I am getting sick of chasing around 1 horde stack for 20 turns

[Yomamashouse]

I have 3 armies chasing these SOBs around and they always manage to squeak by. I basically have to wait to fight them when they want to. Am I historically ignorant? Should a huge mob consisting of every man, woman, and child in a tribe be able to evade three armies in their own lands? My sense is that they shouldn't be able to.

[Fanest]

Use agents to slow it down - very simple rly, either way i would run if i were in AI situation too, its only logical

[RGA]

No forced march mod is your friend

[haikiller11]

There are two solutions for this. You either corner them with your superior forces (well, you're chasing them means they are no longer a mediate threat.) or like me due to the lack of resources, I sued for peace then destroyed them.

[Humble Warrior]

What should happen is any running army should be stopped by the sea- then you would eventually get him- Just like in historical reality. But you won`t get that with armies that turn into ships in this game, so the merry chase will go on.

[RGA]

What should happen is any running army should be stopped by the sea- then you would eventually get him- Just like in historical reality. But you won`t get that with armies that turn into ships in this game, so the merry chase will go on.

Rarely happends to me. Army loses all of its movement points left, thus making it easier to catch. AI knows this and doesn't like it. But as I said, I used no forced march mod, which significantly improves AI behavior.

[Fromage99]

I try to surround a retreating army to get over this. However, CA should patch the game so that retreating armies lose movement points for their next turn. The way the system works now is that retreating armies end up getting extra movement points, because retreating didn't cost any, and the next turn they have all movement points available. They should also add attrition to armies in forced march in enemy territory.

[Fanest]

Why attrition? Whats your reasoning behind this, because in reality people don't die because they have to walk 30km instead of 20km. Forced marched armies if attacked already suffer greatly from reduced morale, fatigue which in turn reduces unit fighting capabilities by 50% (can't be gained during battle) and other stat maluses, moreover forced marched armies always get ambushed and cant deploy properly.

I agree with that retreating army should loose movement points proportional to their move/retreat for the next turn.

[Huberto]

Why attrition? Whats your reasoning behind this, because in reality people don't die because they have to walk 30km instead of 20km. Forced marched armies if attacked already suffer greatly from reduced morale, fatigue which in turn reduces unit fighting capabilities by 50% (can't be gained during battle) and other stat maluses, moreover forced marched armies always get ambushed and cant deploy properly.

I agree with that retreating army should loose movement points proportional to their move/retreat for the next turn.

I'm pretty sure stragglers and deserters are more common when the daily march approaches endurance level, at least historically. It not so much people dropping dead on the march, although I suppose that happened as well.

[Humble Warrior]

I'm pretty sure stragglers and deserters are more common when the daily march approaches endurance level, at least historically. It not so much people dropping dead on the march, although I suppose that happened as well.

Depending on the circumstances of a retreat it was quite common for men to use this chance to awol due to a loss of moral. This would be even more pronounced if the army is retreating from a lost battle. Even Men dying on the march was common, especially when part of an army that lost a battle had suffered wounded in the process- Or just left behind, as did happen

[Fanest]

I'm pretty sure stragglers and deserters are more common when the daily march approaches endurance level, at least historically. It not so much people dropping dead on the march, although I suppose that happened as well.

Stragglers usually catch up before battle also their numbers are usually very small (mybe 5ppl out of 100) as for deserters thats already represented with army integrity.
If im not mistaken armies on forced march do get a penalty to integrity - not sure though, however they most certainly get a penalty when marching through neutral and enemy lands.

Depending on the circumstances of a retreat it was quite common for men to use this chance to awol due to a loss of moral. This would be even more pronounced if the army is retreating from a lost battle. Even Men dying on the march was common, especially when part of an army that lost a battle had suffered wounded in the process- Or just left behind, as did happen

I always saw the retreats that u can do before battles as tactical since no battle follows it if not caught later on. Therefore i see no reason for morale loss and subsequently desertion which as i mentioned before is already represented with army integrity which in the end makes more sense.

All in all when u look at the integrity and all that it brings one can see that it is pretty clever addition to TW games and i hope they keep it and improve it to make it even more important in next TW games.

[RGA]

Why attrition? Whats your reasoning behind this, because in reality people don't die because they have to walk 30km instead of 20km. Forced marched armies if attacked already suffer greatly from reduced morale, fatigue which in turn reduces unit fighting capabilities by 50% (can't be gained during battle) and other stat maluses, moreover forced marched armies always get ambushed and cant deploy properly.

