IMPORTANT NOTE:
THE KAUNITZ PROJECT IS IN THE PROCESS OF MIGRATING FROM ETW TO NTW
(new thread: http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=532933)
THE ETW ENGINE IS NOT STABLE ENOUGH FOR MULTIPLAYER GAMES.
SOON FEATURING:
MEGASALEXANDROS "PREUßENS GLORIA" MODELS
WANGRINS "NEC PLURIBUS IMPAR" MODELS
This is the notorious "Kaunitz Project" for vanilla-ETW - a mod on which I've been working since 1st April 2010, including minor and major breaks. It all started here, well hidden in the DMUC-submod-board. The Kaunitz-Project is a custom battles-only (i.e. no campaigns!) mod aimed at multiplayer games. The mod tries to deliver a more "realistic" and - as a consequence - more "interesting" experience to players, for which reason it makes use of all the moderate means that the engine provides, regardless of the AI.
Detailed descriptionSpoiler Alert, click show to read:
Gameplay on the "grand tactical" level
One of the main reasons why vanilla battles felt so dull to me was because they didn’t force you to make a lot of decisions. All you had to do was to move forward your whole army and then maybe try to turn a flank with a single unit of cavalry. But wasn’t that what 18th century battles looked and felt like? Well: no! It’s not history that provides us with boring battles, it’s the game. Reading accounts of actual battles gave me much more exciting pictures of 18th century warfare than playing the game did. I came up with many reasons of this mismatch and I tried to tack in my mod as much as the engine would let me.
The most important issue is the complete lack of a grand-tactical level, which is a real pity given that the grand tactical aspect is where a computer game could surpass even the best tabletop game. Basically speaking, vanilla battles begin at a point at which an 18th century general would have already done his job. Once the opposing armies were “locked” in combat, a general had very limited means to affect the further order of events – instead, he had to rely on the competence of his subordinates. The generals’ main task was located on an earlier stage of the battle, namely to bring about favourable situations for his own troops, which puts a big emphasis on what I call manoeuvring. It is this aspect that decided battles and that makes 18th century warfare so interesting for me.
As it is, the game doesn’t provide us with means to represent manoeuvring. Every movement of your troops is visible to the enemy who can react directly – without any delay of time! – by a simple click. In reality, a general would be unable to overlook the whole battlefield and he would depend on information being brought to him by aide de camps. He had to make up a picture in his head of what was happening, where the main force of the enemy was, etc. If he found himself in the unpleaseant situation to change the plan, he would need to send out aide de camps to his brigades – which, of course, took time. To sum it up, in reality battles were characterized by restricted lines of sight, a huge delay of orders and (sometimes contradicting) information of any kind (the aide de camps also needed to find their moving recipients in the chaos of battle), and by unrelieable subordinates (misinterpretation of orders, positions,…).
Due to the precarious communication conditions, the outcome of battle depended quite a lot on the “initial plan” (the “dispositions”) that the attacking general and his subordinates designed before the battle. Flank movements like in the battle of Leuthen or at Brandywine were decided upon before the battle, they were not “ad hoc” decisions and were something completely different from the common “let the single cavaly unit charge into the flank” that we get in ETW.
I think it is obvious that hardly any of the points mentioned can be modelled in ETW. For example, we would need multiplayer battles with fog of war (you shouldn’t even be able to see your your allies’ units!) and players shouldn’t be allowed to communicate with each other during the battle. Players should need to make up a plan before the battle – for example, a player could have the task to move to this or that position and then attack in this direction at 4 o’clock. Alas, we can’t have that.
What I’ve done is, first, to scale everything down to 4:1. By this, maps become 4 times bigger, which means that there is more distance between the armies at the start of the battle (more time/space to manoeuvre), and we can actually bring in a “fog of war”, which would have been unrealistic if we kept the scale to 1:1.
