-Team (if not the C-Team), yes Rommel and Rundstedt included. But would A-Listers like Model or Kesselring do any better? At the time Model was busy attempting to contain Soviet attacks in Ukraine, Kesselring was tied down in Italy. After Rundstedt was replaced by the excellent defender, Gunther von Kluge, he was not able to hold on either. ....

I agree with the gist of your post but I'd like to quibble about A and B team membership. Rommel gave sound advice on the situation in the West in 1943-1944, predicted the landing sites and was prevented by hard headed superiors from what he saw as a better deployment (as discussed it probably wouldn't have won the day but might have played better than IRL).

Rundstedt squabbled with Rommel over tactical posture but his score is on the board: his Army Groups were the ones that performed the most staggering advances and Kesselschlachts in all history, and to state baldly he was B or C grade does not reflect his actual conduct. In Poland he struck important blows, in France he carried out the critical penetration and encirclement, and ditto in Barbarossa where his forces annihilated the bulk of the Soviet forces opposing the German invasion in Ukraine.

Rundstedt was arguably "past it" but conditions in France in 1944 were not those of 1939-1941, with oppressive oversight and an unbalanced playing field crippling every Nazi general's efforts. Kesselring's brilliance is proven by his ability to operate effectively in this environment (not to mention his superb command of combined arms), but I believe Rundestedt and Guderian are in the same rank, and Rommel in the group immediately below in terms of effective leadership (with Manstein, he may have been a self promoter but could get the job done in mobile field operations). Rundstedt was sacked twice for speaking his mind, not for speaking nonsense.

I just don't think there is a good pivot point in 1944. The Allies were all in and doing things better. A less successful D-day (again I can't see a fail) just means Stalin gets to occupy more of Europe.

That sees to be the consensus. I think the pivot for Germany is 1933, when they go full Adolph. Never go full Adolph.

I mean realistically With FDR in office and committed to a hard line on Japan and supporting the UK and than the USSR even with a war, and with Churchill and committed to the fight and Stalin faced with a nature of what Germany was going to impose... I don't see see too many the good turning points.
D-day certainly not.

FDR gave very clear and courageous focus to US efforts. If he died there's a chance US intervention could have been less focused, allowing for more atrocities and Soviet gains in Europe, maybe a Japan-first doctrine etc. but as you say these are quibbles about dates, not outcomes.

In fact I don't think you can find a Axis victory without handwavium and unobtainium and space bats. I think there times when they could have not lost, but ideology and leadership of Japan and Germany kinda precluded that kind of thinking.

The old conundrum, if Germany is smart enough to win WWII, hey are too smart to start it. The unobtamnium I see is either he Army seizing power in 1933, or a stronger centrist candidate conducting his own night of the long knives and rounding up the villainous Nazi scum (as well as treacherous Communists) in 1930.

In these scenarios 'kinder, gentler" German Republic, "deeply worried about European civilisation in the face of the threat from the East" could fabricate border wars with the Poles (whose military leadership were spoiling for fights at all points of the compass) and set up the Capitalist crusade that was every Soviet leader's nightmare. Short wars with limited objectives establishing friendly regimes in former Tsarist provinces would be Stalin's salami tactics played against him. The Germans could throw bones to the British in central Asia, maybe Japan in the Far east (bad for China, but lss chance of a military coups as the constitutional government has wins in the board). Obviously France is ofside and the US will fume at Japanese gains, bu they'd stop short of helping the Reds surely.

Still horrible, and the Soviet people get it in the neck as in real life. The crap ending to WWI ensured at least one more dirty war, can't see the mid 20th century not drenched in blood without tons of space bats.

Not invading Russia and just preparing for a defensive war with Stalin. Could have been a turning point but Hitler would have been forced to ask total war sacrifice from his population (not something he wanted to do) and probably deal more equitably with his is empire as soon as the UK refused to bail. Otherwise just the UK opting out after the fall of France (or France fighting on but that is a Germany looses faster).

