Mamluks and Khwarezmians for the Ayyubids

[WarlordZ]

First of all, I love the mod, all the units are beautifully done!

I was just wondering why the Ayyubids do not have elite mamluk cavalry units (both heavy horse archers and heavy melee cav). Historically, the last few Ayyubid sultans had increasingly large mamluk regiments. It was al-Salih Ayyub's elite Bahriyya and Jamdariyya regiments that overthrew the Ayyubid dynasty and established the mamluk regime. These mamluks were also the ones who defeated the Crusaders at the Battle fo Mansura and the only army that could face down and defeat the Mongols in the field during the thirteen the and fourteenth centuries. There were also large numbers of Khwarezmian mercenaries serving in the later Ayyubid armies (fleeing the Mongol advance).

[KAM 2150]

Islamic factions do not have all units yet.

[lion8000]

First of all, I love the mod, all the units are beautifully done!

I was just wondering why the Ayyubids do not have elite mamluk cavalry units (both heavy horse archers and heavy melee cav). Historically, the last few Ayyubid sultans had increasingly large mamluk regiments. It was al-Salih Ayyub's elite Bahriyya and Jamdariyya regiments that overthrew the Ayyubid dynasty and established the mamluk regime. These mamluks were also the ones who defeated the Crusaders at the Battle fo Mansura and the only army that could face down and defeat the Mongols in the field during the thirteen the and fourteenth centuries. There were also large numbers of Khwarezmian mercenaries serving in the later Ayyubid armies (fleeing the Mongol advance).

That's no exactly true emperor Ivaylo of Bulgaria has driven back the Golden Horde during 1278-1279 and bey the same time he defeated the Byzantine empire which was in alliance with the Mongols.

[WarlordZ]

Thanks for the answer Kam.

Lion, while that is true to a certain extent, Ivalyo did not defeat any significant forces, certainly not the entire power of the Golden Horde bearing down on him, he most probably defeated a raiding force sent into the region. The Mongols did not have designs to occupy the region, they wanted to reduce it to vassal status and receive tribute, which they did. when Ivalyo was faced with the more elite forces of the Golden Horde he was pushed back and besieged and the region in general remained a Mongol vassal state. In contrast, the Mamluks were never reduced to vassalage, they defeated both small raiding parties and full scale invasions from the Ilkhanate. They also had diplomatic relations with the Golden Horde and int he peace talks with the Ilkhanate they came to terms as equals. This was not the case with the Mongols' interractions with other peoples during the 13th century.

[+Marius+]

These mamluks were also the ones who defeated the Crusaders at the Battle fo Mansura

Not exactly a bragging right, one of the weirdest battles of the Crusades haha.

Even the Emir of the Mamluks managed to get himself killed in that engagement, nearly everyone died except the Frenchies.

[WarlordZ]

I am not sure what your sources are on this battle/campaign, the guy who got killed was not the emir of the mamluks, it was Fakhr al-Din a freeborn commander. After his death the amirs of the mamluks Baybars and Faris al-Din Aqtay took over command and counterattacked. The result was that by the end of the campaign the entire crusader army ceased to exist, its members being either killed or captured. on the other hand mamluk losses were quiet right. The Bahriyya who did the bulk of the fighting and repulsed the crusaders suffered hardly any losses (their regiment remaining intact for decades to come).

[+Marius+]

the guy who got killed was not the emir of the mamluks, it was Fakhr al-Din a freeborn commander.

You are confusing sultan and emir as a title.

on the other hand mamluk losses were quiet right. The Bahriyya who did the bulk of the fighting and repulsed the crusaders suffered hardly any losses

Hardly any losses?

They lost Mansura twice, and had to grind fight the crusaders in the streets.

It was a bloodbath for both sides and the only one stating light casualties is Al Maqizi who is hardly a unbiased source.

Ibn Wasil for instance states that only the cavalry vanguard of the crusader army was defeated(just as the vanguard under Yusuf was defeated on the other side) while the crusader infantry did an organized retreat.

(their regiment remaining intact for decades to come).

What does that even mean?

That is nonsensical for 13th century warfare.

