Crossroads at Antietam: An Exploratory Narrative
The Battle of Antietam Creek, or Sharpsburg, represented a crucial turning point in Lee's Maryland Campaign. Fought between the Union Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, the costly and hectic clash at this small creek in western Maryland officially denied Lee the chance to wrest Maryland from the Union and turn Northern popular support against continuation of the war. Yet, McClellan's numerous failures of initiative before, during, and after the battle meant Lee's army would retreat to fight another day and continue to protect Richmond.
The 1862 campaign season began well for the Union. McClellan had enjoyed success in his Peninsula Campaign into Northern Virginia, and menaced the Confederate capital with his Army of the Potomac by early June. However, the increasingly famous Confederate commander, Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson had skillfully outmaneuvered and defeated three separate Union armies in the Shenandoah Valley in the month prior, threatening Washington itself. Lincoln personally ordered a consolidation of the defeated Union forces to protect the capital, dubbed “The Army of Virginia,” under the command of John Pope.
In June, Robert E. Lee assumed command of the Confederate forces protecting Richmond, and by the end of the month, aggressively attacked the cautious and flighty McClellan in a series of battles now known as the Seven Days' Battles or Seven Day's Campaign. At the cost of 16,000 Union troops and 20,000 Confederate, Lee removed the threat to Richmond and drove McClellan back to Harrison's Landing on the James River. Soon after, Lincoln recalled the Army of the Potomac to aid the Army of Virginia in defending Washington and the Shenandoah Valley.
In a masterful campaign that arguably cemented his reputation as a great commander, Lee advanced north after leaving a token force to guard Richmond. Together with his corps commanders, Jackson and Longstreet, Lee engaged Pope's army in a series of battles that culminated in the grand contest at Second Bull run, where the Confederates outflanked the numerically superior Union forces and drove the latter back to Washington in late August.
Union defeat was largely due to the fact that McClellan had almost deliberately failed to link up with Pope's army in time. The people of Washington DC nearly panicked en masse, and several Union commanders, Pope and McClellan among them, were “reassigned” to other posts as punishment for the defeat. Lee observed these events and saw a golden opportunity. Seizing upon many of the same conditions that would press him to embark on the infamous Gettysburg Campaign less than a year later, Lee informed Confederate President Davis of the former's decision to invade Maryland.
Lee's decision was not altogether spontaneous. He would launch his campaign in coordination with Confederate raids into Kentucky under Kirby Smith and Braxton Bragg. These two operations respectively sought to bring Kentucky and Maryland into the Confederacy by popular revolt. If successful, these actions would cut off Washington DC from the rest of the Union, bring the invaluable resources of the remaining “Border South” into the Confederacy, turn Northern popular sentiment decisively against the war, and force the Federal Government to recognize Confederate sovereignty and sue for peace. If all else, Lee hoped a decisive Confederate victory in a Union state would convince foreign powers, namely France and Britain, to take the rebels seriously and recognize the Confederacy as a nation.
Lee also had his own pragmatic reasons for invading Maryland. His army had suffered heavy casualties in the Northern Virginia Campaign, and was suffering from a grievous lack of supplies. To fall back on his supply base at Richmond would mean forfeiting all the gains he had just won at such great cost. Yet, he could not hope to attack Washington, now defended by the combined forces of the Armies of the Potomac and Virginia. Moreover, an attack on Maryland would deter this huge army from attacking Richmond. So, on September 4, 1862, Lee crossed into western Maryland, hoping to resupply and reinforce his army in the welcome arms of the local population before embarking on further operations against Union forces.
Unfortunately for the Confederates, Lee's army suffered severe setbacks from the beginning. Many of his exhausted troops were incapacitated by disease, and thousands more deserted or refused to fight, often because of personal moral reservations about “invading” another state. Thus, Lee's force quickly diminished from 55,000 to 45,000 troops as he ventured into Maryland. Another problem for Lee was that he had entered a section of Maryland friendly to the Union, and received no real support from the locals. In fact, the Confederates were seen as hostile invaders by the majority of Marylanders, even in Baltimore, formerly a secessionist stronghold.
Undaunted, Lee ordered Jackson to seize the US Army arsenal at Harper's ferry while JEB Stuart and DH Hill moved to defend the South Mountain passes to the rear of Lee's army. After hearing reports of Union army activity in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania to the northwest, Lee sent Longstreet to occupy Hagerstown, Maryland, less than 25 miles south of Chambersburg. Having divided his forces in such manner, Lee established a base of operations at Frederick, Maryland. There, he worked to coordinate the strikes on Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry, even contemplating an invasion of Pennsylvania. He had no idea that McClellan was moving to intercept him at the head of some 75,000-80,000 Union troops. Lee left Frederick, intending to rendezvous with his corps commanders at Hagerstown and decide whether to invade Pennsylvania.