The fog of war means that all units are basically hidden from the enemies’ sight. You will not know the whereabouts of the enemies’ position from the start. How/at what ranges can you discover the enemy? First I thought about “realistic” distances, so that an enemy unit would be spotted with the plain eye at about 1400 yards (350 ingame yards, according to the scale). But this didn’t lead to satisfying results. The game does not take into account hills and other terrain that would block lines of sight. And then, I didn’t like the fact that the general (you!) could instantly see an enemy that one of your units could see. As I’ve said before, if the discovery of an enemy came as a surprise, the respective commander would have to send out an aide de camp to the general, which would take time. So what I’ve done is to further decrease spotting ranges for individual units, so that enemies will only be discovered when they’re comparatively close. Thanks to the scale, this doesn't lead to a lot of stress for the player. You will still have enough time to see the enemy before he strikes you, it’s just that even if you react to it, your units won’t be there in time! I have to admit however, that the close spotting ranges do not feel very "intuitive". You will have enemy units appear in the middle of a plain out of nowhere. Blame it on the games' lack of any kind of sight-obscuring haze, not on me. You can also see it differently: whereever you move a unit to a position, this unit will be supposed to hold that position. According to its orders to defend, the unit will hold its position during the time that the aide de camp is on his way to the general (and back). This should also make scouting a bit more risky and it will increase the importance of cavalry. Maybe we will see some more recognaissance "in force", that is: advance guards.
The decreased spotting range has positive effects: 1) reconnaissance is very important. Send out your hussars and light troops and/or build an advance guard. The low detection ranges also mean that an advance guard is actually capable of screening the troops behind (without having to move too far ahead) so that the enemy cannot see them without pushing the advance guard back. 2) The role of reserves is greatly enhanced because battles become more chaotic and unpredictable. In post 86 and 88 (page 5), you can read an after action report which shows that this system can bring about very interesting situations. My flanking manoeuvre was stalled by my enemy deploying a second reserve line, while earlier, he himself didn’t dare to push forward aggressively against my “demonstrating” wing. Moreover, I first had to make out where my enemies’ flank was.
In general, the fog of war feature means that you as the player are forced to imagine and think much more, just as a general would have had to. Since your “vision” is extremely limited, you have to anticipate your enemies’ movements/plans much more. Questions will spring up: Does he have some reserves there? Is this his flank? What happens if I push forward here? Why isn’t he already attacking me? Does this single advancing unit herald the attack of a larger force, or is this only a distraction? Of course, the whole thing is becoming the more interesting, the bigger the armies and the more the players. 1 versus 1 engagements don’t enfold the full potential of this feature. In games with more units, much extremer local superiorities can be achieved, whereas with 20 slots, you will have to split up your army in a rather predictable manner (some cavalry, some artillery, some eclaireurs, some line units – there’s not much left to form a flanking party of). I really wanted to get rid of the arcade-aspect of the game. Players should win because they anticipated the movements/positions of the enemy, not because they could click faster than their enemy. I tried to put much more emphasis on planning and anticipation rather than on ad-hoc-reaction (but micro-tactical mistakes can still cost you a battle).
However, as this system alone is a bit too restricted, I also allow for “General”-units. These units represent the general and his staff. It is a fragile unit whose purpose lies in its larger detection range. Thus a flanking movement will be discovered earlier if “you” are present on the respective flank. The unit is not supposed to act on its own for it can be caught by light cavalry, and, if unlucky, can be shot down by chasseurs. So it's not neccesarily a good idea to let the general scout ahead on his own. By loosing your general, your army will be virtually blind. It is problematic though that the enemy always gets to know íf he has killed your generals' unit.
Another point of notice: For the fog of war feature’s sake I’m not a big fan of implementing all kinds of uniforms (uniforms on a regimental basis) into the game. If all your units look the same to the enemy, it will be harder for him to gauge the strength of your troops (Is this the same unit as before, or does he have two units here?). Therefore, I plan to keep the roster really small, based on unit types rather than individual regiments. It’s bad enough that players will be able to tell the difference between grenadiers and ordinary line infantry from exaggerated distances.
