Why does is it that it seems like the best generals in U.S. history are hardly ever the top general in charge?

[RedGuard]

starting after WW1 the "General of the Army" or if you prefer Supreme commander has always been more of a political job than real good generalship. Eisenhower was great at mending fences between U.k. French and American relationships but he wasnt really that great tactically. MacArthur was sort of an idiot and yet he somehow was given command of the U.S. forces in Korea until Truman fired him. Patton was marginalized because he wasn't PC, but he was clearly one of the Best U.S. Generals in WW2 but had to play second fiddle to Bradley and Montgomery even though he was often in the right about what the German army was doing or thinking.

And a much more recent example is General David Patreus wanting to arm al-nusrah with weapons to fight isis regardless of the fact that they are an alqaeda front. Meanwhile General Mad Dog Mattis was marginalized because he said something off the record about letting Assad and Russia do in both and he was forced to resign from centcom. I guarantee McChrystal would have still been the commander if he hadn't challenged President Obama despite the fact that he is obviously a pretty mediocre general as well.
There are probably more examples of this going even farther back and what got me thinking about it was the fact That Napoleon got most of the credit his good generals did and I started thinking about U.S. history and its mostly the same thing. Why does it happen?

[Meelis13]

thats largely- especially concerning current events- subjective. And as you said, being top general in charge is more political job. Thats because nowadays there are so many allies working together, with each general having its own vision how to do things. That means inevitably, that top general has to play more of a politician to keep all generals working together, if you understand what i mean.
In the past, top general still had large ammounts of control over the battle/campaign due to nature of warfare- there was often 1 army vs another, while often large, not few million large as say in ww2.

[hellheaven1987]

Patton was an amateur fighting his own people.

[O'Hea]

Being a modern American combatant commander, especially in a region as complicated as CENTCOM, absolutely IS a political job. Even where there is combat, the generals fighting a counterinsurgency will always look unimpressive compared to generals maneuvering whole divisions in pitched battles.

Regarding Eisenhower versus Patton, for example- laymen appraise generals by whether or not they win a lot of battles. So if you're the overall commander and you don't have maneuver units under your direct command, then you end up looking like an inferior general compared to your subordinates who run armies for you.

[Cyclops]

Meelis and O'Hea have covered the main points well, basically in any army there are complex roles relating to recruitment, supply, motivation, politics etc. Armies tend to a hierarchy of seniority as well as being subject to political influences in most cases as well so the "top soldier" often is no fighting man.

Just a note on Napoleon: he really was a great soldier whether commanding a battery (as at Toulon) a small army (as in 1797) or the Grande Armee. Innovative, open minded, swift (mostly), decisive (mostly), a brilliant eye for terrain, a gunner such as the world has never seen, and the ordinary soldiers loved him like a God. He inspired a fair degree of loyalty in his immediate subordinates (they did force him to abdicate twice and then there's Bernadotte...) and had a knack for delegating (as at Austerlitz and Wagram) at the right moment (except in 1815, should've had Grouchy at Waterloo and Ney pursuing Blucher dammit). He sucked at grand strategy, his approach seems to have been "if popularity dips, start another war for the glory LOL" but that's a criticism of him as an emperor not as a general.

[Wulfburk]

pretty much as the others have said, but just gonna say that Patton playing second fiddle in ww2 was the right thing. Even though he still managed to get 4 of the 5 american divisions with the most casualties from normandy on.

The way Bradley, Dempsey and specially Montgomery coordinated the normandy campaign (with patton and Crerar being activated on its breakthrough stages) and facing the opposition they were it was pretty much quite an achievement and unsurpased by the western allies till the end of the war. If Patton was in place of Bradley it would have been a disaster.

[Darkhorse]

I'm glad you've mentioned Dempsey, a fascinating and underrated figure with a keen eye for maps and terrain. I don't think any other man was capable of commanding 2nd Army at the time except perhaps Alexander.

