What if D day had failed

[Cyclops]

I'll have a shot at winning D Day for the Germans without stripping the Eastern Front. Its not easy as the materiel disadvantage is staggering. So is the intel situation. So is the tech disparity. So is the strategic imbalance.

1. The weatherman poos his pants. D Day is delayed until the 18th and get trashed in the storm that historically sank one of the mulberries on the 20th. Either the invasion is called off for another month (and becomes far more predictable and easy to defend against) or worse, the first wave gets ashore and then the supply line gets cut. Fifty to a hundred thousand men, including the bulk of Commonwealth elites, get massacred and the whole show has to be reset, probably to a new location.

2. Hitler is killed/disabled/stops micromanaging OKW's operations. Rommel gets his tanks forward and with the skies a mess he ploughs panzers into the beachheads. Combined with the above, he can hit a second attempt on the nose and maybe stop it for the rest of 1944.

3. The Me262's work as Hitler intended? We're getting space bats here, but some supersonic tactical bombers (yes they had shocking safety, poor reliability, probably wouldn't have worked as bombers and were suppressed by CAPs because the Allied airforces bodied the Nazis in 1944, but what if) might have taken down elements of the allied fleet which made the invasion so devastating. The US forces were almost entirely green and the allies were a bit slow (Monty wasn't a coward but he was methodical and impressed by German capabilities) and IIRC we've had sources posted on this site about how the Germans feared the savage and accurate naval bombardment all through the long summer days. Alternately they could savage the troop ships (before deployment onto the landing craft, bit hard to pick off penny packets) and shatter the incoming waves before they hit the beaches. IIRC that was Hitler's hare-brained intention.

This last one is silly of course as the Nazi's best bet is if the skies are of limits due to weather.

The ANVIL landings in the South of France were a backup to secure a major port (Marseilles in this case): allied supply lines from D Day to the Rhine were only held together by truly amazing feats of logistics (something the US has done better than any other country since 1861). The garrisons at La Rochelle and Brest held out until 1945, and the Nazis blew the rest of the minor ports (did the allies get some in the Low Countries in late 44? can't remember). The South was thinly protected because of the focus on the Pas de Calais, the obvious invasion site. Staging attacks through the Med was very tricky but the utterly green US forces did it brilliantly with Torch in 1942, so its plausible an effective substantial attack could have come through Provence or Aquitaine.

Basically the US were the logistical kings, and the UK proved just as resourceful and pragmatic inventing PLUTO, Mulberries etc for the occasion. Between them they had the two best navies, and a proven capacity for massive and complex amphib operations from Torch to Husky, as well as lessons learnt from Anzio and Dieppe. The hammer was going to fall and Hitler had too many eggs and not enough armour.

If you've ever gamed this through its easy to get cut up as the allies, but the German winning conditions are things like "delayed the breakout to Brittany to August" or "held Caen until D+20", its never "threw them into the sea". In the event very few D1 objectives were reached: this was not due to incompetence, just SNAFUs and pretty stiff German fighting. I think they did pretty well and things could have gone a lot worse for them. I think the historical outcome was at the low end for the WAllies, if you fought it ten times they'd be in Caen on D+1 or +2 on eight of them.

[conon394]

The Me262's work as Hitler intended?

Did Germany have a bomb sight available to make a fast jet fighter bomber effective? I don't know about the ships in the Atlantic so much of the top of my head, but in the pacific by 1944 ships had stapled on so much AA they just churned out walls of lead, Germany could not afford kamikaze 262s And frankly their pilot training program was already gutted. They never had the luxury of sending men home after X number of missions to do stints in training schools like the US and UK or just be a reserve. I mean my grandfather was tail gunner on B-29 and got his go home papers after being on his second plane that went down (shot down first second mechanical failure) but was routed to be an instructor instead and than recalled for Downfall. A man who never had any regrets about the first bomb - a bit about the second but he was by his own admission not too keen on going back to be the back of the plane. But as he noted optimistically he really pitted the guys who had to cram into the turrets in the ETO and other older planes in the pacific - the reason why he survived two planes going down he always noted.

[Cyclops]

Did Germany have a bomb sight available to make a fast jet fighter bomber effective? I don't know about the ships in the Atlantic so much of the top of my head, but in the pacific by 1944 ships had stapled on so much AA they just churned out walls of lead, Germany could not afford kamikaze 262s And frankly their pilot training program was already gutted....

Yep thx for the extra info, its definite Space Bats for the 262.

Glad you grandad made it home. One of mine was a doctor who cared for internees and the other drove trucks in Central Australia: he had narcolepsy but it didn't matter, if he passed out and drifted off the road in the red centre its flat red dust for about 1000k either side of the McDonnell Ranges, so he usually had a few hours to wake up...

