Do objective moral values and duties exist?

[Valden]

The Moral Argument for God’s existence runs as follows:

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.
2. Objective moral values and duties do exist
3. Therefore, God exists.

Definitions;

Moral duty: an obligation to act in a certain way.
Moral value: the worth of an action.
Objective: Existing independently of human opinion.
God: Maximally great and transcendent mind, deduced as creator/designer of the Universe through cosmology and teleology.

Premise 1 explained: An objective moral value is a moral value that is true regardless of societal consensus or personal opinion, under this philosophy the statement ‘one ought not torture children’ has always been true, regardless of historical, cultural or personal context, and regardless of whether or not any human beings exist to perceive it. For instance, the statement ‘one ought not commit acts of hatred’ was true regardless of societal consensus to the contrary in Nazi Germany, where anti-Semitism was widespread, even if the Nazis had conquered and brainwashed the entire world into agreeing with them, this would have had no effect on the truth of the moral statement. What is ‘normal’ is of no consequence to objective moral values, they are objectively true, meaning they hold regardless of human opinion.

If objective moral values exist, they must exist metaphysically, as they are outside human jurisdiction, but are perceptible to us as obligations. This requires a supernatural entity to exist, whereas under naturalism no such entity can exist. If objective moral values exist, naturalism is therefore false. If moral obligations exist metaphysically then, two things logically follow. First, that metaphysical entities do exist, and second that moral obligations have been set for us. Given these two points it is entirely justifiable to deduce from the metaphysical existence of objective moral obligations the existence of a metaphysical moral obligator, from whom an ultimate standard of morality stems. It is fairly uncontroversial that if objective moral values and duties exist, God must exist. The crux of this issue is whether or not objective moral values and duties do in fact exist.

Objection 1:

The Euthyphro dilemma:
1. Is something good because God wills it? If so, what is good becomes arbitrary, subjective to the mind of God.
2. Does God will something because it is good? If so it is a moral value that exists independently of God, and God is therefore not required for objective moral values and duties to exist.

Answer: The Euthyphro dilemma is a false one because it posits only two options, whereas there is in fact a third way. This is that God wills something because he is good, His own nature is the ultimate standard of goodness. God’s own character defines what is good, he is the ultimate standard of morality, an omnibenevolent being. Since God is the ultimate standard of goodness his commands will reflect this. If someone were to ask “If God were to command the torture of children, would we be obliged to torture children?” they would be asking a logically incoherent question, since God is by definition the ultimate standard of goodness He would not order evil. The morally good/bad is therefore determined by God’s own nature, and his will is the manifestation of his nature. So:

4. God wills something because He is good, his nature is the maximum standard of goodness.

Objection 2:

Humanism:
Most people want to affirm objective moral values; not many people would say that whether or not it is wrong to commit murder is down to societal consensus or personal opinion, a simple social convention like shaking hands with a new acquaintance. Instead, they will affirm that is always true that murder is wrong, however some people try to avoid the consequential existence of God by proposing a humanist explanation, namely, that whatever is good for human flourishing is good, and whatever causes damage to humanity is bad.

Answer: Taking human flourishing as a stopping point is arbitrary. Firstly, if atheism is true and God does not exist, why think that human flourishing is more valuable than the flourishing of arachnids or jellyfish? Because we are ‘superior’? But how do we define what is or isn’t superior, we have no objective standard, simply our subjective opinion that a more advanced brain makes us ‘better’ than other species. In other words, the humanist explanation for objective moral truths is guilty of speciesism: arbitrarily favouring one’s own species over another.

Premise 2 explained: Actions like murder, rape and abuse are not just socially unacceptable, they are morally evil. When asked, most people will recognise the moral evil of these actions, people pay lip service to relativism, but when pushed will mostly become moral realists. Through our moral experience we encounter moral duties and values, just as the fallibility of our senses does not lead us to doubt the existence of the physical world around us, neither should the fallibility of our consciences lead us to doubt the existence of objective moral values and duties. Our perception of them may well be flawed, that does not mean the values and duties do not exist.

Objection:

The sociobiological objection: If our moral values and duties were instilled in us by evolutionary and societal conditioning, then the existence of moral values is illusory, we have instead naturally adapted the code of practise that best facilitates our survival.

Answer: Firstly, this objection does nothing to undermine the truth of our moral experience, for this exists independently of how we came to have those experiences, which is what the objection claims is sociobiologically determined. I could gain my moral beliefs from a random word generator that happened to say “Don’t kill children”, my method of determining a moral truth would certainly be flawed, but that does nothing to undermine the belief itself. The sociobiological account may demonstrate that our perception of moral values has changed over time, but by employing it to dismiss the objective truth of moral values, the atheist is committing the genetic fallacy by dismissing a belief based on how it came to be held.

However, the objection could be used to attack our justification for holding our moral values to be true, rather than their actual truth. For instance, under the evolutionary account alone there is no reason to think our moral beliefs are true, as evolution is governed not by truth, but by survival. Our moral beliefs would therefore be those that best facilitate our survival, rather than those that are true. Whilst sounding powerful, this objection is actually very weak: It assumes atheism is true. If there is no God, then of course our moral values were determined by evolutionary means to facilitate survival, not truth, but that simply begs the question in favour of atheism; if God exists He would have guided evolutionary process or instilled them into us. This is perfectly compatible with the evolutionary account, because mutations do not occur at random, despite popular opinion. Mutations occur regardless of benefit to the organism, not at random without causation. There is therefore no incompatibility with the idea of a divinely guided evolutionary process.

