how to beat phalangites head on?

[Frost, colonel]

CORRECT ! I saw a program on history channel explaining why the legionnaire beat any soldier in the battle field , so they show how the legionaire beated the phalanx also and it was head to head, 1st they used the pilums to create caos , after they push with shields all the way win and use the gladius to disablethe sarissa from the sides!!!! really sarissa couldnt do much!!!when they got enough close in the phalnx dude was stabed easely, become a easy target!!!! I always been irritated how some many think phalanx was superior head on

And yet goes against Polybius,
"Now, a Roman soldier in full armor also requires a space of three square feet. But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man---because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing---it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear if he is to do his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force his way through easily---seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigor to the use of their swords. Therefore, it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength."

I think I would prefer his view over the TV, but it's odd that we debate this so much, that there is so much devision on whether a legionary could break the Phalanx head on, on flat ground.

I remember 26yrs ago being involved in making dioramas for museums and collectors(I was the head painter). One was of the Romans fighting the Mak Phalanx. The struggle was how to represent it and we were not sure, so we opted for the Romans trying to force a way in past the pikes points and left it at that(the figures was lead so we could individually animate each one). Nice diorama that one, and there were some really nice one's covering various periods.

[CDR Hurricane]

Now, a Roman soldier in full armor also requires a space of three square feet. But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man---because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing---it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear if he is to do his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx...

Strange thing is, in every video I have seen so far of Rome 2, the legionnaires fight in very close order... about as tightly packed as the hoplites in the recent Macedonian battle. At this point I doubt that is going to be changed.

I always been irritated how some many think phalanx was superior head on

If phalanxes are not superior to equally priced infantry on flat ground with a head on confrontation, noone will use them. They are more rigid, unwieldy, and disadvantaged on the flanks and rear than any other type of infantry. I am assuming that CA will make phalanxes the strongest (head on) melee infantry simply for gameplay balance reasons even if historical evidence can prove this was not the case.

[Aleksander the Average]

romans often retreated over rough ground, where a phalanx had difficulty taking advantage of gained ground. once broken by such rough ground, the phalanx was frontally vulnerable to roman assault. the main advantage that romans had, however, was that no matter where they were and in what formation and size of unit, they were equally effective in their primary role in close combat. the phalanx, being inherently defensive rigid in its formation, was not effective in small squads and so could not prevent the roman pillaging of the the countryside.

for further reading, your best bet is probably Polybius (Scroll to the bottom to see some important advantages that i have marked in bold):

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

The Roman Maniple vs. The Macedonian Phalanx

Polybius, The Histories, Book XVIII, Chapters 28-32:

In my sixth book I made a promise, still unfulfilled, of taking a fitting opportunity of drawing a comparison between the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their respective system of tactics, and pointing out how they differ for better or worse from each other. I will now endeavor by a reference to actual facts to fulfil that promise. For since in former times the Macedonian tactics proved themselves by experience capable of conquering those of Asia and Greece; while the Roman tactics sufficed to conquer the nations of Africa and all those of Western Europe; and since in our own day there have been numerous opportunities of comparing the men as well as their tactics, it will be, I think, a useful and worthy task to investigate their differences, and discover why it is that the Romans conquer and carry off the palm from their enemies in the operations of war: that we may not put it all down to Fortune, and congratulate them on their good luck, as the thoughtless of mankind do; but, from a knowledge of the true causes, may give their leaders the tribute of praise and admiration which they deserve.

Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hannibal and the defeats which they sustained in them, I need say no more. It was not owing to their arms or their tactics, but to the skill and genius of Hannibal that they met with those defeats: and that I made quite clear in my account of the battles themselves. And my contention is supported by two facts. First, by the conclusion of the war: for as soon as the Romans got a general of ability comparable with that of Hannibal, victory was not long in following their banners. Secondly, Hannibal himself, being dissatisfied with the original arms of his men, and having immediately after his first victory furnished his troops with the arms of the Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the end. Pyrrhus, again, availed himself not only of the arms, but also of the troops of Italy, placing a maniple of Italians and a company of his own phalanx alternately, in his battles against the Romans. Yet even this did not enable him to win; the battles were somehow or another always indecisive.

It was necessary to speak first on these points, to anticipate any instances which might seem to make against my theory. I will now return to my comparison.