[hellheaven1987]

Again this just seems forced I can't find any good way the Germans could have made D-Day a failure. Its sort of the reason I been sitting for a year on a 3 page post on the Lamian war and the results of an Athenian victory. I can't really narrow it down to just one or two elegant alterations but it would require an amount different that starts to look like cheating. So why bother since the tide of history was too strong in its set direction.

Unless Hitler rained V weapons on Normandy and then in the middle of chaos launch a combined suicide mass assault both on sea and land in same time using submarine and armor...

Which brings the question, why Hitler did not try to use V3 as the central piece of Atlantic Wall?

[conon394]

Yep thx for the extra info, its definite Space Bats for the 262.

Glad you grandad made it home. One of mine was a doctor who cared for internees and the other drove trucks in Central Australia: he had narcolepsy but it didn't matter, if he passed out and drifted off the road in the red centre its flat red dust for about 1000k either side of the McDonnell Ranges, so he usually had a few hours to wake up...

Bummer. Sorry mate.

My other one made it through the Pacific [tough SOB had been in the army for maybe 4 years before the war (Staff Sergeant) got chosen for cave clearing duty never talked about that except once] but the SS executed my wife's grandfather in field hospital a few weeks into the Normandy invasion. More fun though the one who got shot down ended up with some tribe/villagers Burma. They would not move till the season was right to travel. So he spent 6 months with them and had great stories to tell. His time there and in India really did change him in a good way . I always remember that his wife retained the easy prejudices of the day but when she would mouth it out he would be livid and leave the room and go down to his work shop if at home or publicly correct her when about.

[conon394]

Which brings the question, why Hitler did not try to use V3 as the central piece of Atlantic Wall?

Because they could not really produce them and they were fantastical waster of resources as were all the V weapons really(*). The resource wasted could have built I really don't know but a lot Hetzers to up gun the men defending against the attack and they actually reliably worked and could be concealed from the air power of the allies.

Unless Hitler decided to rig them for nerve gas. Which logically he should have because if the Germans were lucky and USSR was stalled for another season The US was going to glass Berlin. The thing is he was stupid he opened the can of total war and the US was planning to take it to 11. His only real chance was do it first.

[Cyclops]

Bummer. Sorry mate.

No it was a happy ending he lived through the war. He would fall asleep at the wheel, run of the road through the desert, wake up minutes (maybe hours) later and steer back to the road. Its bizarre really, because there's spinifex/other flipping hazards but he never even crashed once. In civilian life he inherited a massive fortune, half a million pounds (thirty or forty millions in today's money) and blew the lot gambling and investing (no loss, it was money from a Gombeen man made during the Famine, cursed money), so I guess he was saving his luck for war service.

My other one made it through the Pacific [tough SOB had been in the army for maybe 4 years before the war (Staff Sergeant) got chosen for cave clearing duty never talked about that except once] but the SS executed my wife's grandfather in field hospital a few weeks into the Normandy invasion. More fun though the one who got shot down ended up with some tribe/villagers Burma. They would not move till the season was right to travel. So he spent 6 months with them and had great stories to tell. His time there and in India really did change him in a good way . I always remember that his wife retained the easy prejudices of the day but when she would mouth it out he would be livid and leave the room and go down to his work shop if at home or publicly correct her when about.

The war did funny things to people, and the chance to travel broadens the mind. My father inherited his fathers (the doctor) almost manic egalitarianism (he was politically right, but socially tolerant to the point of supporting gay marriage in the 1970's). My grandmother enjoyed easy casual racism and bigotry toward literally everyone who was not Irish Catholic. She would give anyone charity, but she looked down on almost everyone. She never went 200 miles from her birthplace until she was 50 (she lived in Queensland, think Texas/Alabama/Florida).

On my mother's side the pacifist uncle stayed in the PO for both wars, the martinet missed out on both wars (too young then too old-he busted a gut faking his age, names etc but to no avail) and the bigamist had a great time in France and managed to survive.

None of my family were within ten thousand miles of D day. The Commonwealth was stretched but had more resources, and the US had deliberately kept the factories stocked and the Army relatively small. We could have thrown the switch, given Japan another year of life and ploughed two Overlords in if necessary.

[conon394]

No it was a happy ending he lived through the war. He would fall asleep at the wheel, run of the road through the desert, wake up minutes (maybe hours) later and steer back to the road. Its bizarre really, because there's spinifex/other flipping hazards but he never even crashed once. In civilian life he inherited a massive fortune, half a million pounds (thirty or forty millions in today's money) and blew the lot gambling and investing (no loss, it was money from a Gombeen man made during the Famine, cursed money), so I guess he was saving his luck for war service.



