Russian geopolitical strategy: how much of Putin's foreign policy is perhaps influenced by Aleksandr Dugin's seminal work on geopolitics (1997)?

[Roma_Victrix]

This thread will discuss Aleksander Dugin's 1997 Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geo-political Future of Russia (Основы геополитики: геополитическое будущее России; Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii), its influence on current events, contemporary Russian foreign policy, and Russia's ultimate global aspirations. It was co-authored by General Nikolai Klokotov of the General Staff Academy in the Russian military, and is generally seen as a useful text in educating those seeking a commanding role in Russia's military or in the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Dugin is also the author The Fourth Political Theory (2009), in which he espouses a fourth political theory to supplant and supersede the first (liberalism/liberal democracy), the second (Leftist Marxism/Communism), and third (Right-wing Fascism) major political theories of the modern age. However, for sake of time and clarity, this thread will focus on his geopolitical ideas in regards to Russian and global current events, not so much his more nuanced political theory. Online sources will be listed below for the convenience of those who want to read beyond the premise and details presented in this thread.

Preliminary discussion

In Russian society and politics, Aleksandr Dugin is still something of a gadfly without much if any concrete political clout. This despite being a former advisor to two different Chairmen of the State Duma, Gennadiy Seleznyov and Sergey Naryshkin, a respected author, academic, contemporary philosopher, political scientist, and more importantly the founder of the Eurasia Party. In addition to his own party, Dugin was one of the original organizers of the National Bolshevik Party (now banned) and National Bolshevik Front under its founder and current leader Eduard Limonov. Limonov, who was once sentenced to four years imprisonment for illegal arms purchasing alongside dropped charges of planning to invade Kazakhstan with a small private army (LOL), was for a long time a leading member of a coalition opposing Vladimir Putin and his United Russia party, yet the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 has made Limonov change his tune. He's now a solid supporter of Putin! And despite Bolshevism being decidedly leftist by virtue of its Marxist-based ideology, National Bolshevism happily attaches itself to Russia's right-wing movement thanks to their shared interests and nationalist values. These become all the more acute when viewed through the lens of all those who lament the fall of the Soviet Union and with it the decline of Russia's geopolitical power and destiny on the world stage.

Which brings us back to Dugin (and more broadly the Eurasian movement founded by Lev Gumilyov decades ago). In 2014, shortly after the outburst of Euromaidan, Russian annexation of Crimea, and initial separatist conflict in Ukraine, Dugin lost his position as Head of the Department of Sociology of International Relations of Moscow State University, because he openly advocated for the killing of Ukrainians...all of them. Much like the (now deceased, Cold-War-era) Belgian neo-fascist and former Nazi Jean-François Thiriart, Dugin also has aspirations for Russia as a dominant leader within a proposed pan-European political union, albeit with some drastically different goals and wider, more global outlook for Russia's ambitions. Yet it's hard to pigeonhole Dugin into one specific category, especially with his litigated dust-ups and heated disagreements with natural allies like Sergey Kurginyan, founder of the Essence of Time movement that mixes elements of Marxist communism with Russian patriotism. Unlike Kurginyan, however, Dugin's contributions to Russian geopolitical thought will arguably outlive him, and as we shall see in a moment, have arguably already profoundly impacted Russia's foreign policy during Vladimir Putin's tenure as president (and briefly as prime minister).

Dugin's grand geopolitical strategy

Russia's recent involvement in conflicts stretching from Georgia to Ukraine might seem like circumstantial and spur of the moment decisions, but are they part of a calculated geopolitical strategy? At the core of Dugin's political philosophy is the belief that empires of land and sea, i.e. Eurasianist versus Atlanticist empires, are bound to clash and form natural rivals, a clear allegory for the relationship between landlocked Russia and the maritime powers of the United States of America (and now to a lesser extent Great Britain, cleaved of most of its former overseas empire). In this Dugin certainly subscribes to Huntington's multipolar world view of civilizations, which perhaps fuels in part his glaring distrust for Russia's greatest rival, the US and by association the Russian "fifth column", which he views as a disruptive tool utilized by the American intelligence agencies working overseas. He also seemingly incorporates some ideas of Francis Fukuyama, if only to explain the US hegemonic model for promoting political and economic liberalism in traditionalist civilizations like Russia and the Islamic world (which he views as a potential ally, if headed by Iran as a sort of regional overlord).

Although he has recently spoken words of praise for the Trump White House and the seemingly shared "anti-globalist" interests of Putin and Trump, the linchpin of Dugin's geopolitical theory is nevertheless the formation of political axes that exclude the United States. In fact, one of these alliances involves Iran, an alleged member of George W. Bush's neo-conservative-branded "Axis of Evil" announced in the run-up to the Iraq War. Yet the proposed "Moscow-Tehran Axis" is but one moving part to a larger puzzle presented by Dugin for redefining Russia's role in the world at the expense of the liberal, globalist order led by the United States during and after the Cold War. Obviously he was no fan of America's recent imperial project in the Middle East (Iraq) and South Asia (i.e. Afghanistan) under Bush and Obama. His preferred style of Russian imperialism doesn't involve the brute force and preemptive-strike tactics of the Bush Doctrine; rather, it involves a labyrinthine diplomatic approach seeking to cajole or threaten certain countries and entire international bodies into cooperating or simply bowing to Russian expansionism, in some cases without firing a single shot.