Apart from the implementation of a fog of war- feature, there are more reasons in favour of the 4:1 scale. It’s hard to explain in detail, but outflanking a line that stretches over 1000 yards (ca. 8 units according to the scale) is something very different from outflanking a line that stretches only over 250 yards (8 units of the same size on a 1:1 scale). There are different effects of scope. A line of 250 yards can realign itself comparatively easily and quickly, a line of 1000 yards certainly can’t. So, to make manoeuvres effective and and interesting option to players in the first place, we need to have an appropriate scale.
One more point to add here is that in mid 18th century battles, the roles of attacker and defender were always very distinct. In most cases, the defender remained idle in his defensive position. ETW doesn’t allow us to distribute roles to players. But I’d suggest that – if both players agree – they can still act according to roles. An interesting approach would be to deny the "defender" a "generals staff"-unit, so that his information on the movement of the enemy will be very restricted, forcing him to act more cautiously and to keep his troops more together.
Gameplay on the "small tactical" level
(wip; Honestly I don't know where I should even begin.) A very simplified provisional list:
Immersion-content
- more reasonable (but still a bit too high!) casualty rates. If the looser takes a bad beating, he usually loses about 50% of his troops. This is achieved by more reasonable morale settings in combination with a more authentic effect of musketry and by the implementation of more realistic movement mechanics (you'll need cavalry to shatter a disrupted enemy!). A retreating unit is always faster than an advancing unit!
- There's now much more distinction between troop types (especially cavalry and infantry) in order to give them their historical roles; I had to strip infantry off the ability to form square since the instant square is a game breaker. Basically you'll have to put infantry in a very deep formation so that it can turn quickly enough if threatened by cavalry in order to fend it off with musketry. This is not exactly how squares were supposed to work (firepower..) but it's a better representation than the instant square. Also, the "foot print" of vanilla squares (even the pike square!) was much too large, giving a square a wider frontage than the same unit in line formation. If you play the mod you will see that my solution isn't even that unbalanced.
- Cavalry is much more inflexible than in the vanilla game and can't deploy in the flank of the enemy as quickly as before.
- bigger emphasis on proper deployment. 1) units move much slowlier and are more cumbersome. 2) Due to the reduced firing arcs, gaps in your line are extremely dangerous and flank supports are more important. The reduced firing arcs also give the game a much more realistic feel - keep in mind that the battalions represent frontages of about 200 men, packed closely together, so that it's zone of fire would be limited to it's front only. A battalion can now hardly ever engage more than 2 battalions at the same time and is more prone to threats from the flank.
- As the game is much more morale-driven, the casualties will (and historically should!) be very one-sided in some situations. Shock actions are not attritional in nature. It's more like: hop or drop!
- I've attempted to implement a "cohesion" system (instead of the vanilla "fatigue"), so that a unit's fighting capabilities and morale will be reduced in certain situations. There are now more statuses and gradiations than just "ready" and "routed". For example, the cohesion system is used to make the first fire of a unit (i.e. when it is still "fresh") the most accurate one. Accuracy decreases very quickly after the first discharge.
- The tactical units (battalions and squadrons) should all have their historical frontages (less true for artillery, I'm afraid).
- Complete rework of artillery. I've tried my best to make artillery as realistic as possible. Most importantly, the trajectories should now be flat, so that artillery will have problems with firing down- or uphills. Generally speaking, if you're used to vanilla, you'll be disappointed about the effect of artillery. But you should also keep in mind that 1) units move much more slowly in this mod (crossing artillery's field of fire can take some time...) and 2) when imagining the effect of artillery, keep in mind that one soldier model represents 4 "real" soldiers. Artillery will always need support units if you don't want it to be overrun.
- Shock actions both by cavalry and by infantry are extremely hard to model with this engine. I'm afraid that shock actions still lead to much too high casualties for the looser (very bad for cavalry engagements!!). The overall results (who routs?) are quite satisfying though. Bayonet charges are modeled in a special way. A charging infantry unit will actually gain momentum (represented by fatigue recovery) while charging (from a certain distance on), while the defender will keep loosing cohesion if he keeps up his defensive fire. Now, either the defender's fire will break the charger, or the charger manages to make contact. In the ensuing melee, the charger will rout the defender very quickly because of the cohesion/momentum-difference. This is the only way to model bayonet charges so that the defender can't simply "counter-charge" in the very last moment in order to get the same charge-bonus as the attacker.
