(This may be more of a philosophical question, but I really wanted to ensure that this was kept in a forum where discussion would primarily take place based on the natural sciences and have as little involvement from religion as possible)
Allow me to make the presumption that the consciousness (with this I mean self-awareness, the "self", in case the terminology is wobbly) of, say, a person would be divisible: that we would be able to split the brain of a person into two autonomous halves that each could operate independently of each other. Note that I am not referring to the actual anatomical halves of the brain, but rather a supposed surgery in which the literal consciousness of a person is split in two. We know that consciousness is related to the brain (some animals have self-awareness, most do not, depending on their brain to body size proportion and functionality; elephants, apes, magpies and dolphins are commonly cited examples), so it would seem reasonable to assume that it either constitutes a specific area or several areas.
The question is what would happen to the original person? Would he or she assume one of the two resulting consciousnesses (through chance - and in that case - why and how would chance determine this?) or would the original self-awareness "die", only for two similar self-awarenesses to arise with the same memories (or respective halves of the original memory) as the subject before the "surgery" - and in that case, why? We can more or less safely say that it is impossible for the person to assume both self-awarenesses (assuming there is no communicability between the two, which there is not, without axons spanning between the involved neurons).
It would seem that, depending on the answer, we acquire different implications. One example would be that, if the "pre-surgery" consciousness ceases to exist, there must be some form of "absolute barriers", e.g. without these properties or functions, self-awareness dies. If that is the case, what are the barriers, and why are they absolute? On the other hand, a result in which the original person assumes one of the two "post-surgery" consciousnesses implies that self-awareness is flexible, but it raises more questions in the line of how or why?
The question itself may be paradoxical. For there to be an answer, we must have a definite result, but since the definite result is impossible to acquire without consulting or being the test subject (each related to unique problemacies) we may very well find ourselves in a situation where we ask the same question again (is the answer from the original self-awareness?/did I die?). The original supposition may be an impossibility - then again, we must ask ourselves why - and, indeed, from a practical perspective we see that there may be no use in asking these questions since the observability of the results is limited or inexistant.







Reply With Quote






