Divine Command Theory
Divine Command Theory is any branch of ethical inquiry that takes as it's basis that things are morally good or bad, or morally obligatory, permissible, or prohibited, solely because of a Deity(singular or otherwise)’s will. At face value, this appears to be a solid foundation for ethical thought and in fact it still is a major condition of many individual's morality. However, the DCT has faced opposition in the form of Euthyphro.
The Euthyphro dilemma
The Euthyphro dilemma is based off a discussion of what it means for an act to be holy in Plato's Euthyphro. The Euthyphro is a dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro, set outside the court-house in Athens. In the course of their discussion he attempts several different analyses of piety, but none of these analyses stands up under scrutiny.
Among Euthyphro’s attempted analyses of piety is one that has been taken to be an unsophisticated form of divine command theory. At one point in the discussion, Euthyphro affirms that “the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious”. The line of questioning by which Socrates undermines Euthyphro’s theory has been the inspiration for many modern critics of divine command theory proper.
The crux of this argument is this question, “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” This question has given rise to an argument that is now known as the Euthyphro dilemma, and which forms the first major rebuttal to the divine command theory. Each of these two possibilities, the argument runs, leads to consequences that the divine command theorist cannot accept. Whichever way the divine command theorist answers this question, then, it seems that his theory will be refuted.
The modernised version of the question asked by Socrates is this: “Are morally good acts willed by God because they are morally good, or are they morally good because they are willed by God?”
If the former answer is chosen then it results in the Independence Problem
Independence Question:
If morally good acts are willed by God because they are morally good, then it seems that they must be morally good prior to God’s willing them, otherwise God would not will them. If morally good acts are morally good prior to God’s willing them, though, then they must be morally good independent of God’s willing them.
If the latter answer is chosen then it results in several different problems
Arbitrary Question:
The divine command theory appears to render the content of morality arbitrary. If divine command theory is true, it seems, then what is good and what bad depends on nothing more than God’s whims. Whims, though, even God’s whims, are not an adequate foundation for morality.
Emptiness Question
If divine command theory is true, then God’s will is the standard of moral goodness. To say that God is good, then, would be to say that God is as he wills himself to be. To say that God’s commands are good would be to say that God commands what he wants to command. To say that God’s actions are good would be to say that God doesn’t forbid himself from doing anything that he does. There is surely, however, more to moral goodness than this.
Abhorrant Command Question
The problem of abhorrent commands is the problem that divine command theory appears to entail that even morally abhorrent acts such as rape, murder and genocide could possibly be morally good. In fact, on more than one occasion God has commanded these very acts. Are they justified?
So the question then to the Ethos is: Do you believe in the Divine Command Theory and if so; how do you resolve these issues?





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