A region-by-region explanation of Dugin's strategy

Europe: it should come as no surprise that Dugin views at least some of the former Soviet republics as belonging to Russia. Although his book states that Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland should be given a special status in his proposed Eurasian union (coincidentally the name of a now real international project established by Putin to mirror the EU), Dugin believes that Belarus, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine should return to the Russian fold entirely, and Finland should be absorbed completely before division into Russian oblasts. On the other hand, Estonia, along with Kaliningrad, should be given to Germany as a compensation and as a goodwill gesture in the formation of a Moscow-Berlin Axis. For Dugin, France is seen as a traditional partner with Germany in opposing the "Atlanticism" of the US and UK, so the proposed Axis could theoretically include Paris as well (Putin's courting of Marine Le Pen comes to mind). He sees no worthwhile alliance to be had with the UK, America's strongest ally, although he stresses that Great Britain should be cut off and excluded from continental Europe by any means necessary. Romania, Macedonia, "Serbian Bosnia" and Greece on the other hand are to be viewed as traditionalist Orthodox allies of Russia who can be relied upon in opposing the Western-imposed order. In fact, Dugin believes that Russia's Eurasian project should extend into Bulgaria and Serbia.

East Asia: Dugin stresses that Russia and Japan should unite as a single bloc to oppose the rise of China as well as the Pacific interventionism of the United States. To persuade Japan to join Russia's side by appealing to Japanese nationalism with the return of the Kuril Islands to Japanese sovereign control. To safeguard Russia's Central Asian backyard in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyztan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, Dugin proposes the dismantling of China's territorial integrity by cleaving from it Manchuria, Tibet, and Xinjiang, in addition to securing Mongolia as a Russian outpost. This, he believes, would induce China to project its power elsewhere and in the opposite direction towards the south, content with dominating or at least heavily influencing its neighbors across the South China Sea, including the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia (minus Vietnam, which Dugin sees as a Russian ally).

The Middle East and South Asia: in addition to the proposed Russian pact with Iran to combat US interests in the region, Dugin believes that Armenia could be added to this alliance as a trusted partner. Azerbaijan, however, should be divided in his estimation or simply annexed by Iran. Dugin imagines that, via its close partner Iran, Russia will finally access the warm-water ports of the Indian Ocean and project the combined Russian-Iranian military and economic might over the whole region. Meanwhile, Turkey is viewed as being as intractable as China in entering this proposed Russian world order and should be given "geopolitical shocks" with armed rebellion of its ethnic minorities such as the Kurds and internal, domestic chaos fostered by covert Russian actions.

The United States: in his book, Dugin weaves a common theme into every one of his points: the American-imposed globalist order must be curtailed and hopefully dismantled entirely. He believes that this can be achieved by appealing to separatism within the US, promoting "Afro-American racists" to stir trouble and generally sew the seeds for social and racial conflicts. His ultimate aim is to destabilize American politics with sectarianism, fueled in part by the promotion of dissident and extremist groups. In order to ensure that the United States no longer interferes in Russia's global plans and ambitions for the future, another streak of American isolationism should be fostered, as was the general American outlook and domineering foreign policy of the interwar years (i.e. between WWI and WWII).

Current events and the evolution of Dugin's world view over the past two decades

Although only the economic relationship based on oil and gas has come about for Russia and Germany (with Putin and Merkel having a perpetually frosty relationship), the foresight of some of Dugin's other premonitions shouldn't be ignored in light of recent events. Since he published his book twenty years ago, the UK has voted to leave the European Union, just as Dugin imagined, in addition to Russia's cleaving of entire regions from Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and Ukraine (Crimean Peninsula, Donetsk and Luhansk in easternmost Ukraine). Although China has been attempting to build stronger relationships with Central Asian states, its most recent international focus has been on the South China Sea in opposing the US hegemonic interests there, building new military bases on artificial islands. Iran is now a fairly strong ally with Russia in regards to the Syrian Civil War and dual support given to the Assad regime, in opposition to the alignment of US, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The latter under Erdogan has seen tons of domestic turmoil, some of which is undoubtedly supported clandestinely by Russia, although Russia and Turkey have been mending fences lately. Even Dugin has been supportive of that lately! Although he generally supports any plan or international project invested in by Putin. His ideas about promoting separatism in the US, including fomenting the rise of black racists, seems eerily similar to what's going on with the current Black Lives Matter movement and the anti-SJW response to that. As for promoting American isolationism on the world stage, the US now has a president who shares these ideas, albeit in a way that coincides with traditional American nationalism, safeguarding borders, curtailing immigration, and forming new economic relationships with other countries, especially the Russian Federation. This is in stark contrast to Bush, who believed in projecting American power overseas with hard power, "shock and awe," and Obama, who pursued a more soft power approach in getting the world to align with US interests while sanctioning both Iran and Russia.