(wip)
New sounds
Unit cards
No new models yet (hopefully I manage to implement the models of "Nec Pluribus Impar" and the "Seven Years War Mod" for version 2.0)
No new music (but I can recommend "40 Years in the Family" by the Tippecanoe Ancient Drum and Fife Corps in order to get attuned; example. Iwas really luck to find this on Itunes because the tunes are short and simple, played by but a few fifers and drummers)
Video material and battle reportsSpoiler Alert, click show to read:
Here is a commentary by the user mAIOR on a battle he fought against the AI (version: kaunitzmp6). (7 parts)
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Here is an introduction to the mod by the user Didz, who explains the basics of the mod (4:1 scale) in a battle against the AI. The record is based on an earlier version of the mod (27th may 2011), but the design philosophy and the explained concepts are still valid. (5 parts)
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
My battle report of one of my first multiplayer games versus "bloody bill". One of my most interesting battles so far (based on an earlier version of the mod).
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Narrative and maps: http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showt...5#post10311415
Screenshots: http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showt...5#post10312105
A battle report (including a video) of one of my battles against the user Cangry
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
List of extraordinarily helpful and responsive betatesters
(more credits will show up in the mod's main menu-background-video)Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
(listed by the point in time that they've taken a big interest in the mod)
Didz
Dee Jay
saddletank
bloody bill
Cangry
Filip von Zietek
mAIOR
Contemporary artSpoiler Alert, click show to read:
A small collection of contemporary art refering to the third silesian war.
Sources usedSpoiler Alert, click show to read:
Here is the list of articles and books that I've drawn on for this mod (apart from Didz's invaluable help, that is). Note that there are a lot of titles in it that touch on the American Revolution and Napoleonic warfare rather than the third Silesian War. This is simply due to the fact that the latter conflicts seem to have attracted much more (recent) scholarly interest, especially when we talk about the micro-historical approach which is necessary if you want to model game mechanisms. There are also articles in it that don't deal with warfare/"mechanics" per se. I have not listed the basic resources such as the "Grosser Generalstab" or the kronoskaf Seven Years War homepage. I've marked the titles that I considered extraordinary detailed and thus extraordinary helpful from a wargamers'/modders' perspective:
Rory Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon (New Haven / London 2000). (!)
Michael Hochedlinger, Austria's Wars of Emergence 1683-1797 (Modern Wars in Perspective, London u.a. 2003).
Matthew H. Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only. The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775-1783 (Campaigns and Commanders 19, Norman 2008). (!INCREDIBLY INTERESTING!)
Brent Nosworthy, Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies (London 1995).
Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (London/New York 1987).
Franz A. J. Szabo, The Seven Years War in Europe 1756-1763 (Modern Wars in Perspective, Harlow u.a. 2008).
Claus Telp, The Evolution of Operational Art 1740-1813. From Frederick the Great to Napoleon (Cass Series: Military History and Policy, London/New York 2005).
Christopher Duffy, Prussia's Glory. Rossbach and Leuthen 1757 (Chicago 2003). (!)
Thomas J. McGuire, The Philadelphia Campaign (2 Volumes, Mechanicsburg 2007). (!)
George Nafziger, Imperial Bayonets. Tactics of the Napoleonic Battery, Battalion and Brigade as Found in Contemporary Regulations (London/Mechanicsburg 1996). (!)
Sascha Möbius, Mehr Angst vor dem Offizier als vor dem Feind? Eine mentalitätsgeschichtliche Studie zur preußischen Taktik im Siebenjährigen Krieg (Saarbrücken 2007). (!)