McClellan and his army arrived in Frederick just two days after Lee had left. Here one may make a curious observation regarding the primitive state of communications and military intelligence during the Civil War. Even at this point, neither McClellan nor Lee had any idea where the other was located. Lee assumed McClellan would remain in Washington on the defensive, and McClellan imagined Lee to be preparing for a vast encirclement of the nation's capital. Thus, Lee set off to execute his plans, unaware of McClellan's presence, and McClellan positioned his army along a 10-16 mile front as he continued to move forward in search of the Confederate army. As McClellan occupied Frederick, though, he received a piece of paper wrapped around two cigars, originally discovered by Corporal Barton W. Mitchell of the 27th Indiana Volunteers in the ruins of a Confederate camp. Now known as the famous “Lost Order,” this fateful document detailed the outline of Lee's entire campaign plans.
McClellan's and Lee's Respective Operations Prior to Antietam
Despite this windfall of opportunity, McClellan remained true to form. When he finally, slowly, mustered his forces and left Frederick, he moved directly to attack Hill's and Stuart's positions on South Mountain at Crampton's Turner's and Fox's Gaps on 14 September. Surprised by this rather direct maneuver, Lee had learned by 13 September that his entire operation had been compromised. Confederate defenses at South Mountain held long enough for Lee to issue new orders calling for his forces to regroup. Lee considered withdrawing completely and returning to Virginia, but a bizarre determination to capture Harper's Ferry, coupled with a disregard for McClellan's abilities, convinced him to rally at Sharpsburg, Maryland, and wait for Jackson to return. Lee assumed McClellan too cautious to attack him, and felt confident that Jackson could take Harper's Ferry while the rest of the Confederate army marched on Hagerstown, salvaging the campaign. McClellan did his best to comply with this idea, stalling in the unoccupied South Mountain passes all of 15 September, saving Lee's incomplete force of just 18,000 men from certain destruction. Hearing of Jackson's impending success at Harper's Ferry, Lee decided to form a defensive position west of Antietam Creek, north of Sharpsburg, and offer battle.
McClellan, still believing the enemy to possess a “massive” force, commenced skirmishing with the rebel forces on the afternoon and evening of the 16th. Little Mac continued to position his forces throughout the night. He planned a grand assault for the following day, wherein his right, under Burnside, and left, under Hooker, would fall upon the Confederate flanks, rolling up the enemy line, at which point McClellan would order a full attack on the rebel center, breaking Lee's army completely. McClellan's indecisiveness and poor leadership, as well as that of some of his corps commanders, however, would produce a much different course of events. In the meantime, his delays allowed Jackson to rejoin Lee after taking Harper's Ferry before the main battle began on the 17th.
Commanders at Antietam
Union:
Maj. Gen. George McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac
Maj. Gen Joseph Hooker, commander of the I Corps
Maj. Gen Edwin V. Sumner, commander of the II Corps
Maj. Gen Fitz John Porter, commander of the V Corps
Maj. Gen Wlliam B. Franklin, commander of the VI Corps
Maj. Gen Ambrose Burnside, commander of the IX Corps
Maj. Gen Joseph Mansfield, commander of the XII Corps
Confederacy:
General Robert E. Lee, commander of the Army of Northern Virginia
Maj. General James Longstreet, commander of the I Corps
Maj Gen Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, commander of the II Corps
Maj. Gen JEB Stuart, commander of the cavalry corps and reserve artillery
Phase I of the Battle, Assaults by the I Corps, 5:30 to 7:30 AM
On afternoon and evening of the 16th, McClellan had ordered Hooker's I Corps to begin an assault on Lee's left flank. If Hooker met success, McClellan planned to then execute his grand flanking maneuver, with Burnisde attacking Lee's right and McClellan then committing the remainder of his troops to the center for the “final blow.” However, McClellan deemed it unnecessary to let Hooker in on this secret, so as Hooker's corps marched on Lee's left upon the road approaching Hagerstown to the north, the typically aggressive corps commander decided to take cover in the “North” and “East Woods” and await reinforcements. Hooker believed he was attacking alone, unaware of McClellan's plans. Therefore, the Union attack on Lee's left stalled and would not resume until the following morning.