Many considerations may easily convince us that, if only the phalanx has its proper formation and strength, nothing can resist it face to face or withstand its charge. For as a man in close order of battle occupies a space of three feet; and as the length of the sarissae are sixteen cubits according to the original design, which has been reduced in practice to fourteen; and as of these fourteen four must be deducted, to allow for the weight in front; it follows clearly that each hoplite will have ten cubits of his sarissa projecting beyond his body, when he lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the enemy: hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth rank will have their sarissae projecting farther beyond the front rank than the men of the fifth, yet even these last will have two cubits of their sarissae beyond the front rank; if only the phalanx is properly formed and the men close up properly both flank and rear, like the description in Homer:

So buckler pressed on buckler; helm on helm; And man on man; and waving horse-hair plumes In polished head-piece mingled, as they swayed In order: in such serried rank they stood. [Iliad, 13.131]



And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front of each man of the front rank there will be five sarissae projecting to distances varying by a descending scale of two cubits.

With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to imagine what the appearance and strength of the whole phalanx is likely to be, when, with lowered sarissae, it advances to the charge sixteen deep. Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth are unable to reach with their sarissae far enough to take actual part in the fighting. They, therefore, do not lower them, but hold them with the points inclined upwards over the shoulders of the ranks in front of them, to shield the heads of the whole phalanx; for the sarissae are so closely serried, that they repel missiles which have carried over the front ranks and might fall upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks, however, during an advance, press forward those in front by the weight of their bodies; and thus make the charge very forcible, and at the same time render it impossible for the front ranks to face about.

Such is the arrangement, general and detailed of the phalanx. It remains now to compare with it the peculiarities and distinctive features of the Roman arms and tactics. Now, a Roman soldier in full armor also requires a space of three square feet. But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man---because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing---it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear if he is to do his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force his way through easily---seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigor to the use of their swords. Therefore, it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength.

Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but maneuvers for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.

For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished facts. The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course, those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately.

The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well-equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others.

I thought it necessary to discuss this subject at some length, because at the actual time of the occurrence many Greeks supposed when the Macedonians were beaten that it was incredible; and many will afterwards be at a loss to account for the inferiority of the phalanx to the Roman system of arming.

Source:

From: Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, 2 Vols., trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (London: Macmillan, 1889), pp. 226-230.

Scanned by: J. S. Arkenberg, Dept. of History, Cal. State Fullerton. Prof. Arkenberg has modernized the text.

I hope that this is helpful in your search for knowledge. -Aleksander

[GussieFinkNottle]

romans often retreated over rough ground, where a phalanx had difficulty taking advantage of gained ground. once broken by such rough ground, the phalanx was frontally vulnerable to roman assault. the main advantage that romans had, however, was that no matter where they were and in what formation and size of unit, they were equally effective in their primary role in close combat. the phalanx, being inherently defensive in its formation, was not effective in small squads and so could not prevent the roman pillaging of the the countryside.

for further reading, your best bed is probably Polybius:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

The Roman Maniple vs. The Macedonian Phalanx

Polybius, The Histories, Book XVIII, Chapters 28-32:

In my sixth book I made a promise, still unfulfilled, of taking a fitting opportunity of drawing a comparison between the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their respective system of tactics, and pointing out how they differ for better or worse from each other. I will now endeavor by a reference to actual facts to fulfil that promise. For since in former times the Macedonian tactics proved themselves by experience capable of conquering those of Asia and Greece; while the Roman tactics sufficed to conquer the nations of Africa and all those of Western Europe; and since in our own day there have been numerous opportunities of comparing the men as well as their tactics, it will be, I think, a useful and worthy task to investigate their differences, and discover why it is that the Romans conquer and carry off the palm from their enemies in the operations of war: that we may not put it all down to Fortune, and congratulate them on their good luck, as the thoughtless of mankind do; but, from a knowledge of the true causes, may give their leaders the tribute of praise and admiration which they deserve.

Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hannibal and the defeats which they sustained in them, I need say no more. It was not owing to their arms or their tactics, but to the skill and genius of Hannibal that they met with those defeats: and that I made quite clear in my account of the battles themselves. And my contention is supported by two facts. First, by the conclusion of the war: for as soon as the Romans got a general of ability comparable with that of Hannibal, victory was not long in following their banners. Secondly, Hannibal himself, being dissatisfied with the original arms of his men, and having immediately after his first victory furnished his troops with the arms of the Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the end. Pyrrhus, again, availed himself not only of the arms, but also of the troops of Italy, placing a maniple of Italians and a company of his own phalanx alternately, in his battles against the Romans. Yet even this did not enable him to win; the battles were somehow or another always indecisive.