Furthermore, the sociobiological objection is self-defeating: If naturalism is true then all of our beliefs, not just our moral beliefs, are the result of sociobiological conditioning. The evolutionary account therefore leads to scepticism of human knowledge in general, including itself as it presupposes the axiomatic assumptions of science, which are themselves human beliefs. Remember, under the evolutionary account beliefs are not evolved for their truth, but their ability to facilitate our survival. There is therefore no reason to trust ANY of our beliefs, including those axiomatic to science. The sociobiological objection to objective moral values is therefore incoherent.

Premise 3 explained: Well little further explanation is needed, if objective moral values exist then God must exist. I would like to clarify a point that may lead to sedition and bad feeling if left unanswered though:

I am not claiming that belief in God is required to lead a morally righteous life, neither is that the claim of the argument I have put. I have no doubt there are atheists who lead decent lives, I am in no way casting an aspersion on anyone’s moral character. It is instead the existence of God upon which the existence of objective moral values and duties is contingent. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist and our perception of them is illusory, a sociobiological trick to facilitate our collective and individual survival. The existence of objective moral values is therefore inconsistent with atheism, any atheist who upholds such values does so inconsistently with the logical consequences of atheism and naturalism. It is the existence of God, not belief in Him, that is the issue here, so I don’t want to see any responses claiming I am calling all atheists evil, because I most certainly am not.

Peace be with you all,

Valden

[God]

However, the objection could be used to attack our justification for holding our moral values to be true, rather than their actual truth. For instance, under the evolutionary account alone there is no reason to think our moral beliefs are true, as evolution is governed not by truth, but by survival. Our moral beliefs would therefore be those that best facilitate our survival, rather than those that are true. Whilst sounding powerful, this objection is actually very weak: It assumes atheism is true. If there is no God, then of course our moral values were determined by evolutionary means to facilitate survival, not truth, but that simply begs the question in favour of atheism; if God exists He would have guided evolutionary process or instilled them into us.

But if atheism is true, this does follow right? So there may be no need for God in morality. It doesn't necessarily exclude the idea of a god that started the universe with no idea what would happen or the evolutionary process either.

EDIT:

God: Maximally great and transcendent mind, deduced as creator/designer of the Universe through cosmology and teleology.

Well it does by this definition I guess.

[Valden]

But if atheism is true, this does follow right? So there may be no need for God in morality.

The problem with it is that is simply presupposes that atheism is true, that our moral experience is ultimately an illusion to facilitate our survival. As I went on to say, this objection is actually self-defeating because it undermines ALL human beliefs, not just moral ones. Axiomatic and putative metaphysical claims, such as those science is based on are therefore also called into question.

Given the logical failure of this objection, it fails.

Also, it is not a case of 'If atheism is true...there may be no need for God in morality', If atheism is true, there is no morality, we would exist on the level of moral automatons fulfilling our sociobiologically conditioned paradigm to facilitate our survival. The issues of freewill and moral obligations would be out the window.

[Aeneas Veneratio]

Also, it is not a case of 'If atheism is true...there may be no need for God in morality', If atheism is true, there is no morality, we would exist on the level of moral automatons fulfilling our sociobiologically conditioned paradigm to facilitate our survival. The issues of freewill and moral obligations would be out the window.

You really need to establish a link between the existense of some god and morality before this discussion can actually begin. Mankind is the only animal specie on this planet that kills for other reasons than survival. Other animals kill, so they can eat or because they are threatened. I see no decency in that side of Mankind, no divine morality guiding us.

[Ciabhán]

I don't have the same moral code as you. You don't have the same moral code as a member of an African death squad. He doesn't have the same morals as a Jew from 2000 years ago. That Jew didn't have the same morals as a Greek of the same time. That Greek didn't have the same morals as an Indian Buddhist whose morals differ from a Japanese Samurai whose morals differ from a Native American dog soldier.

Yes it's quite a disjointed point, on purpose. Through the ages morals have differed and at any one time different societies and classes within those societies have had different moral codes. On top of that individuals who may have existed at the same time, followed the same religions, been from the same society, and shared a class/caste among that society also differ in their moral codes. Morality is not concrete it's ever changing. It's subjective not objective.

[Valden]

I don't have the same moral code as you. You don't have the same moral code as a member of an African death squad. He doesn't have the same morals as a Jew from 2000 years ago. That Jew didn't have the same morals as a Greek of the same time. That Greek didn't have the same morals as an Indian Buddhist whose morals differ from a Japanese Samurai whose morals differ from a Native American dog soldier.

Yes it's quite a disjointed point, on purpose. Through the ages morals have differed and at any one time different societies and classes within those societies have had different moral codes. On top of that individuals who may have existed at the same time, followed the same religions, been from the same society, and shared a class/caste among that society also differ in their moral codes. Morality is not concrete it's ever changing. It's subjective not objective.

Our perception of moral values and duties has certainly changed over time and varies depending on cultural background, that does not mean there are no objective moral values though. The former does not logically follow from the latter. Collective or individual opinion are of no consequence to the actual truth of a moral statement if it is objectively true, which is my argument, just as different opinions on any issue do not render that issue non existent.

You have not addressed the argument exactly, but raised doubt that we are capable of identifying what is or is not an objective moral value because different people have different ideas as to what is or isn't righteous. I think this is fallacious though, because in referring people who uphold seemingly evil moral codes as evidence against objective moral values, you assume that if objective moral values exist then everyone would obey them! Of course people make bad moral decisions, sometimes entire cultures fall into corruption. That does not mean the objective standard does not exist.

