Why is Hannibal considered so great?

[Kitsunegari]

Did they help Hannibal?

[Hanny]

Did they help Hannibal?

No they were pro Roman, ( Hanny crushed the Volocea in getting to Italy and Rome gave Massila control of there land post war) its there colonies in Spain, North of the Ebro, that Hanny tried to rub out, to curtail Roman naval passage, when he went to Italy, by removing hostile ports to facilitate Roman passage to Spain.

Added a further link to last post to explain further, another visual aid here:http://geacron.com/home-en/?&sid=GeaCron191272

Massilai had Rhode and Emporion are two examples of Massiots colonies.

[Kitsunegari]

Saguntum was Greek? I know of Emporion as well, but i guess it wasn't important by this time.

[Hanny]

According to Strabo, Saguntum was founded by Greek colonists from Zakynthos, Livy otoh, that it was co-founded between the Zakynthians and the Rutuli from the city of Ardea, south of Rome, but was trying to justify Romes intervention over Suguntum. Post 2pw all survoirs of suguntum were given Roman citizenship, so it may be that Livy was right.
Edetani would be the local Iberian tribe that would have had ties with it.http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/...3Achapter%3D34

[Hanny]

Hannibal did not have the option to invade Italy by sea, since the Carthaginian navy was all but nonexistent after the First Punic War.

This is the only part i think your post was weak on. Carthage had the largest naval and comerical docks in the Med, 220 ships.

For Navel transport see History of Roman sea power by J H Thiel. or here http://historiantigua.cl/wp-content/..._Punic_War.pdf Apendix II has a cmpative fleet strength year by year from the primary sources.

Bagnal cites 100 transports sent to Hannibal with stores being captured in 205/4, at the same time 7000 more troops are dispatched to Mago in Balaerics, which he then goes to N Italy with a total 12000 Inf 2000 cav + El, he retains 10 warships and sends the rest back to Carthage. In contrast they capture 200 transports in 203 when a Roman resupply fleet is storm driven onto cape Bon.

Livy mentions 500 ships towed out and burnt at the end of the war, so the capacity was certainly there for a lift of considerable size at all points in time.

[Kitsunegari]

So you think the issue was the Barcid rivalry with Hanno the Great? He was a consistent opponent of there projects in Spain and renewed war with the Romans and possibly convinced the Carthaginian senate to not send reinforcements to Italy.

[Hanny]

Not really. This political oposistion to Barcids, comes from F Pictor acount, ( Roman politcal strife did not have to exist in Carthage but Pictor simply asumed it did) there is not really much to support the idea of political oposistion to the Barcids that had any clout, Barcids held nearly all the mil commands, or were politcaly alligned with those that did, the Gisgo faction, both firmly set on war with Rome. Only Hanno wanted no war, and oposed Barcids on principle.

Hanno political faction was ecilpsed by Hasdrubal son of Gisgo faction ( controlled Africa except when Barcids were suffetes in 241 237 227 and 203 and were loyal to the Barcids)which itself was eclipsed by the Barcid faction, which returned to full state control in 196.
http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/cgi-bin/cgi...us,poemsummary
The Roman envoys arrive in Carthage and are received in the Carthaginian senate, where sentiment is divided. Hanno delivers a speech against Hannibal and foretells doom for Carthage if war with Rome is pursued (270-326). Gestar counters with a forceful speech in support of Hannibal and an attack on Rome. When the Carthaginian senate refuses Hanno's demand for the recall of Hannibal, Fabius declares war (270-390).

While Hannibal and his men are relaxing in Capua, his brother Mago sails to Carthage where he reports to the Senate the successes of Hannibal and makes a fierce attack upon Hanno (483-553). Hanno responds with a speech urging that peace be made (554-600). But the Senate rejects this suggestion, and reinforcements are sent both to Spain and Italy (600-611).

224 Hasdrubal sends to Carthage asking for Hanny to be sent Spain, to command its cavalry, Hanno objects to Barcid Spain grooming another Barcid to rule Barcid Spain by right. Hanny is promted to the rank and sent as Hanno has no political clout, he had lost the argument earlier to even goto Spain when Hamicar won the vote to exapand into Iberia, and once there run at as he saw fit, he did this after doing whjat Hanno could not do, win the mercenary war. Livy tells us Hanno was "a lone voice" objecting to Hannys request post Cannae. Lastly Carthage never sued for peace till Hanny stopped the 104 fromm continueing the war past Zama defeat byt pysicaly throwing Hasdrubal the kid away and telling the 104 to surrender, as even post Zama the 104 who ran Carthage wanted to fight on.