What do you guys think? Do you think Dugin is just a fringe guy who Putin largely ignores and doesn't really heed? Or is Dugin's approach to geopolitics fully embraced by the Kremlin, if begrudgingly so?

For those who are interested, the following are sources that I've consulted to construct this thread, and that are worthy of investigation:
* Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics by John B. Dunlop
* Russia’s New—and Frightening—“Ism”, by John B. Dunlop, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, July 30, 2004
* Theory Talk #66: Alexander Dugin (interview with Aleksandr Dugin, December 7, 2014)
* Post-Soviet “Uncivil Society” and the Rise of Aleksandr Dugin: A Case Study of the Extraparliamentary Radical Right in Contemporary Russia (by Andreas Umland, Ph. D. in Politics, University of Cambridge, 2007)
* The Russian 'philosopher' who links Putin, Bannon, Turkey: Alexander Dugin (Henry Meyer, Onur Ant, Chicago Tribune, Feb 3, 2017)
* Various articles on Wikipedia just for quick references and basic facts

[Nikitn]

Answer: Zero. Russian strategy is not decided by fringe-wackos.

In fact, Dugin is much more known among kids in the US/UK who are regularly fed with Russia horror-stories and think they are knowledgeable, than he is known in Russia.

[Abdülmecid I]

Dugin's theories aren't anything special, as he's just a far-right "visionary", borderline Nazist, dreaming about the expansion and the majesty of the Russian nation. Nikitin is right that his supposed influence on Kremlin is not only exaggerated, but, in fact, invented out of literally nothing, in order that both the Russian Federation and her president be described as the 3rd Reich and Hitler respectively. Thanks to that intentionally misleading presentation, hostile policies against them can be initiated with a larger public support. In reality, however, the foreign policy of Russia, like those of every other state in history, are determined by its geopolitical and financial interests and not ideology, which would only manage to render their foreign policy less flexible and therefore proportionately clumsier and less fruitful. Appeals to moral principles or national ideals are often used by the leadership, in order to gain popular support, but the truth is that cynicism reigns supreme in foreign affairs. Russia's goal is to protect and promote its interests, not the restoration of the Soviet Union, although her interventions, purely for geographical reasons, will usually involve previous members of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact.

Currently, due to Russia's undeniable weakness, when compared to her main antagonist, the United States, means that their stance is mostly defensive (in contrast to Dugin's ultra-nationalist aggressiveness), in the sense of trying to maintain her already existing sphere of influence, without that meaning that, in a more specific context, Russia would avoid offensive operations. These are accusations, usually originating from biased analysists. It's like blaming Erdoğan for aiming to recreate the Ottoman Empire, while again his goal revolve around increasing Turkish influence around his neighbors, or take the sincerity of the antisemitic messages of the Iranian clergy for granted, while they essentially hope to gain popularity among the largely antisemitic Middle East. To sum it up, neither foreign policies nor political leaders are inspired from glorified thoughts about an illustrious past or future, any claims to the contrary, coming either from them or their diplomatic opponents should be rejected as propaganda, intended to manipulate popular will.

Any matching between Dugin's ramblings and the Russian government's actions can be explained either by a simple coincidence or by the fact that the notorious political scientist accidentally made a suggestion, based on the economic, political, social and diplomatic status quo, and not on his national-bolshevist paranoia.

[Ἀπολλόδοτος Α΄ ὁ Σωτήρ]

Dugin? Zhirinovsky, to a mild degree, is a more realistic influence, don't go that far to the russian fringe.



Watching Dugin is somewhat entertaining, like Alex Jones.

[Roma_Victrix]

Answer: Zero. Russian strategy is not decided by fringe-wackos.

In fact, Dugin is much more known among kids in the US/UK who are regularly fed with Russia horror-stories and think they are knowledgeable, than he is known in Russia.

So you're saying that children in the US/UK know more about Dugin than the Russian military, which to some degree uses his aforementioned book as a standard textbook for understanding geopolitics? Interesting. Also notice how I never said Dugin decided anything for Russia. This thread is about the potential influence of his ideas, in a think tank style, on the Russian establishment, the Kremlin, and President Putin. Influence can mean a lot of things and clearly Dugin's seeming exclusion from high politics as of late shows that having your ideas accepted to whatever degree does not translate into direct political power.