At dawn on the 17th, Hooker and his I Corps moved to attack Jackson under early morning fog. Hooker's goal was to gain the high ground near a church building to the South which ironically belonged to a group of German pacifists known as the “Dunkers”. He was supported by the XII Corps in the East Woods, protecting his flank, and the I Corps artillery and the Union rifled field pieces commanding the heights east of Antietam Creek. The Union artillery inflicted stiff punishment on Jackson's position, but by the time Hooker's corps emerged from the North Woods into the cornfield to the south, the Confederate artillery began returning fire. Soon, the cornfield, stalks some six feet high, was engulfed in what Confederate Colonel Stephen D. Lee later described as “artillery hell.” Both sides suffered horrendous casualties, and the Union advance became bogged down and disorganized as communication between divisions and brigades within the I Corps fell apart. Because of this, Union divisions of the I Corps failed to advance in unison, and were individually repulsed by Confederate troops under Maj Gen Alexander Lawton.
Within two hours, over half of Jackson's officers had perished, and his line nearly broke under fierce Union assaults as the latter sought to win the Dunker church ground. Jackson called upon John Hood's division for support. Hood soon arrived in force, and a fearsome clash between the blue and the grey again erupted in the cornfield. Horrific carnage ensued as one side drove the other out of the cornfield only to be driven back themselves. After both sides suffered terrible casualties, the contest ended in stalemate, though Hooker had failed to gain any ground, much less turn Lee's flank. Hooker brought up reinforcements from the XII Corps, over 7,000 men under Maj Gen Mansfield and Brigadier Gen Greene. Mansfield's division was composed of raw troops and quickly stalled under staunch resistance from Hood's division, but Greene successfully outmaneuvered the latter, vanquished the Confederate artillery that had been shelling the cornfield, and captured the church. Hooker moved to support Greene and continue the attack, but was wounded by a rebel sharpshooter and carried from the field.
Command of the I Corps then fell to second in command, George Meade, but he was unable to bring order to the Union's chaotic position. Unsupported, Greene was driven back from the church by Hood's men, who had regrouped in the West Woods. Hence, some 3 hours after Hooker's original attack, it appeared stalemate loomed again. Two divisions from the Union II Corps, under Maj Gen John Sedgwick and Brig General William French rushed forward to maintain the pressure of Union assault. However, the two divisions became separated in the confusion, and Sedwick ran headlong into a barrage laid by the Confederate artillery, together with reinforcements from Lee's right. The result was a Confederate attack from three directions on Sedgwick's division, roughly comparable a small-scale version of Hannibal's double envelopment of Varro's legions at Cannae. Sedwick was himself wounded, and his division repulsed, suffering some 40% casualties. Finally, further reinforcements from the XII Corps engaged the Confederates near the West Woods around 10 AM, some 5 hours after the battle began. Union reinforcements under Greene, who had captured the Dunker church earlier, arrived and helped push the rebels into the West Woods.
Phase II of the Battle, Assaults by the XII and II Corps, 9 AM to 1 PM
By midday, the Confederate left had been pushed back into the West Woods, where heavy fighting raged on. Brig Gen French's division from the Union II Corps had ventured far to the south after losing Sedgewick's men, bumping into DH Hill's battered troops who had launched attacks from the West Woods into the cornfield all that morning. The rebels took up solid defensive positions along an old wagon road that would come to be called “Bloody Lane.” This road ran through the center of Lee's line, and the battle would soon become concentrated there as both sides sent reinforcements in a hellish contest for the road. French ordered a series of assaults on Hill before falling back in costly failure. Union reinforcements from the II Corps supported French, even as Lee committed his reserves to aid Hill and try to outflank French.
Fierce fighting over the Lane ensued until after noon, when the “Fighting” 69th New York Irish Brigade arrived, outflanking Hill's position, and turning the Lane into a death trap for the rebels. By this time, both sides had lost several officers, and a botched Confederate order resulted in the entire defensive force at Bloody Lane withdrawing in confusion. The Union forces gave chase, and might have collapsed the whole Confederate center had not Longstreet's artillery driven them back. Even still, the rebel center was threadbare, and numerous Union officers, including commander of the fresh VI Corps, William Franklin, asked McClellan for permission to launch a full assault. However, the carnage at Bloody Lane had unsettled Little Mac, and he declined, squandering yet another opportunity to destroy Lee's army.
