[History] Dunkirk: Germany’s Last Chance?

[Garbarsardar]

Author: Garbarsardar
Original Thread: Dunkirk: Germany’s Last Chance?

Dunkirk: Germany’s Last Chance?

Dunkirk: Germany’s Last Chance?



On May 24, 1940, while 1.000.000 allied soldiers were cut off and surrounded in Benelux, a Halt Order was issued to the Panzer troops, permitting the initiation of operation Dynamo, and the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from the port of Dunkirk.
What led to this order, and which were the strategic consequences of it, is the subject of this thread.

“We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory.
Wars are not won by evacuations. But there was a victory inside this deliverance, which should be noted.”
Speech entitled “The miracle of Dunkirk” delivered by Winston Churchill, on June 4, 1940

“A victory over England was simply given away”
Wolfram von Richthofen, commander VIII air corps

“We had missed the great moment”
Wilhelm List, commander 12th Army


I do not believe there is another war in history that gave rise to so many “what ifs” as the Second World War. It is probably an effect of proximity, abundance of information, lingering emotionality; it may be as well the case of WW2 being a monumental and at the same time modern struggle. Or it may be the case that the context of this war is the centerpiece around which the European and at a lesser degree the American contemporary mentality was build.

“Could Germany win this war?” is much a much more repeated question that the “Could we have lost it?” allied counterpart. The winner is often far more content and secure to ask similar questions.

In previous threads, (http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=48410; http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=48150) I stated my opinion that the war was lost for Germany when the leadership failed to: 1). Either prepare the economy and industry for a protracted struggle 2) Realize that the Polish “go for broke” gamble (that France and the UK will stay out of it as they did with the Czechs) had no chance to materialize.

Given that Hitler’s long term strategic goal was always to attack the Soviet Union, the only chance Germany had was the quick elimination of a western front. Needless to say still that was no guarantee that the 40 or more divisions that could be spared would make a significant difference, or that oil would be less of problem through some form of UK co-operation. That in turn could enable a more clear tactical and strategic thinking and make the dilemma Moscow or the Caspian irrelevant. As you can see, there are still too many “what ifs”.

In the following paragraphs I will describe the moment of crisis regarding the elimination of the western front. In my opinion this was the Dunkirk evacuation and its psychological impact on the British people and politics. Then I will argue on the reasons of the “famous” Halt Order, that probably deprived Germany of a strategic victory, and lastly I will speculate on the consequences of a potential elimination of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF).

Timeline of events



May 10, 1940. Fall Gelb, begins. The German army is attacking France and Benelux according to the Manstein plan.

May 13, 1940. Breakthrough at Sedan.

May 16, 1940. Churchill flies to France, meets Gamelin and is informed that there is no strategic reserve. The danger of envelopment of the allied forces in the north becomes clear and present.

May 18, 1940. Rommel reaches Cambrai and occupies it.

May, 20 1940. Occupation of Amiens and Abeville. The last bridge on the Somme is lost, the Allies are isolated in the north.

May 23, 1940. 20:00: Von Rustend commander of Army group A (the southern arm of the pincer with 71 divisions, including most of the Panzer force issues a close-up order to panzergruppe Kleist and Hoth. The order reaches the troops on the morning of the 24th, while they are within 15km of Dunkirk, having already crossed Aa canal, the last natural obstacle. At the moment there is no allied force capable of stopping them.

May 23, 1940. 23:45: Brauchitsch chief of staff, transfers the Panzer divisions to Group B (the northern arm of the pincer) in order to countermand Runsted’s order. The transfer is set for 20:00, May 24.

May 24, 1940. The “Halt Order”: Hitler intervenes, empowering Runsted again and forbidding the crossing of the canal line to the northwest of Arras.
“On orders of the Fuhrer…the general line will not be crossed northwest of Arras. On the western wing, instead, the important thing is to get all mobile units to close up and to force the enemy to run into the mentioned favorable defense line”.

May 26, 1940. 18:57: Operation Dynamo starts.

June 4, 1940.09:40 German forces enter Dunkirk



Operation Dynamo: The Evacuation at Dunkirk

Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay


Operation Dynamo was masterminded by Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay, who had been given less than a week to prepare. The British assembled a fleet that grew to 861 ships, reinforced by Belgian and French units. The fleet consisted of 1 Cruiser, 56 destroyers and torpedo boats plus a motley assembly of barges, yachts, fishing boats and excursion steamers.

The initial projection of the British Admiralty was for the evacuation of 45,000 men while Ironside (Chief of the Imperial Staff) was even more pessimistic, expecting no more than 30,000 evacuees. The weather did not hinder the operation, since the channel enjoyed unusually calm waters that permitted evacuation not only from the harbour but also directly from the beach, as can be seen from the table below.