Ironically, the Barcids’ dominance at Carthage was a fact that
both they and their opponents wanted to deny by the end of the war.
Their opponents, and Roman friends of these like the contemporary
historian Fabius Pictor, argued that the Barcid generals in Spain had
launched the war in the teeth of universal opposition at home. The
Barcid side, Hannibal included, claimed that he lost because the
home authorities had refused to support him properly. Both claims
are still widely believed, though neither is convincing. The reality is
that in the Barcids, as in the Magonids and the family of the fi rst
Hanno the Great, Carthage found a new ruling house, its success
resting on military prowess and adept political skills until these
assets collapsed.

Dextor Hyos, The Carthaginians.

[Spartan JKM]

Great stuff.

This post is mainly one constructed before, revised here for the relevant context:

HannibalB, I agree with your view that Hasdrubal's defeat in NE Spain was more decisive than the Metaurus - but only in the larger context of analyzing the war with the benefit of hindsight. The Scipio brothers were still ultimately crushed. Indeed, the Romans established themselves and never let up in preventing the NE corridor form opening for passage to Hannibal in Italy, and the Carthaginians, however much they had to restore their control in each commander's regions, should have closed the door on the beleaguered legions still holding out north of the Ebro before the arrivals of Nero and Scipio the Younger in 211-210 BCE (it was this inaction which was ultra-decisive). But at the time, the result of the battle near Dertosa carried not the reaction of the Metaurus verdict (and not solely because, IMHO, one was out of Italy and the other inside Italy); after all, it was the first Roman triumph allowed to any general for a victory in the war. I don't think Hasdrubal was going to 'break through to Italy' had he won this battle. More re-solidifying was needed here. True, two Carthaginian-led armies on Italian soil in 215 BCE would have sent shock waves throughout Italy more dangerous for Rome than the same scenario a decade or so later, where even then it was reacted to with great anxiety. From Greece to Iberia to Sicily, the propitious conditions for her war effort with the locals would have almost surely mitigated substantially with Hasdrubal's linkage with Hannibal; the latter had been amazing at freeing himself from the tightening Roman noose around him. Livy gets uneven concerning Hannibal's moves in the south in 208-207 BCE, but what we can clearly glean is that he had force-marched to and from the heel of Italy up as far north as Salapia, even Laurinum (cf. The History of Rome, Books 27.28, 27.40, respectively). If Hasdrubal, no rank incompetent, could have marched as well as his older bother...



By 209 BCE, a wider scale of cause and effect was momentous.

If we uncritically follow our main sources on the Battle of Baecula in 208 BCE, Hasdrubal seems a rank incompetent, given his decision to move south and place his smaller force in the path of Scipio's army, though not enfiladed. But he clearly got out there before being beaten substantially. I share your absorption of Richard Gabriel's military acumen on these issues. Both his bios on Hannibal and Scipio are superb and boldly revised at the appropriate points.

As of 209 BCE the action in the Greek theater began swinging in Philip V's favor, who would now fight like a 'beast at bay', as Polybius put it; he marched south and defeated an allied force of Aetolians, Pergamunians and Romans near Lamia ('two battles', according to Livy, Book 27.30.2, which might mean one battle with a bloody pursuit of the vanquished counted as another, à la the possible scenario with Onomarchus and Philip II in 353 BCE), and the following year Philip defeated Rome's ally Attalus I of Pergamon near Opus, compelling both Attalus I to return to Asia, and the now isolated Roman fleet under Publius Sulpicius Galba to sail back to Aegina. Philip was disappointed by the absence of promised Bithynian ships and the sudden disappearance of the Carthaginian fleet which had positioned itself off Corcyra, but he nonetheless cut the communications between the Aetolians and the Roman fleet, while securing his own lines in central Greece to the Peloponnese.

With the arrival in northern Italy of Hasdrubal in the spring of 207 BCE, the Romans were compelled to relinquish their presence in the Greek theater, other than mildly patrolling the Illyrian waters. Moreover, the smashing defeat of the Spartans by the redoubtable Philopoemen in the late spring/early summer of the same year ensured an Aetolian need for a truce. But after the verdict of the Metaurus, Philip could not go out of his way to court any hostility with Rome by upholding or receiving anymore support for the Carthaginians, who now were on the verge of ultimate defeat. Rome was very fortunate, coupled with her quick actions in the opening bout in Greece, when tensions increased throughout the late summer of 216 BCE. But I feel we cannot stress too much with attitudes of merriment or disappointment from our personal convictions. All I can do is ramble