Dugin's theories aren't anything special, as he's just a far-right "visionary", borderline Nazist, dreaming about the expansion and the majesty of the Russian nation. Nikitin is right that his supposed influence on Kremlin is not only exaggerated, but, in fact, invented out of literally nothing, in order that both the Russian Federation and her president be described as the 3rd Reich and Hitler respectively. Thanks to that intentionally misleading presentation, hostile policies against them can be initiated with a larger public support. In reality, however, the foreign policy of Russia, like those of every other state in history, are determined by its geopolitical and financial interests and not ideology, which would only manage to render their foreign policy less flexible and therefore proportionately clumsier and less fruitful. Appeals to moral principles or national ideals are often used by the leadership, in order to gain popular support, but the truth is that cynicism reigns supreme in foreign affairs. Russia's goal is to protect and promote its interests, not the restoration of the Soviet Union, although her interventions, purely for geographical reasons, will usually involve previous members of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact.

Currently, due to Russia's undeniable weakness, when compared to her main antagonist, the United States, means that their stance is mostly defensive (in contrast to Dugin's ultra-nationalist aggressiveness), in the sense of trying to maintain her already existing sphere of influence, without that meaning that, in a more specific context, Russia would avoid offensive operations. These are accusations, usually originating from biased analysists. It's like blaming Erdoğan for aiming to recreate the Ottoman Empire, while again his goal revolve around increasing Turkish influence around his neighbors, or take the sincerity of the antisemitic messages of the Iranian clergy for granted, while they essentially hope to gain popularity among the largely antisemitic Middle East. To sum it up, neither foreign policies nor political leaders are inspired from glorified thoughts about an illustrious past or future, any claims to the contrary, coming either from them or their diplomatic opponents should be rejected as propaganda, intended to manipulate popular will.

Any matching between Dugin's ramblings and the Russian government's actions can be explained either by a simple coincidence or by the fact that the notorious political scientist accidentally made a suggestion, based on the economic, political, social and diplomatic status quo, and not on his national-bolshevist paranoia.

A fantastic counterargument. Bravo! I'd rep you, but I've already done so too recently. I agree that Dugin's ideas are out there and not to be taken so seriously, and that Dugin's theories simply do not match with political reality or expediency (such as the firm limitations of Russian activity in Europe thanks to the framework of NATO, if not the EU). However, there's no denying that some of his ideas developed during the Yeltsin years seem to have lined up with Russia's later foreign policy actions during Putin's presidency. The question remains as to whether they had any impact on the Russian decisions to invade Georgia and Ukraine, as well as form a Eurasian Union, or if these are all just coincidental and circumstantial.

Also, if Dugin was just some hopeless kook, he wouldn't have co-authored a book with a Russian general and had another Russian General Leonid Ivashov, head of the International Department of the Russian Ministry of Defence, as a senior advisor for its content. Clearly some people within Russia's military establishment take him very seriously, which is pause for concern.

Dugin? Zhirinovsky, to a mild degree, is a more realistic influence, don't go that far to the russian fringe.



Watching Dugin is somewhat entertaining, like Alex Jones.

Yep, Zhirinovsky is taken way more seriously, perhaps due to his personality and far more solid political career as Vice Chairman of the State Duma. Yet Dugin isn't exactly as fringe in Russia as, for instance, former KKK leader David Duke is in American politics. Dugin isn't exactly in the doghouse. Some of his ideas are actually mainstream, or at least commonly accepted by Russian nationalists. As for Alex Jones, it's certainly entertaining to watch him and compare his videos to that of Dugin (hell, Jones has even interviewed him, lol...talk about double entertainment). Jones, who has long had his show on Youtube, became much more popular after interviewing Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign, yet Jones is obviously not a political force or a politician of any kind. He's a radio personality and a filmmaker. Compare that to Dugin, who's actually founded a political party of his own.

[Nikitn]

Literally your entire argument of Dugin's impact on Russians strategy hinges upon these two assumptions:

1) Various social sciences neocon loons from America say that he is important and try to use him to portray the Kremlin as essentially fascists.
2) The alleged fact that the book was "co-authored" by some General "Klotkov" whom I could find nothing about when I google. And even if this guy exists, it's quite uncertain to what extent he supports the ideas of the book - for all we know, Dugin might've just used him as a discussion partner.


However, what is certain is that nobody in Russia is aware of Dugin, and those who are aware of him discount him as a fringe element. Further, the notion that this guy's writing is somehow a serious influence on the general staff is complete nonsense.


At the end of the day, I suspect this guy has influenced many more western neocons than he has Russian intellectuals. Sorry.

[Dromikaites]

Dugin is not taken seriously by the Russian leadership. He was just useful to Putin for a little while for stirring up the nationalist fervor among a small and otherwise motley minority of educated Russians. But then Putin realized Dugin wasn't gaining much traction and as a result Dugin fell out of whatever marginal favor he had enjoyed up until then.

That much can be said about Dugin's current relations to Putin and on Dugin's influence on Putin's thinking.

