American Civil War vs Napoleonic Wars

Some time ago i have run across this article:

http://johnsmilitaryhistory.com/cwarmy.html

What were Napoleonic tactics, and how do they differ from Civil War tactics?

If you understand how Napoleon fought, you will see that Civil War tactics were different in a number of important ways. These differences perhaps explain the indecisive nature of Civil War combat.

In the gunpowder age, battle was rarely decisive; Napoleonic combat, the ultimate development of linear tactics, is the exception. To understand Napoleonic tactics, you first have to understand how and why they developed. To do that, you have to go back one hundred years before even Napoleon's time to the invention of the socket bayonet. Before then, an infantry battalion was an unwieldy and vulnerable combination of musketeers and pikemen, with the pikemen protecting the musketeers from enemy pikemen and cavalry. When the socket bayonet replaced the plug bayonet, musketeers shed themselves of pikemen because they could now protect themselves and still fire their muskets. Musketeers stretched themselves thinner, first into six ranks, then four, then three, and finally just two. It was still an awkward system in some ways, with difficulty deploying an army from the march into line of battle. In Marlborough's day, in the early 1700s, it took most of the day to prepare for battle, and it was impossible to surprise an enemy on the march. When battle began, the whole of the infantry would typically attack together simultaneously in two lines. The logical place for cavalry was still on the flanks. In battle, the cavalry would defeat the opposing enemy horsemen then attack the rear of the enemy infantry just like in the 1600s - but also much like during the Civil War, at least in theory. By Napoleon's time, however, this would change - thanks to advances in infantry tactics.
With the use of thinner battle lines - two or three ranks - a quicker system was developed to deploy from marching column into line of battle. Battle was becoming more practical, no longer a rare and consensual event. Frederick the Great perfected this system, marching and deploying on the enemy's flank for a devastating attack. If you have read about Frederick at Leuthen, you will see the similarities with Jackson's attack on the XI Corps at Chancellorsville, Early's attack at Cedar Creek, and Warren's attack at Five Forks. And if you have heard of Rossbach, then you might be skeptical of Longstreet's hoped-for turning movement at Gettysburg. Indeed, in many ways the Civil War looks more like the Seven Years War than it does the Napoleonic Wars.




Let's take a look at change in the 18th century and the development of Napoleonic tactics, one feature at a time.


Artillery

There was plenty of room to improve upon mid-18th century tactics, and the defeated and humiliated French army lead the way with reform. The Austrians had already made great strides in reducing the weight of their guns, with their new pieces weighing only half as much as their predecessors. The French adopted these concepts with the Gribeauval system. Frederick had already complaining in the Seven Years' War that the new Austrian artillery was killing off his highly trained infantry, who were re-known for their discipline and quick rate of fire. The new lighter field artillery had the potential to revolutionize warfare. There was no choice for a monarch but to enter into an artillery arms race - or else have his army slaughtered. Masses of the new mobile guns could be brought to bear against the enemy, blowing holes in his line and demoralizing his men.

Skirmishers

Frederick was also whining that Austrian light infantrymen sent ahead of their main line were picking off officers and men while taking cover behind trees and terrain features. With an army made in many cases of forcibly recruited Euro-trash held in bondage only by the threat of severe punishment, Frederick couldn't trust his men to go forward and skirmish. With the prospect of freedom, they might run away and never be seen again. Frederick resisted this change, at least for a while. Other armies developed highly trained and motivated special units of light infantry too. Although skirmishers of the French Revolutionary Wars and Napoleonic times are often stereotyped as ill-trained levies good for nothing more than swarming in dense masses in front of the enemy line, modern historians dispute this. Whenever possible, skirmishers of the era were highly motivated, well trained, and good shots. Their calm, slow, well-aimed fire, combined with artillery, gradually wore down the enemy and un-nerved the survivors before the main attack.

Columns

A misunderstanding of early English-speaking historians has distorted our understanding of a major aspect of Napoleonic warfare - the use of columns. Focusing on the Peninsula War and relying almost exclusively on British sources, some historians came to the misguided conclusion that the French primarily used battalions of infantry for shock action in columns of attack. As early as the mid 1700s the French were keeping their second line in column formation to allow for a flexible response to problems or opportunities on the first line. During the 1777 Battle of Brandywine, the British army, generally thought of as conservative, advanced on the rebels in maneuver columns then deployed into line. By Napoleonic times French infantry, preceded by skirmishers, advanced toward the enemy in battalion-sized columns for more flexibility and maneuverability on the battlefield, allowing them to adjust to enemy deployments, better seize opportunities, or to attempt to flank the enemy line. Before contact with the enemy, however, the columns would deploy into line for the firefight. A bayonet charge in column formation was only done after gaining firepower superiority when the enemy troops looked shaky and on the verge of breaking. Against most armies, this method worked very well. The infantry's increased flexibility helped in other ways. The infantry columns also allowed much closer cooperation with the artillery, which was better able to mass against a portion of the enemy line or even move forward with the infantry. More importantly, closer co-operation with the cavalry was also possible. Unlike in the 18th century, cavalry could advance right along with the infantry.

Cavalry

While 18th century cavalry was placed exclusively on the flanks, the new infantry columns allowed the mounted arm to advance in columns directly in support of the infantry, and even change places with them to lead the attack. To protect themselves. enemy infantry would form squares, but in so doing they deprived themselves of much of their firepower and their ability to maneuver. If artillery could be brought forward, the enemy squares would be blasted out of existence. Either way, a massive hole was formed in the enemy line, and decisive victory was assured.

In terms of grand tactics, Napoleon would typically threaten the enemy's flank, forcing him to commit his reserve. He always kept a large reserve available, a vitally important part of his system, to either exploit success of stave off defeat. Most often, with the enemy reserve committed, Napoleon would send his own reserve into the weak point in the enemy line and secure a decisive victory. Co-operation among all three combat arms was key to Napoleon's system, and the reserve decided the battle. Does this sound like Civil War tactics to you? No! Civil War armies kept few reserves, and Civil War combat featured little in the way of combined arms cooperation. Civil War tactics were NOT Napoleonic.


Map of the Battle of Waterloo, 1815



Note that Napoleon's army (in blue) has cavalry not only on the flanks but also behind the infantry. The same is true for Wellington's army. Also note that Napoleon has a large reserve composed of Lobau's corps and the Imperial Guard. This deployment is very unlike that of a Civil War army.



Map of Bussaco, 1810 - Napoleonic Tactics Gone Bad



In rough terrain French artillery was ineffective, and cavalry couldn't cooperate with infantry. Here at Bussaco, large numbers of British skirmishers hid the infantry line and allowed a surprise volley followed by a decisive bayonet charge on the un-deployed French columns.


