The history of warfare proves that disaster usually falls upon the force that loses its cohesion. When formations are shattered, rout usually follows. And it is in unorganized retreat, as well as in panicked withdraws, where most casualties take place. If only for this one and single reason alone, it is generally imperative that armies and navies maintain formation during battle.
This general principle however begs a fascinating question, was it imperative for the Roman fleet to maintain its formation at Cape Ecnomus? And if not, why wasn’t it?
Obviously, the corvus will be central to this discussion, which had a deterministic effect on the course of the battle. But to truly appreciate this, and its negating effects on Carthaginian naval skill and strategy, one really needs to see and comprehend the military disaster that had just unfolded:
The Battle of Cape Ecnomus (256 BC), depending on your reference point, was either one of the worse tactical blunders or incredible displays of maneuver planning in the history of naval warfare. On one hand, you have the total collapse of the Roman “wedge” formation, which arguably was flawed from the start, and destined to separate because of its transports. And on the other, you have a daring but well-conceived strategy of annihilation from the Carthaginians, which like the future Battle of Cannae, resulted in maneuvers designed to bring about the complete destruction of the opposing force. The appearance of a feigned retreat followed by swift and coordinated attacks from both flanks is instantly recognizable and goes without saying. But that the Roman fleet avoided being encircled or defeated in detail, without the clear benefits of a formation, while also being unduly separated into three unequal parts, and still managed to rally and win decisively, against an experienced naval power like the Carthaginians, demands immediate and stunning explanation. It also goes without saying that this battle was incredibly large, some 300 ships and 150,000 men on each side. Altogether, perhaps the largest naval battle in history.
But to return now to the truly difficult question at hand, was it imperative for the Roman fleet – if they wanted to win or survive the battle– to maintain its formation against the Carthaginians? Well then, the answer if not a partial yes, would seem to at least be a complicated no.
In some sense, it’s not enough to argue no based on who won, or no strictly from the perspective of winning, because we really don’t know what the Roman battleplan actually was. For instance, did the Roman navy, with its transports, really mean to engage in a large-scale open sea battle with the Carthaginian fleet, or was it always part of the plan to try and sail through? The Roman fleet, after all, was primary an invasion force, intended to transport a Roman army from Sicily to Africa in one piece. And a fleet formation like the wedge seems extremely peculiar, not least of which because it had never been used in naval combat before (at the fleet level), but because its primary purpose, as a land tactic, had always been to initiate a breakthrough or create penetration. Its main advantages of course, were a narrower font and refused flanks that protected an army or a unit as a compact whole until it could make contact with the enemy. This argument thus assumes that the Roman navy, which was very much organized like a land force, did not really intend to lock itself in a decisive battle with the Carthaginian fleet, which by default carried enormous risk, but had intended instead to sail straight through to the coast of Africa. Of course, the idea of avoiding battle and avoiding casualties by adopting the wedge for the purposes of creating a naval convoy (arguably a first in naval warfare)- would only serve to benefit the Romans in the long run, and would go a long ways towards explaining what the Roman battleplan actually was.
Mirroring the convoy argument, the next argument that should be considered before arguing no is that, in a way, a fleet formation was an obvious source of strength and protection for the Roman fleet. While in formation, its most vulnerable vessels and transports would be shielded from attack in all directions. Additionally, any attack made against the front of the Roman wedge would have to be made head on, where the bows and rams of the Roman ships protected the bows and rams of other Roman ships. It was of course hoped that a close order formation, like the wedge, would protect the Roman fleet from faster and more maneuverable Carthaginian vessels, where, so long as the Romans could keep their formation tight, their ships and vessels would be protected from flanking and ramming; the most primary methods of attack. Altogether then, a convincing argument can be made that the Roman formation, whether meant to be a convoy or not, acted as a real center of gravity for the Roman fleet. With it came obvious strength in numbers, mass, depth, cohesion, unity as well as the frontal power necessary to clear the way to Africa. And perhaps most importantly, so long as the Roman squadrons remained close together, the Roman fleet could not be defeated in detail.
As convincing then as these arguments appear to be, those who believe them would almost certainly need to believe that the Romans nearly lost the Battle of Cape Ecnomus, which, based on a close reading of the available sources and battle results does not appear to be the case. Even with the collapse (or deliberate destruction) of the Roman formation -and arguably the Roman battleplan-, the Roman squadrons still appear to have fought on a nearly equal footing with the Carthaginian fleet. Moreover, there is also not much to suggest that the Romans had improvised a victory, either through maneuver or radical repositioning, when they were in fact locked in battle, and again probably couldn’t have. Improvising alone, without the benefits of luck or a colossal mistake by the other side, would also not have lead to such decisive results. And though fairly equal numbers at the beginning of the battle does have something to do with the outcome, and arguably helped the Romans endure any immediate losses, the fact that the collapse of the Roman formation was not at all a turning point or decisive, suggests that the Romans still had other important tactical advantages left that were not dependent on numbers or maintaining its fleet formation. What were these advantages then if not mass and cohesion? And why was the Battle of Cape Ecnomus not actually victory from defeat?