The war did funny things to people, and the chance to travel broadens the mind. My father inherited his fathers (the doctor) almost manic egalitarianism (he was politically right, but socially tolerant to the point of supporting gay marriage in the 1970's). My grandmother enjoyed easy casual racism and bigotry toward literally everyone who was not Irish Catholic. She would give anyone charity, but she looked down on almost everyone. She never went 200 miles from her birthplace until she was 50 (she lived in Queensland, think Texas/Alabama/Florida).

On my mother's side the pacifist uncle stayed in the PO for both wars, the martinet missed out on both wars (too young then too old-he busted a gut faking his age, names etc but to no avail) and the bigamist had a great time in France and managed to survive.

None of my family were within ten thousand miles of D day. The Commonwealth was stretched but had more resources, and the US had deliberately kept the factories stocked and the Army relatively small. We could have thrown the switch, given Japan another year of life and ploughed two Overlords in if necessary.

Last point is spot on. Given the US was not a risk of attack the army could have expanded its fifty division limit and simply more women would have gone to work. And of Japan had no real offensive potential any more and could have been put on the back burner especially after the IJA decided on the absolute epic strategic waste of resources that would never have any impact on the outcome of the war in Ichi-Go. I mean really did they imagine FDR saying oh no China fell I guess we have to negotiate were they hitting the crack pipe a little too much?

On the local thing. Its OT but that has been one of eye openers about having to move to SE Idaho and a failed attempt at running a bar. The number of locals who have never left not just not ever left their state but just the 40-50 mile radius around Blackfoot. Never been to a real major city or even flown on a plane. My neighbor was horrified when my wife mentioned that when we were in London (*) for a couple weeks we had designated times when our High school aged kids could roam around with their transit cards and prepaid cards to explore London or go back and do something that had caught their imagination and we would just all agreed to phone in and meet a X place for lunch or dinner (or failing phone contact go back to the hostel). I mean I know London has its rough patches but growing up in Detroit in the 70s I had hard time worrying about anything more than a pick pocket.

* down side of being married to a USDA scientist is living in rural red state america, up side lots travel points make adding the family to cool destinations (for conferences) she goes to for work affordable.

[Darkhorse]

I think there would be two quite dramatic early consequences.

First, the upsurge in résistant activity (plus SOE/OSS) leads to greater exposure. A post-invasion failure crackdown would severely weaken the various operating cells. Damage from sabotage activities ahead of/during the invasion could be fixed within weeks or months, but rebuilding these cells could take years.

Secondly, I think there would have been a massive change around in Allied high command. Normandy was largely Monty's plan, which was refined and approved by the winder committee. I wouldn't be surprised if most of these senior figures were removed from command or sent to other theatres. Generals such as Dempsey, Bradley, and Patton and would have to be moved up, and perhaps so would O'Connor and Roberts. Alexander, Clark, or even Wavell would likely be recalled (the latter or switched with Slim to see him take on a European command) and you'd see a more prominent role from capable officers such as Horrocks or the Canadian Simonds.

If anybody escapes the switch-around, it would be the Admirals such as Ramsay and Vian. I could see Ramsay replacing Ike, being honest - likely at Churchill's insistence. Another contender would be Mountbatten.

A second invasion would be attempted, likely not for another year. Two likely routes here, a less ambitious and smaller operation in Norway, or an all-out high risk landing in Belgium/Pas de Calais.

[conon394]

I still not liking this AH question. I mean you can roll any number of what if questions about if Alexander dies here or there because he almost did all the time or what if Harold did not catch an arrow at Hastings. But like I said I just can't really walk through the vast number of changes needed to make D-Day fail so it kind of takes the wind out the sails of my speculation. I can see one beach fail but not all of them.

@Darkhorse

Decent call on the command shuffle but like I said I can't see d-day failing with the resources the Germans had and the intelligence situation and the command structure... Sure the Germans might still be past masters and improvised fluid warfare, and the Russians at organizing and hiding a massive artillery assault followed by a mechanized avalanche but the US and UK were simply the best at large scale amphibious operations, they had the practice the experience and bluntly the quality troops and equipment to more or less do one wherever they decided to mass and accept the willingness and ability to accept casualties

[Darkhorse]

Indeed, as you say it is very difficult to see D-Day fail.

The only thing that could really have stopped D-Day was an unpredicted turn in weather conditions. Even then, it would have to be truly atrocious to stop the LCTs with the AVREs and Flails, and the DD Shermans would either be launched closer in (as on Sword) or landed conventionally (as on parts of Juno/Sword). These were the first wave, if they are committed then the infantry has to follow. On Sword, the armour did a pretty good job at suppressing German defences before the infantry arrived, so launching the LCAs closer in would have been an option.