The new French tactics in Spain and Portugal didn't work out so well, and their old school British opponents may have never understood their intent. Rough terrain complicated the system considerably. It was difficult to mass artillery batteries, and it was difficult for cavalry to support the infantry. Wellington sometimes sent as much as one third of his men forward as skirmishers, and the French could never gain superiority over them. Since Wellington kept his infantry hidden behind the reverse slope, the French maneuver columns blundered upon the British line and were surprised. Struggling to deploy into line and disorganized and shocked by the surprise encounter, the French received one or two close range volleys from their British opponents who then let out a cheer and charged. The British system worked consistently, except at Albeura - and at Waterloo, where the open terrain suited Napoleon's methods. Terrain explains much of the British success against the French. In part, terrain also explains why combined arms tactics were so rare during the Civil War, but we'll discuss that later. Perhaps because of the British success, and because of the bloody nature of Napoleon's later battles, post-Napoleonic military theorists became somewhat reactionary and supported tactics which looked backward to the 18th century.



Civil War Tactics Look Like a Poor Man's 18th Century

The first American army, the Continental Army, was based on its British opponent during the Revolution; even then, the British were known for a brief musketry exchange followed by a charge. Civil War tactics don't resemble this, or British Peninsula tactics, or Napoleonic tactics. But Civil War tactics do resemble the 18th century in that infantry was typically formed in two lines flanked by cavalry. Civil War battles sometimes even featured a Frederican oblique order attack.

Although Gettysburg featured a Napoleonic concentration of artillery, genuine Napoleonic tactics for example, would have involved cavalry supporting Pickett's Charge - and Union cavalry charging in pursuit - in short, combat with the potential for decisiveness. The technology of rifled muskets didn't make this sort of thing impossible. Koniggratz in 1866 shows this as do some later Civil War battles. Because combined arms attacks weren't regularly attempted, battle was predictably indecisive.

Unlike Napoleonic and eighteenth century battle, all too often, Civil War combat degraded into a confused infantry firefight with officers gradually losing control, with any hope for maneuver lost. After the onset of confusion, shock action with the bayonet was not practical. Perhaps due to lack of training and discipline - an inevitability to some degree with a democratic government - it was always difficult to get men to close with the enemy. Once an infantry advance stopped in order to fire, it could rarely be made to continue forward. Prussian observer Justus Scheibert believed that a deficiency in lower level officers, who showed "ignorance of military things", explained why the brigade became the tactical unit of the war, "hence stiffness in the lines and clumsiness in management and direction of troops". Poor performance on the battlefield was the result, and "the loss of an upper-level commander would cripple (the) advance". He described an attacking infantry division as "like ghosts of days and ways of Frederick the Great.", in essence a poor man's version of mid 18th century methods. (Scheibert 49) He described a typical attack;

"The nearer to the enemy, the more faulty the lines and the more ragged the first (line) until it crumbled and mixed with the skirmishers. Forward went this muddle leading the wavy rest. Finally the mass obtruded upon the point of attack. In a sustained, stubborn clash, even the third would join the melee. Meanwhile the usually weak reserve tried to be useful on the flanks, or stiffened places that faltered, or plugged holes. In sum it had been a division neatly drawn up. Now its units, anything but neat, vaguely coherent, resembled a swarm of skirmishers." (Scheibert 41)

In contrast, Scheibert writes:

"Prussian tactics freed (officers) to use their own minds... Liberated battalion and even company commanders could be the heads of tactical units, their own, and make them fight as right-thinking officers saw fit and as well-trained troops best could. The flexible line at the forward edge resembles a chain , then with detachable links under independent guidance. At crisis they can dismember into smaller and even the smallest units without disfunction... Our Prussian tactics thus gave our line officers energy, elasticity, and speed - to the entire army's benefit... Furthermore, diligent peacetime training provided our troops an abundance of formations, something to fit any circumstance... Lee, the first American to acknowledge this superiority, replied in the thick of Chancellorsville when I spoke with amazement at the bravery of Jackson's corps: 'Just give me Prussian formations and Prussian discipline along with it - you'd see things turn out differently here!" (Scheibert 49)

An extreme example of how potentially decisive combat degraded into chaos is Brawner Farm. Jackson had the opportunity to attack and crush an isolated and much smaller Union division with his corps, but an indecisive firefight resulted, and because of Jackson's peculiarities, his subordinates feared to take the initiative and stood idly by while the opportunity to destroy a Union division was lost.


Could Civil War battles have been decisive?

Maybe. Skirmishers weren't consistently well used. In the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars, skirmishers could all but decide a battle, but we don't see that in the Civil War. The Confederate army improved in this respect through the war, forming elite sharpshooter battalions in each brigade, but the Union army allowed its light infantry to decline over time. Why couldn't the Union army have formed units similar to the Confederate brigades' sharpshooter battalions and one-upped them by giving their skirmishers repeating rifles to instead of to the cavalry? Union skirmishers with repeaters firing rapidly from a prone position could have easily dominated Southern light infantrymen - and possibly even repulse full scale attacks. Could the cavalry have advanced with and supported infantry like in Napoleon's time? If you accept the argument that rifled muskets were little better than smoothbores, then maybe they could. Although admittedly an occurrence of the smoothbore era, Jeb Stuart successfully attacked Union infantry at 1st Manassas. Later examples were not as successful. At Gaines Mill and at Cedar Mountain Union cavalry unsuccessfully attacked infantry, but these failures should come as no surprise since these were desperate attacks against unbroken advancing infantry.

Perhaps the fences and broken terrain with numerous woodlots made cavalry attacks on infantry impractical. At Chancellorsville, for example, a Union cavalry regiment attacked down a narrow road, unable to change direction. Failure was the predictable result. Lack of training and experience in the cavalry arm may also have made it impractical. Horses were expensive, and it was difficult to find forage for them in the sparsely populated country. European cavalry was the product of years of training, a horse alone requiring three years to train. Further, Union cavalry were armed with repeating rifles, and in many cases served as mounted infantry, which meant that they largely abandoned the full potential of shock attack, their traditional battlefield role. The Union cavalry mounted shock attacks against infantry and conducted after-battle pursuit only late in the war - at Third Winchester and Cedar Creek for example. We may never know what could have been.

An Artillery Revolution?

We have seen that the effectiveness of rifled muskets wasn't as great as is often portrayed. So far, we haven't said much about Civil War artillery. The supposed threat that rifled muskets posed to artillerymen is largely an illusion. Artillery units suffered lower casualty rates than the infantry, in line with experience in previous wars. New rifled artillery pieces were accurate at long range, making columns vulnerable. At ranges less than 1,000 yards, brass Napoleon guns were more useful. (Fratt 50) Civil War brass guns were nowhere near as effective as the artillery of the 1866 and 1870 wars in Europe. The guns do look much like their Napoleonic predecessors, but appearances can be deceiving. The 12 pounder Napoleon guns were actually a great improvement over their predecessors.