[Ciabhán]

Our perception of moral values and duties has certainly changed over time and varies depending on cultural background, that does not mean there are no objective moral values though. The former does not logically follow from the latter. Collective or individual opinion are of no consequence to the actual truth of a moral statement if it is objectively true, which is my argument, just as different opinions on any issue do not render that issue non existent.

You have not addressed the argument exactly, but raised doubt that we are capable of identifying what is or is not an objective moral value because different people have different ideas as to what is or isn't righteous. I think this is fallacious though, because in referring people who uphold seemingly evil moral codes as evidence against objective moral values, you assume that if objective moral values exist then everyone would obey them! Of course people make bad moral decisions, sometimes entire cultures fall into corruption. That does not mean the objective standard does not exist.

Who's to say that societies with different morals than yours are the corrupt ones? They probably think the same of you.

Morality is the very definition of subjective as morals exist only in the minds of each individual. There is no single set of rules that every single human being since the beginning of time has agreed upon and been judged by. That being the case there is no objective human morality. In order to show that some god's morality is objective truth, the rulebook by which all existence is judged and that we all are equally beholden to you have to show objective evidence of a god first. Neither making the assumption that morality has an objective source nor the assumption that god/s exist proves the other because both require evidence that none of us have.

Pretending for a moment I believed in a god I'd be more inclined to believe it's personality was one of relative apathy towards what such lesser beings do. We don't judge other animals according to any of our morals as we don't expect them to understand them. I'd bet any entity that could magic up the universe is so far beyond our scope of understanding as to make the gap between human thought and that of a fruit fly seem non-existent in comparison.

It's sheer human arrogance to assign characteristics even vaguely similar to ourselves to any form of god entity.

[Valden]

Morality is the very definition of subjective as morals exist only in the minds of each individual. There is no single set of rules that every single human being since the beginning of time has agreed upon and been judged by. That being the case there is no objective human morality. In order to show that some god's morality is objective truth, the rulebook by which all existence is judged and that we all are equally beholden to you have to show objective evidence of a god first. Neither making the assumption that morality has an objective source nor the assumption that god/s exist proves the other because both require evidence that none of us have.

You seem to misunderstand the notion of the existence of objective moral values; I have made the point many times now that the truth of these values is by definition independent of human opinion of them (remember that objective: independent of human opinion), your argument that no agreement 'since the beginning of time' has ever been reached is therefore irrelevant.

As I have argued, the perception of moral values through moral experience is enough to warrant belief in objective moral values, although our moral experience is fallible we have no choice but to trust it, just as we have no choice but to trust our senses and believe in the existence of the physical world. We could ultimately be in the Matrix, but both beliefs (in the physical world and the truth of our moral claims) exist as properly basic beliefs. What theism provides that naturalism does not is justification for holding these beliefs to be true.

Pretending for a moment I believed in a god I'd be more inclined to believe it's personality was one of relative apathy towards what such lesser beings do. We don't judge other animals according to any of our morals as we don't expect them to understand them. I'd bet any entity that could magic up the universe is so far beyond our scope of understanding as to make the gap between human thought and that of a fruit fly seem non-existent in comparison.

So if you believed in God, you would believe in a God who was utterly apathetic toward the creatures he was responsible for? Your god seems to be an inconsistent one, why would he create the universe if he didn't care/ had no motive for doing so? You're reading petty human traits into a maximally great being; C. S. Lewis once said that the true nature of good might be just as terrifying as the true nature of evil.

This actually isn't the case. The Spartans felt that such rites as their cheese stealing ritual was necessary to build men of proper strength and character. This ritual involved the flogging of young boys, and evolved to become something of a tourist attraction for the Romans -- at which point it became even more brutal, and many boys did not survive the ordeal.

This is another misunderstanding of the argument for the simple reason that people/societies breaking moral laws does not mean that law does not exist. Transgression is permitted by a God who created us with freewill, I made clear that I am not contending the human race is morally perfect and never fails to fulfill its moral obligations!

Secondly, you are reducing an issue with a complex sociohistorical background into 'Spartans tortured children!' Did the Spartans see it in such terms? Of course not, as you allude to, they lived in a fierce warrior culture, and so had their own cultural mythology to justify such actions. They would not have seen it merely as the moral abomination of torturing a child, but the just action of building a warrior. So really the example you give of an 'alternative' morality is actually an example of true moral transgression being justified with cultural mythology, just as murder and slavery have been justified under the guise of a 'just war'. People invent stories to justify their actions every day: Go into a prison and ask around, the chances are most of them will claim to be innocent! Do they really believe this, or are they just trying to convince themselves?

we are humans ourselves, so naturally we are going to value human life more than any other life. Looking out for number 1 -- that's a biological imperative. A jellyfish would care more about jellyfish than humans, not because it is more valuable, but because it is a jellyfish and has a vested interest in putting jellyfish first. And even when you isolate humans, we find several subsections of different priorities: I'm European, so naturally I'm going to care more about what happens in Europe than elsewhere in the world. That is not to say that Europeans are any more worth than others, not at all. And further, I'm Scandinavian, which means I care more about Scandinavia than the rest of Europe -- and I'm Norwegian, which means I care more about Norway than the rest of Scandinavia. And naturally I care more about my family than my neighbour's family -- this does not at all reflect on anyone's objective worth, but my point of view. All worth is based on someone's point of view: a thing can only have value insofar as someone thinks it has value. And so all value, all worth, is subjective -- the objective value does not exist, demonstrably because we cannot agree on it.

Well you seem to have a very generous opinion of jellyfish; I am not sure if a jellyfish 'cares' about anything, that's quite a major assertion you have made.