Date// From the beach // From the harbor// Both// Total
27 May // -- // 7.669 // 7.669 // 7.669
28 May // 5.930 // 11.874 // 17.804 // 25.473
29 May // 13.752 // 33.558 // 47.310 // 72.783
30 May // 29.512 // 24.311 // 53.823 // 126.606
31 May // 22.942 // 45.072 // 68.014 // 194.620
1 June // 17.438 // 47.081 // 64.429// 259.049
2 June // 6.695// 19.561 // 26.256 // 285.305
3 June // 1.870 // 24.876 // 26.746 // 312.051
4 June // 622// 25.553 // 26.175// 338.226

British soldiers try to flat on a wing of a german plane


During the operation a total of 370,000 men (including lesser contingents from other ports) were evacuated, amongst them 123,000 French. Around 500,000 had to surrender while the number of KIA during those days is still to be confirmed. Of the 861 ships, 272 were sunk, including 13 Destroyers. The losses of RAF were 177 aircraft compared to 240 Luftwaffe airplanes. But the most important loss was that of the totality of the BEF equipment: 63,000 vehicles, 20,000 motorcycles, 475 tanks, 2,400 artillery pieces and vast quantities of arms ammunition and gear.

“The best of all we had to give had gone to the British Expeditionary Force, and although they had not been proceeding as fast as we had hoped. The best of all we had to give had gone to the British Expeditionary Force, and although they had not the numbers of tanks and some articles of equipment which were desirable, they were a very well and finely equipped army. They had the first fruits of all that our industry had to give, and that is gone.”
Speech entitled “The miracle of Dunkirk” delivered by Winston Churchill, on June 4, 1940

Equipment abandoned on the beach






The reasons for the halt order

18th May, 1940: Every hour is precious. F. H.Q. sees it quite differently. Führer keeps worrying about south flank. He rages and screams that we are on the way to ruin the whole campaign. He won't have any part in continuing the operation in a westward direction, let alone to the south-west, and still clings to the plan for the north-westerly drive.

24th May, 1940: The left-wing, which consists of armored and motorized forces and has no enemy in front of it, will be stopped dead in its tracks upon direct order from the Führer. The finishing off of the encircled enemy army is to be left to the Luftwaffe.
From the War diary of Franz Halder, Chief of Staff to Brauchitsch.

From British Newspaper of the time



There are two sets of reasons put forth to explain the halt order. The first set is about the tactical and operational aspects of a direct attack against Dunkirk. The second set, propagated mainly by Liddel-Hart (History of WW2, 1970; The other side of the Hill, 1965) is addressing Hitler’s strategic thinking and his supposed desire to “go soft on the British”. We’ll address the first set…ehem…first:

Tactical concerns

It has been supported by Hitler amongst others (Jodl, Keitel) that the terrain was unsuitable for the operation. They even cite some of Guderian’s objections on the “waterlogged” terrain. Not only the objections of Guderian came on the 28th, after two days of heavy rainfall and 4 days after the halt order, but the same man later ordered the use of armored forces and ensured success in the much more unfavorable terrain at lake Ilmen during Barbarossa. (http://www.third-reich-books.com/ope...barbarossa.htm)

Another source of concern was the state of the Panzer force. The main argument for this comes from a report emanating from Kleist stating that 50% of the Panzer force was out of commission. Kleist later pointed out that he never used such a percentage (Irving, Hitler’s War) and all the official records of the German divisions point at the fact that the time spent in repair never exceeded “a few hours”.

Hitler also mentioned the fear of an allied counterattack. Not only there were very few indications of such a prospect, but the order called for the immediate halt of ALL Panzer divisions, without any provisions for action or reserve. It is evident that it was a decision made on principle and not due to tactical considerations.

Operational concerns

The first argument comes from one of Hitler’s closest collaborators Jodl as concern over the course of further operations to the south. Well even the hesitant Runsted acknowledged that all the money was in Dunkirk and that the conclusion of operations in the North was a prerequisite fro ant further action. In support Jodl adds the lack of information on the allied forces. However Halder in a letter addressed to Mussolini and sent on the 25th maintains that 72 allied divisons were in the pocket. And that is actually 2 more than in reality. So no one can claim that Hitler underestimated the mafnitude of a potential success.