The weather could also have scattered the airborne drop over an even wider area or prevented that from proceeding. Whether D-Day would have proceeded on the back of a failed or cancelled airborne drop is another matter, but as Varsity showed, a daylight drop was workable. Anyway, a less effective airborne drop could have enabled units such as 21st Panzer to launch more effective attacks.

However, by the time the 21st got rolling, there were two partial squadrons of DDs ('A' and 'B' Sqns 13/18th Hussars), and at least two intact squadrons of conventional Shermans ('C' Sqn 13/18th and at least one sqn from the Staffs Yeomanry), not counting the M10s of 20th AT Regt and whatever towed guns were about. That is a fair amount of armour, and that is just on for sword. Even without airborne forces holding choke points such as Pegasus Bridge, its not like German armour could be a silver bullet, they'd have a battle on their hands.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

I guess what OP really should ask is if a German victory at D-Day would cause enough political repercussions to induce the Western Allies into making a separate peace. I have no idea if the Allies would make peace or be forced to by the general populace of Britain and America. The other issue is if it would convince the French to join in on the Axis side. Which is also impossible to say.

As usual with alternate history asking whether the outcome is possible is major part of answering the question. The Germans can't win Normandy. The beauty of landing in Normandy is that Germans have no way to defend. Normandy is a massive stretch with enough flat areas that once the Allies gain momentum they can't stop. So the Germans are overstretched and completely outgunned, can't defend that entire stretch, are lacking in reserves and Panzer Divisions and completely lack air superiority. Now had the Allies landed exclusively in Brittany or Calais they might be plugged and contained. But not in Normandy. Even after the landings already occurred, a seasoned defensive commander like Gunther von Kluge had no way to halt them. He also had nowhere to anchor his position, attempting to defend between both the Loire and Seine rivers. But his entire line was rolled up and it caused a scenario which is literally called "the Void". Only way I can see the Germans holding Normandy is if they were not simultaneously fighting in the East and could bring most if not all 100+ Divisions over to France.

[conon394]

I guess what OP really should ask is if a German victory at D-Day would cause enough political repercussions to induce the Western Allies into making a separate peace. I have no idea if the Allies would make peace or be forced to by the general populace of Britain and America. The other issue is if it would convince the French to join in on the Axis side. Which is also impossible to say.

As usual with alternate history asking whether the outcome is possible is major part of answering the question. The Germans can't win Normandy. The beauty of landing in Normandy is that Germans have no way to defend. Normandy is a massive stretch with enough flat areas that once the Allies gain momentum they can't stop. So the Germans are overstretched and completely outgunned, can't defend that entire stretch, are lacking in reserves and Panzer Divisions and completely lack air superiority. Now had the Allies landed exclusively in Brittany or Calais they might be plugged and contained. But not in Normandy. Even after the landings already occurred, a seasoned defensive commander like Gunther von Kluge had no way to halt them. He also had nowhere to anchor his position, attempting to defend between both the Loire and Seine rivers. But his entire line was rolled up and it caused a scenario which is literally called "the Void". Only way I can see the Germans holding Normandy is if they were not simultaneously fighting in the East and could bring most if not all 100+ Divisions over to France.

Yes essentially outside of some massively bad weather of a century bad scale that went unforcast or/and unabated the Landings were going to work. Now if the allies did pull the plug for weather and tried to beg off another time you might also get some serious repercussions with the USSR. Stalin thinking the US and UK were really just letting him bleed. Stalin already was not believing the US and UK about 43 when they made it clear the logistics were simply not available and could not be rounded by shooting people.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Yes essentially outside of some massively bad weather of a century bad scale that went unforcast or/and unabated the Landings were going to work. Now if the allies did pull the plug for weather and tried to beg off another time you might also get some serious repercussions with the USSR. Stalin thinking the US and UK were really just letting him bleed. Stalin already was not believing the US and UK about 43 when they made it clear the logistics were simply not available and could not be rounded by shooting people.

Plus the officers and generals defending Normandy were some of the biggest stooges in Germany. Everything that they could have done wrong they ended up doing. For instance the day of they completely let down their guard, presumably because OKW had warned them weeks prior and no invasion materialized.

The guys in France really were the B-Team (if not the C-Team), yes Rommel and Rundstedt included. But would A-Listers like Model or Kesselring do any better? At the time Model was busy attempting to contain Soviet attacks in Ukraine, Kesselring was tied down in Italy. After Rundstedt was replaced by the excellent defender, Gunther von Kluge, he was not able to hold on either. I doubt Kluge could have done better if they transferred him to France from the start.

