Did Antiochus III had any chanche against rome in the Syrian wars?

[Mary The Quene]

Before the roman-syrian war happened, The romans already knew how to React toward elephants (punic wars) and Phalanx armies (macedonian wars) so the strength of The seleucid got already compromised.
But however the Seleucid empire still had an impressive army with a lot of diffrent units (like Dahae horse archers,scythed chariots).But do you think he had a chance to win the battle of magnesia with such an impressive army? I think he lost because he faced an Infantry based Army and not a cavalry army where he had a lot of experience with.

[ImperialAquila]

He had a chance. A slim one if I may add but a chance nonetheless. His army was impressive, that's true enough but I think it all comes down to battlefield tactics. The Romans as you have stated, had the advantage of experience in fighting elephants and phalanx armies. The Successor states used Alexander's tactics for years but they failed to understand the most crucial factor in trying to emulate Alexander's style of warfare and that was the ability to adapt to the ever changing flow of battle. Alexander knew when to use the same tactics over again and when not to use them.

Pyrrhus failed. Philip V similarly failed. They never learned from their mistakes because they strongly believed in Alexander's tactics, thinking it was unbeatable. That made fighting phalanx armies so predictable and so damn easy to counter.

[Teutonic]

I think Antiochus III managed to clinch defeat from the jaws of victory at Magnesia. He failed to take advantage of his success on the left flank, and the idiotic use of the scythed chariots screwed the right flank. The phalanx, being deprived from it's flanks' protection, did well. They formed into a huge impenetrable square with the elephants in the middle. But, as you say, the Romans knew how to deal with elephants and when the elephants went berserk (I guess because of Roman missile fire) they broke the phalanx order and that was it.

I think in the war of 192-190 bc the Seleucids had a good chance. They should have won at Magnesia and had huge manpower reserves to persevere with the war. After victory in Magnesia they could take out the Roman's allies in Asia Minor after which the Romans would've found it very difficult to send another expeditionary force there.

But in this case, the Syrian War may have become Syrian Wars over the decades and centuries. Who knows? Without being afraid from the Romans the Seleucids would've probably conquered Egypt. But Parthians' attacks on the Seleucids' back and Rome's strenght in depth and determination...

PS Epirus and Macedon were tiny compared with the Seleucid Empire. They had very limited resources. Also, partly because of the availability of different types of troops and cavalry, the Seleucids and Antiochus III were quite adventurous in their tactics. Perhaps too adventurous at Magnesia with the stupid chariots and the positioning of the elephants in-between the phalanx spread across it's whole length.

[Manuel I Komnenos]

By 197 BC, the year he got in Asia Minor, Antiochus was considered the most powerful and prestigious ruler in western Asia and rightfully so. He had defeated the Parthians and the Bactrians and forced them to become vassals and most recently he had crushed the Ptolemies and was in the process of conquering every last Ptolemaic stronghold in Asia Minor, on his way to Thrace. Afterwards, we see Antiochus III make a number of blunders. I'll number them to make it easier to see:

1)Landed in Greece with an inadequate army of just 10,500 soldiers. His army from Asia hadn't been mobilized yet. The impression he caused to the Greeks due to his past victories soon wore off when they say how few his forces were, compared to the promises he had made for landing with tens of thousands of soldiers. He found little support in Greece, as even Phillip V, his most likely ally, chose to side with the Romans. His only allies were the Aetolians and the Athamanes.

2)Ignored the advice of Hannibal, which was the most reasonable to have been said among his council members, as Livy puts it. Hannibal proposed to Antiochus to have him sent to Carthage with a few ships so that he could rally the population against the Romans once again and argued that the best course of action was for Antiochus to land in Italy, not allow the Romans to fight him in Greece. How right was Hannibal when he said that last thing. Instead, Antiochus gave the Romans the initiative and kept Hannibal with him.

3)His navy, despite its good commander, Polyxenidas the Rhodian was not on par with the combined Rhodian, Pergamene and Roman fleets. Antiochus needed to construct more ships and train the crews for several months before engaging in operations. Without control of the seas, Antiochus did not stand much chance in this war.

4)After his naval defeat, Antiochus made an inexplainable blunder. He abandoned Lysimachia in Thrace, which could have held the Romans for months and simultaneously left the shores of the Hellespont, allowing the Romans to land easily on the opposite site.

5)In the battle of Magnesia, he placed his elephants in intervals between his phalanx, even though he should have placed them in front of his phalanx and sent them to wreck havoc on the Roman lines. He also used chariots which proved disastrous for his left flank which was disorganized thanks to them.

[Teutonic]

Just looked at my post above- in my first sentence talking about flanks, I mean the Romans' flanks there. Antiochus' cavalry on his right wing broke the Roman's left, and so on.

[Manuel I Komnenos]

I think generally the battle of Magnesia was one of the biggest upsets in history. Every way you look at it, you can't possibly expect Antiochus to lose. What should I mention first? The 54 Asian elephants? How could the Romans withstand their charge, even if they were accustomed to fight elephants? The cataphract cavalry? The Macedonian phalanx which was made up of veterans who had participated in the campaigns of Antiochus and were as experienced as Alexander's troops by that point?

[DarthShizNit]

The Seleucid army I believe was capable of taking on the Romans they were some crack troops and their phalanx was formed up of hardcore veterans. But for whatever reason, Antiochus decided that he wasn't the general to do it, despite just a year earlier being a total bad ass as a general. Seriously, the amount of mistakes he made, strategically and tactically speaking is frankly mind boggling considering his showing in the east.