Sascha Möbius, Beschleunigung von militärischen Bewegungen im 18. Jahrhundert am Beispiel der preußischen Taktik in den schlesischen Kriegen. In: Hartmut Heller (Hg.), Gemessene Zeit - gefühlte Zeit. Tendenzen der Beschleunigung, Verlangsamung und subjektiven Zeitempfindens (Münster/Hamburg/Berlin 2006) 235-265. (available online: http://www.matrei.ruso.at/dokumente/04_zeit_moebius.pdf)
Sven Externbrink, "Que l'homme est cruel et méchant!" Wahrnehmung von Krieg und Gewalt durch französische Offiziere im Siebenjährigen Krieg. In: Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft 18 (2005) 44-57.
Marian Füssel, Das Undarstellbare darstellen. Das Bild der Schlacht im 18. Jahrhundert am Beispiel Zorndorf (1758). In: Birgit Emich, Gabriela Signori (Hg.), Kriegs/Bilder in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit (Zeitschrift für historische Forschung Beiheft 42, Berlin 2009) 317-349.
Marian Füssel, Der Wert der Dinge. Materielle Kultur in soldatischen Selbstzeugnissen des Siebenjährigen Krieges. In: Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit 13/1 (2009) 104-121. (available online: http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2009/3075/pdf/mgfn13_01.pdf)
Marian Füssel, Die Aasgeier des Schlachtfeldes. Kosaken und Kalmücken als russische Irreguläre während des Siebenjährigen Krieges. In: Stig Förster, Christian Jansen, Günther Kronenbitter (Hg.), Rückkehr der Condottieri? Krieg und Militär zwischem staatlichem Monopol und Privatisierung: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Krieg in der Geschichte 57, Paderborn u.a. 2010) 141-152.
Alexander Balisch, Die Entstehung des Exerzierreglements von 1749. Ein Kapitel der Militärreform von 1748/49. In: Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs 27 (1974) 170-194.
As a whole: Bd. 3 of the "Schriften des heeresgeschichtlichen Museums in Wien": Maria Theresia. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Heerwesens ihrer Zeit (Graz/Wien/Köln 1967).
Johannes Kunisch, Der kleine Krieg. Studien zum Heerwesen des Absolutismus (Wiesbaden 1973).
Marcus von Salisch, Treue Deserteure. Das kursächsische Militär und der Siebenjährige Krieg (Mlitärgeschichtliche Studien 41, München 2009). (very good for the Saxon/Polish army and the Prina "campaign"!)
Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession (New York 1993).
verschiedene Beiträge in: Wolfgang Adam, Holger Dainat (Hg.), "Krieg ist mein Lied". Der Siebenjährige Krieg in den zeitgenössischen Medien (Schriften des Gleimhauses Halberstadt 5, Göttingen 2007). (from a military perspective especially the article by Bernhard Jahn about the converse interpretations of the battle of Lobositz (which was a draw, really *g*).)
For those interested: There are many more articles by Sacha Möbius and Marian Füssel that I haven't read yet. Just take a look at the publication lists on their respective homepages.
Quote collectionSpoiler Alert, click show to read:
This is a collection of quotes that fit to this mod and will maybe be implemented into the game. I'm especially searching for quotes from the Seven Years War, although I've also added some of the American War of Revolution. I'd be very thankfull if you have some quotes too! I'm not very picky. I list quotes that are in some way interesting for me, either because they tell us something about tactics, because they give us a small glimpse in a soldiers' feelings and everyday life, or because they include some bonmots or heroic deeds. (You could also help me with good english translations)
1) Feldmarschall Daun responding to colonel Thiennes’ offer to let the De-Ligne-Dragoons charge during the battle of Kolín (1757): „Mais vous ne ferez pas grand cause avec vos blanc-becs!“
Thiennes: “Blanc-becs, montrez que vous savez mordre sans avoir de barbe, montrez que pour mordre il ne faut que les dents et pas de barbe!”
“But you won’t achieve much with your greenhorns ("without beards")!” Thiennes: “Greenhorns, show how you can bite, even though you have no beards! Show that it just takes teeth to bite, but not beards!”
2) "Nebst dem könnt Ihr gäntzlich versichert seyn, und Ich verpfände Euch Mein Kayserlich Königliches Wort, daß bey einem glücklichen Ausschlag Euer große Verdienste mit allem dank und Gnaden ansehen, hingegen einen unglücklichen Erfolg Euch nimmermehr zur Last legen werden."