Truth be told, a fleet formation, like the Roman wedge, was only one element of an extremely formidable series of systems, subordinate formations, and tactical countermeasures that the Romans used to negate close quarters ramming, which is why, in the final analysis, its importance as a survival tool -or center of gravity- for the Roman fleet must be downgraded. Most important to this argument of course is the Roman corvus. Often described as a gangplank with a large spike, any ship that drew too close to the bow of a Roman ship risked attaching itself to the beak of a corvus, where, as a disabled ship, it could then be boarded. It is here notably, in boarding actions, where the Roman navy truly excelled. Its naval officers and marines often being made up of experienced and heavily armed legionnaires, which, together with the corvus, had the unusual effect of turning a naval action into a land battle. Against this unique system, the very last thing a Carthaginian admiral ever wanted to do was fight a land battle at sea.
But this decisive combination against ramming does not just end with the corvus. It also extends outwards as well, and combines with defenses employed throughout the Roman fleet.
 
Any Carthaginian ship that thus wanted to ram another Roman ship would have had to have dealt with this whole series of effective countermeasures, which in combination, was a decisive tactical system. A fleet formation was important because Carthaginian ships could only engage one other ship at a time, which limited maneuver and generated obvious tactical risk when approaching Roman ships that were overlayed or stationed in between ships. Close order formations (and independent sub formations) adopted by the Romans at the squadron level were also decisive because they provided a backup formation – plus a source of cohesion- to Roman ships when the fleet formation failed. Roman squadrons that maintained their own lines, independently, denied spacing and gaps that could have been used for flanking and ramming by faster and more maneuverable Carthaginian ships. Once a tight squadron formation was broken, a Carthaginian ship still likely needed to make contact with a moving target (evasive maneuvers), where indeed, in the case of flanking or ramming, proper angles mattered. And of course, if a Carthaginian ship could even make contact with a Roman ship, especially in the crowded mess of naval battle, it then still needed to penetrate a likely reinforced hull, perhaps with copper belts or bronze plating, or against just plain old wood, which unsurprisingly was tough to sink. And even if this was possible there was still the immediate danger of making contact with the Roman corvuses and marines, along with the whole array of defensive arrows, towers, javelins, and grappling hooks from supporting ships that made approaching a single Roman ship extremely perilous and close to reckless. None of these countermeasures of course even begin to describe the obvious risks that ramming inevitably undertook; everything from becoming stuck in another ship’s hull, to having one’s oars ripped off, to the obvious naval skill, speed, and spacing requirements. Ships that rammed another vessel needed to withdraw immediately or risk being rammed themselves. Roman quinqueremes may have even have been built larger and heavier than their Carthaginian counterparts to accommodate more crew, which again, might have added to their durability. Yet, crucial to understanding the battle outcome, of course, are also the enclosed decks and row boxes that protected rowers from the sights and sounds of battle. Simply creating maneuver chaos and fleet separation was not going to instigate panic aboard a Roman ship, whose rowers, while below deck, were largely oblivious to the sights and sounds of battle until contact was made with another ship. Our traditional view of shock then, from land combat, formation collapse, and tactical surprise, only applies to the Roman captains that piloted a Roman ship from above deck, one of which was a battle-hardened centurion. Breaking apart a Roman formation at sea with trickery and maneuver would thus not have the same collapsing effects on order and unit cohesion as it would on land.
As formidable as the ship, squadron, fleet system appears to be -and its family of subsystems like the corvus + marines- the one glaring weakness was that a fleet formation, like the wedge, was always going to prove totally inadequate for sailing. Fleet formations (that differed from a line) could be used to receive an attack, but not make one. This was true for all gallery age formations that involved sailing and cruising with hundreds of ships. An actual perimeter defense to guard against flanking and ramming, like the kyklos (circle), was too large and cumbersome to be used at the fleet level and certainly could not be done under sail. Any formation used for cruising naturally requires all ships to maintain pace and at least some appropriate distance, less they run into each other’s oars and hulls. This notable problem again, especially with signaling and spacing between ships, was partly the reason why sailing formations above the squadron level were almost never used. The Roman wedge of course, with its tremendous size and odd combination of towing vessels and escorting ships, would fair no better if it tried to sail. But instead of keeping an unbroken line to receive an attack, or the shoreline to avoid being flanked, the Romans would attack the Carthaginian line. A gap thus formed between the Roman vanguard and rear squadrons, who, with their transports, were unable to keep pace. That they were unable to do so, is entirely on the fault of the Consuls, who ordered the attack, Carthaginian trickery (depending on your reference point), and the notable ignorance that came with trying to adopt a land formation, and marching mentality, into a large naval creation at sea.
