Liberalism and the permanent State of Exception.

[Inkie]

I'm trying to take the recent 'Executive Power' thread a little further here (for the reference, a state of exception = Pretty much a state of emergency or état de siège, where the state can function beyond the law). Having recently started reading Giorgio Agamben's State of Exception and seen the (rather good) film J. Edgar, I have become more interested in the issues of global and local threat and the rising power of the executive. Although you can arguably trace this phenomenon as a constant throughout history, the great crises and events of the 20th century have led to an unprecedented rise in the pervasiveness of the unlimited, unbound SoE (which can be deployed impulsively, casually and with the constant potential to annihilate fundamental human freedoms): Examples of such crises are the rise of Communism and Fascism, both World Wars, the Cold War, Terrorism, Nuclear Proliferation and perennial economic crisis.

All of these have – according to Agamben - led to a greater centralisation within the state leading to the decline in power of the judicial and legislative to the benefit of the executive, which has failed to relax its grasp on power in the peaceful intervals between crises and maintained its dominance: It can even be argued that, rather than the legislative organising the legal framework within which the executive can operate, the executive is (and has been for decades) pushing for laws by decree (this goes back to President Lincoln emancipating slaves practically alone), which the legislation merely implements, in a truly Weberian bureaucratic style. Likewise, the judicial frequently sees itself sacrificed on the altar of the SoE – where laws can no longer apply to the State because of necessity.

Fundamentally, as Santi Romano argues, all laws see their origin in necessity, and the SoE transcends written laws because of its apparent de facto necessity for the survival of the state. The whole origin of this necessity is, from my point of view, the rise of international and domestic unpredictable threat, which can in theory only be stabilised by an executive which can extend its own powers to respond with due speed and efficiency. Even though I'll use the US Patriot Act as a basic example of the increasing permanence of the State being exempt from binding laws and codes, this is a trend which concerns us all: Do we require a permanent SoE which can at any moment infringe human rights? If such a trend is to continue, will it be necessary to control and counter-balance the power of the executive? How would this be achieved? Frankly, for now I am relatively content with the current situation because I feel protected, yet I can't help but feel the nagging sense of “après nous le déluge” where escalating international drama results in an accelerated curtailment of individual liberties, no matter whether they are citizens of your state or not (this should never matter anyway when we're talking about human rights).

I would also especially like to hear from the Libertarians or staunch liberals of this forum and, from a theoretical perspective, how the Hayekian/Austrian school state would react to such pressing international concerns. Would it, in your opinion, have the right to declare the state of exception? And if so, how would the state's power be limited? Wouldn't limitations render the SoE pointless? For now, I think the only real limit upon such a force are frequent divisions within the executive which 'slow it down' so to speak, but such a limit will never have the result of reversing this trend nor will it have any capacity to change it.

So, any thoughts?

[Mr. Scott]

Well the executive branch is an interesting thing.

I don't necessarily attribute the power of the Executive branch as a result of it's incremental gains in power during crisis, but rather due to the necessities to managing a global-spanning American Empire (argue what you will, it's an empire by every definition, except in name).

The president, essentially, is the "emperor" of this Empire. With such immense capabilities to almost unilaterally invade countries (After all, the US has only officially declared war 5 times in its history (congressional approval), but we've been in dozens upon dozens of military missions and occupations), and with the ability to basically go into trade or political agreements with other nations, without forming direct treaties, the American president has an astounding power over US foreign policy. Because the foreign policy of a nation must have a single voice, it is reasonable that the President would be given almost total domination over it. A divided voice is far weaker.

Over the past century, as this American economic, cultural, political, and military empire has expanded, so has the effects of foreign policy on our nation. Because of the massive entanglement of the American economy with the world, and visa versa, the president, basically the sole leader of American foreign policy, has gained a tremendous level of power over the US economically, culturally, and politically, primarily because of the growing importance of foreign policy.

The biggest issue the US faces is will American democracy be able to survive the conditions of managing an Empire? Few nations have succeeded in maintaining both their empire and their democracy, with the exception of the UK. Rome sure wasn't able to.

However, domestically, it is very possible for the US to retain its democracy. Because our form of the "Emperor" is elected directly by the people, even if the executive branch does exercise a stronger will upon the populace, it will always be subjected to public opinion. In many ways, its as though we as a nation elect a little Emperor every 4 or 8 years. Once that little emperor's turn is up, we go to the next one.