I agree with that retreating army should loose movement points proportional to their move/retreat for the next turn.

Commenting on the historical aspect of forced march and tactical retreat, I have some points:

1. Forced march was very taxing. Ancient armies had very limited supply system. Men would march for a few hours then pitch camp, send a forage party to either buy or pillage foods from the countryside. Forced march meant fewer hours of foraging, so it's not unheard of that men sometimes had to march on empty stomach for days on end. While attrition was an unavoidable part of armies on campaign (Russian armies are said to lose up to 50% of their strength to disease and malnourishment fighting in the Caucasus in 19th century), it was even more so in forced march. The faction who suffered the worst was often cavalry because horses required a huge amount of fodder which could not be reliably supplied on forced march. They had to rely on any plants found on road, often either poisonous or very nutrient-poor.

2. Straggling was another problem of forced march. While it's true that stragglers would eventually find their units (not an easy task before the age of radio and GPS), there would always be new ones (men got sick and had to be left behind, men got lost during foraging, etc.) As the result, armies on forced march was constantly understrength. That was a big problem since ancient battles were often one-day business.

While not much details of forced march in ancient warfare were recorded, one could still take a quick glimpse on one of the most disastrous forced march in history, i.e. the march of Napoleon to Moscow in 1812 to see how environments alone could devastate one of the best equipped and best organized armies of its time.

3. Tactical retreat was and is always demoralizing. Generals are never good at communicating their thinking to ordinary soldiers (for good reasons). Thus there is always a certain level of mistrust between soldiers and generals. A good general is not necessarily a good student of Sun Tzu, but one who could command respect and confidence from his troops. Even in WW2, tactical retreat was often considered an dishonourable act by soldiers. Now apply this psyche to ancient warfare, where most soldiers were shanghaied into the army against their wills and esprit de corps was more often than not non-existent, it was easy to see how a minor tactical retreat could be conceived as impending disaster (Sure, the general won't retreat unless the doom is almost upon us) and thus induce panic and complete collapse of discipline.

[Humble Warrior]

Commenting on the historical aspect of forced march and tactical retreat, I have some points:

1. Forced march was very taxing. Ancient armies had very limited supply system. Men would march for a few hours then pitch camp, send a forage party to either buy or pillage foods from the countryside. Forced march meant fewer hours of foraging, so it's not unheard of that men sometimes had to march on empty stomach for days on end. While attrition was an unavoidable part of armies on campaign (Russian armies are said to lose up to 50% of their strength to disease and malnourishment fighting in the Caucasus in 19th century), it was even more so in forced march. The faction who suffered the worst was often cavalry because horses required a huge amount of fodder which could not be reliably supplied on forced march. They had to rely on any plants found on road, often either poisonous or very nutrient-poor.

2. Straggling was another problem of forced march. While it's true that stragglers would eventually find their units (not an easy task before the age of radio and GPS), there would always be new ones (men got sick and had to be left behind, men got lost during foraging, etc.) As the result, armies on forced march was constantly understrength. That was a big problem since ancient battles were often one-day business.

While not much details of forced march in ancient warfare were recorded, one could still take a quick glimpse on one of the most disastrous forced march in history, i.e. the march of Napoleon to Moscow in 1812 to see how environments alone could devastate one of the best equipped and best organized armies of its time.

3. Tactical retreat was and is always demoralizing. Generals are never good at communicating their thinking to ordinary soldiers (for good reasons). Thus there is always a certain level of mistrust between soldiers and generals. A good general is not necessarily a good student of Sun Tzu, but one who could command respect and confidence from his troops. Even in WW2, tactical retreat was often considered an dishonourable act by soldiers. Now apply this psyche to ancient warfare, where most soldiers were shanghaied into the army against their wills and esprit de corps was more often than not non-existent, it was easy to see how a minor tactical retreat could be conceived as impending disaster (Sure, the general won't retreat unless the doom is almost upon us) and thus induce panic and complete collapse of discipline.

Well said. I`ll Rep when I can.

[ThorHa]

Even in WW2, tactical retreat was often considered an dishonourable act by soldiers.

Not true. The best army of that time frame - the German one - did it more often than not (if not hindered by stupid Fuehrer orders), it was just another weapon in a tactical arsenal. No recorded influence on troop morale.

Regards,
Thorsten

[Humble Warrior]

Not true. The best army of that time frame - the German one - did it more often than not (if not hindered by stupid Fuehrer orders), it was just another weapon in a tactical arsenal. No recorded influence on troop morale.