(last page of the letter of Maria Theresia to Feldmarschall Daun, ordering him to break the Prussian siege of Prague, Wien, 7. Juni 1757)
"I assure you and give you my word as empress and queen, that in case of success I will hold your services very dear and I will be grateful, however in the case of a defeat I will not blame you."
3) "Avez-vous entendu une semblable cannonade? Pour moi je n’en jamais entendu de pareille!" (Frederick II to General Major Syburg refering to the cannonade at the battle of Torgau 1760)
"Have you ever heard/been in such a cannonade? I haven't!"
4) „Nur einmal schielte ich auf die Seite und sah, daß ein Unteroffizier in meiner Nähe von einer Granate zerrissen wurde, daher ich um so mehr abgeschreckt ward, neugierig zu sein.“
(Lieutenant Christian Wilhelm von Prittwitz /battle of Kolín, 1757)
"Only once did I squint aside, only to see how an NCO close by got torn by a grenade. From that moment on, I didn't dare to be so curious anymore."
5) A quaker-woman to General Knyphausen before the battle of Brandywine Creek 1777: "My dear man, do not go down there, for George Washington is on the other side of the stream, and he has all this world with him."
Knyphausen: "Never mind, Madam. I have all the other world with me."
6) „I hope … that we – (I mean the English) – may be a bit more closely drawn toegether for the attack. For unless we are, I cannot yet reassure myself that infantry with its files four feet apart can capture intrenchments by escalade, or hold its ground against cavalry.”
(Hesse-Kassel Colonel von Donop in a letter to the Prince of Prussia, 2. September 1777, refering to the open order commonly used by the British during the American War of Revolution)
7) "Ich zu meinem Teil hatte die Ehre zu Anfang des Treffens, dass mir nahe über dem Kopfe vorne durch die Spitze des Hutes eine Flintenkugel drang und nicht lange darauf eine zweite durch die große Krempe der linken Hutseite derart, dass mir dieser vom Kopfe fiel. Ich sagte zu denen von Hertzberg, so nicht weit von mir standen: "Meine Herren, soll ich den Hut wieder aufsetzen, den die Kaiserlichen so gerne haben wollen?" "Ja freilich", sagten sie, "der Hut macht dir Ehre."" (Officer Ernst Friedrich Rudolf von Barsewisch during the battle of Hochkirch)
At the beginning of the battle I had the honour to receive a bullet through the front tip of my hat, close to my head, and only shortly afterwards a second one through the left brim of my hat, so that the hat fell off. I asked those of Hertzberg, which were standing close by: "Gentlemen, do you want me to put the hat on again, that (the hat) the Imperials seem to want so much?" "Why of course!", they said, "it/the hat honours you!"
8) "Auf dem Wahlplatz eignete ich mir eine österreichische Grenadier- und eine Husarenmütze zu. Von ersterer brauche ich das Bärefell vor den Bauch, und von dieser das Schaffell zur Nachtmütze." (anonymous Prussian soldier after the battle of Lobositz)
On the battlefield, I took/acquired an austrian grenadier- and husar-cap. I used the bearskin of the former for my belly, and the sheepskin of the latter for a nightcap.
9) "Der König bezahlte jedes Canon, so dem Feinde genommen wurde, 100 Ducaten, vor eine Fahne 12 Ducaten und eine Estandarte 24 Ducaten." (memoires of the royal servant Karl Gans Edler zu Puttlitz, refering to the rewards that Frederick promised before the battle of Leuthen)
The king rewarded every gun taken from the enemy with 100 ducats, an (infantry-) banner (Fahne) with 12 ducats, and a (cavalry-)banner (Estandarte) with 24 ducats.
10) Daun on the issue of making a military career in the habsburg army more attractive for the nobility: "l'honeur et le sang (...) font bien moins (...) le mouvement interieur de l'home que l'interet et la convenniance particulliere qui trespasse sur tout malheureusement che nous."
