...the situation has deteriorated even further. To give a very simplified summary, the country is mainly divided into two major coalitions. Firstly, there is the UN-recognized Government of National Accord, which essentially dominates what could be defined as Tripolitania (including the cities of Misrata, Sirte and, of course, the capital, Tripoli). On the other side, we have the significantly more powerful faction of the Libyan National Army (supposedly under the jurisdiction of the civilian body of the House of Representatives, which is based on "Cyrenaica", in the east of the country). The Libyan National Army is led by general Haftar, an army officer, who joined the anti-Gaddafi opposition, after he was captured during the disastrous (for Libya) war with Chad. Haftar returned to Libya, following the events of the Arab Spring, where, thanks to his remarkable skills in political manoeuvres, has succeeded in evolving from an asset of CIA into a fearsome warlord.
In the last days, hostilities have intensified, because the Libyan National Army, attacked the positions of the "Tripoli-regime'', threatening to "liberate the capital", after he had previously conquered the south of the country. Haftar easily advanced in the open countryside, but his offensive has stalled in the urban environment, where his superior equipment and relatively well-trained soldiers is less efficient against fortified defenses, manned by determined irregulars. The future of the capital is incertain, while foreign diplomats maintain a neutral and flexible stance, attempting to reconcile the opponents. For example, both France and Italy (the two countries, which have invested the most into the countries oil production) superficially pretend to tolerate the Government of National Accord, while they also enjoy cordial relations with general Haftar. Haftar was viewed even more positively in the past, as the most reliable friend of the West in Libya, but his aggressive and opportunistic tactics (apart from the ongoing war and invasion, Haftar has tried to overthrow the authorities multiple times in the past, which led to the negotiated compromise of being officially recognized as the head of the armed forces) have put his meekness and loyalty into doubt, in comparison to the days when he obediently cooperated with the American intelligence services. Haftar's biggest atout is that his forces hold the vast majority of Libya's oilfields and pipelines, in the south and east, with the exception of the refinery and port of Zawiya.
In my opinion, what renders Libyan's prospects particularly dim is that neither LNA nor GNA are unified organisations, with a clear hierarchical order. The former does not even pretend to deploy a regular army, but instead its forces are recruited by a great variety of militias, protecting the interests of a myriad of warlords and cities (my personal favourite is the mighty Petroleum Facilities Guard). GNA isn't much better, as it owes its expansion to the strategic alliance with equally numerous tribal militias and political parties. The troops of the Amazigh, the Tuareg or even the fans of the Jamahiriya frequently join and abandon the coalitions, in order to increase their influence, usurp political power or even declare their independence. In the meantime, Sudanese mercenaries offer their services to the highest bidder, while jihadists raid isolated communities. This leads to the conclusion that even if Haftar manages to totally destroy the GNA and even achieve international recognition, there is nothing stopping Libya from fragmenting again, because Haftar's partners will quarrel over their share of the profits, while his defeated enemies will exploit his weakness to regain their privileges. In contrast to Syria, Libya lacks even a skeleton of the state apparatus, which could provide the chance, thanks to war exhaustion, of a unification of the wrecked country and the gradual reconstruction of the destroyed infrastructure.
This is why, for me, at least, in contrast again to the very cleverly orchestrated by Washington Syrian intervention, Operation Odyssey Dawn was a grave mistake, not only from a moral, but also from a cynical perspective. French and Italian firms (Paris and Rome, and secondarily Rome, were the most dedicated advocates of regime-change, as the United States participated only after the European militaries proved incapable of decisively prevailing over the underfunded Libyan army), as well as a couple of Gulf monarchies, basically aspired to sign advantageous contracts with the "revolutionary" administration, at the expense of their Chinese competitors. However, due to the fact that the rebels only won, because of the impact, both material and moral (encouraging Gaddafi officials to change sides) of the aerial campaign, the result of the civil war was a vacuum of power and an almost uninterrupted civil war. As a consequence, oil exports experienced dramatic rises and falls, which doesn't exactly contribute very positively to company revenues. To conclude, I suspect that Libya's future will involve either a continuous conflict or a loose federation. In the latter and most optimist scenario, trade and overall productivity could somewhat recover to pre-2011 levels, but daily life and communications will remain extremely vulnerable to flare-ups of sectarian, tribal and political violence, between local warlords.