Could the increased effectiveness of Civil War era artillery help explain the tactical changes since Napoleon's time? Perhaps advances in artillery explain why it was rare for infantry to advance in maneuver columns, and almost never with cavalry support. Prussian observer Justus Scheibert says as much; "Americans tried the column for offense and gave it up because artillery poured murder on their columns." (Scheibert 41) The only alternative, advancing over long distances in line, was cumbersome and likely to result in confusion. Better discipline and better coordination between units was required to successfully attack in line. At Waterloo the contending armies started the battle 700 yards from each other. Due to improved artillery technology, at Gettysburg the armies were separated by a distance roughly twice that, around 1,400 yards. (Fratt 53-4)

Just as in Napoleon's time, brass smoothbore pieces dominated the battlefield. Let's take a look at what had changed. Civil War armies preferred the 12 pounder Napoleon gun, named after Napoleon III, and used them almost exclusively for their smoothbore needs. In contrast, Napoleon's Grand Battery at Waterloo - created for long-range bombardment - was made up of 24 of the 12-pounders and 48 6-pounders. So only around one-third of the Emperor's Grand Battery was made of Civil War sized weapons. (Barbero 102) Overall for the battle, just 80 of Napoleon's 534 pieces were 12 pounders, just 15% of the total. (Fratt 44) As low as this percentage may seem, Wellington's Peninsular veterans were shocked at even this proportion of 12-pounders. The universal Civil War use of long range 12-pounders had significant benefits. More guns along the battle line could be concentrated against the enemy in both attack and defense. At Gettysburg, guns from along most of the Union line were able to concentrate against Pickett's Charge. In Napoleon's time, this sort of thing just wasn't practical. For short range defense against infantry attack, the 12 pounder was a great advancement from the past because a canister round from a 12 pounder not only contained more projectiles, those projectiles could be shot much further. This made the weapon much deadlier than its smaller rivals. (Eighteenth century tests showed that canister projectiles spread 32 feet per 100 yards of range.) (Hughes 35)


Another beneficial advance of the 12-pounder Napoleon was far and away the most important and dramatic. Before and during the Napoleonic Wars, guns, which are direct fire weapons, were limited to firing round shot or canister. Howitzers, for indirect fire at a higher trajectory, fired a shell, a hollow projectile filled with explosive detonated by a fuse which was set alight during firing. Around 1800, Henry Shrapnel invented the round that bears his name, a shell filled with powder and small round balls, a much more lethal round than the simple shell that it made obsolete. When it was invented, the shrapnel round could only be fired by howitzers, a small fraction of the artillery pieces in use. With advances in metal technology, however, and with a reduction in the powder charge from 1/3 to 1/4 of the weight of the projectile, the shrapnel round could be fired from a standard piece styled a "gun-howitzer", the famed Napoleon gun-howitzer. Seventy eight bullets were contained in a single 12 pounder shrapnel round. (Coggins 67) No longer was the artilleryman limited to roundshot at long range. Now he could deliver killing power said to approach that of canister at nearly a mile's range. In British peacetime experiments, around 10% of the bullets in a shrapnel round hit a target. (Hughes 38) Both enemy infantry and cavalry were made more vulnerable. Brent Nosworthy notes that during the 1859 Italian War, artillery disrupted a cavalry unit from over a mile away, preventing it from forming and attacking. Confirming that this thinking was prevalent during the Civil War, in 1865, Francis Lippitt wrote in "A Treatise on the Tactical Use of the Three Arms, Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry",

Since the introduction of the new rifled arms, exposing cavalry
masses to a deadly fire at far greater distances than ever before known,
a fire often reaching to the reserves, it seemed doubtful whether the
maneuvering and charging in heavy compact masses, which formerly
rendered cavalry of the line so formidable, would any longer be practical.

So more than any other cause, advances in artillery technology made the combined use of cavalry and infantry for decisive combat a difficult proposition.

Despite all this, many historians still believe that artillery wasn't important during the war. Casualties caused by artillery fire were negligible - or so they say. A frequently cited example is the Wilderness, where artillery was said to account for only about 6% of all casualties. Paddy Griffith points out that many casualties attributed to small arms fire may in fact have been caused by artillery, specifically by the small round balls in Shrapnel rounds. Griffith suggests that the percentage of casualties caused by artillery in this battle were probably in proportion to the percentage of artillerymen in the armies. Because of the terrain, this battle, and this result, represent an extreme case. Lee knew that he was deficient in artillery, and he fought in the Wilderness in order to negate the Union advantage. The relative ineffectiveness of artillery in this battle is clearly an aberration. Chancellorsville was also fought in the Wilderness. In this battle, perhaps only the Confederate guns at Hazel Grove allowed Lee to capture Fairview Heights and defeat the Union army. Look at Spotsylvania a year later, also fought in the Wilderness. The massive Union attack on the Mule Shoe broke through because Lee had withdrawn his artillery the night before. Several days later, a Union attack on the base of the salient failed quickly and decisively due to Confederate artillery fire. And we must remember that most ground was NOT as unfavorable as the Wilderness. Take a look at Malvern Hill, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg and the importance of artillery is obvious. Clearly artillery was important or army commanders wouldn't have eagerly added to their stocks of guns up until the last year of the war. In fact, Paddy Griffith suggests that in some battles, artillery accounted for 20 to 50% of casualties. Those who over-estimate the advantages of the rifled musket say that it threatened to make the artilleryman obsolete, but perhaps the opposite was more true. Although many historians do not stress this point, or even acknowledge it, advances in the artillery arm had made Napoleonic combined arms tactics difficult to impossible.


C-Cubed and Staffs



Civil War generals, especially Lee, are often criticized for creating inadequate staffs, and these criticisms are entirely justified. An authority on Napoleonic warfare, Scott Bowden in "Last Chance for Victory" says that Napoleon had more staff officers in a division than Lee did in his entire army at Gettysburg. Unable to coordinate the army effectively, on July 2nd Lee launched an en echelon attack, a favorite technique of Frederick the Great, largely because it was impossible to get all of his divisions to attack simultaneously. When division commander Gen. Pender was hit, the attack broke down, perhaps saving the Union army. McClellan's attacks at Antietam are another example of poor coordination. Possibly planned as an en echelon attack for similar reasons, the Union army was instead committed piecemeal, one corps at a time, and each one was defeated in turn. Despite the incompetence of the Union command, Lee's army was near the breaking point, and had McClellan committed the reserve, a Napoleon-like act that you might expect from someone known as the "Young Napoleon", the Confederate army would surely have been destroyed. Unlike the Napoleonic Wars, and more like the 18th century, reserves were a rarity in the Civil War, and a commander had few options once a battle "developed". There is no doubt that deficiencies in staff along with problems with command, control, and communication greatly hindered Civil War generals. These problems remained throughout the war without serious improvement. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. America inherited Britain's distrust of a standing army, and America had never waged a large war of European proportion. The British army, always smaller than its Continental rivals, lagged in the development of staff, and it was their system that was the obvious model for the revolting American colonists. In the mid-1800s, despite the translation of French drill manuals, there was little or no attention given to foreign techniques for the management of large armies. Why should there have been? Only the Mexican army was a threat, and they had been easily thrashed! Edward Hagerman, in "The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare" suggests that ideology explains the stunted staff development. A standing army was distrusted in the English-speaking world, and a general staff was seen as another step toward a militaristic and anti-democratic state.