With globalization taking a stronger and stronger hold, and with America's cold war empire (which was expanded very hastily and messily) starting to solidify and consolidate itself where it matters (think of the Romans during Pax Romana, where the cultures and economic/political systems of its empire began to integrate). We will likely see the role of the American president grow ever stronger. Centralization, at least when it comes to foreign policy, is inevitable.

[Town Watch]

However, domestically, it is very possible for the US to retain its democracy. Because our form of the "Emperor" is elected directly by the people, even if the executive branch does exercise a stronger will upon the populace, it will always be subjected to public opinion. In many ways, its as though we as a nation elect a little Emperor every 4 or 8 years. Once that little emperor's turn is up, we go to the next one.

American President is not actually elected directly by the people. You guys have the indirect method because you have the Electoral College which casts its votes for the presidential candidate.

Didn't Bush still win the presidential election 2000, even though he received less nationwide votes than Al Gore.

But because Bush won the Electoral College voting by a good majority, he became the president.

[Justice and Mercy]

American President is not actually elected directly by the people. You guys have the indirect method because you have the Electoral College which casts its votes for the presidential candidate.

Didn't Bush still win the presidential election 2000, even though he received less nationwide votes than Al Gore.

But because Bush won the Electoral College voting by a good majority, he became the president.

By a good majority? He barely won.

When the popular vote is that close you're not going to see a big difference in the electoral votes. The electoral votes ARE the popular votes, weighted by region.

I think only once an elector voted differently from their district, and that was the clown from D.C. (if I recall correctly).

[Enemy of the State]

I would also especially like to hear from the Libertarians or staunch liberals of this forum and, from a theoretical perspective, how the Hayekian/Austrian school state would react to such pressing international concerns. Would it, in your opinion, have the right to declare the state of exception? And if so, how would the state's power be limited? Wouldn't limitations render the SoE pointless? For now, I think the only real limit upon such a force are frequent divisions within the executive which 'slow it down' so to speak, but such a limit will never have the result of reversing this trend nor will it have any capacity to change it.

As an Austrian, I have no opinion on this subject. Austrian economics and liberalism/libertarianism are not the same thing and it is important to keep them distinct from each other. Economics is value free, and should never make judgements on good or bad. However, as a liberal, I don't see much of a difference. I think state power is already largely unrestricted. The state is after all the creator, interpretor and enforcer of all positive law. Only the armed masses and foreign states can restrict a state's power. Despite all the division and rhetoric we see in politics, I think they're but minor disagreements on how to operate the machinery of coercion. It is in the interests of people working in all branches of government to increase state power.

[Inkie]

Well the executive branch is an interesting thing.

I don't necessarily attribute the power of the Executive branch as a result of it's incremental gains in power during crisis, but rather due to the necessities to managing a global-spanning American Empire (argue what you will, it's an empire by every definition, except in name).

The fact that the American executive was already gaining power long before its era of hegemony suggests that this is indeed a gradual trend which coincides with:

- The rise of state power due to technological innovation.
- The amount of crises endured by a state, both internal and external.
- The growing rise of international, global threat.
- The need to act effectively as an international power and combat these threats both external and domestic.

Essentially, the reason you have put forward coincides with mine: The running of an international empire does appear to be more effective with an all-powerful executive, but such a phenomenon only occurred as a result of the American need to combat threats such as: Nazi Germany, Communism and Terrorism. In turn, due to the necessity of running both empire and state in a manner which is self-protective, the executive empowers itself once again.

The president, essentially, is the "emperor" of this Empire. With such immense capabilities to almost unilaterally invade countries (After all, the US has only officially declared war 5 times in its history (congressional approval), but we've been in dozens upon dozens of military missions and occupations), and with the ability to basically go into trade or political agreements with other nations, without forming direct treaties, the American president has an astounding power over US foreign policy. Because the foreign policy of a nation must have a single voice, it is reasonable that the President would be given almost total domination over it. A divided voice is far weaker.

Exactly: What I'm arguing is that most governments, in particular ones which currently have a military agenda abroad, have an extremely powerful executive which has the capacity to violate human rights both domestically and internationally. I agree that a unanimous voice is certainly conducive to a confident and cohesive foreign policy, but the linkage of both a massively powerful executive and the constant change of leadership linked with Democracy does indeed result in more international turbulence and instability.

