Holy Roman Emperor Frederick the Great?

[♔Oggie♔]

I do not intend this threat to fall under the topic of alternate history, so the title is perhaps a bit poorly chosen. However after days of paper deadlines and exams my brain has run out of any original thought...

Anyways, I was reading up on the Austro-Hungarian empire and it's conscription policy in the 19th century. However as with any person that is interested in history I found myself looking for more information on basically everything that I read on every new page. The problem is that you quickly wander off to other time periods and topics... resulting in 20+ wikipedia webpages as tabs. Long story short, I wandered off from Austria-Hungary to the Holy Roman Empire in the 18th century and of course the rivalry between Prussia and the Habsburg monarchy. This led me to asking the following question:
Why did Frederick the Great never try to become Holy Roman Emperor? Yes I know the Habsburgs wore the crown continuously four two-hundered years or so, but the elector of Bavaria was emperor between 1742-1745, so it was still possible for another monarch to be elected.

So, given the rivalry between Austria and Prussia, why did Frederick the Great never tried to become Holy Roman Emperor? I cannot find this information anywhere, so therefore I thought of asking you guys on this forum. Thanks!

[KEA]

This indeed was in the sphere of possibilities (I think a proposition like that was put forward by France), but there were several reasons against it. Most of all the Frederic didn't want to and that he was a Protestant (so no chance to be elected by the mostly Catholic electoral council).

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

During the "Potato War" (the Bavarian Succession War 1778-1779) Frederick actually got enough support from Bavaria and Saxony, among other German states, to challenge the authority of the Austrians. However he really only intended to use it as a bargaining chip against the Austrians as he did not himself have the true aspirations to become Emperor nor did he see any particular value in it as Austria was on the decline and Prussia itself was declining. Due to the Franco-Austrian alliance there was no real way for Frederick to become Emperor and challenge both France and Austria and perhaps many others. His goal was exclusively to use enough backing to force the Austrians to drop their claims over Bavaria and keep them from becoming overly powerful. But as I said Prussia was on the decline, the "Potato War" was one of Frederick's worst campaigns, not that it was much better for von Lacy and von Laudon though.

[♔Oggie♔]

Ah nice, so basically strategic calculations made him want to stay out of the becoming emperor scheme?
Prussia in itself could not challenge an Austrian-Franco alliance,k and the Habsburgs would of course be pissed off if Frederick managed to sway the vote.
So with the position itself having mostly only prestige benefits and no real power, it was not worth aggravating two great powers.

That seems like a rational motive. Thanks guys!

[Owlparrot3]

Well my opinion and it may be wrong is that Fredrick was simply not interested .The HRE was a state that was falling apart and was catholic while Prussia was protestant .Also Fredrick was among the first of nationalistic monarchs .He wanted to make Prussia a great power by bringing lands under his direct control rather than play around with the court politics,political intrigues and the glorious net of dynastic alliances that were prevalent in the HRE .Also the Habsburgs lineage contirbuted to all this .Even though at one point he had the required influence to become the emperor .He like everybody knew that defeating the Habsburgs in politics was hard .

[KEA]

Well my opinion and it may be wrong is that Fredrick was simply not interested .The HRE was a state that was falling apart and was catholic while Prussia was protestant .Also Fredrick was among the first of nationalistic monarchs .He wanted to make Prussia a great power by bringing lands under his direct control rather than play around with the court politics,political intrigues and the glorious net of dynastic alliances that were prevalent in the HRE .

Fixed

[Cyclops]

I think the HRE was becoming less of a functional state and more of a dead weight in operative terms. The Kreise still served some administrative purpose, but the Diet was not able to effectively decide matters as the larger component states of the HRE were acting as sovereign powers in their own right: the recess of 1803 proved how fragile it had all become.

The Emperor Francis finally played the self destruct card in 1804 to prevent Napoleon seizing the HRE on his death (I think Napoleon had enough electorates in hand with the defection of Bavaria in 1803, and looked likely to sweep a couple more-as he in fact did easily), maybe that was available to Joseph II and Maria Teresa?