Polybius relates, The Histories, Book 5.109-110,

"… During the winter [217-216 B.C.] Philip took into consideration that for his enterprise he would require ships and crews to man them, not it is true with the idea of fighting at sea - for he never thought he would be capable of offering battle to the Roman fleet - but to transport his troops, land where he wished, and take the enemy by surprise. Therefore, as he thought the Illyrian shipwrights were the best, he decided to build a hundred galleys, being almost the first king of Macedonia who had taken such a step. Having equipped these fleets he collected his forces at the beginning of summer and, after training the Macedonians a little in rowing, set sail. It was just at the time that Antiochus crossed the Taurus, when Philip sailing through the Euripus and round Cape Malea reached the neighborhood of Cephallenia and Leucas, where he moored and awaited anxiously news of the Roman fleet. Hearing that they were lying off Lilybaeum, he was encouraged to put to sea again and advanced sailing towards Apollonia. Just as he was approaching the mouth of the river Aoüs, which runs past Apollonia, his fleet was seized by a panic such as sometimes overtakes land forces. For some of the galleys in the rear, which had anchored off an island called Sason lying at the entrance to the Ionian Sea, came in the night and informed Philip that some vessels which had crossed from the Sicilian Strait had anchored in the same roadstead and announced to them that they had left at Rhegium some Roman quinqueremes which were on their voyage to Apollonia to join Scerdilaidas. Philip, in the belief that the Roman fleet would be upon him in less than no time, was seized by fear, and at once weighed anchor and gave orders to sail back. Quitting his anchorage and making the return voyage in thorough disorder he reached Cephallenia on the second day, traveling continuously by day and night. Plucking up a little courage he remained there pretending that he had returned to undertake some operations in the Peloponnese. As it turned out, the whole had been a false alarm. For Scerdilaidas, hearing that Philip had been building a considerable number of galleys in the winter and expecting him to arrive by sea, sent to inform the Romans and beg for help, upon which the Romans sent a squadron of ten ships from their fleet at Lilybaeum, these being the ships that had been sighted off Rhegium. Had Philip not taken alarm so absurdly and fled before this squadron, now was the opportunity for him to make himself master of Illyria, the whole attention and all the resources of the Romans being concentrated on Hannibal and the situation after the Battle of Cannae; and most probably the ships would have fallen into his hands also. But as it was the news upset him so much, that he made his way back to Macedonia without suffering any loss indeed but that of prestige…"

These 100 galleys were called lemboi, fast and maneuverable light galleys which could 'dart in among the enemy's heavier units to break up their formation, interrupt their tactics, even do damage to their oars' (cf., Polybius, Book 16.4.8-12; Lionel Casson, Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World, pp. 126-127). However, they would be inadequate if the Romans intended to defend Illyria from him in force with their war galleys. Moreover, the intense naval Battle of Chios in 201 BCE illustrated Philip's lack of experience in this field, despite having the hardware and numerical advantage. Roman resolve and action is to be credited, but here, specifically, ten Roman quinqueremes off the mouth of the Aoos River (modern Vjosë), joined by whatever Scerdilaidas could add if he could do so before Philip could have hypothetically engaged them, would have had no chance under such circumstances. But once the ball got rolling after his initial bout of impetuousness, Philip V came off better then all his foes amid the kaleidoscope of hostilities until Rome's official and prudently diplomatic sanctioning of terms in 205 BCE. This matched Hannibal's foresight in allying with Philip over a decade earlier.

By the time Zama was fought, it was surely too late for any allies outside of Africa for Carthage to exploit. But as Appian's in-depth analysis (certainly drawn from the lost works of Polybius covering the same backdrop) of the final war showed, Carthage could prosper remarkably well, ironically, with such major losses, being that her business-like policy on all aspects of life would be minimized. With the coming of the campaign season of 207 BCE, the antagonists in Spain and Greece waited to see what happened over the critical event now in Italy before undertaking any substantial moves; Carthage had little trouble marshaling and sending a 'new army' to replace that of Hasdrubal (Livy, Book 28.1.4), despite the loss of the SE parts of the Peninsula due to Scipio's recent mastery in this sector of the war, starting with his brilliant storm of New Carthage in 210 BCE. As the new army under one Hanno, soon joined by Mago, was vigorously consolidating with their Celtiberian allies, Marcus Julius Silanus with a flying-column ('he outstripped not only messengers reporting his approach but even rumors of it') pounced on them and smashed them piecemeal (Livy, Book 28.1.5-2.14).

See, these are the type of decisive elements of the war we simply cannot hang on Hannibal. Some 'excuses' are tenable. The Romans simply beat the Carthaginian-led forces under conditions which were either equal or advantageous, hypothetically, to Carthage, who had been mobilized and quantitatively superior to the Romans everywhere he was not.