Over the past century, as this American economic, cultural, political, and military empire has expanded, so has the effects of foreign policy on our nation. Because of the massive entanglement of the American economy with the world, and visa versa, the president, basically the sole leader of American foreign policy, has gained a tremendous level of power over the US economically, culturally, and politically, primarily because of the growing importance of foreign policy.

The biggest issue the US faces is will American democracy be able to survive the conditions of managing an Empire? Few nations have succeeded in maintaining both their empire and their democracy, with the exception of the UK. Rome sure wasn't able to.

It's interesting that you use the example of the UK, which maintained a global empire but never felt the need to call into use the semi-permanent SoE, until the advent of WW1, a time of great crisis. The mere running of the empire did not warrant such measures as the Defence Of the Realm Act (1914), or the Emergency Powers Act (1920). As such, as we see the era of American hegemony recede and a continuation of international chaos (New World Disorder, as put forward by Hirsch in 1997) the executive may feel the need to continuously exert some of its more sinister powers in an attempt to constantly maintain a unilateral concentration of power which is already long gone.

However, domestically, it is very possible for the US to retain its democracy. Because our form of the "Emperor" is elected directly by the people, even if the executive branch does exercise a stronger will upon the populace, it will always be subjected to public opinion. In many ways, its as though we as a nation elect a little Emperor every 4 or 8 years. Once that little emperor's turn is up, we go to the next one.

With globalization taking a stronger and stronger hold, and with America's cold war empire (which was expanded very hastily and messily) starting to solidify and consolidate itself where it matters (think of the Romans during Pax Romana, where the cultures and economic/political systems of its empire began to integrate). We will likely see the role of the American president grow ever stronger. Centralization, at least when it comes to foreign policy, is inevitable.

I don't see the American empire as one which is increasing its grasp. The heyday of US hegemony in my opinion is following the Second World War, when it alone possessed nuclear weapons and had unprecedented control over a crushed (Western) Europe, which has since grown more distinct. I don't think the US can continue to maintain a Neo-Conservative style policy and many have realized that, but try telling this to the executive branch - or whoever commands it - when another crisis (or 'crisis', aka. everyday global life) emerges. What I'm saying is that the executive will continue to focus on wants of security despite economic recession and an inability to maintain control everywhere at once. For now, cases such as Bradley Manning and al-Awlaki are rare exceptions, but we might see the executive continue to act in such a manner with increasing regularity. It's accepted now because it's deemed necessary, and it's deemed necessary by the state because it sees threats everywhere: It deems almost constant curtailment of rights necessary to maintain peaceful lifestyle for its citizens. What's worse: If such an attitude is warranted, or if it isn't?

As an Austrian, I have no opinion on this subject. Austrian economics and liberalism/libertarianism are not the same thing and it is important to keep them distinct from each other. Economics is value free, and should never make judgements on good or bad. However, as a liberal, I don't see much of a difference. I think state power is already largely unrestricted. The state is after all the creator, interpretor and enforcer of all positive law. Only the armed masses and foreign states can restrict a state's power. Despite all the division and rhetoric we see in politics, I think they're but minor disagreements on how to operate the machinery of coercion. It is in the interests of people working in all branches of government to increase state power.

The three overlap in several aspects, and I meant to use all three so that proponents of such ideas would feel concerned. The fact that state power is unrestricted is one of my central points - your response here is relatively ambiguous and doesn't provide a message I can work with. Isn't the fundamental tenet of the Austrian school regarding the state that it should be predictable and self-containing? That's pretty much the entire purpose of Road to Serfdom, to argue against phenomena we are witnessing at an increasing rate. My question to you is: How can you conciliate the 'Etat gendarme'/limited state with the current global situation? Domestic and International Terror are the new Red Scare, and have brought about another increase in arbitrary state power (I hate to keep sounding like a fearmonger) which leads me to wonder whether such an increase is fully necessary, legitimate, and fruitful in the long run. Is the Austrian state compatible with the current security situation?

[Justice and Mercy]

The current security situation does NOT require a "state of exception". Not even close. A state of exception should only be allowed when the proper use of powers becomes impossible (think Civil War).

Further, I wouldn't even encode a "state of exception" into law. It IS breaking the law, and should be seen as such.

[Inkie]

This is a good response. I believe that Western leaders (or at least the US) should consider accepting the end of the Neo-Con era of interventionism once the Afghan fiasco is over. The government will simply have no more legitimate excuse to possess arbitrary powers, and yet I'm positively certain that all these laws authorizing the SoE will remain untouched, despite their irrelevance, and they'll just add to the pile of additional rules encouraging the state to create situations of paranoia (apparently) warranting a permanent SoE...

