Stratfor: Assessing Iran's Regional Geo-strategic Ambitions

[Caelius]

Dr. George Friedman and Robert Kaplan themselves sit down and give a broad Geopolitical briefing of the situation with Iran as it stands at present, and enlight of a number of very recent developments on the international political front.



As i've made clear in previous posts, the Iran issue is a subject matter that doesn't just center around their clandestine weapons program. Friedman and Kaplan do an excellent job laying out the different motivations the Iranians have for pursuing such a belligerent position within the region's geopolitical arena....but what I love the most is how they also make clear the reasons for why all the talk of some immediate Israeli attack is nothing short of hyperbole.

Hyperbole that's being used by Hawks on both sides to trump up a potential conflict, which is unlikely to occur short of the Israelis getting the mindset of a clear and present danger to the survival of their State. Other points of interest also include the reasons why the Israelis will never accept the notion of a nuclear Iran (their lack of strategic depth to absorb damage), and also a valid point for why the Iranians themselves can't reliably be trusted with nukes (multiple political power centers and the inherent domestic governmental instability that flows from it).

[Burnum]

I think they're largely right. But, I also think that they're underestimating Iran's influence in Central Asia, and the reasoning why it's influence is limited. It's a small but important point.

[mrmouth]

At like 2:20, they mention Iran within the context of Central Asia. Ive always been far more wary of the idea of them reestablishing the Persian Empire with Syria and Lebanon. To say they would not be bringing periods of enlightenment with them this time, is an understatement.

Good video. Hopefully it can spark a rational debate.

[Mangalore]

... Hyperbole that's being used by Hawks on both sides to trump up a potential conflict, ...

It's certainly hyperbole. Problem is that all three sides are in election frenzies. And regardless of the absence of fair elections in Iran the last unfair election has pointed to a power struggle that might aim at getting rid of Amahidnedjad by the Grand Ayatollah and push back military influence in the political arena.

So we have everyone being at their stupidest as strong men might garner votes or influence.

... and also a valid point for why the Iranians themselves can't reliably be trusted with nukes (multiple political power centers and the inherent domestic governmental instability that flows from it).

Erm. you missed their point there (as evident by them comparing the US as _similarily_ divided as Iran). The point is that Iran is domestically divided and thus is limited in it's potential options since any faction desiring bold policy changes can be sabotaged in public opinion by the other faction.
Similarily the US cannot change it's policy because the democrats and republicans are bickering over the right course and Obama cannot make any bold decisions without risking the coming elections.
Saying that Iran cannot be trusted because it is more pluralistic than an autocratic China is not a very solid point because it doesn't equate to being unstable (though obviously that being possible is the more worrisome aspect). They were speaking of political influence of single power centres in shaping policy. If there'd be only one power centre you'd make the very same arguement since one power center might be jingoistic and radical so we'd still wouldn't want to trust them with nukes. Multiple power centers actually increase the likelihood that any nuclear option would face significant domestic opposition by more moderate or conservative thinking groups who do not think blowing up another country for lols is a good idea.


The whole "rebuilding the Persian empire" bit is a bit placative. Iran is factually the largest country between Turkey and Pakistan so they obviously try to exert certain influence in regions they consider to have valid interests in. Them considering themselves the Shia protector is one, them having economic dealings with Pakistan and India is another without the need to invoke pictures of imperialistic expansionism.
And there's the antagonism between Saudi Arabia as the next largest country with massive oil riches and an equally or even more radical interpretation of Islam jockeying for power and influence among its neighbors just as much.

Edit: Overall nice find. I like it when some people try to explain foreign policy on a more elevated level than is the usual case for politicians and daily news.

[mrmouth]

The whole "rebuilding the Persian empire" bit is a bit placative. Iran is factually the largest country between Turkey and Pakistan so they obviously try to exert certain influence in regions they consider to have valid interests in. Them considering themselves the Shia protector is one, them having economic dealings with Pakistan and India is another without the need to invoke pictures of imperialistic expansionism.

I don't think they were trying to pander to anyone considering I have heard this idea addressed in this manner, only a few times. Most people don't know the sense of manifest destiny, buoyed by the inherent victim complex, that all areas of government subscribe to in Iran. Forget Shiite protector, they want as close to total domination over the regions they have been a growing factor in, for the last 20 years.

When you begin to make Qatar nervous enough to shop for such a significant, conventional deterrent to Iran, that shows that it goes well beyond oil interests in that specific region. That country has had good working relations with Iran until now. And they are not stopping at trying to mitigate the Iran risk through military accusations alone, but in also trying to end Assad.

[Caelius]

It's certainly hyperbole. Problem is that all three sides are in election frenzies.

You didn't get that from Jon Stewart did you? The current election frenzies have certainly shrunk the echo chamber in all three, but the hyperbole has been going on much longer then that.