Comparatively, Alexander's more auspicious results (in terms of the wider, political scope) require more scrutiny before assuming he controlled peripheral events more smartly because events worked out more favorably in the longer run. Like any man in the same 'position of position', Alexander had no control over what happened with his subalterns in the regions of hostilities he wasn't present. If Memnon had not died suddenly after taking Mytilene (or during; the chronology is a little unclear. Scipio could have died when he was seriously ill during the mutiny he had to put down at Sucro in 206 BCE), and with it the alliance to Persia of the Cyclades Islands, Alexander would have in all likelihood been in big trouble; as with Hannibal, he would not have anytime soon been beaten in the field, and could adeptly be self-sufficient for a quite a while, but he would have been cut off from his home bases, and Demosthenes would have exhorted his talents with all his vigor to convince Athens and others to rise against Macedonian hegemony, now with solid forensic ammunition, knowing Alexander now seriously enfiladed. Agis III, in all probability, would have been in a much more favorable position of support when his revolt broke, culminating at the Battle of Megalopolis in 331 BCE. Thus the entire logistic issue - a paramount element of Philip II's reforms with his revolutionary army - on top of the evolutionary steps he drew from - would have limited Alexander as of late 333 BCE.

That it did not happen, as with the reality that Hannibal ultimately failed, are aspects of historical terrain, of which there are a smorgasbord of examples to ponder throughout the spectrum of military history. But in examining the details of cause and effect amid the intricate events along the way, one seems obtuse when pressing that it's a 'bottom line' who ultimately won or lost. Why come on a great history blog do discuss the details, then?

Again, Greece was hardly neutralized in Rome's favor in 208/207 BCE (though there was practically nothing to worry about over an incursion on Italy itself), nor was Spain - in the sense that if the Barcids linked up, the preponderance of the remaining core Italic and Iberian allies would have likely forsaken Rome (or at the very least begin seriously considering to do so; those in the north were 'all on the verge of revolt' already), and the ripple effect everywhere else would have seemingly crumbled for Rome's cause like a pancake effect: Hannibal was forced to be increasingly circumspect, but Rome was reaching the end of her resources (not yet 'at the end' of her resources, mind you) by now; grain had been requested by Rome from Egypt on two occasions the previous few years, the first time eight years prior, if Polybius' fragments suggests correctly, when weighed with Livy concurrent data, and much of Etruria (Livy says 'all of' at one point, but I feel we should allocate for hyperbole) was on the verge of disaffection (the grain extracted from Etrurian communities for the war effort was surely becoming too demanding; this was all part of Hannibal's aim), the census was much lower, and the manpower pool constituting citizen manpower had been decreasing each year for the sixth straight year; we also read that 11,000 men were sent from Spain to Italy by Scipio to afforce the situation in Italy (if this is a mistake or purposed invention, it reflects how seriously the Romans viewed the arrival of Hasdrubal in northern Italy). The pendulum could have quickly swung to Carthage's favor if things worked out more fortuitously with their efforts in Sardinia, Greece, and Sicily – as they did for Rome. Hasdrubal and Hannibal could never have besieged Rome with their hook-up, but had they joined, the hitherto loyal allies throughout Italy would have been compromised, or their alliance to Rome even outright cracked. The inner Latin colonies were out of the war, and before Hasdrubal's arrival, 'the allies' were having meetings over what to do, and on top of that, there were inquiries after the Metaurus to see who was in the process of helping Hasdrubal or 'who had already given him help'. When Hannibal was confined to Bruttium, many place too negative view on his situation, IMHO: after all, Quintus Sertorius was indeed dubbed 'the new Hannibal'! Even once his larger objective was clearly not attainable, Hannibal relinquished his southern holds and concentrated himself in the 'toe of Italy' (the 'ball', actually in a more geographic sense). Here the terrain would make it difficult and costly for the Romans to dislodge him; the war took on a specific and more limited task now. Bruttium is mainly mountainous and almost entirely surrounded by the sea, which provided Hannibal with a perfect base to check any Roman advance, and also compel the Romans to keep a large standing army near him. Moreover, Polybius tells us that the land was still being harvested. His strategic goal behind these tactics was similar to that of his father in the First Punic War, to induce Rome to an acceptable peace treaty in return for the departure of the Carthaginian foothold in southern Italy. In 205 BCE, Scipio successfully took Locri with a stealthy assault from Sicily, but that port could not be sustained by Hannibal now, so his arrival was surely to primarily get his garrison out of there (thus both succeeded). But in the summer the following year, we read from Livy of an irregular defeat (a 'running fight') inflicted by Hannibal on the consul Publius Sempronius Tuditanus, but soon both consuls combined to defeat Hannibal (Book 29.36). This was simultaneous with Livy telling us that 'Etruria was almost wholly in sympathy with Mago'. The last two are probably overstated; Hannibal simply pulled away due to the presence of two Roman armies, and though Etruria was showing serious signs of disaffection (particularly the city of Ariminium), it seemed more isolated than concentrated. We read nothing of any punitive measures, as was the case of Capua and the twelve Latin colonies etc. But the fact some of the Etrurian and Umbrian communities were allegedly already helping Hasdrubal upon his arrival in the summer of 207 BCE reveals a very tense situation, and a further compromise - beyond those who broke away nine years earlier - to the Roman Federation.

