Thread Introduction
As most of you are aware, recent years have seen a dramatic rise of gender-identity awareness. The LBGT movement has grown enormously. Feminism, though present for many decades now, has also been quite vocal in recent years. You probably have noticed changes in everyday life as well, such as the installation of gender neutral bathrooms, safe-spaces, or questions about gender identity on applications.
In any event, this thread is not about determining whether these changes are good or bad. Instead, I pointed out these changes because they are illustrative of a major philosophical point which has actually preceded these changes: gender as a construct. The notion that gender is an epistemological construct was a major point made by "feminist" scholars such as J. W. Scott and Judith Butler long ago. Constructivism (and deconstructivism) goes even further back, and one can easily discern an intellectual lineage that goes back to the likes of Fanon, Foucault, and Derrida. And while I certainly respect the work of Scott and Butler, today we are beginning to see a new shift, one which concerns me. Namely, the notion that gender is constructed is beginning to be taken for granted. The purpose of this thread is to revisit this point and give it a philosophical treatment. Is gender constructed? And if so, what are the implications?
My Treatment of the Matter
Constructivism tends to go hand-in-hand with relativism. The fact that gender is socially constructed is seen as evidence for its deceiving nature, and for those who are really cynical it is evidence of a patriarchal system that inculcates these notions in order to keep women down. Relativism is thus a powerful weapon in the hands of those who despise the currently existing, as it was for Foucault and as it is for many feminists today. And it is particularly this relativism which I will argue against in the treatment below. However, I am not going to make a nature versus social-constructivism argument (since this would not be very philosophical at all). I will not deny that gender is a construct. My point is that this constructivism does not have to mean relativism, nor does it have to mean the rejection of gender differences as we know them.
Scott argued that although society would have us believe otherwise, gender is ultimately a constructed conception of sexual difference, not a natural difference. Yet she nevertheless believed there was such a thing as sex, that is, the natural biological difference between the sexes. Butler, however, not only thought that gender was constructed, she also thought that sex was constructed. To Butler, there could be no notion of sex or gender prior to mind - it was an epistemological phenomenon. And it is by performing gender, she contended, that it becomes naturalized, creating the impression of an ontological gender and hiding its epistemological nature. Identity is therefore created through a constant repetition and realization of the discourse on gender.
Admittedly, there is much that could be debated here already. But my gripe is with the following conclusion Butler draws: agency "is to be located within the possibility of a variation on that repetition." In other words, Butler is contending that if women are to be agents, if they are to be free, they must resist that repetition. By extension, they must resist the socially accepted norms of gender. Freedom, in other words, is to be found in resistance, a notion very reminiscent of Foucault. Therein lies a major fallacy which, if taken for granted, could have major social repercussions. Just because gender is constructed does by no means imply that I need to resist it and deny socially accepted norms. Though I can certainly be an agent by resisting (and there is nothing inherently wrong with that), this does not have to be the only way to be an agent. The very performance and repetition of gender, making use of it as a means to realize one's desires, can itself be freedom. There is nothing in the notion of constructivism, philosophically speaking, that implies I need to resist the constructed notions in order to be liberated. In fact, Butler, if we bring her thinking to its logical conclusion, will encounter the same relativistic fallacy that all adherents of relativism encounter: if gender is relative, and if this relativism means that I need to resist the relative in order to be free, then my very act of resistance and the new notion of gender that I have created for myself must necessarily also be relative. What have I accomplished by replacing one relative concept with another? Constructivism should never mean that whatever is constructed is bad. To the contrary, that something is bad can only be demonstrated through socially meaningful ways, i.e., such a debate would itself be constructed. There is nothing inherently wrong about gender differences as we know them today. It is only in social context that we encounter problems. And it is within the social context that these problems need to be resolved. But this should never mean the denial of society as such, its denigration, or a complete resistance to it.
Ok, enough for now...Let's hear some other thoughts first.