Just like a broken clock tells time correctly twice a day, so did some of Dugin's many ideas happen to materialize. In some other respects he's simply delusional. Like when he imagines Poland might find any interest in joining his Eurasian Union, when he imagines Romania is a natural ally of Russia or that Japan would be interested in teaming up with Russia (an economy smaller than Italy's) against China instead of being part of the American-led anti-Chinese coalition.

He should be given credit for understanding neither Turkey nor China can be long term allies for Russia in spite the current friendly overtures of each of those 3 towards the others. But it's more about a broken clock being right than deep insight.

(Actually neither can China and Turkey be long-term best buddies given the resources rich Central-Asian Turkic states are prime targets for the Chinese economic and political expansion while the Turkish economy would benefit from accessing those natural resources too..)

As for Iran, they are on good terms with Russia right now only because the Russians accidentally help them regain the political control over Eastern Mediterranean some 1400 years after the Persians had last controlled [directly and briefly] those shores. Iran's strategic interest is to have safe trade routes to Western Europe and decent enough political relations to put those trade routes to good use. Once that strategic goal is achieved Iran doesn't need Russia anymore. On the other hand the Iranians realize they are standing in Russia's way to the Indian Ocean, which means their more likely move once Syria is pacified would be to improve their relations with the US.

Bottom line: Dugin is right Russia needs to be part of an Eurasian Union else it would lose Siberia to China. But that won't happen as he imagines, with Russia leading that Eurasian Union. What would probably happen is Russia would be eventually gobbled up by EU's expansion eastward. Putin's shenanigans in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea won't be able to prevent that from happening.

[Heathen Hammer]

Dugin has some interesting ideas, and he does identify a problem (or should I say repeat what the problem is by Traditionalist thinkers before him), but his solution doesn't make much sense.
Russia's best bet is to start allying itself with euroskeptic political powers in the West, establishing a united front against globalism.
At the same time the biggest obstacle here for Russia would be not the decaying EU/NATO or any other decaying archaic organizations, but its very own cosmopolitan oligarchy, which has rather strong ties to globalist elites. Once these oligarchs stop being a problem (either via democratic change followed by a sweeping legislature, or via more "hands-on approach"), more steps can be taken to deal with cosmopolitan globalist capitalism in the rest of the world.
Long story short - history is a cycle, and we are at the beginning of a new one. Time will tell how it will turn out, but one thing for sure - it will be very different from the world we live in today.

[Nikitn]

Dugin is not taken seriously by the Russian leadership. He was just useful to Putin for a little while for stirring up the nationalist fervor among a small and otherwise motley minority of educated Russians. But then Putin realized Dugin wasn't gaining much traction and as a result Dugin fell out of whatever marginal favor he had enjoyed up until then.

That much can be said about Dugin's current relations to Putin and on Dugin's influence on Putin's thinking.

Just like a broken clock tells time correctly twice a day, so did some of Dugin's many ideas happen to materialize. In some other respects he's simply delusional. Like when he imagines Poland might find any interest in joining his Eurasian Union, when he imagines Romania is a natural ally of Russia or that Japan would be interested in teaming up with Russia (an economy smaller than Italy's) against China instead of being part of the American-led anti-Chinese coalition.

He should be given credit for understanding neither Turkey nor China can be long term allies for Russia in spite the current friendly overtures of each of those 3 towards the others. But it's more about a broken clock being right than deep insight.

(Actually neither can China and Turkey be long-term best buddies given the resources rich Central-Asian Turkic states are prime targets for the Chinese economic and political expansion while the Turkish economy would benefit from accessing those natural resources too..)

As for Iran, they are on good terms with Russia right now only because the Russians accidentally help them regain the political control over Eastern Mediterranean some 1400 years after the Persians had last controlled [directly and briefly] those shores. Iran's strategic interest is to have safe trade routes to Western Europe and decent enough political relations to put those trade routes to good use. Once that strategic goal is achieved Iran doesn't need Russia anymore. On the other hand the Iranians realize they are standing in Russia's way to the Indian Ocean, which means their more likely move once Syria is pacified would be to improve their relations with the US.

Bottom line: Dugin is right Russia needs to be part of an Eurasian Union else it would lose Siberia to China. But that won't happen as he imagines, with Russia leading that Eurasian Union. What would probably happen is Russia would be eventually gobbled up by EU's expansion eastward. Putin's shenanigans in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea won't be able to prevent that from happening.

Indeed Dugin is delusional, but sadly so is your post.

(1) Russia isn't "driving to the Indian Ocean". There is no strategic reason for it to do so.
(2) Russia will not "lose Siberia to China" - I know you hope Russia will split up, but it simply won't happen. Sorry.
(3) Russia's economy (PPP - nominal is not an appropriate comparison as it doesn't take into account local price differences) is around the same size as Germany's. Sorry again.