But, indeed, bottom-lined history is more concerned, overall and basically, about people under circumstances of actual cause and effect, not what could have happened, however tantalizingly close. It's fun and not unnecessary to inject passing phrases for the sake of trivia, such as 'Xerxes could have won in 480 BCE if he had only heeded Queen Artemisia's advice', but pressing such scenarios with too much emphasis is, indeed, not history. That's why there exists these 'alternate history' chat rooms, etc. But identifying them is hardly insignificant, IMHO.

As usual, superb references and research, Hanny

However, I am always open-minded with regards to Livy's mention of the '500 ships', which doesn't seem nor pressed as reportage (from a modern view). However, judging by the enumerations we read concerning Bomilcar around Syracuse in 212-211 BCE, Carthage was probably building vessels after the war broke. There's another interesting detail amid Livy's comment:

Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, Book 30.43.12-13,

"...The ships Scipio ordered to be put to sea and to be burned. Some historians relate that there were 500 of them - every type of vessel propelled by oars; and that when the Carthaginians suddenly caught sight of the fire it was as doleful for them as if Carthage itself were in flames. The deserters were more severely treated than the runaway slaves, Latin citizens being beheaded, Romans crucified..."

We are not told if the deserters, who not only did lend Hannibal their ears, but actually went to Carthage, numbered less than, say, forty people, or more than 10,000. It was probably in between! But it illustrates that citizens, indeed, had left Italy for Carthage during Hannibal's campaigns - Livy distinguishes 'Latin' from 'Roman' citizens. The statement of the 500 ships is often used by Hannibal's non-admirers to show Carthage indeed had naval power, hence his expedition was a private enterprise which needed not to go overland. But plainly, these were not 500 'warships', but rather 'every type of vessel propelled by oars', nor a direct claim from Livy himself (he probably this drew from Valerias Antias, whom even Livy condemned for excessive exaggerations on more than one occasion, though not in this case).

Great thread, James

[Hanny]

As usual, superb references and research, Hanny

Back at ya!

However, I am always open-minded with regards to Livy's mention of the '500 ships', which doesn't seem nor pressed as reportage (from a modern view). However, judging by the enumerations we read concerning Bomilcar around Syracuse in 212-211 BCE, Carthage was probably building vessels after the war broke. There's another interesting detail amid Livy's comment:

One intresting thing in Livy is how they are executed, http://jesusisyhwh.blogspot.co.uk/20...-stake-3d.html another is that there were 900 Roman deserters left after the fall of cartahge to burn themselves alive in the temple of Eshmum, rather than be taken alive, also Carthage built 50 warships while under siege in the 3rd Punic war, not bad for city under siege and short of wood one must asume. Pre fabed and asembled from storage, or not, that is still pretty impresive.

http://historiantigua.cl/wp-content/..._Punic_War.pdf
Page 94, Carthage fleet of 130 warships and 700 merchants is operating in 211. Compare that that to Scipios fllet to take his army to africa and zama of 30 warships (total in service of 160) and 400 transports. Carthage to meet that threat bought 5000 slave oars rowers.

[conon394]

This is the only part i think your post was weak on. Carthage had the largest naval and comerical docks in the Med, 220 ships.

220 is not all that big lots of cities have similar if not larger dock structures...

Going back a bit:

Ill add just one more bit for now, Massilia pop would have been self sufficent in grain, it asked for aid against Ligurians from Rome and Casaer required 3 Legions to siege the city out and builit it a forum for 20,000, so lest use 20,000 for the 2PW population.

Morgen Herman Hanson's method (Shotgun) would put Massilia at somewhere around 37-52,000. That however might well be considered a low edge, the Shotgun method works best with aggregate data and the vitality of Massilian naval effort on the side of Rome and its ability found colonies, and signs of significant trade activity maybe points to a higher density (more metics and slaves for example than a typical average polis)

http://historiantigua.cl/wp-content/..._Punic_War.pdf Apendix II has a cmpative fleet strength year by year from the primary sources.

A good find, interesting though its very hard for modern authors and historians to break the desire to talk about controlling the sea and such Ideals that are rather more suited to modern or the age of Sail, but not to classical naval warfare. You really could not control the sea because out side of a well supplied close blockade of say a single port Ancient warships could not stay on station. Well they could but it was considered quite a hardship and the crew size vs storage meant that it was not really practical for very long.