[dogukan]

This is a good response. I believe that Western leaders (or at least the US) should consider accepting the end of the Neo-Con era of interventionism once the Afghan fiasco is over. The government will simply have no more legitimate excuse to possess arbitrary powers, and yet I'm positively certain that all these laws authorizing the SoE will remain untouched, despite their irrelevance, and they'll just add to the pile of additional rules encouraging the state to create situations of paranoia (apparently) warranting a permanent SoE...

Interventionism in what sense?

[Town Watch]

it's still an indirect vote, indirect election by definition, compared to countries with direct election of president like Finland for example. And it's not actually forbidden or illegal to be an unfaithful elector, even though it has been a rare occurance. Only a few states penalize this practice by nullifying the vote.

[Inkie]

As in, invade a state, garrison it and attempt to re-build it from scratch. I don't see it as a phenomenon intrinsically tied to the state of exception, but I hope that over the next few decades we would see a relaxation in the power of the executive at home, and the bellicosity of government regarding international relations. Living in the UK, I don't believe it's in our interests to take part in huge scale 'state building' enterprises abroad. Even if most of the money is not coming from us, it's still usually a much more costly endeavour than it's worth, and I hope that a possible reduction of executive powers at home would result in a more careful foreign policy. Average Joe doesn't feel threatened today, and nor should he: Why, therefore, does it make sense that we are governed over by a state which gains more arbitrary power by the day? Likewise, in an inversed scenario, a relaxation of Western foreign policy would result in there being no need, even in principle, for the government to be able to hand itself additonal powers, or even possess some of those it already does.

Another, additional point I would like to make - perhaps not linked to the SoE - is that our (Western) foreign policy has essentially gained us little ground over the past few decades (at least proportional to the cost) whereas China follows a relatively unaligned policy which has gained them considerable access to national markets and resources: They don't feel the need to get their fingers stuck in wars with radical groups, or moral questions such as freedom and progress; wherever they go,they're just there for the buck. And why shouldn't we be?

[dogukan]

As in, invade a state, garrison it and attempt to re-build it from scratch. I don't see it as a phenomenon intrinsically tied to the state of exception, but I hope that over the next few decades we would see a relaxation in the power of the executive at home, and the bellicosity of government regarding international relations. Living in the UK, I don't believe it's in our interests to take part in huge scale 'state building' enterprises abroad.
Even if most of the money is not coming from us, it's still usually a much more costly endeavour than it's worth, and I hope that a possible reduction of executive powers at home would result in a more careful foreign policy. Average Joe doesn't feel threatened today, and nor should he: Why, therefore, does it make sense that we are governed over by a state which gains more arbitrary power by the day? Likewise, in an inversed scenario, a relaxation of Western foreign policy would result in there being no need, even in principle, for the government to be able to hand itself additonal powers, or even possess some of those it already does.

I am not sure I understood you correctly. Assuming I did, I think that you are giving too much credit to processes of politics without including the factor of economics, which is in my opinion the driving factor of everything related to a state. I'd like to hear some spesific examples on this though to understand you better.

I can not agree with the assumption that "foreign policy relaxation will bring domestic smoothness" because foreign policy relaxation does not seem possible in a fast globalizing world. The driving factor for globalization is not politics or the governments, it's the economics. Everything follows that. So, long story short, in order to achieve what I understood from your text we need global economic reformation which is something I am for, because I believe globalization; while having it's advantages is unsustainable and more destructive on the long run.

Another, additional point I would like to make - perhaps not linked to the SoE - is that our (Western) foreign policy has essentially gained us little ground over the past few decades (at least proportional to the cost) whereas China follows a relatively unaligned policy which has gained them considerable access to national markets and resources: They don't feel the need to get their fingers stuck in wars with radical groups, or moral questions such as freedom and progress; wherever they go,they're just there for the buck. And why shouldn't we be?

Oh Okay, I completely disagree with the notion that west had been rolling all over the world to help and supress violance. The west(well we would have to define, who from west) IS THERE TO MAKE BUCKS. The difference is, western agenda is more led under private entrepreneurship whereas in China, corporate-state structures are more built-withing each other.
Also, I am extremely critical of western interventions in the rest of the world, especially under the hand of IFIs. You might also want to pay a visit to my thread "development-underdevelopment" which is very much related to this international relations-economics phenomena.