11) "Whenever the attack proves too serious, they [the American rebels] retreat, and to follow them is of little value. It is impossible on account of the thick woods, to get around them, cutting them off from a pass, or to force them to a fight. Never are they so much to be feared as when retreating. Covered by the woods, the number of enemies with which we have to deal can never be defined. A hundred men approaching may be taken for a corps. The same are attacked, they retreat fighting. We think ourselves victors and follow them; they flee to an ambush, surround us and attack us with a superior number of men and we are the defeated.” Lieutenant Du Roi
12) “A pursuing army is always impeded by the effort that is necessary to maintain its own order; while, whether from terror, for safety, or for rallying, the speed of the fugitive is unrestricted. Hence, cavalry are the military means for rendering disorder irretrievable.” Otho Williams, continental army officer
BannersSpoiler Alert, click show to read:
Additional stuffSpoiler Alert, click show to read:
A collection of the expertises written by the user Didz (needs to be updated!)
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Didz on artillery
Didz on artillery accuracy/trajectories
Didz on artillery ranges and trajectories
Didz on the lethality of artillery
Didz on artillery movement rates
Didz on attack column formations
Didz on column versus line engagements
Didz on artillery reloading speed and british/french/prussian fire drills
Didz on spotting ranges
Didz on austrian/prussian movement speed (pace)
Didz on bataillon movements/formation changes
Didz on fire drills
Didz on campaign/army movement speed 1 &2
Didz on movement rates/cadence and the speed of formation changes
Unit-roster of Austria and Prussia (needs to be updated!)
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
As for the costs: You can see that the costs are set so that players should agree over the amount of points for each battle. I don't want to limit players in any other way.
Schema:
Name (number of models) available for factions (AUstria/PRUssia)
cost
detection range (wood/scrubs/open)
characteristics
HEADQUARTER
General staff (2 men) AU,PRU
cost: 8
detection: 40/230/250 (AU), 40/255/275 (PRU)
INFANTRY
Chasseur company (20 men) PRU
cost: 2
detection: 45/70/80
accurate fire (rifles), detection bonus in difficult terrain, low morale, open order, ammunition: 20
Grenzer (70 men) AU
cost: 4
detection: 45/70/80
accurate fire (muskets), detection bonus in difficult terrain, medium morale, open order, ammunition: 30
Infantry bataillon (140 men) AU, PRU (slightly higher morale than AU)
cost: 4 (AU), 5 (PRU)
detection: 30/70/80
medium morale, ammunition: 60
Converged grenadier bataillon (120 men) AU, PRU (slightly higher morale than AU)
cost: 7 (AU), 8 (PRU)
detection: 30/70/80
high morale, high cohesion, morale shock resistant, ammunition: 60
CAVALRY
Hussar squadron (40 troopers) AU, PRU
cost: 3
detection: 30/85/95
low morale, detection bonus in open terrain
Dragoon squadron (30 troopers) AU, PRU
cost: 4
detection: 30/70/80
medium morale
Cuirassier squadron (30 troopers) AU, PRU
cost: 6
detection: 30/70/80
high morale, high cohesion
ARTILLERY
3pdr regimental gun / "grasshopper" (1 gun model) AU, PRU
cost: 2
Battery of 4 6pdr guns (2 gun models) AU, PRU
cost: 4
Battery of 4 12pdr guns (2 gun model) AU, PRU
cost: 11
Explanation of some “characteristics”
accurate fire (muskets)
higher range, higher accuracy, slower reloading, accuracy less affected by cohesion (a unit can keep up its accuracy even when it keeps firing for a long time, or moves around quickly)
accurate fire (rifles)
like accurate fire for muskets, but with bigger effects in all 4 aspects (range, accuracy, reloading, accuracy-cohesion)
open order
the unit is allowed to go into skirmish formation and can thus enlarge its “zone of fire” significantly, although with decreased fire density; the units’ regular formation might be less dense than that of ordinary infantry; the unit is more flexible (slightly faster movement, faster turning)
high cohesion
the unit can keep up its cohesion better and regains cohesion faster (a low cohesion leads to lower morale and lower accuracy)
Current unit cards
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