[HannibalB]

Great stuff.

This post is mainly one constructed before, revised here for the relevant context:

HannibalB, I agree with your view that Hasdrubal's defeat in NE Spain was more decisive than the Metaurus - but only in the larger context of analyzing the war with the benefit of hindsight.

Indeed, I'm not suggesting that the Roman's didn't find the situation unsettling at all in 207 BC... the only way to judge the turning point or most decisive battle/s is to look at it with hindsight - as such, a number of things had already tipped the balance in Rome's favour before the Battle of the Metaurus, which the Romans themselves must have noticed!

However, I am always open-minded with regards to Livy's mention of the '500 ships', which doesn't seem nor pressed as reportage (from a modern view). However, judging by the enumerations we read concerning Bomilcar around Syracuse in 212-211 BCE, Carthage was probably building vessels after the war broke.

Dexter Hoyos (The Carthaginians, p.92) suggests that the famous harbour was constructed during the Second Punic War, 60-70 years earlier than what common opinion is on when both harbours were built.

It certainly makes sense, what with the Romans raiding African shores - they needed to shore up the defense of its own mercantile harbour, and begin constructing a fleet capable to once again challenge the Romans at sea. During the war's first decade, the Carthaginians had the wealth and manpower for such a project.

Great post again James. You and Hanny should really publish something!

[Punic Hoplite]

I don't have time to post in length currently, and I also haven't read everything in this post yet, but has anyone mentioned the Carthaginian expeditions to Sardinia that could have been sent to Hannibal? There was one more source of troops Carthage could have sent, but I can't remember it. Once I get home I'll hit my books to see if I can flush out my post.

[Ludicus]

Hannibal did not have the option to invade Italy by sea, since the Carthaginian navy was all but nonexistent after the First Punic War

Indeed.
In fact, according to Richard Miles,
"Carthage may have ruled the waves for over 300 years, but since the disastrous defeat in the First Punic War the Western mediterranean had become a Roman sea. Hannibal himself was a living embodiment of just how much this situation had changed, for it was solely as a land general that he earned his reputation. Indeed, the Punic fleet in Spain at the start of the Second Punic War consisted of only thirty-seven seaworthy quinqueremes and triremes. Between them Scipio and Longus had over three times that number of ships. Moreover, the Romans controlled many of the bases and much of the coastline by which any fleet would have to pass in making its way from Spain to Italy. The brutal truth was that for Hannibal to transport his army to Italy by sea would have been even more hazardous than the land route. There was no other option than take his army overland through Spain and Gaul, over the Pyrenees and the Alps to Italy"

Source, "Carthage Must Be Destroyed, The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilization" page 236.
Miles is Prof. of Classics at University of Sydney and Cambridge University, and he has written widely on Punic, Roman, and Vandal North Africa and has directed archeological excavations in Carthage and Rome.

conon394

You really could not control the sea because out side of a well supplied close blockade of say a single port

Exactly. Read "The Second Punic War: A reappraisal",Cornell,T.J., N.B. Rankov and P.A.G. Sabin, quote,
"The naval strategy of the Second Punic War was, in essence, determined by the control of a number of key bases and coastlines. Possibly the most spectacular example of this is the fact that Hannibal chose to invade Italy through the Alps, rather than a passage by sea. De Sanctis (and Starr) argued that this choice was dictated by the Carthaginians' inability to transport horses (and presumably elephants) by sea, but this was rightly rejected byThiel on the grounds that they were able to do precisely this on other occasions"

---

"Thiel questioned why there was not vigorous naval support for Hannibal’s offensive, and he argued, “the maritime failure of Carthage decisively contributed to Roman victory.”However, Delbrück asserted that it would have been foolhardy for Hannibal or Carthage to waste money building up a fleet since they could never outstrip Roman naval superiority. More recently, Rankov has suggested that “naval superiority” must be understood within the context of ancient naval warfare. Ancient fleets could spend only short periods of time at sea, and were forced to hug the coastline during operations. For Rankov, Roman naval superiority during the Second Punic War resulted from Rome’s control of Italian coastline communities, thus limiting the opportunities for any Carthaginian fleet to land"
The Italiens in the Second Punic War

--

Acording to The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare,page 367,

"During the Second Punic War the Carthaginian naval effort was not as extensive as that of Rome, but it was still far from negligible. In 212 and 211, for example, Bomilcar took fleets of ninety and sixty-five warships across from Africa to Syracuse. Like the Romans, however, the Carthaginians must have found the second lengthy war a tremendous strain on their manpower resources. In 204, Hasdrubal, in anticipation of a Roman invasion of Africa, purchased 5,000 slaves as rowers for the Carthaginian fleet, but this was presumably an exceptional measure. As with most aspects of ancient Carthage, lack of reliable evidence imposes very severe limits on our understanding"

--
"It may seem a paradox to assert that it was Roman sea-power that defeated Hannibal. Those who foughtat Zama would scarcely agree. But it was respect for Roman sea power that conditioned his strategy ofinvading Italy from Spain; it was Roman sea-power that prevented adequate reinforcements from reachinghim in southern Italy; it was that same sea-power that made it impossible for him to concert an offensive against Rome with the power of Macedon"

Rome Against Carthage, T.A. Dorey and D.R. Dudley.