To your argument: It fails, and I have actually already answered it in my original post, obviously I was not clear enough if this misunderstanding is still adhered to. You claim it is not arbitrary for humans to favour human flourishing over any other animal flourishing, indeed you even say that racial discrimination exist within humanity based on the same principle, but at a racial, rather than special level. your reason is that it is natural for us to favour human flourishing because we are human.

What it is or isn't natural for us to do open to debate, but it isn't a debate that is relevant here. Remember my original contention:

"Firstly, if atheism is true and God does not exist, why think that human flourishing is more valuable than the flourishing of arachnids or jellyfish?"

So it is the moral value of human flourishing, rather than whether or not it is natural for humans to favour human flourishing that is the issue here. Morality is perceived through rational minds, it is not an empirical observation and so science is morally neutral. You have not offered a serious rebuttal to my claim that if atheism is true, the moral value of favouring human flourishing over that of other species becomes arbitrary and stems from a subjective human desire to survive.

I still do not see the link between God and morality. If objective morals exist, there is no reason they would not exist independently of God. Or to put it another way: if God exists, then he is subject to the objective morals. If morality is subject to God's existence, well, that makes them subjective to his point of view. If you argue that his morals are THE morals because he's God, then that's the old "might is right" argument, and I don't have to agree with that.

What you are proposing is Moral Platonism, which I was going to include a rebuttal of in my original post, but decided against it because it is so incoherent; I didn't realise someone was going to take it seriously!

In short, the view holds that moral values like mercy, justice and love just exist objectively and are independent of God. On the face of it the view seems unintelligible, what justification is there to think moral values just exist? You're arguing for the existence of the abstract notion of 'justice' even in the absence of any other people: Justice is an abstract objects, and abstract objects are not temporally confined and so have no beginning/end. What justification is there to hold that these principles simply exist? The all loving nature of God is a justification for their existence, but on their own, what justification is there to believe these abstract objects exist?

Moral Platonism is also a fairly pointless moral philosophy, for since God did not set these moral values, moral duties do not exist, as without a divine obligator there are no objective obligations. This means that, as under Moral Platonism justice and mercy exist objectively, so too do greed and hatred, for instance. Without moral obligations it is equally moral under this view to be greedy as it is to be merciful, as there are no moral obligations. This would render your moral philosophy contrary to moral experience, which although fallible is trustworthy in the same way our sensory faculties are trustworthy, it is therefore justifiable to dismiss it on those grounds. Of course, this is all completely speculative because you did not provide any justification to believe objective moral values just exist without God. If there is no God then who sets moral duties?


I will try and reply to all the responses that have some effort/engagement in them, and to new arguments as they crop up. If I do not respond to your post it is because I do not think you have offered anything constructive, or anything that hasn't already been replied to in another form.

@Claudius Gothicus: you may well be an eloquent and intelligent person, but calling someone an 'epistemological caveman' is still trolling!

[Kissaki]

This is another misunderstanding of the argument for the simple reason that people/societies breaking moral laws does not mean that law does not exist. Transgression is permitted by a God who created us with freewill, I made clear that I am not contending the human race is morally perfect and never fails to fulfill its moral obligations!

But how do you know they were breaking moral law?

Secondly, you are reducing an issue with a complex sociohistorical background into 'Spartans tortured children!' Did the Spartans see it in such terms? Of course not, as you allude to, they lived in a fierce warrior culture, and so had their own cultural mythology to justify such actions. They would not have seen it merely as the moral abomination of torturing a child, but the just action of building a warrior. So really the example you give of an 'alternative' morality is actually an example of true moral transgression being justified with cultural mythology, just as murder and slavery have been justified under the guise of a 'just war'. People invent stories to justify their actions every day: Go into a prison and ask around, the chances are most of them will claim to be innocent! Do they really believe this, or are they just trying to convince themselves?

Indeed, they wouldn't have called it torture. But by what objective standard could we tell them they're wrong?

Well you seem to have a very generous opinion of jellyfish; I am not sure if a jellyfish 'cares' about anything, that's quite a major assertion you have made.

I did not mean that jellyfish cares the same way we do, and I do not believe this is what you thought I was saying. It is not of the slightest importance in this context to what extent jellyfish care. Let us just say for the sake of argument that they DO care: they would naturally care more about jellyfish than about people, precisely because they are jellyfish.

To your argument: It fails, and I have actually already answered it in my original post, obviously I was not clear enough if this misunderstanding is still adhered to. You claim it is not arbitrary for humans to favour human flourishing over any other animal flourishing, indeed you even say that racial discrimination exist within humanity based on the same principle, but at a racial, rather than special level. your reason is that it is natural for us to favour human flourishing because we are human.

What it is or isn't natural for us to do open to debate, but it isn't a debate that is relevant here. Remember my original contention:

"Firstly, if atheism is true and God does not exist, why think that human flourishing is more valuable than the flourishing of arachnids or jellyfish?"

So it is the moral value of human flourishing, rather than whether or not it is natural for humans to favour human flourishing that is the issue here.

The moral value is precisely what we think it to be, and as biological imperative affects how we think, it is absolutely relevant. I brought up the argument about "looking out for number one" in order to show why it is only to be expected that our morals should value human interests more -- not in order to show that human interests are objectively more important, because they aren't.

Morality is perceived through rational minds, it is not an empirical observation and so science is morally neutral. You have not offered a serious rebuttal to my claim that if atheism is true, the moral value of favouring human flourishing over that of other species becomes arbitrary and stems from a subjective human desire to survive.

Why should I rebut it? Of course it is subjective. But you are the one who claims that this is only the case with atheism, and you have yet to support that claim -- what's for me to rebut?