The UK was unassailable, so much so they appointed and alcoholic warmonger as PM as a FU to Hitler. France collapsing was a savage surprise and extended the war by at least three years: Hitler's head was on the block the moment the WAllies showed some backbone. Forget the bomb plot, his Field Marshals would have lined up to shot him if Fall Gelb became WWI.

D Day was won in December 1941.

[Abdülmecid I]

Fair enough and my perception of Rundstedt is very likely coloured by his first two campaigns. Not sure about him "following a script" though, the so called Manstein plan was prepared on Runstedt's orders as a reaction to Fall Gelb. of course everyone claimed responsibility for the plan after it had succeeded and I accept the argument that German tactical capability plus French morale problems may have meant the original plan (if it had ot fallen into WAllied hands) might have worked too.

Rundstedt approved of Mansteins suggestions. But the actual war plan was largely put together on OKW's initiative and by the OKH and its officers as the workers. Largely the decision to carry out an Ardennes attack and to draw the plans which are based on Manstein's suggestions was due to a series of war games which were organized. The German team won by a landslide and then every officer supported it. But the final plan was based on the Manstein Plan. I guess this speaks favorably of Rundstedt for recognizing that the original plans were insufficient. Rundstedt's real credit goes towards carrying out the final plan but it is worth considering that when the operations were actually carried out, French deployments prevented the Allies from actually doing anything about it.

I do think Runstedt's classic Prussian (OK he was a Saxon by Prussian style) leadership allowed the feisty subordinates in Guderian Rommel etc to burst through and, disobeying orders, exploit around the rear of the WAllied forces.

I am assuming you are referring to the events after Sedan had already fallen? If I recall Rundstedt actually ordered all Panzer units to halt (and this is also around the events of Dunkirk). The plan was to take Sedan and move up the rivers towards the coast. I don't think Rundstedt was in support of their later actions, which were insubordinate. Rommel and Guderian are often glorified in the historiography but in my opinion it can be debated how necessary their independent actions really were.

In 1941 Rundstedt methodically tackled the enormous concentration of Soviet forces in Ukraine, driving them back and setting them up for the horrifying kesselschlact at Kiev ( albeit aided by Guderians fateful wheel to the right. Yes Stalins orders crippled the Soviets but it was Hitler's orders that drove the Werhmacht beyond sensible and fensible positions for the crippling Winter counterattack. I thought Runstedt's Barabarossa campaign was textbook and thorough, which annoyed Hitler who was expecting unrealistic results.

[edit] Just a comment about my PoV, I've tried a few table top games (Columbia, TK and TK2, bunch of others) so i definitely have a western bias. The Eastern Front is a nightmare to represent and to conduct. My particular perception is the narrow front south of the Pripyet marshes where Rundstedt faced the largest concentration of armoured and mechanised forces in the world in 1941 is a very tough nut to crack. Yes Stalin's stupid "no aggro" orders mean there's a rapid push back in the first month but it develops into relatively open country with a terrible supply net for the Germans and a great supply net (into the huge hub at Kiev) for the Soviets. The advances into Ukraine may not have occurred at the same pace as the northern blitz but it faced more opposition in greater depth.

ah, If you mean operationally then sure. Rundstedt did well enough at Kiev but in large part the success was due to orders issued from above. At the time Rundstedt was asking for immediate reinforcements and support. Something which Hitler was willing to do, but which went against the desires of people like Guderian, von Bock etc. Yet later Rundstedt seems to have joined the "attack Moscow" clique. In his memoires he also claims to have supported and strongly urged an attack on Moscow. His later performance on the Don was by no means exceptional. Was he correct about not being able to take Rostov? Yeah maybe. But I think above all his removal was actually about Hitler's desire to remove the more traditional Wehrmacht "Prussians" after the debacle of Operation Typhoon. Despite Rundstedt's nay saying the campaign in the Don was necessary and this is demonstrated by Stalin's fervent defense of the region simultaneous to Typhoon.

Minor side note but I always found it interesting that Rundstedt was given command of the main attack in 1939 and 1940 but in 1941 he was given the secondary Army Group South and von Bock was given the main thrust instead of playing support.