[Pyrrhus the Molossian]

Numerous armies were sent to Sicily, Spain and Sardinia but only one shipment of reinforcements reached Hannibal. His government viewed him as a distraction and awarded the recovery of Sardinia and Sixily and the maitenance of Spain more important.

[Biggus Splenus]

I just watched the show "Ancients: Behaving badly" and from what ive saw, it seems like Hannibal was nothing more than a D grade general.

1)His elephants. They chulked up alot of provisions, and slowed his army, and on the battlefield werent doing as good as thier cost. For people who never saw elephants, theyre scary as hell, but after that(when they get to know them) you can just move out of thier way(like scipios army did in zuma). Furthermore, just the fact of having elephants increased the time hannibal needed to spend in the alps to two weeks, when it should have been only one week travel.
2)The alps. He lost 25,000 men there, and most of his elephants. WTF? I mean, wouldnt it had been better for hannibal to go for sardinia, and then sicily, and then raid the southern countryside of rome? Carthage anyways had a superior navy.
3)He may had crushing victories over the romans, but lets look at the romans. From what ive seen, at that time the roman army was managed by two consouls, and they had 24 hour shifts on the general office. Some day one general tried to dig in, while the other went on the offensive. We also know that the roman generals were motivated by oppertunities of glory and politics, rather than co working together for strict military goals.
4)Why didnt he just go for rome when he could? Instead he tried to make failing alliances of Italian cities, letting the much manpower superior romans regroup and rebuild thier army. He just wandered in Italy untill he had to be called back to africa to defend carthage, where he was crushed.

And as we know, history in older times was influenced much from politics. Roman historians maybe wanted scipio to look like a great general. Had he just won over a loser that wouldnt have been as glorious as defeating the "greatest general of them all". That just makes scipio a much better general.

1) Hannibal's elephants were part of his tactics; break the tight roman formations which gave them their fighting ability, and follow up the disorder with an infantry charge, supported by cavalry. Worked well for a long time.

2) The reason why Hannibal lost so much men in the Alps is because of the hostile Celts inhabiting the area, constantly molesting his forces with ambushes. Hannibal crossed into the Alps (along the route possible planned out his father before his death) in the attempt to surprise the Romans. It definitely worked!

Also, Hannibal would have tried to avoid using naval transport because, by then, the Romans navy was superior compared to the Carthaginian one. Also the Romans would be watching the western Mediteranian much closer than the Alps, so they would have been able to prepare for Hannibal much faster.

To use the element of surprise and lack of a size-able navy, is your answer.

3) I'm not sure what you trying to point out here, but I'll have a go anyway. Hannibal had defeated 3 Roman armies all superior in number to his own in 4 years, totally annihilated all of them and in all 3 of these battles Hannibal displayed truly genius tactics. Rome had not suffered a defeat like this since the Gaelic Invasion from North of the Po 390 BCE, but Hannibal had managed to deal 3 of them. Anybody like to tell me that's not impressive?

4) He didn't march on Rome "when he could" (I assume you mean after Cannae) because he didn't have the sufficient manpower, and no siege machinery. Although lacking siege machinery is no excuse, because he could have easily built some, but I think Hannibal may have wanted to stay mobile. Also, after Cannae many southern Italians had defected over to Hannibal's side, so Hannibal now had to defend these allies of his in order to gain more, and he also had to attack the armies of Rome, which was extremely difficult for a force of his size.

You also say that Hannibal was wondering around southern Italy; he certainly wasn't. He was stranded there by his motherland; no reinforcements, no supplies, no way out. Not to mention he had not enough manpower to act against the Romans (his brother had set out to aid him, traveling through the Alps, but once in Italy he was trapped by 2 Roman armies and him and his army massacred; if this army got to Hannibal as reinforcements, then it could have turned the war back over to Carthage's side).

Hannibal was called back home from the Carthaginian senate, to defeat the Roman general there, Scipio Africanus, which Hannibal lost against him in the Battle of Zama. He lost there because of a number of reasons, which I will not list because I got homework to do

[Duptar]

Sieges back in the day were very difficult. Tyre and Rhodes come to mind as well.