It was necessary to speak first on these points, to anticipate any instances which might seem to make against my theory. I will now return to my comparison.

Many considerations may easily convince us that, if only the phalanx has its proper formation and strength, nothing can resist it face to face or withstand its charge. For as a man in close order of battle occupies a space of three feet; and as the length of the sarissae are sixteen cubits according to the original design, which has been reduced in practice to fourteen; and as of these fourteen four must be deducted, to allow for the weight in front; it follows clearly that each hoplite will have ten cubits of his sarissa projecting beyond his body, when he lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the enemy: hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth rank will have their sarissae projecting farther beyond the front rank than the men of the fifth, yet even these last will have two cubits of their sarissae beyond the front rank; if only the phalanx is properly formed and the men close up properly both flank and rear, like the description in Homer:

So buckler pressed on buckler; helm on helm; And man on man; and waving horse-hair plumes In polished head-piece mingled, as they swayed In order: in such serried rank they stood. [Iliad, 13.131]



And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front of each man of the front rank there will be five sarissae projecting to distances varying by a descending scale of two cubits.

With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to imagine what the appearance and strength of the whole phalanx is likely to be, when, with lowered sarissae, it advances to the charge sixteen deep. Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth are unable to reach with their sarissae far enough to take actual part in the fighting. They, therefore, do not lower them, but hold them with the points inclined upwards over the shoulders of the ranks in front of them, to shield the heads of the whole phalanx; for the sarissae are so closely serried, that they repel missiles which have carried over the front ranks and might fall upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks, however, during an advance, press forward those in front by the weight of their bodies; and thus make the charge very forcible, and at the same time render it impossible for the front ranks to face about.

Such is the arrangement, general and detailed of the phalanx. It remains now to compare with it the peculiarities and distinctive features of the Roman arms and tactics. Now, a Roman soldier in full armor also requires a space of three square feet. But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man---because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing---it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear if he is to do his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force his way through easily---seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigor to the use of their swords. Therefore, it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength.

Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but maneuvers for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.

For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished facts. The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course, those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately.

The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well-equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others.

I thought it necessary to discuss this subject at some length, because at the actual time of the occurrence many Greeks supposed when the Macedonians were beaten that it was incredible; and many will afterwards be at a loss to account for the inferiority of the phalanx to the Roman system of arming.

Source:

From: Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, 2 Vols., trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (London: Macmillan, 1889), pp. 226-230.

Scanned by: J. S. Arkenberg, Dept. of History, Cal. State Fullerton. Prof. Arkenberg has modernized the text.

I hope that this is helpful in your search for knowledge. -Aleksander

Ta + rep
btw, the rough ground advantage of Romans can be seen in my 1st pic above

[Maklodes]

Some unit has to be the best in head-on combat. I think phalangites seem like a good candidate for that role, given their other disadvantages (weakness in the flanks, weakness to missiles, limited mobility, etc).

At least, for price. Maybe a 1000 denarii unit of Averni Oathsworn could beat a 200 denarii Egyptian pike levy head-on. Still, I think it's reasonable that pike phalanxes be the most efficient head-on combatants in the game, given their limited utility in doing anything but head-on combat.

[alstl]

They hung theirs shields around their neck to cover the left shoulder. Angle an attack from their right. With both hands on the weapon and no shield they are vulnerable.

Is the game programmed that way? I don't know.

[|Sith|Galvanized Iron]

One simply do not break a phalanx head on.

[RGA]

As other said, terrain is the key. Phalangites simply could not maintain formation in rough terrain. Romans exploited that to great effect at Pydna. Later the Spanish engineer corp deliberately digged trenches and constructed obstacles to disrupt their Swiss pikemen enemy.

Even on flat ground, phalanx was not invincible head-on. Alexander's phalanx was close to collapse twice, at Issus and again at Gaugamela, under the pressure of Persian attack, until his cavalry saved the day. It is said that Alexander relied greatly on his light infantry to fill the gap between pike blocks. In the days of the Successors, this tactic faded out and phalanx became more and more rigid and bulky.