[RangerGxi]

1) Various social sciences neocon loons from America say that he is important and try to use him to portray the Kremlin as essentially fascists.

Putin has outlawed parties that cater to his ideas. It'd be silly to place him as a relevant.

Dugin's grand geopolitical strategy
A region-by-region explanation of Dugin's strategy

I don't see how that matches with Russian strategy, or reality at all. Reads like the ranting of a demagogue.

Nazbol stuff is pretty ridiculous. I get where this idea of a global capitalist conspiracy comes from but It'd be nice if people would prove it before calling for countries to dedicate everything to fighting it.

[hellheaven1987]

I find Robert D. Kaplan's "The Revenge of Geography" a better description about Russian mentality and possible geopolitical move. But general speaking, geopolitic of great powers is not much different than petty competition between two villages in South Sudan today anyway.

[Love Mountain]

Roma, you're not actually buying this garbage are you?

[Roma_Victrix]

Roma, you're not actually buying this garbage are you?

Are you asking me if I believe in all the loony ideas put forth by Dugin?! If so, no. That's not the point of this thread, though. Nice try. The point of this thread is to inquire to what degree some of Dugin's loony ideas have become accepted by the Russian military establishment, the Kremlin, or even Putin. I place that within the context of Russia's recent expansionism and military actions in Georgia and Ukraine, their erstwhile alliance with Iran thanks to the Syrian Civil War, if not their concerted efforts to undermine the EU by giving a platform to Eurosceptics. Obviously Dugin is out of his element in thinking that current NATO allies in Eastern Europe will drop that alliance in favor of a political union with Russia, or that Japan has any interest in forming an alliance with Russia, or that Russia is capable of undermining China's territorial sovereignty/integrity, or even more ludicrous, incorporating Manchuria, Tibet, and Xinjiang into a renewed Russian empire.

I find Robert D. Kaplan's "The Revenge of Geography" a better description about Russian mentality and possible geopolitical move. But general speaking, geopolitic of great powers is not much different than petty competition between two villages in South Sudan today anyway.

Cool, I'll have to check it out! Thanks for sharing.

Indeed Dugin is delusional, but sadly so is your post.

(1) Russia isn't "driving to the Indian Ocean". There is no strategic reason for it to do so.

Yep, this doesn't make much sense given the present geopolitical reality and Dugin was suggesting it as part of a proposed alliance system with Iran (kind of like how US troops come close to the Russian border thanks to the Baltic states being NATO allies). Dugin is clearly nutty for thinking Iran has any interest in allowing Russia to build or share military bases/seaports along the Persian Gulf, let alone the giant brick wall it would face with nuclear-armed India and Pakistan next-door. It does, however, highlight the special relationship that Russia is seeking with Iran at the moment, and not just in arms deals, but also interstate cooperation over Syria and propping up Assad. It's an alliance of convenience and shared interest, with Russia clearly interested in maintaining its military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

(2) Russia will not "lose Siberia to China" - I know you hope Russia will split up, but it simply won't happen. Sorry.

Yes, obviously that's absurd. For that matter, China hasn't really capitalized on the populations of "overseas Chinese" in countries as far afield as Canada, but concentrated far more heavily, obviously, in southeast Asian countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. They aren't really the source of China's power in these countries. It's China's economic might and domestic manufacturing prowess that really matters. They seem far more interested in shoring up claims to islands in the South China Sea than poking the Russian bear in the eye by making threatening overtures in regards to Siberia. The best they could do is simply gobble up and buy most of the private industries there, but more likely this would be a shared venture with Russian companies. Again, that's not the equivalent of China taking Siberia from Russia.

(3) Russia's economy (PPP - nominal is not an appropriate comparison as it doesn't take into account local price differences) is around the same size as Germany's. Sorry again.

Actually, measuring each country's nominal GDP is a standard way to compare their economies, and the nominal GDP of Russia versus Italy as of 2013 was $2.1 versus $2.07 trillion. Russia has a greater purchasing power parity than Italy ($3.5 versus $2.1 trillion), but Italy's per capita GDP was $34,619, while Russia’s was $14,612, hence greater wealth relative to the size of the overall population. I don't think the idea of a significant disparity in living standards and average wealth of each family for Russia and Italy comes as much of a shock, though, if you've been to the developed areas of northern Italy and then compare them to places in Russia outside of Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

Dugin is not taken seriously by the Russian leadership. He was just useful to Putin for a little while for stirring up the nationalist fervor among a small and otherwise motley minority of educated Russians. But then Putin realized Dugin wasn't gaining much traction and as a result Dugin fell out of whatever marginal favor he had enjoyed up until then.

That much can be said about Dugin's current relations to Putin and on Dugin's influence on Putin's thinking.