One of the most propagated issues is the use of the Luftwaffe to eliminate the encircled forces as an operational option. Goring apparently put the offer on the table: “This is a special job for the Luftwaffe! I must speak to the Fuhrer at once! Get a line immediately!” Most members on the Luftwaffe officer corps protested strongly against the idea and even the complacent Jodl considered it ridiculous. 1005 aircraft were lost since the 10th of May while Kesserling estimated the operational strength reduced by 50-70%. In reality the Luftwaffe needed rest and refit much more than the Panzers did. Still it is evident that the idiotic proposal of Goring was used by Hitler as an affirmation of his right to stop the Panzers.

Strategic concerns

“I intentionally spared the British at Dunkirk”
(Political Testament, Adolf Hitler 1945)

As early as “Mein Kampf” Hitler displayed a degree of Anglophilia. He considered British and Germans racially related through the Saxons, he had a view of sharing the world with Great Britain and in 1937 he replaced French with English as the foreign language in German schools.

It is also certain that Hitler himself tried to shed a favorable light on his mistake and present it as a far sighted plan to dominate the British by not annihilating them, reminiscent of the same tactic employed by Stalin to justify the disasters of 1941 like a plan to “lure the enemy deep in the Soviet soil”.

The truth is that in his directive No. 13 (http://www.fpp.co.uk/books/Hitler/ )he clearly ordered the annihilation of the allies in Dunkirk, and even took the step to intervene on a tactical level, to replace the ineffective artillery shells with time-fused anti air shells to cause maximum damage;hardly the acts of a humanitarian or a strategist.

Goring, gave him away again: “The army wants to act the gentleman. They round up the British as prisoners with little or no harm to them. The Fuhrer wants to teach them a lesson they will never forget”
(http://www.fpp.co.uk/books/Milch/index.html)

The probable motive

Hitler had a long history of strife and mistrust with the officer corps. He felt that most generals despised him because of his military career as mere corporal, and his low origin. In all his decisions he felt undermined and betrayed by the “Prussian Aristocrats” and he made an aggressive counterbalancing act to his inferiority complex of even the most trivial decisions. His decision for the formation of the SS as a personal and Party army further demonstrated his opinion about the loyalty of the Wermacht. He even insisted that Dunkirk should be an SS operation, in case the Wermacht had any inclination to let the British escape.

The halt order was decided during his visit to Runsted’s headquarters. He sensed that Halder and Brauchitsch bypassed his authority by removing the Panzers from the command of his favorite general, and more, that HIS war and HIS victory were about to be claimed by the hated Officers corps. With the Halt Order, Hitler reassured his pre-eminence over the Staff, and made clear who is the source of Strategic (and operational, and tactical) authority. This was just one skirmish for Hitler that would end with the complete subjugation of OKW during the War in the East.

German troops filming at Dunkirk




What if…

“If you ask anybody what they remember most clearly about theretreat to Dunkirk they will all mention two things - shame and exhaustion. Shame-as we went back through those white-faced, silent crowds of Belgians, the people who had cheered us and waved to us as we came through their country only four days before, people who had vivid memories of a previous German occupation and whom we were now handing over to yet another. I felt very ashamed. We had driven up so jauntily and now, liked whipped dogs, we were scurrying back with our tails between our legs.”
Brian Horrocks A Full Life (1960)
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWdunkirk.htm

“We shall have lost all our trained soldiers by the next few days-unless a miracle appears to help us”
Gen. Sir Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 25 May 1940.

“Had the BEF not returned to this country it is hard to see how the Army could recover from the blow”
Field Marshall Alan Brooke (n.d.)

During and after the war, the myth of Dunkirk was one of the most famous themes of British propaganda: first because this heroic effort was the only glimpse of hope, not only for the British people but especially for Churchill’s government; later in order to maximize the British role in defeating Hitler.

However one should consider that apart from the loss in men and equipment, the loss in NCO’s (that would train the homeland troops) and higher ranking officers would be almost irreplaceable. Montgomery, Alexander and countless others that later fought in Africa and Normandy were trapped in the pocket.

That catastrophe would probably destabilize the government and a peace would be much more alluring to the British. From here on it is pure speculation, since the accumulation of what ifs from this point on cannot leave any room for prediction.

The most probable scenario would be that Germany would be ready for Barbarossa, (the Blitzkrieg one that Hitler imagined) with 40 more divisions, 2000 airplanes with experienced crews (Dynamo+Battle of Britain losses), and more oil safe and without the need to supply or reinforce troops in other theaters and obviously an intact Airborne Corps.
Would that be enough?

Well, my job here is done; I leave the speculation to you.
Garb.

Fishing trailers during the evacuation


DUNKIRK : From Disaster to Deliverance (Battleground Europe Series) by Patrick Wilson (2000)
Blitzkrieg: From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk by Walther K Nehring and Len Deighton (2000)
History of the Second World War by Basil Henry Liddell Hart (1999)