What you are proposing is Moral Platonism, which I was going to include a rebuttal of in my original post, but decided against it because it is so incoherent; I didn't realise someone was going to take it seriously!

Moral Platonism: objective values exist even in the absence of God. This is obviously NOT what I am arguing for. In fact, I very clearly specified that I do not believe objective values exist, even WITH God. But if moral values DO exist -- this has not been established -- then there is still no reason to assume a GOD from that, precisely because you have only arbitrarily linked one intangible concept with another. God is one idea, objective morality another -- but where's the link? Why must one follow the other?

In short, the view holds that moral values like mercy, justice and love just exist objectively and are independent of God. On the face of it the view seems unintelligible, what justification is there to think moral values just exist?

What justification is there to think moral values exist if God exists? I do not support objective morality in either case.

You're arguing for the existence of the abstract notion of 'justice' even in the absence of any other people: Justice is an abstract objects, and abstract objects are not temporally confined and so have no beginning/end. What justification is there to hold that these principles simply exist? The all loving nature of God is a justification for their existence, but on their own, what justification is there to believe these abstract objects exist?

None whatever. They exist only because we invent them. You are claiming that GOD invented them, but then they are subject to the mind of God, and thus still subjective. And unknowable to us, and consequently irrelevant.

Moral Platonism is also a fairly pointless moral philosophy, for since God did not set these moral values, moral duties do not exist, as without a divine obligator there are no objective obligations.

No, this is not true: the obligations are to US, we the people, not to God. Even if the moralities are prescribed by God, they entail how we treat each other, not how we treat God. And so if objective moral values exist, we have moral duties with regards to what those morals dictate. If killing is objectively wrong, then we have a moral duty to refrain from killing whether there is a God or not -- the duty is not to God. And indeed: we have moral duties even though objective morals do not exist. Because we still have subjective morals.

This means that, as under Moral Platonism justice and mercy exist objectively, so too do greed and hatred, for instance.

Of course greed and hatred exist: those are emotions. Are you saying they cannot exist without justice or mercy?

Without moral obligations it is equally moral under this view to be greedy as it is to be merciful, as there are no moral obligations. This would render your moral philosophy contrary to moral experience, which although fallible is trustworthy in the same way our sensory faculties are trustworthy, it is therefore justifiable to dismiss it on those grounds. Of course, this is all completely speculative because you did not provide any justification to believe objective moral values just exist without God. If there is no God then who sets moral duties?

The above is irrelevant because it is based on the flawed view that moral obligations for some reason cannot exist without God.

[Matthias]

No, they do not. Morality is a human invention, and it is subjective.

Even if you believe in God, it wouldn't mean they exist. God himself has very subjective morals and is quite inconsistent in many various writings proclaiming to be his word.

[Denny Crane!]

No, they do not. Morality is a human invention, and it is subjective.

Even if you believe in God, it wouldn't mean they exist. God himself has very subjective morals and is quite inconsistent in many various writings proclaiming to be his word.

Yes this indeed.

[XIII]

No, they do not. Morality is a human invention, and it is subjective.

Even if you believe in God, it wouldn't mean they exist. God himself has very subjective morals and is quite inconsistent in many various writings proclaiming to be his word.

1. Prove that it's a human invention. You can't just assert this without backing it up.
2. Why do you think God's moral are subjective? If God's morals are based on his own nature, then they would be mind-independent (i.e. objective).

[Kissaki]

1. Prove that it's a human invention. You can't just assert this without backing it up.

Do you know of any instance of morality which was not man-made? It's not that it's an invention as such, but it is in our nature, as social animals.

2. Why do you think God's moral are subjective? If God's morals are based on his own nature, then they would be mind-independent (i.e. objective).

Why would that make a difference? Mind or nature, it's still subjective. I could just as easily say that my personality is not my mind, it's my nature. And objective morality is morality which is not relative or subject to anything, it being mind, nature, time or place.

[XIII]

Do you know of any instance of morality which was not man-made? It's not that it's an invention as such, but it is in our nature, as social animals.

1. First of all, isn't it a contradiction to say that morality is man-made but not an invention?

2. Also, you are making a mistake here in that you are assuming that morality is man-made and therefore completely subjective. You are assuming that without evidence to the contrary, the default view is that objective moral values and duties do not exist (that we should presume moral anti-realism in the absence of evidence to the contrary). The problem is that if there's any view that should be considered the default view, it should be the view that objective moral values and duties do exist. All of us start with this view by default before potential defeaters ever come to our mind. We intuitively believe that some actions and circumstances are morally wrong and ought to be avoided (such as murder, genocide, rape, etc) and it is only when we come into contact with other conflicting and potential defeaters for this belief that we come to believe that objective morals don't exist.

Why would that make a difference? Mind or nature, it's still subjective. I could just as easily say that my personality is not my mind, it's my nature. And objective morality is morality which is not relative or subject to anything, it being mind, nature, time or place.

Objective means mind-independent. If God's nature is what is objectively morally good, then it is independent of God's mind (since it is outside of his control) and therefore objective. The problem here seems to be that you are defining objective problematically (in that you're assuming that objective means an entity that is not relative or subject to any other entity). This definition is quite problematic, by the way. For example, Relativity.

[Kissaki]

1. First of all, isn't it a contradiction to say that morality is man-made but not an invention?

You're splitting hairs. Don't.

2. Also, you are making a mistake here in that you are assuming that morality is man-made and therefore completely subjective.

All morals ever encountered by man have been entirely man-made and subjective. Refute this statement if you can.