And regardless of the absence of fair elections in Iran the last unfair election has pointed to a power struggle that might aim at getting rid of Amahidnedjad by the Grand Ayatollah and push back military influence in the political arena.

....Except for the fact that the outcome of the last elections did the complete opposite of that and basically made the Grand Ayatollah impotent in terms of political influence over Ahmadinejad and the extremist hawks from the IRGC.

Erm. you missed their point there (as evident by them comparing the US as _similarily_ divided as Iran). The point is that Iran is domestically divided and thus is limited in it's potential options since any faction desiring bold policy changes can be sabotaged in public opinion by the other faction.

If I missed it, then you just made it.

I wish Friedman had clarified that point better, but the central notion he was making was that Iran's political leadership isn't centrally organized to the point that if a flashpoint or nuclear issue ever came up, that someone from the West could phone up Ahmadinejad and be given certain assurances by the Iranians themselves.

Even at the height of the Cold War, both the US and USSR maintained open lines of communication so that "cooler heads could prevail" which could avert nuclear war as a result of some flashpoint or incident occurring.

It's what helped maintained the peace, and certainly belies no comparison between Iran and the US in that regard, as no foreign leader from another nuclear power ever has to worry about the President of the United States being politically sabotaged by some Republican junior Senator from Florida carving out his own political turf. They would no that assurances from the President mean exactly what is being said. Just as the US was able to trust the word of Boris Yeltsin when he gave assurances about the safety and reliability of the Russian arsenal to Clinton way back in the early 90s.

Similarily the US cannot change it's policy because the democrats and republicans are bickering over the right course and Obama cannot make any bold decisions without risking the coming elections.

It's not that clear cut. The difference between the US and Iranian situations is that Obama's narrowness of options stems from political concerns, not technical ones. Whereas in Iran it's both. There is no one in the US political system that would question Obama's authority as POTUS to push through a radical shift in foreign policy if he so wanted because of vested powers in his office that allow him to do so.

The Iranian political arena isn't as clearly defined and organized, and when you add nukes to that equation it makes for the potential of different competing power centers to use the issue of nukes to vie for leverage over their rivals.

Saying that Iran cannot be trusted because it is more pluralistic than an autocratic China is not a very solid point because it doesn't equate to being unstable

On the contrary it very much does. Kaplan even made as much clear in the video.

Go to the 10:50 mark if you need to.

Power isn't sufficiently centralized, which prevents them from making quick decisions on foreign policy. Add nukes and it becomes more of a headache.

Friedman's qualifier to that statement dealt with the political aspect of things on the American side, not whether or not power was divided.

If there'd be only one power centre you'd make the very same arguement since one power center might be jingoistic and radical so we'd still wouldn't want to trust them with nukes.

That couldn't be farther from the case though.

Look at all the rival nuclear powers out there which the US deals with which only have one-center of power, and yet is able to abide with them and their nuclear capability.

Russia, China, N. Korea, and even Pakistan all fall under that category.

Multiple power centers actually increase the likelihood that any nuclear option would face significant domestic opposition by more moderate or conservative thinking groups who do not think blowing up another country for lols is a good idea.

No. That's not the point Kaplan.

Multiple power centers complicate the issue dramatically because their competition for influence in foreign policy makes the word of whoever is the current leader worth less than a bag of bricks.

Almost precisely because such instability coincides with a lack of consistency in foreign policy which is then projected abroad, and usually makes other countries extremely nervous.

It doesn't really matter whether or not other power centers in a country would "shout down" a crazy idea or not. What matters is whether the assurances of the political leadership adequately represents the country as a whole, and would be able to carry out such assurances without internal conflict.

Just look at how quickly Russia moved to secure it's nukes after the USSR collapse in '91, or why both the US and China spend billions proping up the regime in Pakistan even if they'd prefer not to. Look at what happened to the USAF leadership after a few nuclear warheads were accidentally loaded onto a B-52 last year.

Them considering themselves the Shia protector is one, them having economic dealings with Pakistan and India is another without the need to invoke pictures of imperialistic expansionism.

But that's exactly what it is though. A spade is a spade and you shouldn't downplay what they clearly pointed out as Iranian motivations for doing so.

[Dr. Oza]

I think they're largely right. But, I also think that they're underestimating Iran's influence in Central Asia, and the reasoning why it's influence is limited. It's a small but important point.

What influence? The Russians/Chinese/Americans have more power and influence in Central Asia than the Iranians can ever hope to achieve. Russia especially.

[Col. Tartleton]

I want to see the Persian-Arabian War. Screw them both says I. Hopefully Iran wins.

The rest of the world has the choice of beating up Iran now or letting them become a Great Power of the 21st century.