[Smiling Hetairoi]

I blame Antiochus defeat at Magnesia at his attempt to adapt. He placed the Elephants between his phalanx blocks to increase their mobility and placed the chariots on the left flank hoping to surprise the Romans with a "new" weapon". Had his left flank held, the phalanx wouldn't have been disrupted and most likely been able to crush the last legion with the help of the right wing cavalry led by Antiochus. Just my two cents.

[Keyser]

Funnily the most obvious (and important imo) blunder of Antiochos has not been mentionned yet... That he left the battlefield in pursuit of the roman cavalry rather than procede to strike the romans in the rear and flank... Exactly like he did at Raphia... Wich makes it even more unforgivable !

[Mary The Quene]

Funnily the most obvious (and important imo) blunder of Antiochos has not been mentionned yet... That he left the battlefield in pursuit of the roman cavalry rather than procede to strike the romans in the rear and flank... Exactly like he did at Raphia... Wich makes it even more unforgivable !

But at that same battle in Raphia it didn't worked too.

[Smiling Hetairoi]

Did he not attack the Romans camp?

[Smiling Hetairoi]

Didn't he pursue the Ptolemaic cavalry because he thought the Ptolemy king was with them?

[Teutonic]

Re: Antiochus' strange pursuit at Raphia. I think Bar Kochva's assertion is that he was trying to find and kill Ptolemy and end the war quickly and take in Ptolemy's army almost intact (ending the battle quickly with little bloodshed), like he did with Molon a little earlier. Or maybe he was trying to attack the Egyptian camp. This could have dealt a huge morale blow to the enemy. That's what the Seleucids tried at Magnesia. And the Romans at Thermopylae vs the Seleucids, successfully.

Keyser, I'm pretty sure that Antiochus didn't persue Roman Cavalry but tried to for the Roman camp. There wasn't much cavalry on the Roman left wing, the Seleucid elite cavalry and cataphracts defeated on of the Latin alae. I'm nitpicking a little since the point you are making stays the same.

[Keyser]

Yep he pursued the forces in front of him and attacked the roman camp, wich let his army and commanders fight alone and being outflanked on the other side of the battle. Exactly like at Raphia, it costed him victory, wich was my point.

I don't know if he truly had a plan in mind (like killing Ptolemy or taking the ennemy camp to give them a morale blow), but even if it was planned from the start and not just some problem of cavalry control or overenthousiasm and problems of priorities, the fact it costed him the victory in a battle he could have won if he stayed on the field with the cavalry not only once but twice is really the most terrible blunder of them all.

[Smiling Hetairoi]

Quite intriguing how the Romans could sustain so many losses yet grow while other nations fell due to one battle.

[DarthShizNit]

Quite intriguing how the Romans could sustain so many losses yet grow while other nations fell due to one battle.

Not really. Carthage lasted through two twenty year wars. The Macedonians would last for over half a century before finally being taken out. The Seleucids were in a precarious position, as a lot of their military and political power came from a relatively small amount of Greek and Macedonian settles, which once beaten he lost his most effective fighting force in the field was put out of use for the foreseeable future. The Seleucid empire would still go onto to survive for more than a century, but in this one war, it really all came down to that one battle given the nature of the Seleucid empire.

[Manuel I Komnenos]

Not really. Carthage lasted through two twenty year wars. The Macedonians would last for over half a century before finally being taken out. The Seleucids were in a precarious position, as a lot of their military and political power came from a relatively small amount of Greek and Macedonian settles, which once beaten he lost his most effective fighting force in the field was put out of use for the foreseeable future. The Seleucid empire would still go onto to survive for more than a century, but in this one war, it really all came down to that one battle given the nature of the Seleucid empire.

The Romans could have completely conquered Macedonia and the Seleucid Empire but they refrained from this for a number of reasons. Basically, after Cynoscephale and Magnesia, the armies of both kingdoms had been utterly destroyed. They recovered after a generation, but after those battles they simply couldn't hold the Romans.

[DarthShizNit]

The Romans could have completely conquered Macedonia and the Seleucid Empire but they refrained from this for a number of reasons. Basically, after Cynoscephale and Magnesia, the armies of both kingdoms had been utterly destroyed. They recovered after a generation, but after those battles they simply couldn't hold the Romans.

Fine, go ahead and use you're superior knowledge of the subject against me

[Manuel I Komnenos]

Fine, go ahead and use you're superior knowledge of the subject against me

I don't have a superior knowledge. I'm just pointing out that the Romans were not really interested in the affairs of Greece or Asia Minor: they wanted to keep the status quo and avoid giving too much power to a single state. For example the Aetolians asked Aemilius to conquer Macedonia and remove Phillip V, but he refused.

[Keyser]

Well regarding the seleucid, they had manpower problems.

Antiochos mustered a large army for magnesia, but once it was defeated and killed/captured/dispersed. His manpower was spent. Magnesia for him was a gamble, he put most of his manpower reserve in the battle. After that it was gone.
Not in total manpower available, but the hellenistic kings relied on their greek/macedonian settlers and mercenaries. And there was a limited amount available to them, once it was spent, they were gone for several years.

The roman just gambled a consular army and allies, if they lost they could simply levy other legions and allies.