Phase III of the Battle, Operations Surrounding "Burnside's Bridge," 10 AM to 4:30 PM
With fighting on Lee's center and left stalled, attention turned to the right, where Ambrose Burnside had been ordered to attack. Remember, all these attacks on Lee's right, center, and left were supposed to have been conducted simultaneously. However, it would be 10 AM before McClellan's order to attack reached Burnside, five hours after Hooker had first marched on Jackson. Even then, Burnside took plenty of time to organize his attack. Burnside and his IX Corps would need to cross a bridge over Antietam Creek to the south end of Lee's line in order to attack. Burnside's insistence on capturing the bridge itself is a source of great controversy, with various sources arguing over whether Burnside's men could have forded the river downstream and avoided the bridge altogether. Additionally, Burnside felt slighted by McClellan, who had temporarily demoted him to IX Corps commander in order to give command of the I Corps to Hooker. In any case, Burnside reluctantly opted for the bridge, and he demonstrated this reluctance thoroughly.
Though the Confederates only had some 300-400 men of the 2nd and 20th Georgia regiments to defend the bridge under Robert Toombs, Burnside was wary about risking his 12,500 men in a direct assault on the bridge. Toombs commanded a series of bluffs overlooking the bridge, giving him ideal cover to rain fire down on anyone who crossed. Though Burnside's artillery and vastly superior manpower could easily have taken the bridge, he elected to skirmish with Toombs, then launch a series of small attacks. After Burnside finally began coordinating artillery attacks on Toomb's position, the latter withdrew following reports of Union troops approaching his flank. Finally, Burnside's troops rushed across the creek and attacked Lee's right flank. Once again, Lee's entire army seemed on the brink of collapse. Yet, two serious Union blunders and one great stroke of fortune saved him again. First, Burnside's debacle at the south bridge had taken 3 hours, giving Lee's army a few more precious moments of life. Second, by the time Burnside moved to attack the rebel flank across the creek, McClellan and Maj Gen Fitz John Porter of the V Corps decided against sending the latter to aid Burnside and finish Lee. Thus, Lee was able to resist Burnside's IX Corps long enough that, in combination with the 3 hours wasted that morning, Confederate commander AP Hill arrived on Lee's right from Harper's Ferry just in time to save the Army of Northern Virginia.
Hill's men had traded their tattered grey homespuns for fresh blue uniforms at Harper's Ferry. Thus, when Hill's fresh forces slammed into Burnside's flank, the latter was thrown into confusion. Burnside's entire corps then beat a hasty retreat back across the same bridge that they had spent so much time and lives to capture. Finally, darkness fell on the day of 17 September, 1862. Some 23,000 men lay dead or wounded, including 10,000 Confederates. Union reinforcements continued to pour in all night and the following day. On the morning of September 18, Lee braced for the final, crushing attack he was sure would come. Yet, Little Mac seemed convinced that Lee commanded some unimaginably vast army. The former launched a half-hearted assault on AP Hill's position before calling a truce to bury the dead. Lee and his army would quietly escape back into Virginia that night, concluding the second bloodiest battle of the war up to that point.
Reactions to the battle were mixed. Most, including President Lincoln, berated McClellan for his conspicuous failure to destroy Lee's numerically pitiful force. Little Mac himself wrote the President, calling it a “glorious victory.” While certainly disheartening for many in the Union, Antietam would later prove to be a strategic success for many of the same reasons that Gettysburg would. It ended Confederate hopes of taking Maryland, even as Smith and Bragg's Kentucky campaign fell apart. As Lee returned to Virginia to lick his wounds, President Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Set to take effect in January of 1863, the Proclamation freed all slaves in Confederate territory. This reasserted Lincoln's refusal to recognize Confederate sovereignty by claiming executive control over “insurrected” states. Coupled with news of Lee's failure to capture Maryland, it helped to discourage European powers from recognizing Confederate sovereignty in a war that now, politically at least, appeared to be waged between the anti-slave North and the pro-slave South. It also represented a growing development of total war against the Confederate insurgency on American soil.
On the home front, dying and wounded men continued to pour into the surrounding communities during and after the battle. Like the little village of Gettysburg less than a year later, many small towns became sprawling, makeshift hospitals, with casualties filling the buildings, streets, and open spaces. As lists of the dead and dying, along newspaper images and reports, rushed off to cities and towns across the nation, both sides received a rude awakening to the horrors of the war. Coupled with the still-fresh wounds of Second Bull Run, the carnage at Antietam would remind people of the reality of a long and bloody war, previously believed by many to be a brief and decisive contest. These grim effects on the public sphere augmented those of a more political and military nature regarding the battle itself. Thus, while McClellan's failure to rout Lee allowed the latter to fight on for two and a half more agonizing years, the grand strategic Union victory at Antietam represented a crucial turning point in the war.
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