So there was no staff tradition in the army, and when civil war broke out, no one had the insight or knowledge to see a better way - or perhaps more importantly, the desire to challenge the status quo. Faulty staff work ruined good plans with the potential for decisive results at Seven Pines and the Seven Days, for example. Lee, the greatest commander that the war produced, despite increasing the number of couriers to transmit orders, sought to economize on his staff. So for the dubious benefit of having a few more officers in the ranks, perhaps thousands of men died unnecessarily. Less than two months later, as an another example, at 2nd Manassas Jackson and Longstreet did not co-ordinate their attacks, and a precious opportunity to destroy a Union army was lost.

Civil War combat methods were a recipe for futility - a confused firefight, no shock action, no combined arms coordination, poor control by the army commander, and no reserves to reinforce success. It's no wonder that there was no Waterloo of the Civil War.






Command Style



Lee is often criticized for using discretionary orders, but this was actually one of the great strengths of his army. Particularly considering the terrain, his inadequate staff, and the difficulty of getting timely and accurate information, Lee giving his subordinates latitude was to his advantage. For example, Ewell is condemned for failing to take Cemetery Hill and Culps Hill on the first day of Gettysburg, which, it is said, Jackson surely would have done. The effects of this failure are clear - 140 years later. However Ewell had good reasons for his actions. His corps was disorganized, and a large Union force was on his flank, right at the foot of Benner's Hill. Had he been attacked in his flank, the wisdom of his decision wouldn't be questioned. The Prussian observer Scheibert quotes Lee as saying, "You have to realize how things stand with us. Recognize that my orders then would do more harm than good. I rely on my division and brigade commanders. How terrible if I could not. I plan and work as hard as I can to bring my troops to the right place at the right time. I have done my duty then. The moment I order them forward, I put the battle and the fate of my army in the hands of God." (Scheibert 42)

In addition to the Army of the Potomac's many political problems, unlike the Army of Northern Virginia, it suffered from a top-down command mentality, something which had also hindered Napoleon's opponents. At Wagram in 1809, for example, a French corps marched along the front of the Austrian army, vulnerable to attack. The Austrian commanders, however, did not take the initiative and remained in passive defense. Similar things happened in the Civil War. Let's take a look at the Grant/Meade era, when subordinates were given little latitude to think for themselves. At the Wilderness, one of Warren's divisions was sent forward to Saunder's Field without support on its flanks. Another division with the opportunity to remain on the high ground at the Chewning Farm was ordered to pull back. At Spotsylvania, Warren was ordered to attack when this was an obvious waste of human life. Having not been given simple, common sense discretion, by the time of the battle at Cold Harbor, Union troops - from corps commander to private - were taking discretion. Instead of wasting lives in suicidal attacks, many units instead made only token attacks. This sabotaged any hopes of success that neighboring units had, resulting in yet another waste of human life.

Subordinates must be encouraged to think for themselves - told what to do, but not how to do it. Their input and ideas must be sought. This prepares them for higher command. This was Napoleon's way, and this would be the way of the German Army in World War II, which is the model for the current US Army system of "operational analysis". To deprive commanders of discretion invites the many failings of a top-down system, just like in a totalitarian government - or a business where the CEO doesn't want to hear bad news. Lee's Confederate army was far from perfect - but at least in this way it was clearly superior.



Conclusion


The Civil War was not modern tactically, but it was not fought using Napoleonic tactics either. Regardless of the reasons - technology, tactics, terrain, command and control problems - or more likely a mixture of all these things - circumstances tended toward making Civil War combat less decisive than Napoleonic combat. Whether Napoleonic combined arms cooperation was still possible on a large scale during the Civil War is debatable. But the advent of rifled muskets doesn't explain this failure. Advances in artillery technology had more effect, but even these changes don't offer a complete explanation. Command, control, and communications problems, along with difficult terrain, made decisive battle more difficult to achieve. Numerous are the examples of Civil War battles on the verge of decisiveness - but without that final step that would have annihilated the enemy - Shiloh, Second Manassas, Antietam, Gettysburg, Chickamauga. Perhaps this failure to achieve decisive results encouraged the late-war custom of entrenching, although there are other explanations. The Prussian observer Justus Scheibert argued that breastworks were "safeguards against panic". (Scheibert 50) Modern historian Earl Hess argues that troops entrenched as a reaction to the shock of battle. Others point out that entrenching freed up troops to turn or flank the enemy - so entrenching was essentially a method to facilitate maneuver - one which had the opposite effect. Only one side had to entrench in order to force their opponent to do so. To do otherwise was just too risky, and there was no turning back. All of these explanations have validity. The 1864 campaigns little resemble those of 1862 or 1863. Battle lines were stretched thinner, putting commanders even more out of touch with the situation, and making armies even more difficult to control than before. At any rate, battle tactics had failed. Perhaps the use of entrenchments was inevitable, with a bloody attritional struggle like the Overland and Petersburg Campaigns being the predictable result.

Personally, I don't hold much stock with the idea that ACW tactics were based on the previous tactics of wars fought a century earlier. One could just as equally argue that WW2 tactic's were based on those of WW1 because the men still dug trenches, or that WW1 tactic's were based on the principles of medieval siege warfare. There are certainly analogies that can be made, and historians never miss out on a trick when it comes to peddling a few books that that publish them. But they are tenuous at best, and some are just down right silly.

By 1860 Winfield Scotts original drill manuals which had been published in 1835, had been replaced by an updated set of books published by William J Hardee, shortly to become a Confederate General and inspiration behind the Hardee Hat. These books collectively known as 'Hardee's Tactic's' were the most influential texts available in the first two years of the war and were used by both sides. Having been the staple diet of officer cadets at West Point for some time prior to the outbreak of the war.

Hardee's Tactic's included manoeuvres and drills specifically designed to incorporate changes in military technology since the American Rebellion, and the recent wars in Europe’s most specifically the introduction of the rifled musket and the impact it must have on the deployment and movement of troops. It also rather quaintly came in various specific editions tailored exclusively for use by different types of regiment. For example there was a special edition for units of 'Black Troops' and another specifically for regiments of Zoaves. There was also a separate edition just for militia regiments.

The only real difference between the copies used by the North and those used by the South was the omission of Hardee's name from the front cover.

Hardee's Tactic's were based a number of simple principles.