You are assuming that without evidence to the contrary, the default view is that objective moral values and duties do not exist (that we should presume moral anti-realism in the absence of evidence to the contrary). The problem is that if there's any view that should be considered the default view, it should be the view that objective moral values and duties do exist. All of us start with this view by default before potential defeaters ever come to our mind.

Problem: just because people THINK their morals are objective, this does not mean their morals ARE objective. This just means that people tend to think, "I'm right, and anyone who disagrees with me is wrong". NO objective morals have ever been found to exist. ALL morals CLAIMED to be objective have been contested and so cannot possibly BE objective. The only counterargument I hear is "oh, but if they don't follow this set of objective morality, then they're wrong". Wrong? According to whom? You? They will say the exact same thing about YOU and YOUR morals, because YOU disagree with THEM. So how on earth do we resolve who is right and who is wrong? It's one word against another.

We intuitively believe that some actions and circumstances are morally wrong and ought to be avoided (such as murder, genocide, rape, etc) and it is only when we come into contact with other conflicting and potential defeaters for this belief that we come to believe that objective morals don't exist.

This is becoming really tiresome. EVERYBODY agrees that murder and rape is wrong, because that is part of the definition of the word. The condemnation of murder and rape means NOTHING until you DEFINE them. Until you do, you are simply saying "wrong is wrong", and that's not exactly the most brilliant moral law I have come across.

Objective means mind-independent. If God's nature is what is objectively morally good, then it is independent of God's mind (since it is outside of his control) and therefore objective.

That's a distinction, sorry. If something is subject to someone's nature, it is still subjective. If it is part of someone's nature it is ALSO part of someone's mind, as the mind reflects the nature. How can something be part of God's nature but not part of God's mind? You insist it's part of God's nature but somehow magically not part of his mind for one reason and one reason only: it is terribly important to you that objective morals exist. Nevermind the fact that they would be inaccessible and irrelevant, even if they did exist.

Also, "mind-dependent" is just ONE thing which makes something subjective. If it is relative to certain situations, certain characters (certain "natures"), it is subjective, not objective. If it is subject to someone's mind, someone's nature... same difference. What if another God came along with a different moral "nature" than your God? Two sets of morals, one conflicting the other, and both objective by your standards. Bit of a paradox, I'd say.

The problem here seems to be that you are defining objective problematically (in that you're assuming that objective means an entity that is not relative or subject to any other entity). This definition is quite problematic, by the way. For example, Relativity.

What about relativity? You say the definition I use is quite problematic, but you don't say how or why.

[removeduser_4536284751384]

1. Prove that it's a human invention. You can't just assert this without backing it up.

We understand the human conscience and how it and why it came to be. We see no evidence of magic in the world.

I also reject your analogy it fails because it is defeated by the very point it was intended to refute: If the universe was created, it's precisely fine-tuned fundamental constants rendering it life-permitting imply the universe was designed to permit life. Talk of scale and control is simply irrelevant to this; God didn't create a bird in a box, He created a universe in which an inter-dependent ecosystem has arisen on at least one planet, enabled by precisely fine-tuned fundamental constants. Our self-awareness, moral agency and rationality differentiates us from every other species we have encountered, this argument that humans are insignificant is deeply flawed for that reason.

As I sad above, the miracle of this universe is that it is life-permitting. If the universe was created then the flourishing of life was at least one of its purposes. Even the humanist would accept that morality is at least useful to aid human flourishing, thus our morality coincides with the purpose of the Designer. So really you are arguing for a huge coincidence (that our morality favours human flourishing in a universe that was coincidentally designed to allow life) when a more rational explanation would be that this morality was intended to exist by the same Designer who fine-tuned the universe, thus a transcendent moral obligator exists.

It's not a huge coincidence at all. We don't know how many universes with how many different sets of attributes there are. We do know that our observation will always be biased because we can only come into existence in a universe that can support us. Do you think it was a possibility we could appear in a universe where humans cannot exist, and conclude it wasn't fine tuned? So that we exist is not an argument that our universe is fine tuned. Besies, how much of this universe can support life as we know it? I heard on a documnetary one time that about 0.00000000000000001% of the observable universe can support life from Earth. 16 zeroes after the decimal. Is that a universe hospitable to life?

I mean, if we were in a universe ideal for our existence, surely we could decide to walk to the next star? Why would stars and space even exist, they aren't hospitable for us? And if we are in a fine tuned universe, why is entropy going to kill us all without us being able to do anything about it? Heat death is inevitable if nothing else is.

How can you ascribe purpose to a designer? Why would a designer give two craps about us? We understand why human morality exists without a deigner. We know animal morality exists as well. And as expected, and as with all strategies in biology, there is an alternative leeching strategy that increases evolutionary fitness when present at a certain ratio to the main strategy. People without conscience.

[Facupay]

They don't exist, just as an objective reality does not exist. I see one reality and you see another and I'll never know what you feel, think or see. So, if we can't even have the same reality, how on earth can we have the same moral code?

There is nothing absoulte about morality. You can have 7 billion people following the same moral code and you just need a single, crazy and alienated guy differing with it and that's it, no objective morality.

[Ironside II]

4. God wills something because He is good, his nature is the maximum standard of goodness.

No known god fulfills that. The closest argument is that all the god's actions are either good or just. But just is not good.

And it's here it starts to fall apart. Because if there's no abillity to differ between objective values interpretated by a subjective mind and subjective values and never will be, the debate is pointless.

Even assuming that such a God exist, believing in Him won't do anything. It won't bring you closer to what those moral truths are, it say anything about the point following those either.