I wonder how things would have played out if Hitler and Stalin agreed to a separate peace in 1943. I would think that Stalin just attacks the Germans from behind if Hitler attempted to redeploy West. If Hitler thwarts an Allied invasion I guess Stalin grabs all of Europe?

What exactly would it take the Allies to just make peace though? Britain could just keep getting goods at this point, the real hardship for Britain came when the war ended and shipments from USA stopped until about 1948. What I'm wondering is do the Allies just make peace or do they blockade and invade again? The Germans can just be starved out, especially since they have to hold all of Europe. Blockading Europe is no issue for the RN and USN combined. Don't know if the Germans could improve their rockets or get a working nuke between say... 1944 and 1950? How exactly would they deal with their resource problem? Even if the Allies make peace Stalin is still sitting on tonnes of resources and I don't know that the Germans could even beat the USSR one on one in 1944.

[conon394]

I just don't think there is a good pivot point in 1944. The Allies were all in and doing things better. A less successful D-day (again I can't see a fail) just means Stalin gets to occupy more of Europe.

I mean realistically With FDR in office and committed to a hard line on Japan and supporting the UK and than the USSR even with a war, and with Churchill and committed to the fight and Stalin faced with a nature of what Germany was going to impose... I don't see see too many the good turning points.

D-day certainly not.

In fact I don't think you can find a Axis victory without handwavium and unobtainium and space bats. I think there times when they could have not lost, but ideology and leadership of Japan and Germany kinda precluded that kind of thinking.

Not invading Russia and just preparing for a defensive war with Stalin. Could have been a turning point but Hitler would have been forced to ask total war sacrifice from his population (not something he wanted to do) and probably deal more equitably with his is empire as soon as the UK refused to bail. Otherwise just the UK opting out after the fall of France (or France fighting on but that is a Germany looses faster).

[Cyclops]

Plus the officers and generals defending Normandy were some of the biggest stooges in Germany. Everything that they could have done wrong they ended up doing. For instance the day of they completely let down their guard, presumably because OKW had warned them weeks prior and no invasion materialized.

The guys in France really were the B-Team (if not the C-Team), yes Rommel and Rundstedt included. But would A-Listers like Model or Kesselring do any better? At the time Model was busy attempting to contain Soviet attacks in Ukraine, Kesselring was tied down in Italy. After Rundstedt was replaced by the excellent defender, Gunther von Kluge, he was not able to hold on either. ....

I agree with the gist of your post but I'd like to quibble about A and B team membership. Rommel gave sound advice on the situation in the West in 1943-1944, predicted the landing sites and was prevented by hard headed superiors from what he saw as a better deployment (as discussed it probably wouldn't have won the day but might have played better than IRL).

Rundstedt squabbled with Rommel over tactical posture but his score is on the board: his Army Groups were the ones that performed the most staggering advances and Kesselschlachts in all history, and to state baldly he was B or C grade does not reflect his actual conduct. In Poland he struck important blows, in France he carried out the critical penetration and encirclement, and ditto in Barbarossa where his forces annihilated the bulk of the Soviet forces opposing the German invasion in Ukraine.

Rundstedt was arguably "past it" but conditions in France in 1944 were not those of 1939-1941, with oppressive oversight and an unbalanced playing field crippling every Nazi general's efforts. Kesselring's brilliance is proven by his ability to operate effectively in this environment (not to mention his superb command of combined arms), but I believe Rundestedt and Guderian are in the same rank, and Rommel in the group immediately below in terms of effective leadership (with Manstein, he may have been a self promoter but could get the job done in mobile field operations). Rundstedt was sacked twice for speaking his mind, not for speaking nonsense.

I just don't think there is a good pivot point in 1944. The Allies were all in and doing things better. A less successful D-day (again I can't see a fail) just means Stalin gets to occupy more of Europe.

That sees to be the consensus. I think the pivot for Germany is 1933, when they go full Adolph. Never go full Adolph.

I mean realistically With FDR in office and committed to a hard line on Japan and supporting the UK and than the USSR even with a war, and with Churchill and committed to the fight and Stalin faced with a nature of what Germany was going to impose... I don't see see too many the good turning points.
D-day certainly not.

FDR gave very clear and courageous focus to US efforts. If he died there's a chance US intervention could have been less focused, allowing for more atrocities and Soviet gains in Europe, maybe a Japan-first doctrine etc. but as you say these are quibbles about dates, not outcomes.