[WarlordZ]

It is clear you know very little about Mamluk history. First of all the Sultan was al-Salih Ayyub. He was not even involved in the fighting he died of illness before the battle. Fakhr al-Din was a freeborn emir,/amir not a mamluk, he was a powerful individual who, during this campaign, was assigned as military commander due to his senior position.

The crusaders had the upper hand in the first stages of the battle, the forded the river and surprised the Egyptians, it was in this attack that Falhr al-Din and several freeborn units were routed. After this point the crusaders entered Mansura...they never took it (let alone twice!). The Bahriyya mamluks rallied and organized the defense under their commanders Aqtay and Baybars. after this point the battle turned, the main bloodbath was on the crusader side, most of the Egyptian losses were in the intial surprise attack stage of the battle. If it was such an equal fight, then the Egyptians would not have destroyed or captured almost the entire crusader force including the capture of the king.

And yes, the Bahriyya regiment remained intact. Your comment on 13th century warfare applies to Europe, where at this point professional standing armies were not yet developed, with the exception of household guards of monarchs and nobles. However in the Middle East the concept of professional standing armies did exist. The army of the mamluk sultanate was such an army composed of permanent professional regiments.

I can tell you with certainty (and truly without any intended condescension) that my information on this topic is more accurate than yours. My PhD is on this topic and I teach courses on this time period at a university.

[+Marius+]

It is clear you know very little

I find it quite amusing how often people start their arguments with a statement of that nature.

First of all the Sultan was al-Salih Ayyub.

Did I state anything about a sultan?

The crusaders had the upper hand in the first stages of the battle, the forded the river and surprised the Egyptians, it was in this attack that Falhr al-Din and several freeborn units were routed. After this point the crusaders entered Mansura...they never took it (let alone twice!). The Bahriyya mamluks rallied and organized the defense under their commanders Aqtay and Baybars. after this point the battle turned, the main bloodbath was on the crusader side, most of the Egyptian losses were in the intial surprise attack stage of the battle.

Alright, where did you read that information?

If it was such an equal fight, then the Egyptians would not have destroyed or captured almost the entire crusader force including the capture of the king.

They did not capture the entire crusader force nor did they capture the king in that battle.

You are again confusing stuff, the battle you are describing(the latter section) is not the same battle, but the battle of Fariskur, which happened two months later.

In that battle both sides also had horrid casualties.

Also, note that in both battles, Mamluks had a numerical superiority.


Edit; Realized the issue, for those using wikipedia, the articles for both battles are a huge mess, whoever wrote them, confused both for the other and actually made some stuff up.

And yes, the Bahriyya regiment remained intact. Your comment on 13th century warfare applies to Europe, where at this point professional standing armies were not yet developed, with the exception of household guards of monarchs and nobles. However in the Middle East the concept of professional standing armies did exist. The army of the mamluk sultanate was such an army composed of permanent professional regiments.

Are you seriously suggesting named regiments for Mamlukes in the 13th century?

State your source for that claim, because it is ridiculous to my ears.

My PhD is on this topic and I teach courses on this time period at a university.

[WarlordZ]

OK, first of I do apologize for the way I started off my previous comment. I do not engage in too many discussions online or outside the university setting in general and may have wrongfully assumed that you are not a scholar of history or in the field. I apologize also for the length of this response, but you did ask for it. Now to answer your comments.

I mentioned the sultan because you stated in your previous comment that I was confusing the sultan and the amir/emir. You had stated that the amir of the mamluks was killed at Mansura. I simply stated that the two individuals of note on the Egyptian side who died were the sultan (prior to the battle of illness) and Fakhr al-Din, who was a commander of importance in the army but not a mamluk or the commander of the mamluks. The commander of the Bahriyya regiment at this time was Sayf al-Din Aqtay and his second in command was Baybars al-Bunduqdar (the future mamluk sultan Baybars). Both survived the battle and campaign with the bulk of the mamluk forces intact (i will get back to this point below).

Regarding the taking of Mansura...I am actually quiet curious as to where you got the information that the crusaders took it twice. There was one initial surprise attack when a big part of the cavalry forded the tributary of the Nile. This is the attack in which a portion of the Egyptian army was routed and its commander Fakhr al-Din was killed. The crusaders penetrated to the heart of the town, where they were met by the mamluks who drove them back killing a large proportion of them including the king's brother Robert of Artois. Pretty much most primary and secondary sources describe the battle in this way.

