Austrian Resolve

One thing that I always found remarkable me was how the Austrians, after being beaten, were always ready to come back and fight the French again. They continued to go to war against France and lose time and again. Not just new wars but for example during the 1809 war, after their initial setbacks and losing Vienna, they were still able to fallback and later put up a good fight against Napoleon at Aspern-Essling and Wagram. Does anyone have any explanation to this resolve? Could the Austrian command structure and military system, so often criticized, have enabled this?
I know that while falling back along the Danube before Aspern-Essling Charles reverted to the old command system with exact and detailed orders for everything which actually seemed to restore morale.

This is more an assumption that it was mostly down to Archduke
Charles & the discipline of the troops, Charles was normally over
cautious & would not take advantage of situations which could
lead to a decisive defeat of the enemy but risk a counter attack
to disarray his own forces, he rarely ever pursued & attacks during
battles were not kept up, they'd normally make a tactical withdrawal
once the enemy came with a counterattack, battles were more often
withdrawn from tactically in firm order with the more disciplined troops as
rear guards leading an example for those fleeing to hold steady & there
being numerous occasions where Charles & others would rally squandering
troops. Basically during Charles' time as the Field Marshall battles however
lost would normally not suffer too many casualties, at least near drawing
to the French, apparently the French may have suffered more killed & wounded
at Wagram then the Austrians in fact.

I believe it was in 1908 that they conscripted the Landwehr which gave Austria
the largest army in Western Europe, these were used as well to buff up infantry
battalions which had suffered casualties & were more often used in reserve, this
meant that the losses in the years before were not as damaging for the war effort.
The Austrian troops were verdantly in favour of Monarch & restoring the Empire's
lost lands & were commended for marching masterfully in mass with marching bands
& stubborn banner carriers even in the face of mass artillery, really all in all it was
down to the likes of leaders such as Archduke Charles & the individual troops, Charles'
army reforms improved the system but did not fix it though that was not as much
a problem anymore, really looking at battles under the Archduke they were evenly
matched to the French but the over-cautioness & the tendness to not hold onto
gains & act upon them meant that it normally officially ended up in a French victory.

I saw again this is just an assumption, a quite long winded assumption :L

A number of historians including Gunther Rothenburg have argued along similar lines. The followinge extract is from pages 242 & 243 in "Napoleon's Greatest Adversary" by Rothenburg:

"The main purpose of any armed force is to serve the political ends of the state, and that the Habsburg Army fulfilled this. Austria had entered the war against the French Revolution not to achieve military glory but to defend and restore the dynastic order of the eighteenth century. On this objective there was agreement between the generals and the politicians. Even the conflict between the Archduke Charles and Emperor Francis was more one of personalities and methods than of ultimate aims. At the same time, the political and military leadership realised that radical innovation in the military sphere were linked to changes in government and society that neither of the parties desired. Therefore, albeit with some administrative, strategic and tactical improvements, they retained a military establishment resembling that of the pre-revolutionary period. Basically the Habsburg army remained a dynastic force, relying on its corporate spirit and not enthusiasm or on engaging popular emotions. Its remarkable recuperative powers indicated that this spirit was to be reckoned with.

In purely military terms, it is clear that neither the Austrian commanders nor the troops ever equalled the French at their best. For all his achievements, Charles never could match Napoleon of whom he stood in awe and the other generals, Radetzky included, always preferred not to confront him directly. Staff work, administration, and movement control also remained inferior to that of the French, though by 1813 the gap was closing fast. Throughout the wars, the army suffered from constant, and often petty, feuding within the higher echelons, but this also was true in France, Prussia, and Russia. The failure of a major purge of senior officers, prevented by political and social circumstances, undoubtedly had ill effects. Finally, Austrian strategy remained tied to the eighteenth-century concepts of strategic positions and did not look to the destruction of the enemy forces as its major objective. In tactics too, the reluctance to place emphasis on open order fighting proved a major handicap to the very end.

As for the Austrian troops, they fought much better than could be expected. Enduring great hardships and losses, they displayed fortitude and professionalism. Undoubtedly their discipline was of the highest order, and despite their polygot character, the reliability of the regulars never was in doubt. The Austrian Army Cross, the first decoration distributed to all ranks, summed up their achievement. On the front the medal bore the inscription 'Libertate Europae asserta 1813-1814', while on the reverese side it read 'Grati princeps et patria'. ....."

Radetzky wrote that every defeat was followed by a great outcry for army reform but at the sametime there always was the desire not to spend the necessary funds! As a result the army was never strong enough or adequately equipped. After every battle won by the troops' valour, the means to exploit the success was lacking. While after every defeat the army had to look for salvation in retreat and a hasty armistice. Radetzky believed that the basic cause for this was that the army never had been popular among the masses, while the higher classes also had little interest in a strong army.

In summary the army & state were in effect one which gave them perhaps greater resilience! The Habsburg Empire was a collection of different peoples and different systems of government - there was not a single universal form of government. It is a wonder that the Empire survived as long as it did...

So, who was Napoleon's greatest adversary?
Wellington (thought it is a bit overrated as his "rival" since they only fought once, Wellington's rival seems to be Soult or Ney)
Blucher
Kutuzov
Archduke Charles (Ever since 1797 they have fought)

I've heard it mentioned that Archduke Charles could be best considered
such but I doubt it, to be honest the better generals of every faction
Napoleon didn't often face, not even Charles by much, it's hard to make
a single choice of such. Also I wouldn't consider Blucher a possible adversary,
he's mostly just known for Waterloo & the battles leading up to it, before
then he was not a field marshal & though was very brave on par with Ney,
did not always appear tactical from what I've so far seen & his successes
were more out of luck, I may be blissfully wrong about that though.

Originally Posted by money

So, who was Napoleon's greatest adversary?
Wellington (thought it is a bit overrated as his "rival" since they only fought once, Wellington's rival seems to be Soult or Ney)
Blucher
Kutuzov
Archduke Charles (Ever since 1797 they have fought)

The full title of the book is "Napoleon's Great Adversary - Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1814" (apologies for elevating Great to Greatest as failed to check the exact title....)

You forgot one, a Russian: Зима

Originally Posted by Steph

You forgot one, a Russian: Зима

Disease (dysentery etc) was the biggest contributor to Napoleon's defeat in Russia as it devestated his army; "General Winter" finished off his army.