In fact I don't think you can find a Axis victory without handwavium and unobtainium and space bats. I think there times when they could have not lost, but ideology and leadership of Japan and Germany kinda precluded that kind of thinking.

The old conundrum, if Germany is smart enough to win WWII, hey are too smart to start it. The unobtamnium I see is either he Army seizing power in 1933, or a stronger centrist candidate conducting his own night of the long knives and rounding up the villainous Nazi scum (as well as treacherous Communists) in 1930.

In these scenarios 'kinder, gentler" German Republic, "deeply worried about European civilisation in the face of the threat from the East" could fabricate border wars with the Poles (whose military leadership were spoiling for fights at all points of the compass) and set up the Capitalist crusade that was every Soviet leader's nightmare. Short wars with limited objectives establishing friendly regimes in former Tsarist provinces would be Stalin's salami tactics played against him. The Germans could throw bones to the British in central Asia, maybe Japan in the Far east (bad for China, but lss chance of a military coups as the constitutional government has wins in the board). Obviously France is ofside and the US will fume at Japanese gains, bu they'd stop short of helping the Reds surely.

Still horrible, and the Soviet people get it in the neck as in real life. The crap ending to WWI ensured at least one more dirty war, can't see the mid 20th century not drenched in blood without tons of space bats.

Not invading Russia and just preparing for a defensive war with Stalin. Could have been a turning point but Hitler would have been forced to ask total war sacrifice from his population (not something he wanted to do) and probably deal more equitably with his is empire as soon as the UK refused to bail. Otherwise just the UK opting out after the fall of France (or France fighting on but that is a Germany looses faster).

The UK was unassailable, so much so they appointed and alcoholic warmonger as PM as a FU to Hitler. France collapsing was a savage surprise and extended the war by at least three years: Hitler's head was on the block the moment the WAllies showed some backbone. Forget the bomb plot, his Field Marshals would have lined up to shot him if Fall Gelb became WWI.

D Day was won in December 1941.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

I just don't think there is a good pivot point in 1944. The Allies were all in and doing things better. A less successful D-day (again I can't see a fail) just means Stalin gets to occupy more of Europe.

I mean realistically With FDR in office and committed to a hard line on Japan and supporting the UK and than the USSR even with a war, and with Churchill and committed to the fight and Stalin faced with a nature of what Germany was going to impose... I don't see see too many the good turning points.

D-day certainly not.

In fact I don't think you can find a Axis victory without handwavium and unobtainium and space bats. I think there times when they could have not lost, but ideology and leadership of Japan and Germany kinda precluded that kind of thinking.

Not invading Russia and just preparing for a defensive war with Stalin. Could have been a turning point but Hitler would have been forced to ask total war sacrifice from his population (not something he wanted to do) and probably deal more equitably with his is empire as soon as the UK refused to bail. Otherwise just the UK opting out after the fall of France (or France fighting on but that is a Germany looses faster).

A defensive war instead of Barbarossa you mean? I can't really see that working out due to Germany's lack of resources and oil. A defensive war would have to include also a defense of the Romanian oil fields which would take about as many divisions as Barbarossa anyway. So Hitler might as well give Stalin all the casualties of Barbarossa, and if he really wants to then spend the rest of 1941 digging in. That way he can give millions of casualties to the Soviets, take their most populated areas, take their most developed areas and a large part of the industry as well. Although as Stalin predicted the main target would have to be the Caucasus oilfields.

I really wouldn't put the main decision making down to ideology or leadership. Most of what Germany ended up doing was already decided on by the Reichswehr and some policies which even Hitler was opposed to. Where as Japan really didn't have an ideological policy. The decision to focus on the mainland had been decided since 1895 or 1905. Invading China in 1937 was a snap decision brought about by the global depression and fear of an industrialized China. Even when the leadership attempted to end the war it was rejected by the Chinese and by the Imperial Army as well as other aggressive factions. So Japan couldn't afford not to occupy something on the mainland. The decision to attack the colonies was an additional measure to secure resources and to prevent a direct intervention by the Allies.

For D-Day I don't want to reach. Maybe a hypothetical where Hitler and Stalin make peace in 1943. Hitler redeploys much of his forces to defend France. I can't see the Allies carrying out the landings if they have to defend against some 100 Divisions. Even if they did land they would get cut off from the beach heads and besieged in Cherbourg.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

I agree with the gist of your post but I'd like to quibble about A and B team membership. Rommel gave sound advice on the situation in the West in 1943-1944, predicted the landing sites and was prevented by hard headed superiors from what he saw as a better deployment (as discussed it probably wouldn't have won the day but might have played better than IRL).