1. That the line of battle should be formed in two ranks, one behind the other.
2. That skirmishers should move in advance of the main lines and operate in squads of four men.
3. That the standard cadence for all battlefield movement should be increased to 180 steps per minute.

The later was considered essential as with the rifled musket and the percussion cap troops needed to cover ground faster to minimize their casualties.

4. Troops should be given target practice, and taught to aim.
5. Some specialist units should be trained to move at five miles per hour, whilst still keeping their order to act as flying columns and assault forces.

Hardee's Tactic's were replaced in 1862 by a revised tactical manual written by a Union Brigadier called Silas Casey. Silas Casey's 'Infantry Tactic's' came in three volumes covering individual and company drill, battalion drill and evolutions for Brigades and Army Corps. It was the first manual produced which was specifically designed to cope with the type of warfare being fought at the time and was quickly adopted by both sides. Most importantly it avoided the more obscure jargon and military parlance used in Hardee's Tactic's recognising that most officers by this time were no longer professional West Point Cadets, but simple clerks and teachers who got confused and baffled by the professional language, much of which was in French or German.

He also greatly simplified the descriptions of manoeuvres using everyday language which was clear and concise, allowing inexperienced officers to learn their craft from the book rather than using the book as support for a formal cadetship. Minimum march cadence was now 90 paces per minute, far faster than previous wars, but still slow enough to allow the men to keep order though the formations were now much looser and the intervals much wider to allow for a full stride to be taken with each step. Rather than the restricted pace used when 'Salden's Waddle' was the standard system of movement.

However, even Casey's simplified manual left some inexperienced officers bewildered. When Captain Daniel Candler of a Georgia Regiment found the advance of his unit blocked by a fence, he was at a complete loss as to what to do. In the end he ordered the men to halt, and turning to them he announced 'Gentlemen, we will now take a recess of ten minutes. Break ranks! And when you fall in. will you please re-form on the other side of the fence.'

When more ambitious leaders tried to impose the more intricate manoeuvres practiced by some Zoave and other parade ground units on a regiment of ordinary volunteers the results were predictably chaotic. George Eggleston of Virginia noted that in some regiments 'manoeuvers of the most impossible sort were taught to the men, every amateur officer had his own pet system of tactic's, and the effect of the incongruous teachings, when brought together in battalion drill closely resembled that of the music at Mr Bob Sawyers party. Where each guest sang the chorus to the tune that he knew best.

Most officers were more down to earth in their expectations of what was possible. Captain John Trice of the 4th Kentucky when asked by his superior what he would do to bring his men forward to meet the Yankee's in battle replied 'Well Major, I can't answer that according to the books, but I would risk myself and the Trigg County boys, and go in on main strength and awkwardness.' Another officer asked to quote the orders he would give to move his unit obliquely to one side, admitted that he had no idea what the proper orders were but stated that he would simply shout 'Move the Regiment stauchendicilar to the right'.

Weapons training was equally fraught with problems and misunderstanding. Cavalry drilling with sabres frequently injured their own horses and each other in their attempts to control the movements of their horses and themselves and keep to their formations, all at the same time. Artillerymen new to their craft could be even more dangerous, one Massachusetts Battery trying to hit a tree on a hill 1,000 yards away carelessly forgot to lower the elevation screws on their pieces to the correct height leaving their guns set for a range of 1,600 yards sending shells over both the tree and the hill to land amongst the houses of the village beyond.

However, the thing the infantryman feared the most was bayonet drill. Thanks to the legends and stories spread by old soldiers and evil minded drill instructors new recruits lived in moral fear of being caught up in a bayonet charge. The triangular blade eighteen inches long with deep grooves gruesomely explained as necessary to let the victims blood flow freely out of the wound, had supposedly won battles in past wars and so was viewed with both fear and reverence by the raw recruits. However the thought of having to use it filled them with dread, and the idea of being stuck with one was even worse.

However, for the most part these fears were unfounded. Union surgeons were later to report that of every thousand wounds they treated on four came from any sort of edged weapon whether bayonet or sword. Most of the men drilling with these fearsome weapons would never see them used for anything more lethal than candlestick holders and fire spits. In fact, one old soldier declared that bayonets inflicted more wounds on the training field than they ever did in battle. One new recruit from the Green Mountains noted that when training with the bayonet his regiment drawn up in line looked to be made up about equally of frogs, sand-hill cranes, sentinel-crabs and grasshoppers; all of them rapidly jumping, thrusting, swinging, striking, jerking every which way, and all gone stark mad.' Most of these bayonets would eventually find a more useful employment as farmers in the impoverished South quickly discovered that they made excellent sickles, hoes and scythes.

On the Battlefield putting the drills into practice

Strategy and Tactic's magazine once ran an excellent article on ACW tactic's in which it analysed the conduct of various Corps on the field of battle and discussed how the tactic's employed affected the outcome of the action.

The prevailing problem identified in almost all actions explored was that of unit direction and leading. This was found to be a common failing of regimental and brigade leadership on both sides throughout the war, and resulted in a general lack of understanding of the importance of alignment, unit cohesion and directional management.

As a consequence it was found that many attacks by both sides simple wandered off course, became bunched or scattered, or in the case of some units simply got lost. Officers unsure of which direction to go would simply lead their units in the direction of other units, or if they lost contact with one unit would simply head in the direction of the next one they spotted.

The simple act of crossing a field could throw a unit off course if the field was sloped, as the unit naturally veered off course to follow the line of least resistance, and if faced with an obstacle in it's path most units would simply go round it and head off in another direction. Most officers on both sides found the challenge of keeping their men together and in some sort of line enough to keep them fully occupied. The idea that they also needed to maintain their units alignment with each other rapidly got forgotten in the stress and confusion of battle resulting in unit movement plot diagrams that in many cased look like a childs scribble pad.

Whilst this certainly increased casualities in some instances, particularly when units bunched and began following each other, it also reduced casualties in others.

Units frequently became confused and in the process of becoming uncertain there was a general tendency for units to lose cohesion, even to argue amongst themselves as to which was the right way to go. The net result was a general losening of the files and ranks as some men rushed ahead, whilst others dawdled behind and this looser formation actually reduced casualties. It also left ample opportunity for those less courageous than their fellows to quietly dissappear, which no doubt saved many lives, and led to many potnetially disasterous attacks to end early, before too many men were hit.

I was trying to find the magazine earlier, if I do I shall publish some of the movement plot diagrams as I recall they're quite amusing.

Actually i dont think author of this article wanted to say ACW was based on 18.century tactics, instead, he only says it resemble it due to certain technological changes that made earlier Napoleonic tactics in impossible to be used - and while others cite rifled muskets - he correctly gives more credit to vastly improved artillery effectivity - Artillery had higher range and was more effective against infantry and cavalry, therefore it didnt allowed to use them in close cooperation, or in more active manner..

Using large reserves was not practical as they would be obliterated by long range artillery and improved shrapnel shots. Also because most of infantry were conscripts it was harder and harder to make them advance in proper order, so commanders started to loose control over unit much quicker..