Answer: Taking human flourishing as a stopping point is arbitrary. Firstly, if atheism is true and God does not exist, why think that human flourishing is more valuable than the flourishing of arachnids or jellyfish? Because we are ‘superior’? But how do we define what is or isn’t superior, we have no objective standard, simply our subjective opinion that a more advanced brain makes us ‘better’ than other species. In other words, the humanist explanation for objective moral truths is guilty of speciesism: arbitrarily favouring one’s own species over another.

Yes. And?

Specisism is fundamental to our survival. We even have a sliding scale. Every second, our bodies are killing other organisms and every time we eat, we are consuming other organisms to survive. The lines are up to debate (see fruitarians, or the death of a pet over a soldier), but that there are lines are undisputed.

Furthermore, the sociobiological objection is self-defeating: If naturalism is true then all of our beliefs, not just our moral beliefs, are the result of sociobiological conditioning. The evolutionary account therefore leads to scepticism of human knowledge in general, including itself as it presupposes the axiomatic assumptions of science, which are themselves human beliefs. Remember, under the evolutionary account beliefs are not evolved for their truth, but their ability to facilitate our survival. There is therefore no reason to trust ANY of our beliefs, including those axiomatic to science. The sociobiological objection to objective moral values is therefore incoherent.

Flawed reasoning. Fact. Our senses lies to us. Yet believing those lies increases our survival. Everything is done by close enough. That things are subjective never means that they are arbitary.

Premise 3 explained: Well little further explanation is needed, if objective moral values exist then God must exist.

I'll be pointing out one thing. If objective moral values exist, how are they enforced? By humanity and its constantly flawed and corrupted cultures?
"This breaks this paraticular moral philosophy." "Yes. And?"
Something as large like if morals are subjective or objective should have more weight than the above comment.

You really need to establish a link between the existense of some god and morality before this discussion can actually begin. Mankind is the only animal specie on this planet that kills for other reasons than survival. Other animals kill, so they can eat or because they are threatened. I see no decency in that side of Mankind, no divine morality guiding us.

Plenty of animals kills for more than that. Usually to stimulate the hunting instinct. Cats is an obvious example and it's also the reason why running is rarely recommended.
Some animals seems to be more or less psycopathic or crazy compared to other members of the same specie as well. Unpredictably violent and more prone to put themselves in situations were they are violent.

[Kissaki]

The Moral Argument for God’s existence runs as follows:

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.
2. Objective moral values and duties do exist
3. Therefore, God exists.

The argument fails even at the first hurdle. There is room for much discussion here, but let me first sum up:

1. This is a baseless assertion. Why wouldn't objective moral values and duties exist without God? For that matter, why would they exist with God?
2. Objective moral values and duties demonstrably do not exist.
3. Non sequitur -- it has not been established that there is a link between the existence of God or gods and morality.

Definitions;

Moral duty: an obligation to act in a certain way.
Moral value: the worth of an action.
Objective: Existing independently of human opinion.
God: Maximally great and transcendent mind, deduced as creator/designer of the Universe through cosmology and teleology.

I can work with these definitions. I have a minor problem with the definition of moral value, but nothing significant or relevant to the discussion here.

Premise 1 explained: An objective moral value is a moral value that is true regardless of societal consensus or personal opinion, under this philosophy the statement ‘one ought not torture children’ has always been true, regardless of historical, cultural or personal context, and regardless of whether or not any human beings exist to perceive it.

This actually isn't the case. The Spartans felt that such rites as their cheese stealing ritual was necessary to build men of proper strength and character. This ritual involved the flogging of young boys, and evolved to become something of a tourist attraction for the Romans -- at which point it became even more brutal, and many boys did not survive the ordeal.

For instance, the statement ‘one ought not commit acts of hatred’ was true regardless of societal consensus to the contrary in Nazi Germany, where anti-Semitism was widespread, even if the Nazis had conquered and brainwashed the entire world into agreeing with them,

This was obviously not universally true. In some cultures, acts of revenge have even been mandated.

this would have had no effect on the truth of the moral statement. What is ‘normal’ is of no consequence to objective moral values, they are objectively true, meaning they hold regardless of human opinion.

But who are you to establish certain values as objectively true, irrespective of culture?

If objective moral values exist, they must exist metaphysically, as they are outside human jurisdiction, but are perceptible to us as obligations.

Acts of hatred are often perceived as obligations.

This requires a supernatural entity to exist,

Why?

whereas under naturalism no such entity can exist.

If objective moral values do not exist, how does that preclude the existence of a supreme being, or otherwise supernatural entity?

It is fairly uncontroversial that if objective moral values and duties exist, God must exist.

No, not at all, because you have simply asserted that "if A, then B", without actually presenting any arguments in support of that.

Answer: Taking human flourishing as a stopping point is arbitrary.

Yes, indeed.

Firstly, if atheism is true and God does not exist, why think that human flourishing is more valuable than the flourishing of arachnids or jellyfish? Because we are ‘superior’? But how do we define what is or isn’t superior, we have no objective standard, simply our subjective opinion that a more advanced brain makes us ‘better’ than other species. In other words, the humanist explanation for objective moral truths is guilty of speciesism: arbitrarily favouring one’s own species over another.