Rundstedt squabbled with Rommel over tactical posture but his score is on the board: his Army Groups were the ones that performed the most staggering advances and Kesselschlachts in all history, and to state baldly he was B or C grade does not reflect his actual conduct. In Poland he struck important blows, in France he carried out the critical penetration and encirclement, and ditto in Barbarossa where his forces annihilated the bulk of the Soviet forces opposing the German invasion in Ukraine.

Rundstedt was arguably "past it" but conditions in France in 1944 were not those of 1939-1941, with oppressive oversight and an unbalanced playing field crippling every Nazi general's efforts. Kesselring's brilliance is proven by his ability to operate effectively in this environment (not to mention his superb command of combined arms), but I believe Rundestedt and Guderian are in the same rank, and Rommel in the group immediately below in terms of effective leadership (with Manstein, he may have been a self promoter but could get the job done in mobile field operations). Rundstedt was sacked twice for speaking his mind, not for speaking nonsense.

Whenever criticizing the German generals occurs, there is always a defense of their past campaigns. But this doesn't really work for me because the comparison between the 1939/40 with the Ost Front is just not equal. If you look at the Ost Front none of the generals associated with 1939 and 1940 performed well in 1941. Maybe the impression that they did comes from distortions in the historiography to make it seem as though they had. Rundstedt's performance in 1941 was very average but Bock's performance in 1941 was just horrid. His success in 1941 comes from sticking to the script and Stalin being woefully unprepared to defend against an invasion. Rundstedt may have been better than Witzleben, maybe even better than Bock but his achievements come from commanding the southern flank in 1939 and the central thrust in 1940. In both cases he was sticking to the script which was provided for him. His performance in 1941 was nothing special and actually quite poor in the second half. The rest of his career is ignored for a reason.

Not to be dismissive but I think your perception of the war is largely colored by the western theaters and western sources.

That sees to be the consensus. I think the pivot for Germany is 1933, when they go full Adolph. Never go full Adolph.

I don't really like to deviate from the narrative... everyone always gets awkward if this is brought up but... having actually looked at the source material it does not appear that Germany's actions were due to going Full Adolf. It seems the Reichswehr already had a lot of ideas it was working towards. The Conservative factions which controlled the Reichswehr and the Foreign Ministry wanted a final reckoning with Poland since long before Adolf was in power. In fact if you look at the changing of the guard from Neurath to Ribbentrop, it is Adolf himself who rejects this idea. Whereas the Conservatives want agreements with Britain and the Soviets in order to have a free hand in pursuing territorial claims. Hitler is advocating for a rapprochement with Poland in order to wage war against the Soviets. The only area where Hitler's policy was the same was agreements with Britain, which is why the Conservative clique is willing to play his game.

The other reason this preference for Weimar policy over Nazi policy is unfounded, is because the Reichswehr wanted a small professional army. This is straight from Seeckt's book, where as Hitler ordered an expansion of the armed forces and an implementation of conscription and a larger full time army which could be mobilized. The only thing really keeping the Germans on equal terms with France and the USSR at the time. Most likely Hitler was influenced by Ludendorff's concepts but regardless of one's position on Ludendorff's doctrines this was undoubtedly the correct call. As the Wehrmacht officers quickly discovered, the only way to wage war on the USSR was to go all out and mobilize over 100 Divisions. Not something which would have been accomplished following the Weimar program.

The old conundrum, if Germany is smart enough to win WWII, hey are too smart to start it. The unobtamnium I see is either he Army seizing power in 1933, or a stronger centrist candidate conducting his own night of the long knives and rounding up the villainous Nazi scum (as well as treacherous Communists) in 1930.

Who exactly? The Social Democrats? Zentrum? Neither of these would have been able to shift Weimar policies in such a way. We go back to the conundrum which I outlined above. The Germans would still want a confrontation with Poland and instead of collaborating fully with the West, as was possible between 1933 and 1938, the Germans go back to their double game of playing Britain and France against Stalin, while they sit in between and profit from concessions.

[Cyclops]

Whenever criticizing the German generals occurs, there is always a defense of their past campaigns. But this doesn't really work for me because the comparison between the 1939/40 with the Ost Front is just not equal. ....

Fair enough and my perception of Rundstedt is very likely coloured by his first two campaigns. Not sure about him "following a script" though, the so called Manstein plan was prepared on Runstedt's orders as a reaction to Fall Gelb. of course everyone claimed responsibility for the plan after it had succeeded and I accept the argument that German tactical capability plus French morale problems may have meant the original plan (if it had ot fallen into WAllied hands) might have worked too.

I do think Runstedt's classic Prussian (OK he was a Saxon by Prussian style) leadership allowed the feisty subordinates in Guderian Rommel etc to burst through and, disobeying orders, exploit around the rear of the WAllied forces.