Even with the blunder however, or feigned retreat, the collapse of the Roman formation never came close to dooming the Roman fleet. The evidence here is in the narrative. Both flanking attacks were met not by unorganized rout, or chaotic retreat, but by an organized opponent that came together to form effective resistance at the squadron level. When the transports and/or towing vessels came under threat by the Carthaginian left and right wings, the III and IV Roman squadrons moved to engage them. What thus resulted was three separate, but nearly equal engagements; between the Roman vanguard and Consuls against the Carthaginian center, and the Roman rear squadrons with the Carthaginian left and ring wings. Once the ships and battle lines became locked, and enemy ships were grappled by the corvuses, the battle instantly shifted from one of maneuver to one of “sheer strength.” For his part, Polybius also writes that the Roman vanguard had kept good order under the watchful eyes of the Consuls, yet the Roman rear squadrons too had also managed to maintain strong evidence of cohesion, which is evident in that both squadrons appear to have executed squadron maneuvers and adhere to squadron signals throughout the battle. That no transports appear to have been lost (with the possible exception of the horse transports), is a testament to squadron systems at work. That resistance was formed and sustained without any direction of the Consuls, in spite of formation collapse, is all together more impressive. Finally, when it appeared that the rear squadrons themselves were close to breaking, what still remained to be defeated were the Roman corvuses & marines. This unstoppable one-two combination, undefeated in earlier engagements, again proved decisive here. That the corvus in fact served as a deterrent, in the case of the Roman III squadron that was blockaded by Carthaginian ships, proves that the Carthaginians knew of no real effective counter.
The presence of organized resistance, after a formation collapse and flanking maneuver, argues convincingly then that the Roman formation was in no way a center of gravity for the Roman fleet. It was only the first layer in a comprehensive fleet/squadron/ship system that protected the Roman ships from attack. What remained to still be defeated were the Roman squadrons themselves, followed by each and every Roman ship. While the first two layers, and its configurations of mutually supporting ships, could be negated through maneuver, the final input for sinking and striking a Roman ship was always the same. In order to sink a Roman vessel, it had to be rammed. And in order to ram a Roman ship, you had to risk attaching yourself to the corvus. In the final analysis, it was far easier to execute boarding tactics in tight and congested space with massive quinqueremes, then it was to try to ram and maneuver.
The Battle of Cape Ecnomus thus ends with one of the more bizarre and compelling endings ever seen in the history of warfare. Maneuver, tactics, strategy, deception, tempo, top-down command & control, intelligence, execution, surprise, preparation, and attacking the enemy’s plan (formation) at the decisive point in time, all feel short of producing victory for the Carthaginians. In this truly bizarre ending, where the victor arguably blundered early, outcomes were deterministic. Simply creating effects through maneuver, tempo, and adjusting fleet positions on a map, were not going to generate overmatch capabilities against a system that negated close quarters ramming, the only known method of attack (other than boarding). In close quarter battles where only one ship could predictably engage one other ship at a time, the result against multiple ships armed with the corvus was always the same. Nothing was left to chance or uncertainty, any Carthaginian ship that came too close to a Roman vessel (which was all but certain) alone was going to get stuck. Carthage thus needed to copy the corvus system outright or find an asymmetric counter. The only other option of course, was to swarm a Roman ship with overwhelming numbers, which again was never a possibility against the Roman fleet. Ramming, so long as large numbers of heavy ships armed with the corvus dominated the battlespace, was effectively obsolete.
What follows then is a truism. Capabilities are equal to military advantage. When military advantage exists, a nation or army must adopt their opponent’s way of fighting or develop an asymmetric counter. The Romans, inferior sailors as they were, were aware of their own inferiority at sea and sought domination early by developing new systems. Both fleet formations and convoy like escorts were new doctrines that had never before been used extensively at sea, and the corvus system, specifically designed to counter Carthaginian naval skill itself, was a new technology. Carthage only sought to preserve the status quo by doubling down on previously accepted naval philosophy and doctrine, thinking again everything would work out predictably before as it always had. In the end, it drowned in its own hubris.
|
Lost in Limbo
Re: PotF Anthology
Posting Permissions