[Inkie]

I am not sure I understood you correctly. Assuming I did, I think that you are giving too much credit to processes of politics without including the factor of economics, which is in my opinion the driving factor of everything related to a state. I'd like to hear some spesific examples on this though to understand you better.

I can not agree with the assumption that "foreign policy relaxation will bring domestic smoothness" because foreign policy relaxation does not seem possible in a fast globalizing world. The driving factor for globalization is not politics or the governments, it's the economics. Everything follows that. So, long story short, in order to achieve what I understood from your text we need global economic reformation which is something I am for, because I believe globalization; while having it's advantages is unsustainable and more destructive on the long run.

Good points, but I'm not talking about 'domestic smoothness', that includes employment, society, demographics (religion, culture, ethnicity), quality of life and services, etc...All of which are affected by the economy. Yet what I am discussing is something almost purely political, and related mainly to global politics. What I'm discussing is the high level and number of special powers states have which are usually passed to respond to a specific crisis, but the issue is that these laws do not expire, they are not destroyed when the crisis is over (although certainly, many crises do not appear to be short term, or even finite). Basically, you have a state which starts to use these laws casually, and although I'm not implying that they will be destructive or harmful to us in the near future, I think it is most certainly something worth noting. Also, there are easy alternatives which the state is unlikely to follow because it won't complain at having additional power in its hands.

Oh Okay, I completely disagree with the notion that west had been rolling all over the world to help and supress violance. The west(well we would have to define, who from west) IS THERE TO MAKE BUCKS. The difference is, western agenda is more led under private entrepreneurship whereas in China, corporate-state structures are more built-withing each other.
Also, I am extremely critical of western interventions in the rest of the world, especially under the hand of IFIs. You might also want to pay a visit to my thread "development-underdevelopment" which is very much related to this international relations-economics phenomena.

But how successful have these 'ventures' been? How long do you think it will take before Iraq or Afghanistan will have been considered 'profitable'? And even then, such a question suggests that they will continue to grow in an economically open manner, which certainly appears unlikely. My point is that the techniques used by Western nations are unprofitable, and can easily be written off as biased or imperialistic by the rest of the world: Western governments apply a moral standard to themselves, a limit within which they have to function, and which usually makes interventions these costly (in lives and money), controversial experiences which seem utterly useless.

Either way, global politics as a whole iaren't really related to my question, but what is related is the fact that economies and states are much more inter-connected and thus inter-dependent nowadays, so political events somewhere are going to have repercussions somewhere else. The preferred example of this is Terrorism - in my opinion a phenomenon which has replaced Communism if only in it's ability to make states and people anxious: The state believes that such threats warrant intervention and assassination abroad, and special powers both domestically and internationally to deal with threats immediately. What I'm saying is that we've gotten used to having a state which believes it should act exceptionally and without restraint, at any given moment and with any given crisis/'crisis'. Is this necessary? I really don't know.

[yupper]

All of these have – according to Agamben - led to a greater centralisation within the state leading to the decline in power of the judicial and legislative to the benefit of the executive, which has failed to relax its grasp on power in the peaceful intervals between crises and maintained its dominance: It can even be argued that, rather than the legislative organising the legal framework within which the executive can operate, the executive is (and has been for decades) pushing for laws by decree (this goes back to President Lincoln emancipating slaves practically alone), which the legislation merely implements, in a truly Weberian bureaucratic style. Likewise, the judicial frequently sees itself sacrificed on the altar of the SoE – where laws can no longer apply to the State because of necessity.

Great thread, great responses. I agree with much of what has been said by Musa and Dogukan, but I have a minor quibble with Musa’s summary of Agamben's ‘State of Exception’ that, I feel, is actually fairly central to the ‘what now?’ part of the conversation. Apologies in advance if I come across as a bit pompous and for my inadequate reading of Agamben for those who might teach his work as their bread and butter.

Agamben's 'State of Exception' is not synonymous with 'State of Emergency.' The latter would characterize the increasing concentration of power in the executive branch of a liberal state in the name of national security that compromises civil liberties and rights, whereas the ‘state of exception’ is something slightly different.