Just like a broken clock tells time correctly twice a day, so did some of Dugin's many ideas happen to materialize. In some other respects he's simply delusional. Like when he imagines Poland might find any interest in joining his Eurasian Union, when he imagines Romania is a natural ally of Russia or that Japan would be interested in teaming up with Russia (an economy smaller than Italy's) against China instead of being part of the American-led anti-Chinese coalition.

He should be given credit for understanding neither Turkey nor China can be long term allies for Russia in spite the current friendly overtures of each of those 3 towards the others. But it's more about a broken clock being right than deep insight.

Fair enough. However, in my OP I already highlighted the fact that Dugin did not flaunt any real political power and holds no prestigious position beyond that department chairmanship at Moscow State University he lost three years ago thanks to his outrageous statements about killing Ukrainians. I'm less interested in Dugin the man than I am some of his geopolitical ideas that seem to reflect Russian foreign policy choices of late.

I guess what I'm trying to say here is a classic "chicken before the egg" argument: was Russia bound to recognize its limitations in aligning with Turkey and China, or did Dugin (and others) plant this useful little kernel in the collective memory of Russia's military establishment? How much of Dugin's rhetoric about Georgia and Ukraine contributed to Russia's recent involvement in armed conflicts there? I suppose the Syrian Civil War presented Russia with a unique opportunity to bolster ties with Iran, but was there a preconceived framework for it?

[Dromikaites]

Right now China's resources come mostly from Africa, which would be a major liability in case of a conventional war with any of the likely enemies possessing a more powerful navy than China's.

Controlling those islands won't help solve that strategic problem. That is why I think the South China Sea conflict is just for internal consumption.

Siberia is a different story. All what China needs in order to annex it is to deny Russia a nuclear option. That can be achieved either by developing anti-ballistic missile technology or by developing advanced missiles. Both means require money and scientists, something the Chinese have plenty. And of course time, which the Chinese also have (and stealing technology helps making things happen faster).

However discouraging Russia from retaliating with nukes is not the only possible course of action for China. If the Russian Federation collapses just like the Soviet Union did, then China can help herself with Siberia even before her technology is at the required level.

This is why the Russian leaders are under no illusion regarding a long term friendship with China. They simply consider the West a more imminent threat.

As for why Russia would need naval bases with acces to the Indian Ocean, that's obvious: as long as a nuclear war is not an option, the ability to hurt enemies with conventional forces like navies will continue to be very important.

[athanaric]

that Japan would be interested in teaming up with Russia (an economy smaller than Italy's) against China instead of being part of the American-led anti-Chinese coalition.

I find one of Huntington's scenarios interesting, which has Russia teaming up with the US and whatever is left of Europe against an aggressive China (and her vassals) trying to claim Siberia.

He should be given credit for understanding neither Turkey nor China can be long term allies for Russia in spite the current friendly overtures of each of those 3 towards the others. But it's more about a broken clock being right than deep insight.

(Actually neither can China and Turkey be long-term best buddies given the resources rich Central-Asian Turkic states are prime targets for the Chinese economic and political expansion while the Turkish economy would benefit from accessing those natural resources too..)

There's also ethnic issues between Turkey and China, not helped by massive, expansionist nationalism on both sides.

As for Iran, they are on good terms with Russia right now only because the Russians accidentally help them regain the political control over Eastern Mediterranean some 1400 years after the Persians had last controlled [directly and briefly] those shores. Iran's strategic interest is to have safe trade routes to Western Europe and decent enough political relations to put those trade routes to good use. Once that strategic goal is achieved Iran doesn't need Russia anymore. On the other hand the Iranians realize they are standing in Russia's way to the Indian Ocean, which means their more likely move once Syria is pacified would be to improve their relations with the US.

If they improve their relations with the West. That's a big if. Maybe it would be smaller if Obama were king and neither Trump nor the Clintonists were near presidential power...

[Love Mountain]

Are you asking me if I believe in all the loony ideas put forth by Dugin?! If so, no. That's not the point of this thread, though. Nice try. The point of this thread is to inquire to what degree some of Dugin's loony ideas have become accepted by the Russian military establishment, the Kremlin, or even Putin. I place that within the context of Russia's recent expansionism and military actions in Georgia and Ukraine, their erstwhile alliance with Iran thanks to the Syrian Civil War, if not their concerted efforts to undermine the EU by giving a platform to Eurosceptics. Obviously Dugin is out of his element in thinking that current NATO allies in Eastern Europe will drop that alliance in favor of a political union with Russia, or that Japan has any interest in forming an alliance with Russia, or that Russia is capable of undermining China's territorial sovereignty/integrity, or even more ludicrous, incorporating Manchuria, Tibet, and Xinjiang into a renewed Russian empire.

Of course I'm asking whether you actually believe that this book has somehow infiltrated Russian Stavka. This book isn't guiding anyone's "Grand Strategy". I originally found the references to this book in some Reddit post in r/worldnews in yet another anti-Russian thread, which referenced some conspiracy site as a source. Since then the theory exploded and is now a popular trope in Reddit that's repeated by bone-headed armchair generals. Dugin's book is not a guide nor an influence on Russian grand strategy, it's actually just a reflection of it. It references some truths to Russian strategy but creates absurd reasons and motivations for them.

