A second issue is the size of the Attalid fleet: 35 tetreres sailed to Greece in 209; 20 did the same in the Third Macedonian war, and the convoy of Galatian cavalry destroyed by the Macedonians counted 35horse-transports. At Chios, in 201, the joint fleet of the Rhodians and Attalids counted 65 big ships; the Attalid ships had towers, and in fact Attalos I aligned more kataphract ships than Philip V.46 Though the Bithynian fleet is said to have defeated the Attalid (in the war of 184–182) thanks to Hannibal’s trick of scorpion- and snake-filled jars used as projectiles during the naval battle, during the war of 156–154, the last phase of the war, a fleet of 80 ships ravaged coastal cities allied to Bithynia—27 Attalid, the rest allies. The fleet seems very respectable, throughout the history of the dynasty, from 209 to 155 (and 148); its remnants fought (unsuccessfully) for Aristonikos/Eumenes III.The number of ships is not huge, but is made up of
large, top of the range, heavily equipped units: this tendency is characteristic of the Hellenistic east, and the Attalid fleet is in fact in the same range as the Rhodian fleet (which never counted more than about 40 heavy ships of the line). The ongoing excavation and survey work at Elaia shows, early on, substantial investment in the main harbour of Pergamon —a sign of how important the fleet was for the Attalid state—as a means for strategic projection of force, both to tip the balance in local wars (as when Eumenes tried to blockade the Hellespont against Pharnakes of Pontos),and to participate in ‘high diplomacy’ wars abroad (as in the repeated participation in wars in Greece on the side of Rome). In other words, the small size of the land army was balanced by the investment in as large and powerful a fleet as the Attalids could afford, as an important resource to play the great game of high politics which characterizes their military history