Modern liberal politics conceives of liberties and rights as belonging to a domain free from sovereign political authority (what is conventionally--and narrowly--referred to by libertarians as areas outside of ‘government intervention’ that needs to be expanded through a ‘limited government’), Agamben’s ‘state of exception’ is a direct critique of that dualism (which he does in the book by way of engaging Hannah Arendt). Keep in mind that his concept of the ‘State of Exception’ first emerged not in a book of the same name but as part of his previous book ‘Homo Sacer’ where he elaborates on the work of, among many people, Foucault and an idea that is arguably his life work—biopolitics.

For Agamben, the ‘state of exception’ is the limit condition in which forms of excluded life dwell and are produced—what he refers to as ‘bare life’ in ‘Homo Sacer.’ Borrowing from Foucault, Agamben reverses mainstream liberal accounts of the emergence of modern nation-state articulated through various 'social contract' theories (Hobbes, Locke, etc.) where people surrender their freedom and assume obligations to the leviathan in exchange for protection and security to form the basis of sovereign power—a contract that, gun-rights advocates often assert, must be defended at all costs. Instead, he argues that sovereign power does not affirm its power over life by asserting the sovereign’s absolute authority, but rather by withdrawing its protection, abandoning certain subjects into a realm of violence and lawlessness.

Thus, the ‘state of exception’ can not simply be characterized as oppressive abuse of what would otherwise be considered a balanced relationship between liberty and security in a liberal state, because according to him liberties and rights are not opposed to sovereign exceptionalism. Rather, they are already included in the domain of sovereign power. You have no liberty or rights without the state to guarantee them, no matter how many international treaties or bills are signed in the halls of international organizations like the UN. The ‘state of exception’, Agamben argues, is a permanent fixture of modern state governance (as he states, “exceptionalism is the very structure of [modern state] sovereignty itself”).

The case study he deploys to illustrate his argument is the ‘logic of the (Nazi concentration) camp’, where the state of exception operated as a norm. A more contemporary example people use when (re)deploying his ‘state of exception’ stuff to illustrate how certain categories and classes of people are permanently placed outside the protection of the law and the security provided by the nation-state in the very name of (national) security is the Guantanamo Bay detention camp (a place that Obama had promised to shut down pre-elect but could not). In fact, (nation-state) sovereignty is what makes possible the legally ambiguous existence of a place like Guantanamo Bay, that is a ‘zone of indistinction’ formally under no state’s sovereign jurisdiction and thus a place where the rule of law can be suspended. Moreover, Guantanamo Bay is not the only ‘camp’, far from it. The 'camp' is increasingly the very spaces we live and inhabit.

Returning to the discussion in this thread, Agamben’s point would be that you can’t reverse a ‘State of Exception’ unless sovereignty is no more, which is of course not happening any time soon (and if anything, is becoming increasingly intensified in the name of ‘security’, as Musa says).

[Inkie]

Hmm, a very comprehensive response which indeed points out some of the flaws of my OP and subsequent discussion.

Great thread, great responses. I agree with much of what has been said by Musa and Dogukan, but I have a minor quibble with Musa’s summary of Agamben's ‘State of Exception’ that, I feel, is actually fairly central to the ‘what now?’ part of the conversation. Apologies in advance if I come across as a bit pompous and for my inadequate reading of Agamben for those who might teach his work as their bread and butter.

Agamben's 'State of Exception' is not synonymous with 'State of Emergency.' The latter would characterize the increasing concentration of power in the executive branch of a liberal state in the name of national security that compromises civil liberties and rights, whereas the ‘state of exception’ is something slightly different.

Indeed, in my (flawed) definition, I meant to identify the state of exception as the natural result of steadily increased executive, emergency powers.

Modern liberal politics conceives of liberties and rights as belonging to a domain free from sovereign political authority (what is conventionally--and narrowly--referred to by libertarians as areas outside of ‘government intervention’ that needs to be expanded through a ‘limited government’), Agamben’s ‘state of exception’ is a direct critique of that dualism (which he does in the book by way of engaging Hannah Arendt). Keep in mind that his concept of the ‘State of Exception’ first emerged not in a book of the same name but as part of his previous book ‘Homo Sacer’ where he elaborates on the work of, among many people, Foucault and an idea that is arguably his life work—biopolitics.