Regards,
Thorsten

The Germans in WW2 were never happy having to retreat. Their whole modus operandi was attack. It was not just another weapon in their arsenal. The general routine was attack or isolate and go around. They retreated when they had to, especially when the war turned against them. And moral DID suffer accordingly.

The one caveat was with Rommel, who faked retreating to bring the British into an ambush, but Generally, the Germans never liked retreating, even at Stalingrad when retreat was the only wise option.

[ThorHa]

No too much knowledge about German military history I see. Let´s leave it there.

[Imperator Artorius]

On the subject of attrition during marches, I think that Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 is a fantastic example, as shown by this graph, which shows that the majority of Napoleon's losses occured before the major battle at Borodino on September 7th 1812, on the Moskova River, as well as the proportionally massive losses taken on the subsequent retreat from Moscow.

[Ritmas]

On the subject of attrition during marches, I think that Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 is a fantastic example, as shown by this graph, which shows that the majority of Napoleon's losses occured before the major battle at Borodino on September 7th 1812, on the Moskova River, as well as the proportionally massive losses taken on the subsequent retreat from Moscow.

Nothing to do with forced march at all. Those loses are due being thousands of kms away from home, everyone inbetween hates you, so no reliable supplies, coming unprepared to completely different and harsh climate, tactics applied by russians and many more variables.

[RGA]

Nothing to do with forced march at all. Those loses are due being thousands of kms away from home, everyone inbetween hates you, so no reliable supplies, coming unprepared to completely different and harsh climate, tactics applied by russians and many more variables.

Let's see:

"thousands of kms away from home" is not entirely true. Vilnius, the main base of operation, was only like 700km from Moscow. While it's true that a lot of soldiers (many of them from Germany) suffered from homesick, emotion alone did not kill.

"everyone inbetween hates you" is entirely wrong. No matter how hard the Russians try to depict the war as a patriotic one, the fact is Russian peasants were pretty apathetic. Many (especially the Polish Jews) even supplied the Grande armee in exchange for money. Murder of isolated soldiers by villagers was often oppotunistic killing with motive of plunder or self-defence rather than stirred by patriotic feeling.

"coming unprepared to completely different and harsh climate" is again a myth. The invasion was one of the most thoroughly prepared military operation of its time, and the majority of casualties took place even before the bloodbath of Borodino and the horror of winter. Russian climate from June to September was not exactly pleasant, but it was not much worse compared to anywhere in Europe.

"no reliable supplies" is true, and that's exactly the point I made. That was the main cause of attrition. Napoleon could have stopped at Vilnius, but he didn't. He could have stopped in Smolensk, but he didn't. By pushing his army forward into the barren landscape of Russia, way beyond its capacity of living off the land, he simply let it collapse on its own weight. If this was not qualified as a forced march, then perhaps you and I have different definitions of this term.

[stevehoos]

Let's see:

"thousands of kms away from home" is not entirely true. Vilnius, the main base of operation, was only like 700km from Moscow. While it's true that a lot of soldiers (many of them from Germany) suffered from homesick, emotion alone did not kill.

"everyone inbetween hates you" is entirely wrong. No matter how hard the Russians try to depict the war as a patriotic one, the fact is Russian peasants were pretty apathetic. Many (especially the Polish Jews) even supplied the Grande armee in exchange for money. Murder of isolated soldiers by villagers was often oppotunistic killing with motive of plunder or self-defence rather than stirred by patriotic feeling.

"coming unprepared to completely different and harsh climate" is again a myth. The invasion was one of the most thoroughly prepared military operation of its time, and the majority of casualties took place even before the bloodbath of Borodino and the horror of winter. Russian climate from June to September was not exactly pleasant, but it was not much worse compared to anywhere in Europe.

"no reliable supplies" is true, and that's exactly the point I made. That was the main cause of attrition. Napoleon could have stopped at Vilnius, but he didn't. He could have stopped in Smolensk, but he didn't. By pushing his army forward into the barren landscape of Russia, way beyond its capacity of living off the land, he simply let it collapse on its own weight. If this was not qualified as a forced march, then perhaps you and I have different definitions of this term.

The German 6th army was one of the most thoroughly prepared military operations of its time, yet they froze to death by the thousands in the Russian winter because they did not "plan" on being there in November. Wintering in the redoubtable Russian snows is the definition of unprepared, of any army, in any time period.