Yet Austro Prussian and Franco Prussian wars saw a lot more napoleonic style combat than civil war even despite technological advancement. Austrians in 1866 and French ( in Austro French war in italy) employed batalion columns with great or moderate succes. Prussians advanced in company columns (250 men!) with skirmisher screen and so they did untill their belgian campaign of 1914.

Europeans fought with class like they lawayes did while americans fought in similiar manner to independence war where cavalry was also underrated and underused and badly trained soldiers fought in long disorganised lines.

cavalry was also underrated and underused

Cavalry was heavily used, but not for those "heroic" charges, which you seam to like so much, even though they occured and also were effective, eg. in the Shenandoah Valley campaigns. I would even say that the Cavalry Organisation, the strategy, and their tactical empolyment on the Battlefield was already quite modern and far ahead then the one of their european counterparts, of whom i got the impression that they still wallowed in the ideas of the Napoleonic Wars. So if i think at cavalry charges in the franco-prussian war i mainly have Mars-La-Tour, Froeschweiler and Sedan in mind, in which their main use was to sacrifice themselves and/or to buy some time for the Infantry.

I doubt the ACW would have ended at Appomattox if Sheridans Cav. wouldn't have been used on that large operational layer to cut Lee from his supplys together with their usage as independent, dismounted Infantry when it came to battle. And their use is only underrated by historians, who rather write about fully sucessful or completly desastrous charges then about the small engagments which occured during a raid.

In contrast, Napoleon's Grand Battery at Waterloo - created for long-range bombardment - was made up of 24 of the 12-pounders and 48 6-pounders. So only around one-third of the Emperor's Grand Battery was made of Civil War sized weapons.

As far as i know the "12" of the Napoleon means the diameter of the bore and not the "pound" of the ball. Besides that weren't the Field -Artillery pieces in 1866/1870 mainly 4-pounders?

Europeans fought with class

Yeah, the prussians fought with class, organized and advanced in nice company columns till all their officers got shot down from their horses. After that it got quite a mess with soldiers were looking for any cover they could get (even few miles behind the battle), long lines of units along causeways and edges of forrests, mixed up Regiments in farms and querries.

JAM, this article is "theorycrafting". The author isn't familiar with black powder rifled muskets, or he wouldn't be reaching for these oddball theories. I'm not sure what his agenda is, but any article that starts out saying there's not much difference between a smoothbore musket and a Springfield '61 is just blowing smoke. There are many, many reputable American works on the civil war, there's no need to go hunting for oddball European treatments of the era.

Civil War re-enactments are popular here in the States, and Civil War era rifles are common as dirt. I've shot one, basically everyone here has shot one. Their defining characteristic is extreme accuracy. They have very long rifled barrels. A two hundred yard shot at a man-sized target is a "gimme". You can put two balls into the same hole at 50 yards from a prone position. I think most of the confusion by European authors trying to write about the period is due to the fact that there weren't any full-scale wars fought during that time period by European armies. (Though I'm a bit confused that there aren't at least some accounts by British authors treating rifle accuracy during the Crimean Wars - the USA and Britain were in virtual lock-step vis a vis small arms in this period, we both used the minie-ball rifled musket as our primary infantry weapon, and we both switched to metal cartridge rifles in the same year.)

Basically, the arm of decision in the Civil War was infantry. This was due to the minie ball, of course. There's not much to ask between Civil War and Napoleonic artillery, on the other hand. Cavalry was a bit different, in that the primary close-quarters Cavalry weapon was the revolver, of which most cavalrymen carried a few.

Likewise, it was standard practice for Civil War infantry to fight from cover. Whether you want to call it "skirmishing" is semantics, and the sharpshooting units fielded by both the Union and the Confederacy were more modern snipers than skirmishers - regular line infantry filled the "skirmishing" role, and at much longer ranges. It's basically suicide to adopt Napoleonic style, "stand in the open" type skirmisher screens against a rifle armed opponent. No real mystery behind the tendency towards trench warfare, either.

The reason heavy cavalry fell out of favor was, again, largely due to the jump in small arms accuracy. Any Waterloo-style heavy cavalry charge with the cavalry swirling around squares for hours wasn't feasible. Fifteen minutes into any such action against rifles and all the cavalry would be lying on the ground with holes shot in them. This author's correct in that there weren't many shock actions by cavalry, he's just completely wrong about why that was. Again, it was suicide to try against a rifle armed opponent. Cavalry of the period typically dismounted and engaged with carbines, usually metal cartridge carbines even in the Confederate army. (Both sides had access to Spencer repeaters or the equivalent, they were commercially available to the South though in smaller numbers.)

This is all Civil War 101 obvious type stuff.

re: bayonet charges - even Pickett's Charge wasn't a Napoleonic style advance by dense columns, Pickett's troops advanced in line and fired as they advanced. They drove off parts of the Union line by fire (mostly), and likewise during the Union counterattack Union riflemen drove the Confederates back primarily with fire. The Confederates also suffered very high casualties during their advance from Union artillery firing canister at Napoleonic ranges. <shrug> Overall, infantry fire was more decisive than a comparable Napoleonic action.

Originally Posted by Primergy

As far as i know the "12" of the Napoleon means the diameter of the bore and not the "pound" of the ball.

I have a bit more detail on the 12lb Napoleon's used in the ACW.

They were the most widely used artillery piece in the ACW. The tube was smooth-bored and weighed 1.227lbs. It's full and correct name was the Twelve Pounder Gun-Howitzer Model 1857, is most commonly referred to as the Napoleon.

The diameter of the bore was 4.62", and it took a cartridge containing 2.5 pounds of black powder and a 12.3lb solid iron ball. Its effective range was 1,500 yards, though it was capable of lobbing a shot for well over a mile.

It was named after Emperor Napoleon III of France who adopted it for use in his army (Note: Not Napoleon Bonaparte, therefore its not the same model as the guns used at Waterloo, which is a common misconception)

The Union army only had four at the start of the war, but by the end of the war had manufactured 1,157 in total.

A rare few were rifled, and at least one was cast from wrought iron, but virtually all the other Union guns were cast in bronze.

Ammunition fired included:

Solid RoundShot
Shell - Round and Conical shells filled wth powder.
Grapeshot
and Canister

The Confederacy manufactured about 535 Napoleons for their own use, some in bronze, some in brass and almost a quarter in cast iron. Many more were captured from the Union Army.

It was valued in the North at $600. but was worth much more in the South.

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Edit: Keyser, I already said that I'm a bit puzzled why there aren't accounts of the Crimean War supporting the conclusions reached in the Civil War.

I think I'm right in saying that this was because the Crimean War happened before the American Civil War, or have I missed the point again.