Regarding the original question, there are two traditional 'types' of commander roll. (Staff, in the case of the British, men like Alanbrooke, Dill, Wavell) and Field, (Horrocks, Crocker, Slim and Monty to certain extents).

Officers like Percival were fantastic staff officers but were incapable in the field, O'Connor was fantastic in the field but suffered when it came to the management side. Few men seem to be able to do both, Ivor Maxse is one, Monty to a certain extent.

This is a rather simplistic explanation, but effectively you need one breed of general to prosecute the war - decide strategy, manage recruitment and training, distribute logistics, liaise with between other services/politicians/nations/national leaders and another general, following the direction of the staff, to prosecute the tactical fighting up to about the Corps level.

[hellheaven1987]

If Patton was in place of Bradley it would have been a disaster.

He probably would do it fine since he already had experience about that in North Africa and Sicily, especially with Monty. However having Bradley was not a bad choice since he managed large unit formation better.

[Cyclops]

FWIW I have read that Patton was general the Wehrmacht watched with particular concern and it was a compelling element of Fortitude that Patton was given command of 1st Army Group: he was an active commander interested in mobility and developing situations, precisely what the Germans looked for in their own. Its easy to believe the US over-rate their own soldiers but in this case there is something to the legend.

There was a deal of polite friction in Overlord, and maybe putting Patton under Monty would have made that worse given their antithetical approaches: in the event Bradley managed the landing (and especially the sort of quick adaption required as his green army worked their way inland) extremely well, whereas Patton was certainly the most suitable for Cobra rather than grafting through the bocage.

Its a testament to the goodwill at the highest level of the WAllies (Churchill for all his faults liked, and knew how to work with, the US and FDR had a statesman's touch IMHO, kept his eye on the big picture) and in particular Eisenhower's management skills that all the ducks stayed in a row, and all these ambitious men settled for the roles they got. It would have been extremely easy for any one of Monty, Patton and (I am told an extremely fiery customer) Bradley to blow up; as it was the personalities were barely contained.

[Wulfburk]

Not to derail the thread, but last time i checked all of those "german keeping an eye interested in patton" are post war accounts (liddel hart is quite famous for those and inciting german generals to say all sorts of nonsense). And wasnt Cobra Bradley's operation? Patton was activated only once the breakthrough had been achieved. In normandy too there wasnt much of a clash between Bradley, Monty and Dempsey(which was why i said they coordinated quite well, Bradley and Monty's relation would only go south during the battle of the bulge). The one who made the biggest fuzz was Eisenhower as he was in England and had no clue on what was happening.

[Cyclops]

Not to derail the thread, but last time i checked all of those "german keeping an eye interested in patton" are post war accounts (liddel hart is quite famous for those and inciting german generals to say all sorts of nonsense).

Mate I'm here to learn, if I say something that sounds wrong please pull me up on it.

http://www.historynet.com/patton-the-german-view.htm

A quick Google reveals you are quite right, Patton went unnoticed until he was actually on the loose in France, but he then did gain some attention: he gets some credit for forceful movements in France and in Germany but also some (slightly unfair ) criticism for his somewhat inflated reputation as communicated by prisoners, and equally unfair criticism for timidity (his supplies were insufficient in late 1944 as Ike elected to spread his bets). As you say the highest praise does come from post war interviews: FWIW I would give some weight to the opinion of Guderian even if it was given to US interrogators.

Thanks for the correction, it was worth exploring further.

And wasn't Cobra Bradley's operation? Patton was activated only once the breakthrough had been achieved.

Quite right, thx again.

In normandy too there wasnt much of a clash between Bradley, Monty and Dempsey(which was why i said they coordinated quite well, Bradley and Monty's relation would only go south during the battle of the bulge). The one who made the biggest fuzz was Eisenhower as he was in England and had no clue on what was happening .

I'm basing my thinking on Beevor's book but he dutifully reported the lie about the Germans watching Patton carefully so he may be mistaken: there's a general sense (quite possibly wrong) that Monty was seen as a slowcoach by the US forces, as early as in Africa, and certainly once he "dallied" for three weeks in front of Caen which was a D+1 objective IIRC.