I have to say the Prussians were not well liked under Frederick the Great. He was a daring opportunist an useful tool for the Great Powers but Prussia in his day was a third rate power with a first rate army. I was not really a huge player, just one farting higher than its own arse for extended periods. I think there were a lot of lolz when they were nearly obliterated in 1806, they'd built up a great deal of jealousy and ill will over the last eight decades or so. He was feared and too a degree respected but not liked.

Its quite likely the comfortably semi-independent electors would not be interested in an activist reformer like Freddie either: the ramshackle structures gave the great and small states of the Empire room to be themselves, and many preferred semi-independent weakness to unified strength.

I imagine Frederick built up too many bad boy points to be a serious electoral contender but the religious question is also pertinent: there was never a protestant Emperor before or after, and there was a great deal of rusted-on Catholic ideology about the Imperial Crown. maybe he could have converted? he was a cynical treacherous prick , maybe his subjects would not have minded, or maybe they would have stabbed him in his bed for such a reversal.

So because Frederick was too rude, too successful and too protestant being elected Emperor was never really an option: had he tried I think the Austrians would have either laughed or destroyed the Empire as the occasion deserved.

[Spear Dog]

I was not really a huge player, just one farting higher than its own arse for extended periods.

Aha! I've long suspected you to be the reincarnation of an autocratic military genius, gotcha!

[Cyclops]

Aha! I've long suspected you to be the reincarnation of an autocratic military genius, gotcha!

It was the voices, they told me I was him (when I'm not Napoleon) .

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Arguably the HRE stopped being viable during the Austrian Succession War. The Thirty Years War (or the Schmalkaldic League) aside this was when the Bavarians (von Wittelsback) challenged the von Hapsburg Emperors and claimed the title themselves. Not just that but they got backing from France and Prussia. Since the Spanish Succession War the Bavarians had decided to back the French despite the fact that in ages prior the Bavarians had been allies of the Austrians. However the French, Bavarians and Prussians (Frederick being more interested in his own slice of the pie, aka Silesia) made peace with Austria with limited gains. France and Bavaria did not lose very much other than that Maria Theresa and her husband Francis of Lorraine became Emperor and Empress. The fact that Prussia became as powerful as it did and then openly challenged Hapsburg rule despite having received their favour in the time of Frederick's father, grandfather and great grandfather was in my opinion the main game changer. The Austrians realized this which is why they attempted to grab Bavaria and solidify their position within Germany during the "Potato War" luckily Frederick stopped them. As such the HRE became rather irrelevant but as a smaller state the Austrians could always count on their alliance with France and Tsarina Catherine's "make Russia a European power" schemes.

Ultimately Frederick saw that it was in his interests to cooperate with Austria and Russia for some mutual gain (also no longer possessing the ability for more long fights. France on the other hand was virtually isolated except for their Spanish cousins and their Austrian alliance and so in that regard their borders were secure but did not have the financial ability or military backbone to run around starting wars. The long decline of Austria and almost immediate decline of Prussia turned out to be in Russian and French benefit in the long term. The way I would put it is that Frederick's father and grandfather built up the state which was in a good position that Frederick inherited. However Frederick spent it all and Prussia's decline began which came to a rude awakening by the Napoleonic Wars where France decimated the Prussians in 1806 and Russia came out of the Congress of Vienna having taken almost all of Poland. For Prussia and Austria it continued to be an awkward balancing act until the swift end of the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs at the end of WW1.

[KEA]

The way I would put it is that Frederick's father and grandfather built up the state which was in a good position that Frederick inherited. However Frederick spent it all and Prussia's decline began which came to a rude awakening by the Napoleonic Wars where France decimated the Prussians in 1806.

That's a point of view 19th Century historians had on "Old Prussia". In particular the army of 1806 was seen as a dinosaur locked in outdated traditions to uphold the memory of a king that was first of all a French-loving warmonger. In contrast, post-1806 Prussia was seen as a modern German state, defended and saved by its "citizens' army" against French suppression. Without the nationalist element, this also became part of the socialist historiography, and that way found its way into modern works up until the late 1980s: in 1806 a "people's army" defeated a "lords' army", but this crisis was overcome by the "revolution from above". That way Napoleon and Prussia fitted into Marxists historiography.

Taking a closer look at the period between the SYW and the French Revolution, it turns out that this point of view does not correspond with reality. Frederic was as much a reformer in his peace years as he was a general in his war years, in particular in the important fields of jurisdiction and agriculture. The army too underwent its reforms, and a couple of developments being attributed to the French Revolution or Napoleon are in fact military innovations made in Prussia (and Austria) in the late 18th Century, as a result of the experience in the SYW; such as the usage of assault columns, screens of light infantry, concentration of artillery and so on. The Army of 1806 was a good army wasted by poor generals. Ironically, two relics of the Ferderician period were considered the most competent generals in 1806, Blücher and Ferdinand von Braunschweig (not to be confused with the brilliant Ferdinand von Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel who command the Prussian armies on the western theater during the SYW).

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

That posts deserves a far longer response than I shall give. I would give much of the credit of the Prussian army reforms from around 1803 onward to Gerhard von Scharnhorst. Personally though I see the "people's war" as a total myth. It was essentially a war of the state rather than a war of the king and the Freikorps played a relatively small part in comparison.

That aside I would be hesitant to say that Frederick's Prussian armies started most of what the French would do decades later. Mostly I would argue that they did not do so in a systematic way. Even if that is so one would also be required to prove that the French adopted directly from the Prussians. As for Frederick's reforms well yes he was a state reformer and a military reformer but he didn't come close to the many administrative reforms enacted during the Revolutionary period. Though it would be a lie to say that Frederick did not spend the last years of his reign on state reforms.

[KEA]

I would give much of the credit of the Prussian army reforms from around 1803 onward to Gerhard von Scharnhorst.

That's the "New Prussian Army" as opposed to the "Old Prussian Army".

Personally though I see the "people's war" as a total myth. It was essentially a war of the state rather than a war of the king and the Freikorps played a relatively small part in comparison.

It was called a "people's war" first of all because of the mass conscription. The Freikorps, or women donating their jewelry and stuff like that, are part of the story too. But that's what later generations made of it.

That aside I would be hesitant to say that Frederick's Prussian armies started most of what the French would do decades later. Mostly I would argue that they did not do so in a systematic way. Even if that is so one would also be required to prove that the French adopted directly from the Prussians.

That's the general development of tactics in the inter-war period. Problem is that most people stop reading at the end of the SYW and start reading again at the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars, assuming that "post-Frederician" tactics were single-handed created by Napoleon somewhere between Italy and Egypt. That's wrong. Assault columns were successfully used by both Austrians and Prussians in the last stages of the SYW. Concentration of artillery in general was a major feature in that war. And of course, the British hired German light infantry for a reason, because the German armies, first of all Austria, were leading in light infantry tactics in the 18th Century. All this, of course, found its way into military doctrine, development and teaching in the interwar-period; as such a certain cadet in Brienne would had learned that too in 1779...

The generals of the 1770s and 1780s certainly didn't pretend that everything they did in the 1750s and 1760s had not happened. Just check the theoretical works of that period (hard to find online BTW).

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

I think you misunderstood what I was trying to say. That Blucher is considered good is true, that he was a good commander is arguable, that he was the best commander that the Prussians had is most likely true. But that aside I would give much of Prussia's success to Gerhard von Scharnhorst. Though their "liberation" had more to do with the Tsar and the general zealotry which the populace and military expressed rather than the king himself who was almost becoming redundant. Hence my statement that it was a war of the state rather than the king.

I've found a few theoretical works and books about the development of tactics and mass warfare. That is where my assertion that Prussia was not doing these things systematically. Concentration of artillery had more to do with circumstances in my opinion rather than an established tactic and it was not done by anyone consistently. Prussia was also not known for its light infantry and these were incorporated on any significant scale by Frederick. But again this was more due to circumstance than as a systematic improvement or creation since Prussia's light troops severely declined and were generally distrusted. There was no real reform incorporating light infantry until the 1790-1804 period. The theories were all there, the for example Division was arguably invented in the Seven Years War period by the French but they did not reorganize the army as such, that was what Carnot did decades later. It was not invented as an idea by Napoleon nor Carnot but it was they who implemented this consistently and systematically. They made these reforms and permanently so and used them on campaign and in battle. Although all throughout history you will find that no one person invented something. Usually it was a concept that was tempered over time and then implemented. There was the guy who did it first and the guy who did it best.

[Cyclops]

There is a sea change with the Soldier King Frederick. His many reforms of the kingdom he inherited seem to be consonant with those of an enlightened despot, making the absolute most of what he had, but arguably he was strengthening the state so he could strengthen the army. of course its not just one or the other, but Frederick was an opportunist warmonger in his early days and his reputation suffered for it in his later years, rather like Louis XIV. If there is someone Frederick was imitating its the Sun King: annexations, taking on the world, sensible reforms at home and military glory abroad, no wonder he loved French and hated German, Freddie was a closet Bourbon.

This feeds back into OP's question. As an enlightened despot, who enjoyed rather pagan orgies with Voltaire (if the rumours are true), corresponded with Yekaterina Velikaya and joined the Freemasons Frederick was not a traditionalist. He was a thoroughly modern young man when he took the throne and remained an unconventional self willed grump to his grave. Such a man would be unlikely to pile the hoary chains and musty restrictions of an ancient and irrational institution as the office of Holy Roman Emperor of the German Nation upon himself. He didn't want to earn some old title, he wanted to make himself a new one.

On the matter of the Prussian army, certainly the winds of nationalism blew hard through Germany (spiralling out across Europe from the epicentre of Paris with wildly variable results) and the Prussian state responded very smartly. The creation of the landwehr (essentially a levee en masse), an quantum increase in artillery, the focus away from cavalry and rigid linear tactics to spirited column attacks all show the importance of French Revolutionary influence on the new army. The spirit of national identity and renewal was harnessed through these reforms.

Above all the complete reform of the officer corps and staff system (a response rather than an imitation of the French staff system, one could hardly expect the Prussians to unearth the galaxy of brilliant generals available as leaders and aide-de-camps to the Revolutionary, Consular and Imperial army) set a new direction German military tradition, one that saw the Prussian and Second Reich army achieve pre-eminence in Europe. Allowing every officer on the staff an opportunity to speak freely so strategy and tactics were thoroughly tested made for professional and imaginative warmaking: IIRC British attaches in 1815 found the German staff meetings unsettling, seemingly disrespectful of the commanding general (how could a mere colonel question a proposal of the greatly admired Blucher?). Once again the "new spirit" of nationalism and brotherhood was harnessed here, then disciplined and sent into battle for the dynasty.

[KEA]

Prussia was also not known for its light infantry and these were incorporated on any significant scale by Frederick. But again this was more due to circumstance than as a systematic improvement or creation since Prussia's light troops severely declined and were generally distrusted. There was no real reform incorporating light infantry until the 1790-1804 period.

The Füsiliere as distinguished light infantry were established in Prussia in 1783, that's before facing the armies of the French Revolution, leave alone Napoleon. In 1806 the Prussian army had no less than 24 battalions of light infantry, all but 4 established in the 1780s. I think this should do to rebut the idea that this happened as some kind of reaction to the Revolutionary forces. We can also agree that this was not invented overnight but result of developments in the inter-war period based on the experience of the SYW.

Frederic himself created the Jäger-Regiment (rifles) in 1756. The battle role of the light infantry in Frederic's army was fulfilled by the battalions of grenadiers, a rather unique establishment in the Prussian army. The light infantry Frederic detested were the Freikorps. These not were front-line units but paramilitary formations raised for the "little war". In fact, these were mostly composed of deserters, POWs, criminals and the like, suited only for raiding and raping but most of the times proved useless when facing true soldiers.

[Cyclops]

... The battle role of the light infantry in Frederic's army was fulfilled by the battalions of grenadiers, a rather unique establishment in the Prussian army....

Thanks for that, I was not aware he used his big boys for that role.

Frederick's army reforms are an interesting combination of rational and economical. He poured money into creating a decent cavalry arm so the strength of the infantry he inherited could be transformed into telling victories, but IIRC he really struggled to keep up with the increase in artillery that was occurring through the 18th century.

Brilliant solutions like the horse artillery stopped that gap for a while, but I have a feeling the War of the Bavarian Succession (that's the Potato War is it?) was a fairly bloodless affair because that's how Frederick wanted it: he was in the enviable position of having a reputation so strong no one really wanted to attack him, but perhaps lacked the resources for yet another bloodbath.

Just had a look at a history site, the Prussians came in to support the Saxons in that conflict to prevent a resurgence of the Hapsburg hegemony? Interesting, that's pretty cynical even for Frederick given how hard he hammered the Saxons in the two previous wars. Maybe after that war the Saxons would feel grateful enough to give him their vote (and Brandenburg already has one vote) so that's two, he needs what, five total out of eight at this period? Hanover is a possibility, but surely less so after the infamous reversal of alliances, but if he's elected before that then Saxony is an enemy.

The Hapsburgs have the three Prince bishops and Bohemia in the bag, they just need to bribe one more dude and out of Hanover, Saxony and Bavaria there's no chance of Prussia grabbing all three, let alone getting their own fifth (or even fourth).

The Hapsburgs could be stopped, they were involved in Central European monarchies as well as German principalities and Italy to boot. If they tried anything funny (as Joseph II did in Bavaria) then the Fursts could whip up a quick opportunistic league to stifle things, and it would be back to business as usual, comfortable German herrschaft at its best. If they elected the vain stroppy trouble maker from Potsdam then God knows what he'd get up to. He was a sodomite you know, and had a rapport with that awful Sophie woman on the Neva. What sort of a man consorts with Voltaire? He'd probably try to reform things, tinker with the easygoing modus vivendi that grew up in the shelter of Vienna and Westphalia. Nein nein nein we can't have that!

Essentially Germany had a good thing going and weren't prepared to upset their own applecart for the sake of modernity. In the end the little Corsican did it for them.

[KEA]

Thanks for that, I was not aware he used his big boys for that role.

This was of course not 19th Century light infantry, but anytime something special was required a Prussian general would had called for the grenadiers (which also was somewhat convenient because the parent regiments had to replace any casualties these battalions suffered). BTW, big guys only in peace times; in war times usually the most reliable men of a regiment became its grenadiers.

Just had a look at a history site, the Prussians came in to support the Saxons in that conflict to prevent a resurgence of the Hapsburg hegemony? Interesting, that's pretty cynical even for Frederick given how hard he hammered the Saxons in the two previous wars.

Saxony constantly switched sides (and usually was on the receiving end of the show).

[♔Oggie♔]

I think Cyclop's post basically states it all. Frederick was unloved in by many german principalities and the Habsburgs had the benefit of 4 votes they could count on (at least versus any protestant competitor).

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Frederick's army reforms are an interesting combination of rational and economical. He poured money into creating a decent cavalry arm so the strength of the infantry he inherited could be transformed into telling victories, but IIRC he really struggled to keep up with the increase in artillery that was occurring through the 18th century.

I think that Frederick's most telling reforms were increasing the cavalry arm. By doing this he had decent cavalry and strong regular infantry which was a lethal combination and closed the gap with the Austrians which he experienced during the Austrian Succession where he could not match Austrian cavalry. Aside from gaining some strong heavy cavalry he also adopted the Austrian light cavalry and then created regiments of "irregulars". From the Austrians he also got the light infantry. In terms of artillery I would argue that his reforms gave the Prussians the strongest artillery in all of Europe. The idea was essentially to produce cheaper and lighter cannons while still remaining effective within their weight category. In that regard Frederick's best influences were the French and the Austrians but he also put Russian and Swedish designs to good use. Actually I think that most of the military manuals used by him were German (aside from their own traditions the Prussians also began to see the good things the Austrian armies could put to field) and French manuals. However keeping up with the French and Austrians was certainly a challenge as the French ultimately won the cannon arms race with the Gribeauval System of 1776 or the Year 11 System of 1803. Though I would stress that Frederick increased the amount of cannons in his arsenal by a ridiculous amount.

Though I will say that his chief failings were in other areas. He was at least able to call up the Freikorps late into the Seven Years War and raise another army which he had lost in his more recent defeats.

Brilliant solutions like the horse artillery stopped that gap for a while, but I have a feeling the War of the Bavarian Succession (that's the Potato War is it?) was a fairly bloodless affair because that's how Frederick wanted it: he was in the enviable position of having a reputation so strong no one really wanted to attack him, but perhaps lacked the resources for yet another bloodbath.

Just had a look at a history site, the Prussians came in to support the Saxons in that conflict to prevent a resurgence of the Hapsburg hegemony? Interesting, that's pretty cynical even for Frederick given how hard he hammered the Saxons in the two previous wars. Maybe after that war the Saxons would feel grateful enough to give him their vote (and Brandenburg already has one vote) so that's two, he needs what, five total out of eight at this period? Hanover is a possibility, but surely less so after the infamous reversal of alliances, but if he's elected before that then Saxony is an enemy.

The Hapsburgs have the three Prince bishops and Bohemia in the bag, they just need to bribe one more dude and out of Hanover, Saxony and Bavaria there's no chance of Prussia grabbing all three, let alone getting their own fifth (or even fourth).

The Hapsburgs could be stopped, they were involved in Central European monarchies as well as German principalities and Italy to boot. If they tried anything funny (as Joseph II did in Bavaria) then the Fursts could whip up a quick opportunistic league to stifle things, and it would be back to business as usual, comfortable German herrschaft at its best. If they elected the vain stroppy trouble maker from Potsdam then God knows what he'd get up to. He was a sodomite you know, and had a rapport with that awful Sophie woman on the Neva. What sort of a man consorts with Voltaire? He'd probably try to reform things, tinker with the easygoing modus vivendi that grew up in the shelter of Vienna and Westphalia. Nein nein nein we can't have that!

Essentially Germany had a good thing going and weren't prepared to upset their own applecart for the sake of modernity. In the end the little Corsican did it for them.

At the time of the "Potato War" the Catholic electorates were Mainz, Trier, Cologne, Bavaria and Bohemia/Hapsburgs. The Protestant electorates were Prussia, Saxony and Hanover. Given the circumstances Frederick was able to bring both Saxony and Bavaria over to his side which would give him 3 electoral votes. Though Frederick did not intend to actually claim the Imperial title but merely to give the Hapsburgs reason to give up one their claims against the Saxons and Bavarians. Emperor Joseph II desperately wanted to strengthen his position by annexing Bavaria and returning to a strong position as it was prior to the Austrian Succession. Naturally Frederick wanted to stop him so that the Hapsburgs would not be able to trample just about every other Prince and Elector. The fact that Frederick tried to dislodge the Hapsburgs from their highly privileged position, with Saxony and Bavaria in his pocket, was enough to bring Joseph II to the negotiating table. Losing the empire was not something that Joseph II was willing to risk.

The "Potato War" itself was more as a reaction by Frederick. The campaign itself was considered to be notably bad but it was more punctuated by massive logistical difficulties due to the very harsh winter in Bohemia and the surrounding area. Also due to their respective positions amidst the Bohemian mountains the Austrians and Prussians were poised for a frontal attack/slog fest. Neither side was really willing to risk a massive engagement and Frederick did not show his flare for maneuver (though hampered by the terrain and logistics). Where as the aggressive minded von Laudon was ignored by his cautious superior von Lacy. Attempts by the Austrians to invade Silesia were not successful for similar reasons and Silesia really is quite difficult to invade (especially from the south).