The Crimean War was 1854-56, and apparently the Minie Rifle was not introduced to the British Army until 1853, so little tactical consideration had been given to its impact on the battlefield. It was then replaced in 1865 by the Snider breech-loading conversion of the Enfield Rifle, and in 1871 by the Martini-Henry Rifle.

The American Civil War was 1861–1865, and from what I've read Hardee did consider the impact of the rifled musket when he wrote his manuals for the West Point Cadets. I assume he would have studied the impact of the Minnie Rifle on the battlefields of the Crimea as part of his preparation.

I've just done some more checking and can confirm that the US Army definately sent observers to the Crimea including Colonel Phillip Cooke of the 2nd United States Dragoons, who later fought for the Union, and Richard Delafield, who formed the Delafield Commission in 1855, which also included officers George McClellan and Alfred Mordecai who were present as military observers at the Siege of Sevastapol.
****
Hmm! I've just been reading a bit more about the Delafield Commission and it seems they weren't too successful in their fact finding mission, getting heavily delayed by the French in Paris and arriving late in the Crimea.

This is basically a slightly improved Napoleonic period gun. It was a bit more capable vis a vis firing explosive shot, I believe, but not much to ask between it and the artillery used by Napoleon. <shrug> It was usually decisive when firing canister, again at normal Napoleonic ranges.

Originally Posted by Didz

I think I'm right in saying that this was because the Crimean War happened before the American Civil War, or have I missed the point again.

The Crimean War was 1854-56, and apparently the Minie Rifle was not introduced to the British Army until 1853, so little tactical consideration had been given to its impact on the battlefield. It was then replaced in 1865 by the Snider breech-loading conversion of the Enfield Rifle, and in 1871 by the Martini-Henry Rifle.

The American Civil War was 1861–1865, and from what I've read Hardee did consider the impact of the rifled musket when he wrote his manuals for the West Point Cadets. I assume he would have studied the impact of the Minnie Rifle on the battlefields of the Crimea as part of his preparation.

Same weapons. Brits had minie-ball rifled muskets, so their tactics and experiences should match the Americans'.

Didz, don't put too much weight on Hardee's manuals, I've never heard of them before and I've read numerous accounts of Civil War tactics by American authors. I don't think American commanders were very doctrine-bound, they were more practical minded, ie, just did what worked. I've never heard of either Union or Confederate troops having any trouble with fences, for instance.

Edit: the American army replaced the 1861 Springfield immediately after the war - they would have sooner, and some infantry units switched over during the war, but there were logistical reasons to hold off on full-scale replacement until the bulk of the troops were demobilized at the cessation of hostilities.

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

I've never heard of either Union or Confederate troops having any trouble with fences, for instance.

There was a fence along the Emmitsburg road at Gettsyburg that slowed up Pettigrew's division during Pickett's charge.

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Same weapons. Brits had minie-ball rifled muskets, so their tactics and experiences should match the Americans'.

The other way around surely. The American's should have learned from the experiences of the British and French in the Crimea, or perhaps more correctly from the Russian's as they were on the receiving end.

The extent to which lessons were learned seems to have been limited by the apparent failure of the Delafield Commission to get to the Crimea quickly enough, and whatever shortcomings there were in the conclusions reached and printed in Hardee's Tactic's and Casey's 'Infantry Tactic's'.

However, I'm not sure that they didn't learn and pass on the lessons. Certainly the standard infantry march cadences were increased in both Hardee's and Caseys manuals rising from 76-120 paces per minute to 90-180 paces per minute. The reason for this was probably based upon the French experience in Second Italian War of Independence of 1859, where the French established a tactical principle based upon rapid movement and deployment to counter the Italian rifle fire. The principle being that the italian rifles whilst deadly accurate were slow to reload, and thus a rapid and decisive advance could produce a relatively and bloodless quick victory by driving them from their positions with the bayonet.

Both the French and Austrian's adopted this as a standard tactic and were still employing it in the Franco-Prussian War, so the Delafield Commission may well have brought that idea back with them from Paris.

Likewise, unit formations were changed to increase both the spacing between files and the intervals between ranks making troops somewhat harder to hit, and less vulnerable to exploding shells, which suggests that some lessons were gleaned from the European experiences in the Crimea.

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

Didz, don't put too much weight on Hardee's manuals, I've never heard of them before and I've read numerous accounts of Civil War tactics by American authors. I don't think American commanders were very doctrine-bound, they were more practical minded, ie, just did what worked.

Well at the outbreak of the war they seem to have been the only printed manuals available to commanders on either side. They would certainly have been studied by officers who served as cadets at West Point prior to the start of the war as Hardee was their tactics instructor and served as commandant of cadets from 1856 to 1860. The full name of his manual was Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics for the Exercise and Manoeuvres of Troops When Acting as Light Infantry or Riflemen.

I've never heard of either Union or Confederate troops having any trouble with fences, for instance.

Well that was a direct quote from a primary reference source so it obviously happened. However, I don't think the issue was one of climbing technique, it was a simple matter of command and control and knowing the commands that were needed. Clearly the officer involved either didn't know or had forgotten the drill commands to have his unit negotiate the fence. The thing I found most amusing about the story was the officer's use of the phrase 'ten minute recess' I don't know if this is the same in the US but in the UK the term 'recess' is only usually used in schools, so I got the instant impression that this officer might have been a school teacher in civilian life.

We used to practice close order drill manoeuvres by marching company sized units across car parks with random placements of cars. The issue was not moving across the car park as anyone can do that when free to move at will, the problem arose in trying to combine drill manoeuvres in the correct order to move a solid body of men through various bottlenecks and defiles with the minimum loss of unit cohesion.

Originally Posted by Didz

The other way around surely. The American's should have learned from the experiences of the British and French in the Crimea, or perhaps more correctly from the Russian's as they were on the receiving end.

The extent to which lessons were learned seems to have been limited by the apparent failure of the Delafield Commission to get to the Crimea quickly enough, and whatever shortcomings there were in the conclusions reached and printed in Hardee's Tactic's and Casey's 'Infantry Tactic's'.

dude. You latch onto the silliest things. There's no temporal relationship implied in the statement that "their experiences should match". So, do you know if they did? Were cavalry generally effective or ineffective in shock action vs. rifle-armed infantry during the Crimean War, or did it not come up?

Originally Posted by Didz

Well at the outbreak of the war they seem to have been the only printed manuals available to commanders on either side. They wold certainly have been studied by officers who served as cadets at West Point prior to the start of the war as Hardee was their tactics instructor and served as commandant of cadets from 1856 to 1860. The full name of his manual was Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics for the Exercise and Manoeuvres of Troops When Acting as Light Infantry or Riflemen.

Well that was a direct quote from a primary reference source so it obviously happened. However, I don't think the issue was one of climbing technique, it was a simple matter of command and control and knowing the commands that were needed. Clearly the officer involved either didn't know or had forgotten the drill commands to have his unit negotiate the fence.