Of course Monty had good reason to proceed cautiously, he had a clear idea of the effectiveness of German dynamic mobility from his predecessor's experiences in the Western Desert, whereas the US forces seemed to have an almost over-confident desire to get at the Germans.

[hellheaven1987]

Not to derail the thread, but last time i checked all of those "german keeping an eye interested in patton" are post war accounts (liddel hart is quite famous for those and inciting german generals to say all sorts of nonsense).

German did keep an eye on Patton, for different reason however and was part of Allies propoganda warfare to mislead German.

In normandy too there wasnt much of a clash between Bradley, Monty and Dempsey(which was why i said they coordinated quite well, Bradley and Monty's relation would only go south during the battle of the bulge).

Nope, heavy friction between those three already happened during Caen and Falaise campaign; Monty, due to overconfidence and arrogance, had closely destroyed his reputation during Battle of Caen and in return he blamed everyone under him for the slow push in Caen - Dempsey, Canadian, Polish, etc. Then during Falaise pocket Bradley and Monty could not decide who the should close the pocket and resulted most German force escaped (it was reported Bradley regretted this even deeply years after the war ended), left a bitter taste between those two and finally explode during rush of September when Monty demanded all resource sent to him for Operation Market Garden (Bradley, in his work A Soldier's Story, claimed he was in fury when he knew Eisenhower gave Monty's operation first priority and immediately protested, with Patton at his back of course).

The one who made the biggest fuzz was Eisenhower as he was in England and had no clue on what was happening.

Actually Eisenhower protected Monty since everyone in England wanted to lynch him, including most RAF command and Churchill himself. Martin Blumenson's The Battle of The Generals is a good source to know all the bombs Monty dropped in Allies' high command and it does make you wonder how can one man be hated by so many men in his own side (and hence understand why Monty went to full gamble mode in Market Garden, which its failure dealed the final blow to his own self-confidence).

[Darkhorse]

The RAF's Tedder was another of Monty's greatest critics, and despite his efforts to protect him so was Ike. It was Alan Brooke who ultimately protected Monty the most. Also of note, Goodwood, which it has to be said was largely Dempsey's doing, was Monty's biggest fiasco - and yes, Monty did mismanage it, however, he protected Dempsey in that case.

The issue with Monty is thus, he was good, very good, not perfect, but likely the best available at the time.

What other option was there? O'Connor? Maybe, but he was ageing and ill, and was a desert man through and through. Normandy just didn't suit him. Horrocks? Possibly, but he was inexperienced, wounded, and spent much of the war out of service. Alexander and Slim? Equally if not more capable, but managing campaigns in more difficult theatres. Hobart? Another superb officer, but too confrontational, it was a battle just to get him back in service and he had to command the 79th, that division was Hobart. Hobart was ultimately very lucky that he got on with Monty and Churchill supremely well, because few others were convinced and both Dill and Martel opposed anything the man did. Dempsey? A skilled general, one of Britain's best, but mild of character and relatively unknown.

Monty was skilled enough, ticked enough boxes, was somewhat manageable if Brook was involved, and popular with the men.

[Wulfburk]

Actually the only thing that happened with Falaise was Bradley forcing Patton to halt, a decision he came on his own, and had nothing to do with Montgomery. Later on patton would say that he thought that decision would have come from 21st army group. But it didnt, Bradley did it because his troops were simply overstretched. There were no messages from Monty to Bradley or Patton in relation to that during Falaise. Again a result of post war claims .

And no, there was no friction between Bradley Demspey and Monty. The battle of Caen saw the british force the bulk of the german army in place while keeping the initiative and not allowing them to mass any reserve for a counter attack (while receiving less casualties than both the americans and germans, in fact). Bradley actually thanked over and over again for the british to do that. By Operation Cobra there were 800 german tanks in the british sector and 150 on the american. A direct result of the strategy, and a quick look in the directive Monty sent in 30 June confirms it.

There was of course setbacks, which some british divisional and corps commanders were sacked and etc.

And, Eisenhower actually made it worse. Only when Churchill and he came to see Montgomery in normandy that they were cooled off. They didnt understand the whole strategy of keeping the germans in one place and attacking in the other. Operation Goodwood was an operation first to take off the weight of the british infantry, with their sections having 80& of all british casualties, and second to keep the initiative and the germans locked in their sector. That was all that Monty had planned and it was achieved, and it was first planned to take place alongside Cobra, though with Cobra being delayed a few days, another british or canadian operation was required to take place on that date too, and Bradley felt quite bad about it and thought it was time to take the weight from the british. Dempsey though (the one who actually planned it and its actually his operation) had higher hopes of Goodwoods outcomes. Nevertheless all the hype created by it (because otherwise the bombing runs woudnt have been enabled) when it fell short of the hopes of the people in England (including Eisenhower) everyone thought to sack Monty.

[Dick Cheney.]

starting after WW1 the "General of the Army" or if you prefer Supreme commander has always been more of a political job than real good generalship. Eisenhower was great at mending fences between U.k. French and American relationships but he wasnt really that great tactically. MacArthur was sort of an idiot and yet he somehow was given command of the U.S. forces in Korea until Truman fired him. Patton was marginalized because he wasn't PC, but he was clearly one of the Best U.S. Generals in WW2 but had to play second fiddle to Bradley and Montgomery even though he was often in the right about what the German army was doing or thinking.

Interesting question.

First off though, let’s get our facts and histories right. The first ever General of the Army and top American General in WWII wasn’t Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, or MacArthur, but General George C. Marshall, who by all accounts was one of the most brilliant military minds and accomplished managerial leaders to ever serve in the American military.

In addition to being a competent organizer and diplomat (accomplishments that included the passing of the Atlantic Charter (Pre-War), Marshall Plan (Post-War), Lend-Lease, and overseeing the single greatest military buildup/modernization effort in history), Marshall was a very skilled planner and was directly responsible for authoring Allied Grand Strategy, which he helped co-direct as the senior American representative on the Combined Chiefs-of Staff.

In fact, we should all note, that it was originally Marshall who came up with the overall strategy scheme for Kill Germany First, and it was he who was originally intended to lead Operation Overlord. FDR selected Eisenhower though at the last minute believing that he would otherwise lose Marshall's input and organizational skills for the rest of the War Department.

So as far as the American military of WWII is concerned, I will argue against your hypothesis and say that George Marshall was the best American General (overall leader, planner, organizer, and military strategist) and was rightfully top General of the Army.

Now having defended Marshall and the American military in WWII, I do agree that there are noteworthy instances in American history where the wrong guy was obviously in charge.

Two of the best known instances include:

American Civil War: McClellan, Hooker, Burnside, Meade < Grant
and Iraqi Freedom: Franks, Sanchez, Casey < Petraeus

And while we often cite the board management requirements and diplomatic duties of being a General officer as an explanation -whereas the General rank is derived from being a “generalist” vs. being a subject matter expert- for why brilliant minds like Petraeus and Grant were left sitting on the sidelines, the true reason IMHO has less to do with broad skill requirements and more to do with managerial incompetence and outdated promotion models that are too often based on tradition and hierarchy.

For example. How is it that a 21 year old green Army cadet will immediately outrank 80% of the Army (including most medal of honor recipients, 20+ year men, and actual combat veterans) upon virtue of earning a college degree?!

I don't even use my college degree for my job (history/logistics).

Its truly a broken rank system that can't easily be defended in my view unless its a truly specialized major and degree (medicine, engineering, law, computer science, etc).

So bottom line, as long as the military continues to pick and promote its leaders based on worthless and outdated criteria (politics, time-in service, service connections, vocation, and background/educational and MOS bias) your always going to have a bozo or two in charge.