In Late Medieval era, they used suicide fighter armed with two-handed sword to disrupt enemy pike formation. I would not be surprised if the Gauls or Germans, once coming often enough in contact with sarrissae-armed armies, would develope a similar tactic to counter.

[hellheaven1987]

Alexander's phalanx was close to collapse twice, at Issus and again at Gaugamela, under the pressure of Persian attack, until his cavalry saved the day. It is said that Alexander relied greatly on his light infantry to fill the gap between pike blocks. In the days of the Successors, this tactic faded out and phalanx became more and more rigid and bulky.

Huh? What?

[Jester]

well, i think even half-naked head hurlers would defeat a phalanx...

they d throw the heads which would stick on the pointy ends until all pikes become useless, harmless poles then they would move in and kill em all


the romans could ve used watermelons though

[GussieFinkNottle]

One of the images released by CA shows Roman legionaries dashing an Egyptian (Macedonian) phalanx's order to pieces and penetrating beyond the pikes, via a frontal assault. It seems the legionary is superior to the phalangite in Rome 2
(click to enlarge)

[hochmeister devin]

One of the images released by CA shows Roman legionaries dashing an Egyptian (Macedonian) phalanx's order to pieces and penetrating beyond the pikes, via a frontal assault. It seems the legionary is superior to the phalangite in Rome 2
(click to enlarge)

I pray that CA has fixed the Phalanxs since then otherwise its pointless.

[GussieFinkNottle]

I pray that CA has fixed the Phalanxs since then otherwise its pointless.

They are still brutally effective against mounted troops: look at what they are doing to the Roman cavalry near the top right of the screen, and don't forget legionary evocati are among the best infantry in the game and were famously good against phalanxes

[Ringir]

I pray that CA has fixed the Phalanxs since then otherwise its pointless.

The picture shows some of Ceasar's best legionaries against the leftover of the Ptolemaic empire, it would be very unrealistic if they had lost.

[CDR Hurricane]

One of the images released by CA shows Roman legionaries dashing an Egyptian (Macedonian) phalanx's order to pieces and penetrating beyond the pikes, via a frontal assault. It seems the legionary is superior to the phalangite in Rome 2

Conspicuous lack of dead bodies on both sides, from which we can infer that the units just met and the formation is already shattered. As I was saying, if the phalanx formation is this weak head on, noone will use it, and it will be a complete waste of CA's time. Also note how loose the unengaged phalanx formation on the right is, and yet the Romans are practically standing shoulder to shoulder... We can only hope that CA is still tweaking things.

[♘Top Hat Zebra]

One of the images released by CA shows Roman legionaries dashing an Egyptian (Macedonian) phalanx's order to pieces and penetrating beyond the pikes, via a frontal assault. It seems the legionary is superior to the phalangite in Rome 2
(click to enlarge)

Were the Roman units not purposefully buffed for this battle?

[RandyRhoads]

One of the images released by CA shows Roman legionaries dashing an Egyptian (Macedonian) phalanx's order to pieces and penetrating beyond the pikes, via a frontal assault. It seems the legionary is superior to the phalangite in Rome 2
(click to enlarge)

You can fit an elephant between them...

[nomercysniper]

One of the images released by CA shows Roman legionaries dashing an Egyptian (Macedonian) phalanx's order to pieces and penetrating beyond the pikes, via a frontal assault. It seems the legionary is superior to the phalangite in Rome 2
(click to enlarge)

This quite a poor argument really. Evocati, elite roman infantry, against a levy? People should almost ignore this completely.

[GussieFinkNottle]

This quite a poor argument really. Evocati, elite roman infantry, against a levy? People should almost ignore this completely.

The one in the bottom left is not a levy - these are bronze-armoured hellenistic phalangites, and their formation has not held back the Roman line, who seem to have pushed through it like butter

[Geuvesa]

I think we are not taking into account that the Macedonian Phalanx was designed in combination with heavy cavalry to create a Hammer and Anvil effect. A Phalanx is nothing more than a delaying formation pure for pinning an enemy in position while the cavalry flanks and charges. The Roman heavy infantry is however, a beat all down and dirty machine designed to grind down and subdue any opposing infantry, a product of many wars and adaptations against many foes.