In 1941 Rundstedt methodically tackled the enormous cmcetration of Soviet forces in Ukraine, driving them back and setting them up for the horrifying kesselschlact at Kiev ( albeit aided by Guderians fateful wheel to the right. Yes Stalins orders crippled the Soviets but it was Hitler's orders that drove the Werhmacht beyond sensible and fensible positions for the crippling Winter counterattack. I thought Runstedt's Barabarossa campaign was textbook and thorough, which annoyed Hitler who was expecting unrealistic results.

[edit] Just a comment about my PoV, I've tried a few table top games (Columbia, TK and TK2, bunch of others) so i definitely have a western bias. The Eastern Front is a nightmare to represent and to conduct. My particular perception is the narrow front south of the Pripyet marshes where Rundstedt faced the largest concentration of armoured and mechanised forces in the world in 1941 is a very tough nut to crack. Yes Stalin's stupid "no aggro" orders mean there's a rapid push back in the first month but it develops into relatively open country with a terrible supply net for the Germans and a great supply net (into the huge hub at Kiev) for the Soviets. The advances into Ukraine may not have occurred at the same pace as the northern blitz but it faced more opposition in greater depth.

...
Who exactly? The Social Democrats? Zentrum? Neither of these would have been able to shift Weimar policies in such a way. We go back to the conundrum which I outlined above. The Germans would still want a confrontation with Poland and instead of collaborating fully with the West, as was possible between 1933 and 1938, the Germans go back to their double game of playing Britain and France against Stalin, while they sit in between and profit from concessions.

As for the AH WWII with a "good" Germany we definitely agree its highly unlikely, hence the unobtanium comments. The mess left after WWI did not make along term peace likely and th Soviets were the main chance to get massacred in my view, with Poland a close second. In the event Germany got ploughed under too.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

As for the AH WWII with a "good" Germany we definitely agree its highly unlikely, hence the unobtanium comments. The mess left after WWI did not make along term peace likely and th Soviets were the main chance to get massacred in my view, with Poland a close second. In the event Germany got ploughed under too.

I am saying that WW2 probably wouldn't have started in 1939 if not for Hitler. But I want to really express my meaning since my position is not as simple as that either.
There is a good chance that had the Germans kept building up and did not declare for either Stalin or the Allies, they would have been involved in war at some point.
From 1933 to 1938 the Germans focused on buttering up the Allies and it had been interpreted that this was largely a coalition aimed against the USSR. So where as the Weimar policy of being on Britain's good side was still carried out under Hitler, the difference was that Hitler was not looking for terms with the Soviets, it was considered unthinkable due to Nazi ideology. But breaking from German nationalism Hitler was not looking to push aggressive claims against Poland (so already paradoxical). In fact by 1938 it was largely believed that Poland was firmly in the German camp against a potential team up between the Allies and Stalin (over the matter of Czecho-Slovakia). One of the reasons that Chamberlain left Czecho-Slovakia to its fate and also entered in 1939 was to prevent Stalin from intervening in a European conflict and gaining a foothold in Europe.

But when 1939 broke out into a war Hitler did the unthinkable and signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, even making concessions to Stalin, which was interpreted as a sign that Germany had finally chosen a side, the Soviet side of all things. But that said Hitler was not expecting any war with Britain and France in 1939 and the shock of Western intervention was largely because the matter with Poland was considered to be insignificant and there were many deterring factors. Ultimately Hitler decided to go all in, hoping that Britain and France would back down but also because he was ahead in the re-armaments program (which is crucial to understanding the German mindset). So while the plans for the Wehrmacht were not completed in 1939, Britain and France were not where they would like to be either, but Germany was ahead of them in that regard. Both sides rearming is a clear sign of tensions and future conflict, if there was going to be a conflict it might as well occur in 1939 when Germany and the USSR had a common enemy in Poland and when Britain and France had not completed their armaments program.

But all that means is no war in 1939. Who is to say that there wouldn't be a war in 1942 to 1944 when an actual war had been projected. Even if they were still using Weimar policy the Germans would still want to beat Poland to a pulp and there were many opportunities to do so given that Poland was largely considered a "Fascist" rogue state. It might even be the case that German actions against Poland would be sanctioned by the Allies in that scenario. It would not necessarily be the case that Weimar Germany is willing to collaborate with Britain or France either. Therefore we don't know if another European war would occur. But what I can say for sure is that the Weimar government and the military brass would definitely have backed down in 1939 for fear of war with the West (the scenario would have played out almost exactly the same aside from that, probably even a Molotov-Ribbentrop Neurath agreement).