As for the sources, you have the chronicles of Ibn Abd al-Zahir, Baybars al-Mansuri, Shafi' ibn Ali, Ibn Iyas, and al-Maqrizi among others (late Ayyubid and early mamluk history is very well documented in Arabic chronicles and histories) that give detailed descriptions of the battle. Unfortunately, if you do not read Arabic then you will not be able to read most of them (ibn Abd al-Zahir ha sbeen translated to English, although not very well). I think a small prtion of Ibn Iyas and al-Maqrizi's works have also been translated (but these are very small parts of the whole thing). This material is not something you can come across in your public library or even at most universities. On the Crusader side you have Jean de Joinville's chronicle which goes into quiet some detail on the crusade. ( will mention secondary sources later).

Again the mamluks did not suffer heavy losses. You are confused regarding the composition of Muslim armies of this time period. Even though the mamluks formed the bulk of the standing army of the Ayyubid sultan, they formed a fraction of the actual force present. At this time the actual number of mamluks (all regiments including the Bahriyya) probably did not number over 10,000 men, add to these maybe another 5,000-10,000 professional soldiers who were freeborn (i.e. not mamluks). The bulk of the army being composed of Arab/Bedouin auxiliaries, Turkmen auxiliaries, volunteers etc. these extra troops often inflate the numbers of the armies of this region. However, they sometimes proved detrmiental and sometimes actually did contribute (i.e. the Beoduin's at the Battle of Hims/Homs in 1280). You can refer to Usama ibn Munqidh's accounts of his clashes with both rival Syrian and Egyptian nobles and the crusaders in his memoir "The book of contemplation" (luckily translated to English) and you will see his disdain for these latter troops who more often than not created confusion and broke ranks. The losses at Mansura suffered by the Egyptian army were from among these. The case as similar a decade later at the Battle of Ayn Jalut against the Mongols in 1260. It is reported that the Egyptian army under Qutuz numbered 100,000 men (although this is most probably exaggerated) against 10,000-20,000 under Kitbugha. But again the mamluks here probably made up about 10-20% of the entire force, and were probably the ones who did the most significant fighting as the others in the army lacked the discipline, training, and morale.

Let me reiterate again that the mamluks were professional soldiers. Brought at a young age by their master they were educated, raised and trained under his patronage. Upon completing their training they were emancipated and enrolled in his army/regiment. It took a long time and a lot of money to train a single mamluk. The mamluk was most often a heavily armed/armored cavalry man who could operate as a mounted archer, lancer, and could hold his own against a European knight in melee. There are dozens of Furusiyya manuals (manuals on training mamluks with various weapons and on the equestrian arts) that survive from the period that show the training of mamluks, again unfortunately as far as I know they are all in Arabic. However, there has been an academic article written on this topic in English entitled "the training of a mamluk faris" by Hassanein Rabie that discusses some of these manuals. These "horrid casualties" if they were suffered at all on the Egyptian side, were probably among the lesser trained and more poorly armed and armored troops. Again because the Mamluk regiments survived almost intact to form the mamluk sultanate only a decade after this incident.

Generally speaking, the campaign is often referred to by scholars as the "Mansura campaign" and it not only encompasses the actual battle of Mansura but includes the final defeat of the Seventh crusade. Al-Maqrizi states that at Fariskur Egyptian casualties numbered around 10,000 which may be accurate. However, again these were probably among the auxiliaries and volunteers and not the actual mamluks. If 10,000 mamluks died at Fariskur, the mamluk sultanate would never have come into existance as most of the mamluks would have been dead.