Maybe because Tyre was much better fortified than Rome? We do have records of the Babylonians and Egyptians as well (Nebuchadnezzar and Shalmanezer) failing to capture Tyre via sieges and it was only done by the time of Alexander. However, different from Rome, it was a coastal siege and the walls were huge, requiring Alexander to build not only a causeway but also many rams, catipults and ballista. The Servian wall was no equivalent in terms of thickness and height, although it was long. Your thoughts?

How would he be able to besiege and take Rome with less than 40,000 men? He had ridiculously few men to blockade her given the lenght of the circuit-wall and push her to starvation, he couldn’t hope for a betrayal or negotiations, the defences were formidable and the Romans could muster large numbers of defenders without even recalling the legions operating in Illyria, Sicily and Iberia, so a direct assault would have probably been easily repulsed. And if he stayed there for long he would be trapped by the returning armies.

Yes but how would these legions be there before Hannibal reaches Rome assuming he sets out right after Cannae? The Servian wall was long but how do you defend the whole circumference? Most defenses of sieges were conducted inside the city but the Roman army wasn't capable of fighting in an urban environment like Rome where there was a lot of public buildings: most of Rome was made up of the Forum Romanum where there was plenty of business and political meetings where Hannibal could do a lot of damage. Training was done in a specific area I forget its name but very small to accommodate even a legion.

Furthermore how would he be trapped by returning armies in your opinion? Rome had to guard other garrisons in Sicily as well.

Strategically before the battle, both were considering the same objective, to reach their allies from the west (mainly for cavalry support); Scipio was searching for Massinissa, Hannibal for Vermina and both generals moved their armies towards them. It was a risk on both their parts as they had no control over it, but perhaps Scipio had more reliable information where Massinissa was. Massinissa arrived first at any rate. Vermina arrived just a few days too late to help Hannibal, and was bringing a large force to compliment the Carthaginian which Livy puts at 16,200 men. Livy's date that the battle against Vermina happened three months after Zama makes no sense as Vermina would not sally forth to Zama to fight Scipio's army unless he was there to support Hannibal.

The story of Hannibal being too far from water also appears suspicious. According to Gabriel (p.191):

Why Hannibal would have made such a basic mistake in not providing water for his army and animals in the obviously hot and dry climate is not explained...

Maybe it is possible that Hannibal was looking for logistical support from Vermina? In a dry and arid region such as North Africa and around Tunis I would suppose that supply lines were a little bit of a worry but that bases had stored most of the food and water needed for the army, hence why you may hear of no Issus when Alexander had overrun his line of communications to the Persians. Recall that Hannibal usually foraged during his campaigns as Shean has noted, but that this was in territories somewhat friendly to Hannibal during his trip to the Alps where grain supplies were bountiful.

Primary acounts tell us that slaves (the clear choice for porters in Carthaginian service) fought in the field armies and their owners were payed for any that died as a result, so the numbers do not require any increase from those in the primary acounts as all are already in them, and Hannys army did not take with it the non coms that followed Alexander.

Would this be both Livy and Polybius? I am curious if Hannibal had any slaves or camp followers with him nonetheless, I gave the example of Ager Falanus a while ago where there was camp followers and oxen travelling with him, ox being a valuable logistical resource during the ancient age for how much it could carry. Who were the owners, do we have any accounts of them?

75,000 Franks and Alamanni in early 553 crossed the Alps and took the town of Parma.
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t...20alps&f=false

If I read that correctly the link suggests that Charles' grandfather was unable to invade Italy by crossing the Alps because he lacked the resources necessary to maintain himself once he was over the Alps. So it makes me wonder why Charles was able to do it, also why it was so difficult for Charles et al to do it but not Hannibal since he was in Italy for 16 years. Maybe there was a difference in supply and agriculture in Italy during the two periods?

Bagnal cites 100 transports sent to Hannibal with stores being captured in 205/4, at the same time 7000 more troops are dispatched to Mago in Balaerics, which he then goes to N Italy with a total 12000 Inf 2000 cav + El, he retains 10 warships and sends the rest back to Carthage. In contrast they capture 200 transports in 203 when a Roman resupply fleet is storm driven onto cape Bon.

Would you consider Bagnall a reliable source regarding the support of Scipio's as well as Hannibal's army?

[Hanny]

http://www.livius.org/articles/perso...l-in-the-alps/

Latest update for Hannys route over the Alps.

[Sudden Death]

Hannibal's use of the elephants at Zama was actually quite intelligent, and it appears that most have been sucked into the common belief that Hannibal made a last gamble and charged them into the Roman front line. I also don't believe in the 'elephant lanes' of Scipio either.