For Agamben, the ‘state of exception’ is the limit condition in which forms of excluded life dwell and are produced—what he refers to as ‘bare life’ in ‘Homo Sacer.’ Borrowing from Foucault, Agamben reverses mainstream liberal accounts of the emergence of modern nation-state articulated through various 'social contract' theories (Hobbes, Locke, etc.) where people surrender their freedom and assume obligations to the leviathan in exchange for protection and security to form the basis of sovereign power—a contract that, gun-rights advocates often assert, must be defended at all costs. Instead, he argues that sovereign power does not affirm its power over life by asserting the sovereign’s absolute authority, but rather by withdrawing its protection, abandoning certain subjects into a realm of violence and lawlessness.

Thus, the ‘state of exception’ can not simply be characterized as oppressive abuse of what would otherwise be considered a balanced relationship between liberty and security in a liberal state, because according to him liberties and rights are not opposed to sovereign exceptionalism. Rather, they are already included in the domain of sovereign power. You have no liberty or rights without the state to guarantee them, no matter how many international treaties or bills are signed in the halls of international organizations like the UN. The ‘state of exception’, Agamben argues, is a permanent fixture of modern state governance (as he states, “exceptionalism is the very structure of [modern state] sovereignty itself”).

The case study he deploys to illustrate his argument is the ‘logic of the (Nazi concentration) camp’, where the state of exception operated as a norm. A more contemporary example people use when (re)deploying his ‘state of exception’ stuff to illustrate how certain categories and classes of people are permanently placed outside the protection of the law and the security provided by the nation-state in the very name of (national) security is the Guantanamo Bay detention camp (a place that Obama had promised to shut down pre-elect but could not). In fact, (nation-state) sovereignty is what makes possible the legally ambiguous existence of a place like Guantanamo Bay, that is a ‘zone of indistinction’ formally under no state’s sovereign jurisdiction and thus a place where the rule of law can be suspended. Moreover, Guantanamo Bay is not the only ‘camp’, far from it. The 'camp' is increasingly the very spaces we live and inhabit.

Exactly, the Guantanamo question is one of the fundamental modern case studies of the SoE: I should have focused explicitly on it in my OP, seeing as yes, this is a space where Foucault's 'bios' can be arbitrarily reduced to the 'zoos', or even become unclassifiable seeing as detainees have no status. The questions is, are such abuses necessary to provide for the protection of citizens? How can such treatment truly protect us in the long run? I focused on libertarianism or liberal core values because I was curious as to what such 'anti-state' and individualist theories would provide in a situation where the safety of individuals can be threatened by international terrorism.

As for Guantanamo itself, I think the status quo will remain here so long as the victims are brown muslims who are supposedly terrorists who are out to get us. When 'ordinary citizens' (Manning) start to be abused, opposition is more noticeable. I started this discussion without having exhaustively read Agamben's work, yet what intrigued me is how, according to di Caprio's (excellent) Edgar, in my questioning of such spaces of unrestricted state power, I'm putting into jeopardy my own security - I would have the torture stopped, only to find myself supporting it once my country found itself besieged or attacked, which would inevitably happen if the state were to withdraw its exceptional powers.

I'll just put this in for added effect:

http://video.msnbc.msn.com/nbc-news/41020748#41020748

And yet, is such an attitude necessary for the US, much less for other, smaller states? If we look at Agamben's SoE in the 'contractual' manner, the loosening of state authority and subsequent anarchy would only uncover the essentially symbiotic relationship between state and society, rather than simply demonstrate the necessity of state authority. Would it be a suicidal move for the US to halt its interventionism, to close Guantanamo and to alter its foreign policy, to weaken its state powers and military? The question sounds naïve and simplistic, sure, but I'm looking at a case where international politics will perhaps inevitably become increasingly multi-lateral in the decades ahead, and where perhaps it is in the best interest of the US to accept this and modify its strategy. This links to my next point.

Returning to the discussion in this thread, Agamben’s point would be that you can’t reverse a ‘State of Exception’ unless sovereignty is no more, which is of course not happening any time soon (and if anything, is becoming increasingly intensified in the name of ‘security’, as Musa says).

Personally, I have chosen to link this rise of state power/sovereignty with the course of globalisation and attempts by various states at grasping the slippery soap of hegemony. As such, I wonder that, if the foreign policy of the US were to take a change, perhaps following the Chinese model of unaligned, financially-based 'soft power', we would perhaps witness a reversal of the trend of increasing state sovereignty, seeing as other Western states may follow suit. However, whether such a situation would last due to terrorists (or others) taking advantage of such a trend, is open to questioning, and therein lies the reason for the continuing increase in state power.