As for names regiments. I am not suggesting them I am stating that they existed as mentioned in the sources and among scholars in the field even before the 13th century. Standing armies in the professional Muslim world were established quiet early (much earlier than the 13th century). Some of these units were named and had an identity of their own. Some units such as these existed as early as the umayyad period such as the al-Waddahiyya, al-Sahsahiyya, al-Dhakwaniyya, al-Bukhariyya (refer to Khalil Athamina's article on this "Non-Arab Regiments and Private Militias during the Umayyad Period." These early regiments did not survive long due to the fall of the Umayyads shortly after their creation. HOwever, they were created with the idea that they would be permanent and were named. These names for standing armies/regiments were usually derived from either the name of the commander/creator of the regiment or their place of origin.

By the 13th century it was quiet a common practice to ahve professional named regiments. Salah al-Din came to power with the support of the mamluk regiment of his uncle Asad al-Din Shirkuh, the Asadiyya (dervied from his name). The founders of the Mamluk sultanate came from the Bahriyya regimet. This regiment was the elite unit of al-Salih Ayyub. It is also referred to in the sources as the Salihiyya. They were called the Bahriyya because they were stationed in the Rawda fortress that wa son an isle in the Nile reiver (Bahr al-Nil). The early part of the mamluk sultanate up the the late 14th and early 15th century has been referred to the Bahri period by some scholars (incorrectly because not all sultans of this period were Bahri). Every mamluk regiment thus had a name. You have Sultan Qalawun's Burjiyya (named thus because they were stationed in the towers of the Cairo citdel, Tower in Arabic = burj). But in most cases they are named after their founders/masters i.e. you will come across named regiments such as the al-Zahiriyya (al-Zahir Baybars' regiment), al-Mansuriyya (al-Mansur Qalawun's regiment), and al-Nasiriyya (al-Nasir Muhammad's regimet) among dozens of others. Again pretty much all the primary sources (there are many in Arabic constantly mention these). Secondary scholarship in the field of mamluk studies as also in agreement on this. I have copied some of the sources from the bibliography of my thesis (the whole bibliography is over 25 pages long with lots of Arabic and Persian metrial) that could help you find material on these named mamluk regiments and standing armies of this time period, for the most part these sources are written by western scholars who have studied the Arabic primary material. They pretty much corroborate what I have been saying here.

Lastly, I really do not care what you think about my statement on my profession or if you believe me or not. I mentioned it so that you know that I am not making things up. I would not make such bold claims if they were not true. That would really be a stupid thing to do. I am hoping to defend my thesis within the next 6 months, then it will be available for the public (at least those who have access to university libraries) to read. You are also more than welcome to visit my classes and lectures if you are ever on this side of the world.


Ayalon, David. “Le Régiment Bahriya dans l’armée de mamelouke,” REI, 19 (1951).

Ayalon, David. “Preliminary Remarks on the Mamlūk Military Institution in Islam.” In War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East. Eds. V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp. London: S.O.A.S, 1975.

Ayalon, David. “Studies on the Structure of the Mamlūk Army I.” BSOAS 15, no.3 (1953): 203-228.

Ayalon, David. “Studies on the Structure of the Mamlūk Army II.” BSOAS 15, no.3 (1953): 448-476.

Ayalon, David. “Studies on the Structure of the Mamlūk Army III,” BSOAS 16, no.1 (1954): 57-90.

Ayalon, David. “From Ayyūbids to Mamlūks.” Revue des Etudes Islamiques 49 (1981): 43-57.

Ayalon, David. “The Auxiliary Forces of the Mamluk Sultanate.” Der Islam: Zeitschrift für geschichte und Kultur des islamichen Orients 65, (1988): 13-37
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Holt, P.M. “The Structure of Government in the Mamluk sultanate.” In Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades, ed. P.M. Holt. London: Warminster, 1977).

Humphreys, R. Stephen. From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-1260. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977.

Humphreys, R. Stephen. “The Emergence of the Mamluk Army.” Studia Islamica 45, (1977): 67-99.

Humphreys, R. Stephen. “The Emergence of the Mamluk Army (Conclusion).” Studia Islamica 46 (1977): 147-182.

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[+Marius+]

I am actually quiet curious as to where you got the information that the crusaders took it twice.

From the works of Al-Maqrizi.

I perhaps misremembered, but the town was taken at least once since the fighting is described within the streets and both sections of the wall, meaning, the crusaders were everywhere.