You cannot measure "jewish DNA". What that even means? Can you expain it to me? I understand white DNA or black DNA but Jewish DNA? I guess you promote the idea that Jews are gods chosen people and this is proved by their DNA? Sorry i am dumb and i dont get it

What can be measured is common ancestry back to a relatively small population of individuals who lived in the Levant during the Iron Age. This ancestry constitutes about 50% of the genome of the average Polish or Irish Jew (to use your example). Whereas the average ethnically Polish or Irish person doesn't have any of this ancestry. Although it's not uncommon for a Polish or Irish person to have a very small percentage of this ancestry, say 1 or 2%, indicating they have some Jewish ancestors within the last several hundred years who presumably converted to Christianity. Most Jewish diaspora populations have about 50% ancestry from the original Levantine Jewish population, although it's higher in Iraqi Jews. This is because most diaspora populations were founded mostly by Jewish males and local women, whereas the Iraqi Jewish population was established by forcibly relocated populations from Israel and Judah during the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian periods.

In addition, the non-Levantine ancestry of a Polish or Irish Jew is rarely more than a couple percentage points Northern European, it is usually close to 50% Southern European (so unlikely to be from ethnically Polish or Irish people). This is not surprising because uniparental markers indicate that all European Jews are descended from a very small number of individuals. The male lineages are for the most part identical to the male lineages of other Jewish diaspora groups. This can be traced accurately because the Y-chromosome is passed down from father to son usually unchanged. The occasional mutation is rare enough that giant family trees can be constructed going back thousands of years. The same is true for mitochondrial DNA passed from mother to child usually unchanged. So we know for example, that 60% of Ashkenazi Jews are the direct maternal descendants of just four women. We know that the majority of all Jewish Kohenim males in almost all diaspora groups descend from just a few men who lived about 3,000 years ago.

Counter to your unsupported assertion earlier that a Polish and Irish Jew have nothing in common except being white, they in fact have so much in common that they are at least as similar to each other as an Irish person is to his/her Irish fourth cousin and at least similar to each other as a Polish person is to his/her fourth cousin. This is because only about 350 individuals have contributed to the Ashkenazi gene pool. When Ashkenazi Jews get their DNA tested by commercial testing companies, these companies literally identify every other Ashkenazi Jew in their database as a close relative. This is because such systems are calibrated for typical customers rather than those from traditionally endogamous enthoreligious groups.

[makanyane]

For starters, no Thermopylae did not change the world, the Greeks did not win, freedom and democracy were not preserved, and the Persian invasion was not significantly halted. In truth, Athens still burned and the Spartans did not die alone.

Now that these popular myths are out of the way, how important was Thermopylae?



Militarily, Thermopylae was a well-planned battle that maximized the advantages of holding narrow terrain. A narrow pass meant that Xerxes could not deploy his entire army around the Greek phalanx. Thermopylae’s location also helped force the naval battle at Artemisium, which for obvious reasons, threaten the resupply of Xerxes army in the field if successful.

In short, Thermopylae did make sense as a holding action if the intent was to win the navy battle at Artemisium. As a delaying action, general engagement, or even a last stand (as popular histories go) not so much. In fact, given the performance of the Phocians at guarding the pass around Thermopylae, the battle could even be described as a blunder. No one should have been surprised -least of all Leonidas- that the Persians would try to find a way around Thermopylae after having failed with frontal assaults. Not appointing quality sentries to guard such a critical juncture then is hard to excuse.

Having said that, Thermopylae arguably did provide some shock value. The greatest land army ever seen -in the presence of Xerxes himself- was stopped for three days. However, its not clear exactly -as its been argued intelligently on these forums before- how many Persians died at Thermopylae (only Herodotus says 20,000). No matter the blow to Persian morale (or loss of troops), it was not enough to dent the Persian advance, and probably still not as significant as the death of a spartan king or the sack of Athens.

In short conclusion, I’d argue Thermopylae was mostly insignificant. The entire war was still left to be determined. And more than decisiveness, the battle of Thermopylae should be defined more by mistakes and opportunities lost then any kind of heroic earth-shattering turning point for either side.

Go tell the Spartans, oh stranger passing by, that Thermopylae, more or less, was something just to pass by.