Simple: we are humans ourselves, so naturally we are going to value human life more than any other life. Looking out for number 1 -- that's a biological imperative. A jellyfish would care more about jellyfish than humans, not because it is more valuable, but because it is a jellyfish and has a vested interest in putting jellyfish first. And even when you isolate humans, we find several subsections of different priorities: I'm European, so naturally I'm going to care more about what happens in Europe than elsewhere in the world. That is not to say that Europeans are any more worth than others, not at all. And further, I'm Scandinavian, which means I care more about Scandinavia than the rest of Europe -- and I'm Norwegian, which means I care more about Norway than the rest of Scandinavia. And naturally I care more about my family than my neighbour's family -- this does not at all reflect on anyone's objective worth, but my point of view. All worth is based on someone's point of view: a thing can only have value insofar as someone thinks it has value. And so all value, all worth, is subjective -- the objective value does not exist, demonstrably because we cannot agree on it.

Premise 2 explained: Actions like murder, rape and abuse are not just socially unacceptable, they are morally evil. When asked, most people will recognise the moral evil of these actions, people pay lip service to relativism, but when pushed will mostly become moral realists.

Everyone agrees that murder, rape and abuse are wrong -- that's inherent in the words themselves -- but they don't necessarily agree on what constitutes murder, rape and abuse. To wit: you specifically chose the words murder, rape and abuse. You did not say anything concrete like killing in self defense, sleeping with a woman who regrets it when she's sober, or yelling at a child for cutting up the curtains. These can also be murder, rape and abuse, depending on one's perspective.

Through our moral experience we encounter moral duties and values, just as the fallibility of our senses does not lead us to doubt the existence of the physical world around us, neither should the fallibility of our consciences lead us to doubt the existence of objective moral values and duties. Our perception of them may well be flawed, that does not mean the values and duties do not exist.

Problem: the physical can be objectively measured. The metaphysical cannot. We do NOT have the same moral values and duties, but we can all agree that a scale which says 22 lbs says 22 lbs. True, the scale may be off, but at least it provides an external reference point. Society and laws are external reference points for the individual, and are as close to objective morality as you can come -- but they are relative to the respective societies, and not universal.

Objection:

The sociobiological objection: If our moral values and duties were instilled in us by evolutionary and societal conditioning, then the existence of moral values is illusory, we have instead naturally adapted the code of practise that best facilitates our survival.

Answer: Firstly, this objection does nothing to undermine the truth of our moral experience, for this exists independently of how we came to have those experiences, which is what the objection claims is sociobiologically determined. I could gain my moral beliefs from a random word generator that happened to say “Don’t kill children”, my method of determining a moral truth would certainly be flawed, but that does nothing to undermine the belief itself. The sociobiological account may demonstrate that our perception of moral values has changed over time, but by employing it to dismiss the objective truth of moral values, the atheist is committing the genetic fallacy by dismissing a belief based on how it came to be held.

But here you are admitting that our morals are not, in fact, objective, even if objective morals do exist. And that is the crucial thing here: we know that our morals are subjective. Even if there is such a thing as objective morality, it is irrelevant because we cannot possibly know what it is.

However, the objection could be used to attack our justification for holding our moral values to be true, rather than their actual truth. For instance, under the evolutionary account alone there is no reason to think our moral beliefs are true, as evolution is governed not by truth, but by survival.

True, but does it matter?

Furthermore, the sociobiological objection is self-defeating: If naturalism is true then all of our beliefs, not just our moral beliefs, are the result of sociobiological conditioning. The evolutionary account therefore leads to scepticism of human knowledge in general, including itself as it presupposes the axiomatic assumptions of science, which are themselves human beliefs. Remember, under the evolutionary account beliefs are not evolved for their truth, but their ability to facilitate our survival. There is therefore no reason to trust ANY of our beliefs, including those axiomatic to science. The sociobiological objection to objective moral values is therefore incoherent.

The second to last sentence is a non-sequitur, and the last sentence is a non-sequitur to that. There is no reason to believe that our morality is objective is the logical conclusion, not that ALL our beliefs are suspect. And even so, the conclusion would be that the objection to objective moral values is valid.

Premise 3 explained: Well little further explanation is needed, if objective moral values exist then God must exist. I would like to clarify a point that may lead to sedition and bad feeling if left unanswered though:

I am not claiming that belief in God is required to lead a morally righteous life, neither is that the claim of the argument I have put. I have no doubt there are atheists who lead decent lives, I am in no way casting an aspersion on anyone’s moral character. It is instead the existence of God upon which the existence of objective moral values and duties is contingent. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist and our perception of them is illusory, a sociobiological trick to facilitate our collective and individual survival. The existence of objective moral values is therefore inconsistent with atheism, any atheist who upholds such values does so inconsistently with the logical consequences of atheism and naturalism. It is the existence of God, not belief in Him, that is the issue here, so I don’t want to see any responses claiming I am calling all atheists evil, because I most certainly am not.

Peace be with you all,

Valden

I still do not see the link between God and morality. If objective morals exist, there is no reason they would not exist independently of God. Or to put it another way: if God exists, then he is subject to the objective morals. If morality is subject to God's existence, well, that makes them subjective to his point of view. If you argue that his morals are THE morals because he's God, then that's the old "might is right" argument, and I don't have to agree with that.

[Vizsla]

Morality changes over time.
500 years ago all Christians believed usury was a sin.
Shakespeare’s father was prosecuted for usury for charging interest on a loan.
Now all Christians have bank accounts that earn interest.
If morality flowed from God then it would not change.
Either Christians were wrong 500 years ago or they are wrong now.
Genocide was evil 70 years ago but would not necessarily have been evil 5000 years previously.
From the historical perspective morality is subjective. It comes from society.

Within one civilization and one period in history morality must be objective.
It must be because if it were not there would be no way of differentiating right from wrong.
Or maybe I just prefer to see it that way.
I prefer that possible illusion to the idea that only the threat of violence keeps people moral.