The crusaders penetrated to the heart of the town, where they were met by the mamluks who drove them back

No, they entered the city after which the Mamluks reacted and retook the city.

The Mamluks were not inside the city when the attack happened.

Pretty much most primary and secondary sources describe the battle in this way.

Nope;

"The Franks penetrated Mansura and reached the Sultan's palace. The Franks spread through the narrows streets of the town, while the civil and the military scattered in all directions. Islam was about to suffer a mortal blow, and the Franks were now sure of their victory. It was lucky for the Muslims that the Franks dispersed through the streets." - Ibn Wasil

Other sources state the same.

As for the sources, you have the chronicles of Ibn Abd al-Zahir, Baybars al-Mansuri, Shafi' ibn Ali, Ibn Iyas, and al-Maqrizi among others (late Ayyubid and early mamluk history is very well documented in Arabic chronicles and histories) that give detailed descriptions of the battle.

None of them quoted by you.

Unfortunately, if you do not read Arabic then you will not be able to read most of them (ibn Abd al-Zahir ha sbeen translated to English, although not very well). I think a small prtion of Ibn Iyas and al-Maqrizi's works have also been translated (but these are very small parts of the whole thing). This material is not something you can come across in your public library or even at most universities.

That is remarkably coincidental for you and your argument...

Again the mamluks did not suffer heavy losses.

I have yet to receive any proof from you apart from you claiming so.

You are confused regarding the composition of Muslim armies of this time period.

Nope.

At this time the actual number of mamluks (all regiments including the Bahriyya) probably did not number over 10,000 men, add to these maybe another 5,000-10,000 professional soldiers who were freeborn (i.e. not mamluks).

What you fail to realize is that that is a huge amount of professional troops, let alone cavalry, for European standards.

These "horrid casualties" if they were suffered at all on the Egyptian side, were probably among the lesser trained and more poorly armed and armored troops.

Of that entire block of text i read nothing but "I think" "opinion" "believe" and "probably".

Al-Maqrizi states that at Fariskur Egyptian casualties numbered around 10,000 which may be accurate. However, again these were probably among the auxiliaries and volunteers and not the actual mamluks.

In reality, you cannot prove this.

If 10,000 mamluks died at Fariskur, the mamluk sultanate would never have come into existance as most of the mamluks would have been dead.

Again you simply reiterate your own wishful thinking.

I am not arguing that the entire Mamluk force was annihilated, merely that the army as a whole had major casualties, as it is stated.

Your own notion of them not being Mamluk casualties is flawed, since Saladin himself lost basically his entire Ghulam/Mamluk force at Montgisard, not only them, but his entire cavalry force, the muslim sources, for instance Ali ibn al-Athir, state that basically the entire force of his professional cavalry was lost.

al-Athir states that even the cavalry sent ahead to raid was annihilated as the groups were caught and massacred one by one.

Yet what did Saladin do?

Recruit more.
Replace them.

Like any other military caste does when faced with casualties.

Saladin replaced his entire cavalry force within months/years.



You failed to realize that I was not even arguing that their force was destroyed just as the crusader one was, merely that they had major casualties, which is apparent, as they are mentioned as having them regardless of the fact that they were faced against a smaller crusader army.


What irritated me is your statements which claimed that the Mamelukes left without a scratch, as if they were just mopping up some random army of nobodies when in fact they were fighting against a proper army that was poorly led.

You painted a picture as if they just swept through without any issue, regardless of the fact that the fighting took days to finish in both engagements.


Your source list will probably be very useful to me though, so I do thank you for it.

Best regards

[Slytacular]

Holy Moley, Batman.

Thank you for taking the time to type this out. Thank you Marius for provoking him to type that out.

WarlordZ, is there anyway I can help support your thesis? I would love to visit your class and lectures. Would you also stick around and help provide some information on the 13th century armies and their equipment?

[Slytacular]

Good arguments! I like reading this stuff!

[+Marius+]

Also, I looked it up, historian Francesco Gabrieli, one of the most prominent Arabist and orientalist, stated in Storici arabi delle Crociate, page 290, that Fakhr-ad-Din Yusuf was in fact regent of Egypt at the time of his death.

Meaning that the man who died at the battle was the actual head of state.