Putin's foreign policy is influence by history, realpolitik, and patriotic zeal. Russia's foreign policy, which has been defined by authoritarian pragmatism, does not show any signs of a pre-determined "plan". You can tell by the stark reversal of Moscow's stance on China as a result of the events in Ukraine. The events in Ukraine were a reaction to an unforeseen event, Moscow was happy with the state of affairs by keeping a pro-Russian president in power in Ukraine. Similarly with Georgia, a response to Georgia's NATO aspirations. Mind you, I'm not justifying Russian behavior or saying they are appropriate, but I can hardly see the events that transpired since 2000, as a reflection of Dugin's influence on anything. Quite frankly, I thought the Mudpit was above referencing this ridiculous conspiracy theory and that's not me being sensitive about Russia. That's me finding the "Dugin theory" to be a level of absurd that I typically see in Obama birther theories.

[hellheaven1987]

I would rather argue that Russia's interest is not Indian Ocean, but India itself, as India plays a crucial role in Russia's Central Asia influence (not to mention as counter balance against Chinese). A Moscow-New Delhi Axis can be a potential Long Wall to contain Chinese westward movement, which is crucial for Russia's own control of Siberia.

Yep, this doesn't make much sense given the present geopolitical reality and Dugin was suggesting it as part of a proposed alliance system with Iran (kind of like how US troops come close to the Russian border thanks to the Baltic states being NATO allies). Dugin is clearly nutty for thinking Iran has any interest in allowing Russia to build or share military bases/seaports along the Persian Gulf, let alone the giant brick wall it would face with nuclear-armed India and Pakistan next-door. It does, however, highlight the special relationship that Russia is seeking with Iran at the moment, and not just in arms deals, but also interstate cooperation over Syria and propping up Assad. It's an alliance of convenience and shared interest, with Russia clearly interested in maintaining its military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Iran and Russia are just friends of benefit, since Iran can never truly abandon Muslims under infidels' rule (if it wants to call itself an Islamic State).

Yes, obviously that's absurd. For that matter, China hasn't really capitalized on the populations of "overseas Chinese" in countries as far afield as Canada, but concentrated far more heavily, obviously, in southeast Asian countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. They aren't really the source of China's power in these countries. It's China's economic might and domestic manufacturing prowess that really matters. They seem far more interested in shoring up claims to islands in the South China Sea than poking the Russian bear in the eye by making threatening overtures in regards to Siberia. The best they could do is simply gobble up and buy most of the private industries there, but more likely this would be a shared venture with Russian companies. Again, that's not the equivalent of China taking Siberia from Russia.

In the age of Neo-Imperialism, indirect rule is the basic game method.

I guess what I'm trying to say here is a classic "chicken before the egg" argument: was Russia bound to recognize its limitations in aligning with Turkey and China, or did Dugin (and others) plant this useful little kernel in the collective memory of Russia's military establishment? How much of Dugin's rhetoric about Georgia and Ukraine contributed to Russia's recent involvement in armed conflicts there? I suppose the Syrian Civil War presented Russia with a unique opportunity to bolster ties with Iran, but was there a preconceived framework for it?

Russia has no true friend because it does not believe in friendship.

[Ἀπολλόδοτος Α΄ ὁ Σωτήρ]

Russia has no true friend because it does not believe in friendship.

Maybe Russia doesn't believe in friendship, but these people and their government really, I mean really, like Russia and Putin. Arguably, they have benefited much more from Russia than vice-versa.

[Love Mountain]

Maybe Russia doesn't believe in friendship, but these people and their government really, I mean really, like Russia and Putin. Arguably, they have benefited much more from Russia than vice-versa.

Genuine friendship or is Russia just the largest energy supplier for the Balkans?

[Ἀπολλόδοτος Α΄ ὁ Σωτήρ]

I don't know much about serbian energy supplies, however serbian russophilia is well known to anyone living in the Balkans. I follow Balkan politics closely and have travelled to Belgrade several times, as far as average Serb goes, from my personal experience, 3 out of 4 are russophile. Note that russophile in most cases doesn't imply they are against EU membership, however they are vehemently opposed to NATO.

The Serbian goverment wants cooperation with EU but in a way that doesn't damage their relations with Russia. Most of serbian politicians are openly against NATO membership and for not participating in any sanctions against Russia. Serbian far-right is firmly pro-russian and advocates military alliance with Russia, they have even fought in Crimea.

Serbs and Russians share the same religion and some cultural traits, their cultures were heavily influenced by Byzantium and thus Serbs tend to be very friendly to Greeks as well, but Russians are definitely their favorite people, they like them more than they like Montenegrins.