We used to practice close order drill manoeuvres by marching company sized units across car parks with random placements of cars. The issue was not moving across the car park as anyone can do that when free to move at will, the problem arose in trying to combine drill manoeuvres in the correct order to move a solid body of men through various bottlenecks and defiles with the minimum loss of unit cohesion.

I guess British historians would then be perplexed at the dearth of large bodies of men stacked up behind fences scattered about the American countryside. Somehow I don't find it perplexing, nor confusing that both the Union and Confederate armies routinely took advantage of fences and other tactical battlefield features. (like, you know, trees and those nefarious trenches.) But that's just me.

Originally Posted by Didz

The reason for this was probably based upon the French experience in Second Italian War of Independence of 1859, where the French established a tactical principle based upon rapid movement and deployment to counter the Italian rifle fire. The principle being that the italian rifles whilst deadly accurate were slow to reload, and thus a rapid and decisive advance could produce a relatively and bloodless quick victory by driving them from their positions with the bayonet.

There was no french vs italian fighting in 1859 that I know of. A french expeditionary force under Oudinot command fought against italian republican rebels in 1849 but it was a different war.

The Confederacy also manufacturer Parrot Guns but I don’t have the figures. They also purchased a few 3” Armstrong Rifled Cannon and 6pdr or 12pdr Whitworth Guns, but I don’t have the quantities involved.

Overall, it looks as though the Napoleon retained its majority throughout the war, but it depends how many remained in service and how many were replaced by newer models as the war progressed.

OTOH from what I recall the less sophisticated Napoleon was well regarded, insofar it had better cannister performace and the extra accuracy of the rifled pieces, however handy against point targets, was not of much use against bodies of troops (obviously long range indirect fire was no concern for the field artillery).
It should be noted that pretty much any sort of gun in any possible variation of shape and material was made AND/OR used during the ACW. From classic bronze 6 pdr smoothbores which were still being manufactured as late as 1862 to one offs based on somebody's patent.

Still, black powder would render entire battlefield obscured making any rifled musket extended range not that useful. Practically it was the same situation as before with lots of smoke and blind firing where nobody sees where he is shooting at. MInie ball and rifling was an improvement, but its effectivity would go rapidly down after first salvo. (but of course not the wounding potential which was pretty high for Minie ball)

one thing is practice shooting, other is mass fire of entire battalion armed with black powder weapons...

There is more at the webpage about rifled muskets, i just posted stats that were interesting for me.

Originally Posted by JaM

Still, black powder would render entire battlefield obscured making any rifled musket extended range not that useful. Practically it was the same situation as before with lots of smoke and blind firing where nobody sees where he is shooting at. MInie ball and rifling was an improvement, but its effectivity would go rapidly down after first salvo. (but of course not the wounding potential which was pretty high for Minie ball)

one thing is practice shooting, other is mass fire of entire battalion armed with black powder weapons...

Yeah, black powder weapons make a mess. Regardless, if you can see your target, out to 200 yards you'll hit it. That's a huge difference from earlier time periods. I don't see any problem with firing from a treeline or digging a trench in those circumstances. And another thing that's "understood" by American audiences is that aimed fire by line units is much more prevalent than in Napoleonic battles. American recruits typically didn't have military experience, but almost all had experience with firearms. Indeed, most early war Confederate and many Union units (especially northern states like Minnesota and Wisconsin) were expected to supply their own weapons. That's just unheard-of for European armies.

Sometimes I think it's really a shame that the Europeans didn't send some troops over to get a taste of Civil War combat. There's a real good reason that didn't happen - Civil War casualties were horrendous.

The wars of 1866 and 1870 weren't full scale ones ?

Those were short wars, indeed, but i think they were pretty much as full scale as it could get.

Even the limited ones, like the unification of italy or the crimea weren't exactly push over.

I am not saying that the US civil war is something to be laughed at, or the soldiers/army weren't top quality etc. I fully believe that any war of the scale of the civil war and with the ressources committed to it made it a very serious affair. The people fighting it weren't playing and some of the forces fighting over it could be very veterans.

But as i don't believe european armies were necessarilly ahead or had better troops (they did have way more regulars and ressources in peace time though, as well as more cadres, reservists and trained men), i don't think european conflicts of the time should be underestimated either.

Originally Posted by Keyser

The wars of 1866 and 1870 weren't full scale ones ?

Those were short wars, indeed, but i think they were pretty much as full scale as it could get.

LOL Way to miss the point. Go back and re-read my post. I'm saying that the Europeans didn't have any full scale wars using rifled muskets, so there aren't any European accounts of experience with that weapon. They've no practical experience with cavalry trying to attack infantry so armed. By 1866 and 1870 both European and American armies had replaced their minie ball rifles with some sort of breech loaders, whether paper or metallic cartridge.

Edit: JAM, you just can't compare casualties between the Franco Prussian War and the Civil War. That, plus the author is cherry-picking the Civil War casualties in most of the battles listed, artificially reducing them by listing losses in individual engagements of the overall battle. An example is Grant losing 53,000 out of 109,000 and Lee losing 33,000 out of 59,000 in the month of May, 1864. That time period included the author's "wilderness" battle of May 5-7, but he should treat the entire Wilderness Campaign including Cold Harbor, etc. The Civil War was just nasty.

Originally Posted by Randall Turner

LOL Way to miss the point. Go back and re-read my post. I'm saying that the Europeans didn't have any full scale wars using rifled muskets, so there aren't any European accounts of experience with that weapon. They've no practical experience with cavalry trying to attack infantry so armed. By 1866 and 1870 both European and American armies had replaced their minie ball rifles with some sort of breech loaders, whether paper or metallic cartridge.

Well, yep i missed the point then.

But the austrians used rifled guns in 1866 rather than breech loaders.
And i am not sure how it's an argument given the breech loaders were as rifled as those using minie ball ?

(And then, even though those aren't "full scale", those were the weapons used in Crimea by the french, in Italy too by all combattants, in the Mexican expedition etc)

Casualty rates were not that high if you look at percentages, only difference was that they were pretty similar to both sides almost equally, while during earlier wars victorious side had less casualties (unless Pyrrhic victory), highest casualties at Gettysburg (37% vs 28%), but not that close to Zorndorf (35% vs 45%) or Friedland (9% vs 41%), Napoleonic looses doesnt look like smaller in comparation to ACWs even when just smothbore muskets were used..

What is interesting is casualty ratios from European battles of late 19.century:

19th Centurybattle.............Loss %............Loss %
Solferino...........................13% (French)...12% (Austrian)
Koniggratz or Sadowa..........3% (Pr.).........12% (Aus.)
Gravelotte and Mars la Tour..11% (Ger.).....11% (Fr.)
Sedan..............................4% (Ger.).......14% (Fr.)

and all those were with introduction of more modern weapons than muzzle-loaded rifles..

weapons used at Sedan 1870: