Sir Alfred Ayer's logical positivism impressed me, and has continued to do so, since I studied Emotivism a couple of months ago. Unfortunately we didn't cover his work in much detail, and the Vienna circle were only briefly mentioned. Essentially the position holds that philosophy should aspire to the same sort of rigor as science and that philosophy should provide strict criteria for judging sentences true, false and meaningless by dividing statements into those which are analytic (true a priori) and those which are synthetic (verified by sensory experience).
In many ways this was a continuation of David Hume's scribblings, and with some research I learnt that Kant opposed Hume and defended the idea of synthetic a priori propositions. The more I read, the more I began to warm to it
To be fair, there are problems with the theory, but those are also experienced by science. For instance how do you prove a universal and positive statement such as "All x are y"? Ayer however replied that: And therefore can only be subject to "weak verification." Others however have claimed that general propositions were indeed nonsense.
So why do I like it then? Logical positivism has a "criterion of meaning", which says that a statement is meaningful
if and only if it is empirically verifiable. One intended consequence of the verification criterion is that all non-empirical forms of discourse, including ethics and aesthetics, are not "literally" or "cognitively" meaningful, and so belong to "metaphysics". Essentially they aren't worth bothering about.